Readings on key globalization concepts and major debates - VSIP.INFO (2023)

Readings on Globalization

Globalization An Essential Text George Ritzer This balanced introduction draws on academic and popular science sources to examine major themes and events in the history of globalization. Globalization: A Foundational Text is a comprehensive introductory book that can be used alone or in conjunction with Readings in Globalization. The books are cross-referenced and both are structured around core concepts of globalization. 2009 • 608 pages • 978-1-4051-3271-8 • Paperback




WILEY-BLACKWELL A publication of John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

This edition was first published in 2010. © Editorial Material and Organization © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program was combined with Wiley's global scientific, engineering and medical businesses to form Wiley-Blackwell. Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, P 0 1 9 8SQ, UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, United Kingdom The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, POl 9 8SQ, United Kingdom For details of our worldwide editorial offices, customer service and how to request permission to reuse copyrighted material in this book, visit our website at www.wiley .com/wiley-blackwell. The right of George Ritzer and Zeynep Atalay to be identified as the authors of editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Patents, Designs and Copyrights Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopied, recorded or otherwise, except as permitted under the UK Patents, Designs and Copyrights Act 1988 prior Editor's Consent. Wiley also publishes her books in various electronic formats. Some print content may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks, or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not affiliated with any of the products or vendors mentioned in this book. This publication is intended to provide accurate and authoritative information relating to the subject matter. It is sold on condition that the publisher does not provide professional services. If professional guidance or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress cataloging data is available for this title. PB: 978-1-4051-3273-2 A catalog entry for this book is available at the British Library. Set at 9.5/12pt Minion by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed in USA 1 2010

Introduction to book 1

Introduction to the globalization debate 1

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak? A critique of five key debates in social science literature Mauro F. Guillen

Part I Political Economy 2

Civilizations 2 3

4 5 6

The Clash of Civilizations? Samuel P. Huntington Global Utopias and Civilizations in Conflict: Not Understanding the Present John Gray Can Civilizations Clash? Jack F. Matlock, Jr. The story ends, the worlds collide Chris Brown If not civilizations, what? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World Samuel P. Huntington

Orientalism, colonialism and postcolonialism 7 8 9 10

Orientalism: Introduction Edward W. Said Orientalism and Orientalism in Contrast Sadik Jalal al-'Azm Postcolonialism and Its Dissatisfaction The Orientalism of Ali Rattansi Said: An Important Contribution Today Peter Marcuse

19 21 23

29 34 36 37

43 47 54 57 66







Freedom versus Collectivism in Aid William Easterly The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time Karl Polanyi Freedom is just another word. . . David Harvey

86 101




Structural adjustment 15










146 150




22 23 24

Sociology and the Nation-State in Times of Changing Boundaries Donald N. Levine The Westfailure System Susan Strange Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State Linda Weiss Globalization and the Resilience of State Power Daniel Béland Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization , Sociology and the Challenge of Transnational Studies William I.Robinson

161 166 175






26 27


Structural Adjustment in East and Southeast Asia: Lessons from Latin America Jim Glassman and Pâdraig Carmody The Social Implications of Structural Adjustment: Recent Perceptions and Current Debates Sarah Babb The Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment on Human Rights, 1981-2000 M. Rodwan Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli How International Monetary Fund and World Bank Policies Are Undermining Workers' Power and Rights Vincent Lloyd and Robert Weissman Who Failed in Africa? : I M F-measures or African leadership? Gerhard Scott


nation state



Neoliberalism as an exception, exception to neoliberalism Aihwa Ong

Transnational Practices Leslie Sklair Social Theory and Globalization: The Emergence of a Transnational State William I. Robinson Revisiting the Question of the Transnational State: A Commentary on William Robinson's "Social Theory and Globalization" Philip McMichael



world systems





The System of the Modern World: Theoretical Reprise Immanuel Wallerstein Competitive Conceptions of Globalization Leslie Sklair










33 34 35


228 of


234 240

To die






Towards a sociology of the network society Manuel Castells Depoliticization of globalization: from neo-Marxism to the network society of Manuel Peter Marcuse



World risk society and cosmopolitanism









Network society and informationalism



Empire Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri The Global Coliseum: About Empire Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Interviewed by Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman Reclaiming Empire: Empire and International Relations Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey Africa: The Black Hole in the Middle David Moore D and Neue World Order (Are You Seriously) Stanley Aronowitz Adventures of the Crowd: Answer by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited Ulrich Beck Risk, Globalization and the State: A Critical Appraisal of Ulrich B e c k and the World Risk Society Nacionalismo Craig Calhoun


280 285

McMundo e Jihad




43 44


Jihad vs. McW o r l d Benjamin R. Barber Paris Burns: Jihad vs. R. Barbeiro


301 305


Part II 46






49 50

The world in creolization UlfHannerz Rivers, borders and hybrids: keywords in transnational anthropology UlfHannerz Globalization as hybridization Jan Nederveen Pieterse Glocalization: Time – Space and Homogeneity – Heterogeneity Roland Robertson

Criticism of creolization, hybridity and glocalization 51







Globalization and Culture: Three Paradigms Jan Nederveen Pieterse


Creolization, hybridity and glocalization




Hybridity, so what? The Anti-Hybrid Reaction and the Mysteries of Recognition Jan Nederveen Pieterse The Global, the Local, and the Hybrid: A Vernacular Ethnography of Glocalization Marwan M. Kraidy Globalization and Trinidad's Carnival: Diaspora, Hybridity, and Identity in Global Culture Keith Nurse Mapping the Village “Glocal”: The Political Limits of “Glocalization” William H. Thornton Rethinking Globalization: Glocalization/Globalization and Something/Nothing George Ritzer Dialectic of Something and Nothing: Critical Reflections on Ritzer's Analysis of Globalization Douglas Kellner

324 326 334











An Introduction to McDonaldization George Ritzer



McDonaldization and Global Consumer Culture Malcolm Waters The McDonald's Mosaic: Glocalization and Diversity Bryan S. Turner Transnationalism, Location, and Fast Food in East Asia James L. Watson Global Implications of McDonaldization and Disneyization Alan Bryman


59 60 61

393 396 399




G l o co m o d i n ca tion : How the global consumes the local McDonald's in Israel Uri Ram


world culture





World Culture: Origins and Consequences Frank J. Lechner and John Boli World Norms, Culture, and Politics: Insights from Institutionalism from Sociology Martha Finnemore


Sources and Credits




As the title already suggests, this anthology deals with globalization. We will work with the following definition of globalization: Globalization is a transplanetary process, or set of processes, involving increasing liquidity and increasing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places and information, and the structures they encounter and create, which impede, or accelerate, these flows. 1

Globalization is, of course, a huge subject that cannot be fully covered even in a volume as long as this one. The subtitle of this book makes it clear which aspects of globalization are dealt with here. Our first objective is to introduce the reader to at least some of the most important concepts in the study of globalization. However, this introduction is presented in the context of the debates that revolve around it. Indeed, the entire field of globalization studies is rife with debates of all kinds, and a secondary aim of this anthology is to introduce the reader to at least some of the main issues in the field. These debates are important in themselves, but they also serve to clarify our understanding of globalization. Furthermore, in many cases, the debates also provide at least some examples of the extensions of our knowledge of globalization that result from such debates. Such extensions are important because they make clear that these debates are not just exchanges of different positions, but sometimes lead to advances in our understanding of globalization. All chapters illustrate this fact, but this is especially true where debates over one concept lead to new concepts. Examples of the latter are the debate over neoliberalism, which leads to conceptual extensions such as neoliberalism as an exception, exceptions to neoliberalism, and hierarchical sovereignty (Chapter 4); the glocalization debate leading to the concept of grossization (chapters 13, 14); and the McDonaldization debate that led to the idea of ​​the glocom modification (Chapter 15). Chapter 1 of this volume is unique and differs from others in that it provides an overview of some of the key debates in this field. It forms an introduction to the volume and many of the discussions that follow. The remainder of the volume is divided into two large parts. The first part deals with concepts, debates and extensions of the political economy of globalization. As explained further in the introduction to Part I, this title was chosen because in many cases it is difficult to clearly separate the political and economic aspects of globalization. The term "political economy" is quite old-fashioned; was once synonymous with "economy" and referred specifically to the state economy. However, it is now used more broadly to refer to the relationship between government and business, and is also used here. Some of the concepts discussed in this part (eg nation-state) are more political in nature, while others (eg neoliberalism) are more economically oriented. However, they all deal with the relationship between politics and business to varying degrees. two

In Part II we turn to culture and its relationship to globalization. We hasten to point out, however, that the topics covered in the two parts of the book overlap to some extent and the distinctions made are, at least to some extent, artificial. All topics discussed in Part I are cultural

Introduction to the book

Elements (and this is especially true for themes like Civilizations, Cosmopolitanism, McMundo, and Jihad). Furthermore, all the concepts of culture discussed in Part II certainly have political and economic aspects. For example, world culture encompasses the idea that the world's policies and economies increasingly share cultural similarities. However, all chapters in Part II deal with the question to what extent it is possible to think of a global culture, or whether local culture inevitably retains its own specificity even under the pressure of a globalized culture. While the concepts discussed in this volume are not exhaustive of the main ideas in the study of globalization, they are a good representation of these key ideas. The concepts covered are: Civilizations, Orientalism, Colonialism, Postcolonialism, Neoliberalism, Structural Adjustment, Nation-State, Transnationalism, World Systems, Empire, Network Society and Informationalism, World Risk Society, Cosmopolitanism, McMundo and Jihad, Creolization, Hybridity, Localization, McDonaldization and World Culture. Furthermore, many of the major contributors to our understanding of globalization are represented in debates over these concepts, including Edward Said, Karl Polanyi, David Harvey, Manuel Castells, Samuel Huntington, Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Susan Strange, Linda Weiss , Leslie Sklair, William Robinson, Ulrich Beck, Benjamin Barber, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Ulf Hannerz, Roland Robertson, George Ritzer, Malcolm Waters and James L. Watson. Overall, then, we believe that the inclusion of so many important concepts and the work of so many important contributors to the literature make this a valuable introduction to the field. However, it is important to remember that the work on these concepts by these figures is presented in the highly dynamic context of the debates held around these ideas and thinkers. We believe and hope that this makes this volume not only highly informative, but also a dramatic and interesting introduction to the field of globalization studies.


George Ritzer, Globalization: A Foundational Text. Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. For more information on this definition, see Chapter 1 of this book.


See, for example, David Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to International Political Economy, 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007.

The study of globalization is highly controversial. Indeed, this entire volume is devoted to at least some of the most important conceptual debates in globalization studies. However, there are more fundamental debates surrounding the issue of globalization. This first chapter of the book contains an essay by Mauro F. Guillen that examines five of the most important debates in this field. Although he does not include it in any of his debates, Guillen starts with the much-debated question of what globalization really is. He reviews several definitions and proposes his own definition. He points out that globalization is not just a scientific term, but also an ideology with many meanings. In addition to disagreements over its definition, there is much controversy over exactly when globalization began. Having indeed addressed several debates in his opening remarks, Guillen turns to what he sees as five main debates: •

Is globalization really happening?

Does globalization bring convergence?

Globalization is undermining the authority of the

• •

nation state? Is globality different from modernity? Is a global culture emerging?

Guillen concludes with some reflections on what one of the areas covered in this book - sociology (others include political science, international relations, anthropology, economics, literary theory, geography) - has contributed to our understanding of globalization and its need for further research and interdisciplinary work. About the subject. Some of the debates outlined by Guillen appear later in this book, but the highly controversial nature of globalization is reflected in the fact that there are many other arguments afoot in the field. Many of these appear on the following pages, but they represent only a small part of the large and growing number of debates in globalization studies. While the fact of this exchange does not promise easy answers to the big questions in the field, it does reflect the tremendous dynamism of the field.

Mauro F. Guillen

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak? A critique of five key debates in social science literature Mauro F. Guillen

Introduction Globalization is one of the most controversial topics in the social sciences. Observers and theorists of globalization have variously argued that the rapid increase in cross-border economic, social, technological and cultural exchanges is civilizing, destructive or weak, to use Albert Hirschman's famous metaphors. Harold Levitt's "Globalization of Markets" or Kenichi Ohmae's World Without Borders promise unlimited prosperity and consumerism through globalization, that is, the global as civilization. In stark contrast to this view, historian Paul Kennedy, in Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, warns of our lack of frameworks for dealing with a global world, while political economist Dani Rodrik in Has Globalization Gone Too Far? on increasingly free international economic and financial flows. Like the civilizational view, the destructive interpretation sees globalization as a path to convergence, even though it predicts harmful rather than beneficial outcomes. In contrast to adherents of the civilizing or destructive view of globalization, other scholars, such as Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in Globalization in Question and Robert Wade in Globalization and Its Limits, see it as a weak process that has not yet taken place. the nation-state and other fundamental features of the modern world. In this chapter, I first define globalization and its timing. I then discuss the main contributions of the various social sciences to globalization research, with a focus on sociological perspectives. I organize the discussion and critique around five main debates or questions: Is globalization really happening? Does it bring convergence? Does this undermine the authority of nation-states? Is globality different from modernity? Is a global culture emerging?

What is globalization? Intuitively, globalization is a driven process that leads to increased cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information and culture. Sociologist Anthony Giddens proposes that globalization be seen as a dissociation or "distance" between space and time, while geographer David Harvey and political scientist James Mittelman note that globalization is a "squeezing" of space and time, a reduction of the world. Sociologist Manuel Castells emphasizes the informational aspects of the world economy when he defines it as “an economy capable of functioning as a unit in real time on a planetary scale”. Similarly, sociologist Gary Gereffi writes about global "supply chains," in which production is coordinated globally. Management scientist Stephen Kobrin describes globalization as being driven not by foreign trade and investment but by increasing technological scale and information flows. Political scientist Robert Gilpin defines globalization as “the increasing interdependence of economies in trade, financial and macroeconomic policies”. Sociologist Roland Robertson argues that globalization "refers to both the densification of the world and the heightened awareness of the world as a whole." Sociologist Martin Albrow also defines globalization as the “diffusion of practices, values ​​and technologies that influence people's lives around the world”. I propose to combine the perspectives of Robertson and Albrow and define globalization as a process that leads to greater interdependence and mutual awareness (reflexivity) between economic, political and social entities in the world and between actors in general. However, globalization is also an ideology with multiple meanings and lineages. As Cox noted,

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

it sometimes seems loosely linked to neoliberalism and technocratic solutions to economic development and reform. The term also seems to be associated with cross-border advocacy networks and organizations that defend human rights, the environment, women's rights or world peace. The environmental movement, in particular, has raised the banner of globalism in its fight for a clean planet, as in its slogan “think globally, act locally”. Therefore, globalization is often construed as an impersonal and inescapable force to justify certain policies or behaviors, however laudable some of them may be. In a broader historical sense, Mazlish and Robertson convincingly argue that not only capitalism or advocacy movements, but also Christianity, Islam and Marxism have made global claims and made global claims. Hirsch and Fiss document that the use of the term "globalization" in the press seems to be associated with several ideological references, including "financial market", "economic efficiency", "negative impact" and "culture". The onset of globalization is also contested. It can be argued that globalization begins with the dawn of history. However, the literature tends to date the onset of globalization more recently in Western experience. At one end of the spectrum, historians have noted the importance of the first orbit in 1519-21. World systems theorists argue that the expansion of European capitalism in the 16th century marked the beginning of globalization. Some economic historians point to the turn of the 20th century as the heyday of international trade and investment before the upheavals of World War I and the Great Depression plunged the world into a spiral of protectionism. Robertson argues that globalization began between 1875 and 1925 with "the world's time zone and the establishment of the international date line, the near-universal adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the adjustable seven-day week, and the introduction of international telegraphy and signaling codes. ." Murphy tells the story of international organizations promoting transportation and communication since the 1850s. Students of social movements for the abolition of slavery, women's suffrage or the prohibition of female circumcision argue that the emergence of contemporary transnational advocacy networks can be traced back to the second half of the century XIX.

A third group of scholars begins the analysis of globalization at the end of World War II, with the advent of the nuclear age, the emancipation of colonies, the renewed expansion of trade and investment, and the economic rise of Northeast Asia. There is also justification for telling the story of globalization that began with the collapse of Pax Americana in the early 1970s or the rise of neoliberal ideology in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a more conceptually sound way, Kobrin distinguishes between the trade and investment links of 19th century internationalization and the networking and information links of late 20th century globalization. So there is no consensus whether Magellan and Mercator, James Watt and Captain Cook, Nixon and Kissinger, or Thatcher and Reagan started globalization or, more precisely, the narrative of globalization should begin. Finally, it should be noted that the English term "globalization" was first used in its worldwide meaning around 1960, as opposed to its much older meaning of global as something spherical, total or universal. Definitions and timing aside, one of the persistent problems that plagues the study of globalization is that it is far from being a uniform, irreversible, and unstoppable trend. Rather, globalization is a piecemeal, incomplete, discontinuous, contingent, and in many ways contradictory and puzzling process. Table 1 presents economic, financial, social, political and bibliographical indicators of globalization. Measures are presented for the period 1 9 8 0 - 9 8 not because globalization started in 1980, but because of data limitations. Foreign direct investment (excluding portfolio investment) as a percentage of GDP is 2.5 times higher today than it was twenty years ago - and almost four times higher in developing countries. Trade also grew, though not as fast as foreign investment. Financial globalization has been the fastest growing: the volume of exchange relative to world GDP increased tenfold between 1979 and 1997, and both cross-border bank credit and assets more than doubled relative to world GDP. Some key indicators of cross-border social exchange are also growing rapidly, including tourism and international phone calls (see Table 1). International migration, although increasing, has not reached significant levels in relation to the world population. Also contrary to the trend of globalization is the growing number

Mauro F. Guillen

of nation states - of 157 members of the United Nations

Number of international organizations have more than

1980 to 184 to 1998. And more ethnic groups than

triplicate. Among the international interest groups, which

always seem to reaffirm their identity and yearning


to establish their own state - Palestinians and Kurds,

Esperanto, women's rights and world peace

Basques and Catalans, Scots and Welsh, Tibetans and

grew faster. And the internet crossed

Kashmiris, Corsicans and Quebecers. meanwhile the

Border exchanges in the 1990s, although less than


human rights, the


Table 1 Indicators of Globalization, 1980-1998 Indicators A.







Developed countries, % GDP







Developing countries, % GDP

4.3 —






































Industrialized countries, % GDP







Developing countries, % GDP































Domestic stock of direct foreign investment.


% PIB mundial

Gross value added of foreign subsidiaries.


% World GDP Subsidiary Foreign Exports, % Total World Exports Exports + Imports of Goods. % Worldwide No Services B D P Developed countries. % of developing countries of non-services GDP, % of exports of non-services GDP + imports of goods and services. % world GDP

B. Finance Daily FX turnover. % world GDP

Portfolio of cross-border bank loans. % world GDP



Cross-border banking assets. % world GDP




C. Social and Political International Tourist Arrivals. % World population Stock of international migrants. % World population


International Calls, Minutes Per Million $ Worldwide B D P

. .

















Internet hosts count (thousands)


nation states with participation in


the international organizations of the United Nations, N u m b r




Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

table 1


Indicators D







Literature on globalization, annual entries:


sociological summaries












COUNTRY (Political and International





















relations) Historical summaries Anthropological literature Books printed to

Data refer to 1979, 1984, 1989, 1995 and 1998.



Data refer to 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1995.



International calls via mobile phones or private networks are excluded.


Data refer to 1986, 1991, 1996 and 1997.


Articles or books with the words "global" or "globalization" in the title, keyword, or abstract.





Sources: World Investment Report; International Trade Statistics Yearbook; United Nations Statistical Yearbook; Baldwin, R.E., Martin, P. (1999). Two waves of globalization: superficial similarities, fundamental differences. NBER job. pap. Ser 6904. Cambridge, MA: Natl. Bur Econ. reserve; Tschögl, A.E. (1998). Sources of international competitiveness of countries and banks: the case of the foreign exchange market. To work. Pap., W h a rton School, Univ. Pennsylvania; Vernon, R. (1998). In the Eye of the Hurricane: The Difficult Prospects for Multinational Corporations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press; Miguel Centeno, Department of Sociology, Princeton University; Yearbook of International Organizations; Penn Library Databases.

two or three percent of the population in most countries, but the very rich have access to it. It is perhaps ironic to note that the fastest increase among the indicators included in Table 1 does not relate to globalization itself, but to the literature on globalization. As Figure 1 shows, the number of articles on globalization published in the economic, sociological, and political literature has exploded. The number of books on globalization has also increased significantly. Historical and anthropological literature, on the other hand, is lagging behind. Among the social sciences, sociology was the first to deal with globalization. Sociological journals began to publish a large number of articles on globalization in the early to mid-1970s, largely driven by world systems theory. Some authors have tried to summarize the literature and several anthologies have been compiled. Perhaps the most confusing feature of literature is not its size, but its size.

remarkable range of contributing authors, from postmodern scholars or social theorists who rarely, if ever, engage in empirical research, to empiricists, policymakers, and business consultants.

Five Key Debates The five key debates I identify in this chapter are not an exhaustive list of issues in the vast and rich literature on globalization. However, they capture a wide range of social, political, and cultural issues of interest to sociologists and other social scientists. [. . .] It should not be assumed that those who are on the same side of the fence on one issue actually agree on other issues, or that they are approaching the issue from exactly the same perspective.

M a u r o F. Guillen

Is this really happening? Most of the books and articles discussed in this chapter simply assume that the world is becoming more global, that is, more connected. Countless policymakers, publicists and academics assume that globalization is really happening, without backing up their claims with any data. Economist and politician Robert Reich, for example, proclaims that "national economies" are disappearing and companies no longer have nationality; only humans do. However, there are many skeptics. Perhaps the best documented argument for the weak argument against globalization comes from Paul

Hirst, an Oxford political scientist with ties to the Labor Party. In a recent book, Hirst and Thompson argue that the globalization trend of the past twenty years has been overrated as a process: it is not without precedent in world history, they say, and foreign investment and trade is concentrated in the so-called triad - Western Europe , North America and Japan. In short, they argue that the economy is becoming more international, but not more global. Political scientist Robert Wade echoes this criticism: the volume of trade is small relative to the size of most economies; Domestic investment is greater than foreign investment; multinational corporations located most of their assets, owners, top management and R&D activities in their home countries;

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

and large parts of the world are unaffected by globalization, namely South and Central Asia and most of Africa. The argument for the weakness of globalization is useful in that it provides an important corrective to views and myths about globalization that assume its inevitability and irreversibility. However, there are two main counter-arguments. With regard to the problem of the heterogeneous distribution of globalization around the world, Castells rightly asserts that the world economy is not meant to encompass the whole earth. Instead, it only covers certain segments of activity in developed and developing countries. The second counter-argument is that proponents of the weak thesis focus almost exclusively on the economic and financial aspects of globalization to the detriment of the political, social and cultural aspects. The literature offers and discusses evidence in support of political and cultural globalization that is generally quite convincing. Furthermore, global warming, the AIDS pandemic and the globalization of media have heightened our awareness of living in an increasingly connected world. In summary, scholars who defend the weakness of globalization have helped to debunk certain myths and assumptions about a process that has often been uncritically confirmed. However, they can be too caught up in a 'monolithic' concept of globalization, ignoring the notion that globality is a web of relationships that create mutual awareness.

Does it bring convergence? A second controversial issue in the literature on globalization concerns its consequences, in terms of the convergence of societies towards a unified pattern of economic, political and even cultural organization. Most famously expressed in modernization theory, the spread of markets and technologies is predicted to cause societies to converge from their pre-industrial past, although complete homogeneity is considered unlikely. This way of thinking was promoted by economists and sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s. Economic historians such as Jeffrey Williamson have documented the convergence of income and labor markets in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Sociologist Daniel Bell has advocated a technological convergence of post-industrial societies.

The world society approach in sociology provides additional support for the convergence thesis. In their summaries of an extensive program of empirical research on the global spread of educational systems and other forms of government activity, John Meyer and his collaborators and students argue that the expansion of rationalized government activity has developed an impetus of its own that is largely unaffected by by transnational differences in political structure or rates of economic growth. Rather, the proliferation of rationalized systems follows "the needs of global social organization, the logic and purpose of which are present in almost all states". The result is that "the world as a whole shows increasing structural similarities of form between societies, but without showing increasing equality of outcomes between societies". Nation-states are seen as converging structural similarities, although there is a "dissociation between purposes and structures, intentions and results". World society researchers argue that conformity stems from both the world's culture of rationalized modernity and indigenous groups seeking "consensus" on formal acceptance of "issues such as civil and human rights, the natural world and its scientific investigation, socioeconomic development and education". They even provide evidence that nationalism and religious fundamentalism "increase isomorphism rather than neutralize it". that "the social and ethical content of the economy may be organized differently in different parts of the world". "no single global story is expected". Sociologist Anthony Giddens adds an interesting twist when he claims that globalization is "a process of uneven development that breaks down when coordinated . . . but consists of opposing trends." In another book, Giddens states: "Globalization must be understood as a dialectical phenomenon in which events at one pole of a distant relationship often give rise to divergent or even opposing events at another." wisely

Mauro F. Guillen

Globalization is as much the product of cultural fragmentation as it is the result of modernist homogeneity, and that "what appears as disorganization and often genuine disorder is no less systemic and systematic". However, these social and political theorists did not bother to empirically test their theses, nor did they bother to seek support in the existing literature. However, there is a considerable body of empirical research that supports the antithesis that globalization produces divergence and diversity, or at least does not harm national policies and institutions. Management scientist John Stopford and political economist Susan Strange document that increasingly complex interactions between multinational corporations and states have led to different outcomes, while Doremus et al. show that there are still differentiated national systems of innovation, trade and investment.

Markets and, in the face of free capital mobility, voluntarily and consciously accepted higher interest rates to maintain domestic capital. Students of varieties of capitalism, mainly political scientists, have long argued that companies and countries follow different paths of integration into the world economy. German, French, Japanese and American companies are competitive in the global economy, but rarely in the same industry and market segment. German companies are characterized by high-value, engineering-intensive industries such as advanced machine tools, luxury cars, and specialty chemicals; French companies in major engineering endeavors such as high-speed trains, satellite launchers or nuclear power; Japanese companies in most manufactured goods categories, such as home appliances, consumer electronics and automobiles; and US software, financial services, or biotechnology companies.

Political scientist Geoffrey Garrett has contributed perhaps the largest and most robust body of empirical evidence, although it relates primarily to the experiences of advanced industrial democracies. He argues and empirically demonstrates that, in the context of a global economy, there are at least two possible paths for national economic and social policy makers: either adherence to neoclassical economics or social democratic corporatism. Garrett's analysis refutes simplistic views of convergence and instead proposes to consider the balance between left-right political power and labor market institutions as the two key variables in a contingent analysis of economic performance. The best macroeconomic performance occurs when the two variables are aligned. For example, redistributive and interventionist policies combined with strong labor market institutions result in macroeconomic performance in terms of growth and unemployment that equals or even exceeds the achievements of laissez-faire policies combined with weak labor market institutions. He concludes that there are "lasting differences between countries" in economic policies and engagement in the global economy. In a more comprehensive study, covering over a hundred countries over the period 1985-95, Garrett finds no convergence in government spending patterns as a result of globalization. What has happened in the last decade is that many governments have adopted policies that protect their citizens from the whims of the world.

Comparative organizational sociologists have also presented qualitative and quantitative evidence that, depending on the institutional and social structure of their countries of origin, companies follow different economic methods and adopt different organizational forms, even as globalization increases. Additionally, they collected data on emerging markets along with more advanced ones. Orrii et al. make a series of systematic comparisons between East Asian and Western European countries, showing that unique national organizational patterns not only persist over time, but also contribute to the international competitiveness of companies. Guillen presents systematic case studies and quantitative evidence showing that companies and unions in Argentina, South Korea, and Spain diverged in their patterns of behavior, organizational form, and growth, even as their home countries became more integrated into the global economy during the era. post-World. World War II period. Taken together, the empirical evidence provided by sociologists and political scientists well supports the case for diversity, or at least resilience, in cross-border patterns amidst globalization. It must be admitted, however, that world society researchers also have a point, and one that is well supported by empirical evidence. The reason for these seemingly irreconcilable empirical results may be that world society research has taken measurements at levels of analysis and abstraction that are higher than the most refined.

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

Analysis by comparative sociologists and political scientists. Note that some sociologists reject the very terms of the convergence debate, arguing that globalization homogenizes without destroying the local and the particular. Viviana Zelizer argues that "the economy [...] is culturally different and multiplies in a similar way to other areas of social life, without losing national and even international links". Thus, globalization is not seen as an exclusion or contradiction to diversity. Like Zelizer, Robertson sees the global as the "connection of localities". Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the convergence debate has to do with the impact of globalization on inequality between and within countries. The evidence clearly shows that there is more inequality between countries today than there was ten, twenty, fifty or even a hundred years ago. Surprisingly, the gap in per capita income between rich and developing countries increased fivefold between 1870 and 1990. However, there are several notable developing countries that have managed to close half or more of the gap since 1960, for example South Korea , Taiwan and Ireland. However, since 1980, very few developing countries have consistently grown faster than more advanced ones. Therefore, the level of development of countries does not seem to align due to globalization. In contrast to cross-border inequality, it is unclear whether the increase in foreign trade and investment over the last twenty years has resulted in significantly greater wage inequality or unemployment within countries. Wage inequality has increased in most advanced countries over the last three decades. In a review essay, Kapstein presents several counterarguments to the claim that globalization has been the main cause of increasing wage polarization, including that trade represents too small a percentage of GDP to have a large impact and that technological change it is the ultimate cause of wage inequality. polarization Wages is polarization. Consistent with Kapstein's reading of the evidence, Baldwin and Martin summarize the empirical literature as follows: “Virtually all studies find that trade has some impact on the labor market in both the US and Europe. However, the range of results is wide. Some feel that trade accounts for virtually no part of the wage gap, while others attribute 100% of the gap to trade.

maybe 10-20 percent." Unlike wage inequality, overall indicators of income inequality within countries have not increased over the last thirty years, and there is evidence that poverty rates are falling as countries grow economically and enter the world economy. The impact of globalization on wage and income inequality within countries must take into account that while foreign trade and investment are powerful forces, domestic policies and processes still play an important role in their patterns of growth. While this may be seen as a welcome aspect, it is important to remember that the rise of globalization has, over time, been accompanied by a widening of income disparities between countries, that is, at least in part. inequality within countries is due to increased foreign trade and investment.

Does this undermine the authority of nation-states? A third central issue surrounding the theme of globalization is whether this process overcame the governance structures of the international state system and undermined the authority of the nation-state. Economist Raymond Vernon, for example, has long argued that the proliferation of multinational corporations creates "destructive political tensions" and that there is a need to "redress the balance" between political and economic institutions. Historian Paul Kennedy argues that governments are losing control and that globalization is undermining the position of the working class and developing countries and deteriorating the environment. "Today's global society," he writes, "faces the challenge of reconciling technological change and economic integration with traditional political structures, national consciousness, social needs, institutional arrangements, and habits." Likewise, Kobrin argues that globalization both challenges state autonomy, or independent decision-making, and "raises questions about the meaning of sovereignty in its external sense of a system ordered in terms of mutually exclusive territoriality". And Mazlish argues that global history is an attempt to "transcend the nation-state as the focus of history."

Mauro F. Guillen

Yoshikazu Sakamoto, an international relations specialist, and Robert Cox, a political scientist, agree that globalization creates problems in international governance and reduces the regulatory power of states. For Rodrik, globalization creates social and political tensions within and between nation-states. And political theorist Michael Mosher asks, "Is there a successful way to reconcile the cross-border character of markets with the border-preserving activities of nation-states?" He goes on to argue that globalization has put two liberal practices – market liberalism and democratic citizenship liberalism – on a collision course, raising the dilemma of whether “moral concerns end at the national border”. Sociologists also joined the chorus of opponents of the state. For Waters, there is a "weakening of the State", an increase in international organizations and a trend towards "more fluid" international relations. McMichael also sees a state decline. For Albrow, “The nation-state has failed to confine sociability to its limits, both territorial and categorical. The simple increase in transnational ties, the diversification of personal relationships and the multiplication of forms of social organization demonstrate the autogenous nature of the social and reveal the nation-state as just another form limited by time. globalization is undermining the state because the associated neoliberal ideology is anti-state and not because globalization is intrinsically anti-state He further argues that the state could come back if there is a "return of the ideological pendulum" or a transformation of the state and new elements of state-society synergy. British political economist Susan Strange's analysis is perhaps the most sophisticated articulation of the position that the international system of nation-states, and the nation-state itself, are under attack in a global world. she writes of "the waning authority of the states" and anticipates some possible points of criticism. First, she notes that state interventionism is on the rise, albeit on relatively marginal issues. Second, she argues that there are more states in the world, especially after 1989, but most of the new ones are weak and lack control. Third, she points out that the effectiveness of the East Asian state in orchestrating economic growth was only possible in China.

a post-World War II order in which internal market protectionism was acceptable and mature technologies were available. She also notes three power shifts in the global world, namely from weak to strong states, from states to markets, and from labor markets to financial markets, with some power evaporating or dissolving. Not surprisingly, those who argue that globalization is a fragile process also argue that it can be easily managed by nation-states. For example, Hirst and Thompson and Wade argue that states can deal with globalization even if they have lost some room for manoeuvre, particularly with regard to financial flows. However, weak proponents don't just challenge the notion that globalization is undermining the nation-state. Macrosociology has long held that the global arena is a "playground" for states to compete for economic, military, and political dominance and survival. Therefore, far from threatening states, the world system or international arena actually encourages them. Neorealist international relations expert Robert Gilpin points out that globalization increases the importance of domestic politics as countries engage in regionalization, sectoral protectionism, and mercantilist competition in response to changes in the international location of economic activity, leading increasingly to a “mixed system”. fragmented at the same time. A related, though distinct, argument against the supposed loss of government power in the wake of globalization comes from the political scientist Leo Panitch. He rightly argues that "today's globalization is being written by states and is primarily about reorganizing rather than circumventing them". Moreover, as Cox observes, “Power did not move away from the state, but within the state, i. H. from industry or labor ministries to business ministries and central banks”. And sociologist Sean O'Riain sees states not as passive pawns, but rather as "adaptation, whether by necessity or desire." Another influential social scientist, Saskia Sassen, argues that the state is not becoming less important. Instead, there is a redefinition of the modern characteristics of sovereignty and territoriality, a "denationalization of state territory". Cox argues that globalization transforms the state, not reduces it. Stopford and Strange examine new opportunities for government action in the global economy and conclude that its role has indeed become greater.

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

Complex. According to most political scientists, the nation-state is alive and well, and the Westphalian order is unlikely to be replaced by a fragmented medieval one. A key effect of globalization, however, has been the emergence of global cities – New York, London, Miami, Singapore – whose role and importance transcend the nation-state in which they currently reside. Finally, the world society view also rejects the claim that globalization is undermining nation-states. Meyer and others. write that "globalization certainly presents new problems for states, but it also reinforces the principle of world culture that nation-states are the main actors charged with identifying and managing these problems on behalf of their societies". are surprisingly similar. Scholars of world society, the modern nation-state, conclude, "it may have less autonomy than it used to, but it clearly has more to do". The question of whether globalization is undermining the authority of the nation-state is best addressed by examining the impact of globalization on the viability of the welfare state. Rodrik argues that globalization is putting pressure on government spending on redistribution and welfare, and that the interplay between commercial risk and openness requires more social spending, but governments are struggling to find the money, an argument that Vernon finds compelling. Stryker sums up his assessment of the evidence by saying that globalization imposes limits on expansionary policy, represents a loss of power for the working class, and is leading to the dismantling of the welfare state. According to these social scientists, the challenge is "to create a new balance between market and society that continues to unleash the creative energies of private entrepreneurship without eroding the social foundation of collaboration." These arguments have become common wisdom among neoliberal politicians and journalists. Since the early 1980s, gloomy, often unfounded predictions about the inability of Europe's welfare states to pay for generous social benefits have become commonplace. However, other political scientists and sociologists see things very differently. Political scientist Paul Pierson argues that the welfare state has declined not so much as a result of globalization, but because of it.

indirect measures by conservative governments, such as cuts to the state's revenue base and attacks on interest groups, particularly workers. This is an argument supported by Fligstein and Gilpin. Garrett empirically demonstrates the viability of social democratic corporatism even with increased exposure to globalization in the form of cross-border trade and capital mobility. It also proves that it is possible to win elections with redistributive and interventionist policies and that a better economic performance in terms of GDP growth and unemployment is achieved, but with higher inflation than in laissez-faire countries (USA, Great Britain). Garrett concludes that "good governance is consistent with strong macroeconomic performance" and that markets do not dominate policy. In a direct rebuttal of Rodrik, Garrett analyzes data from over 100 countries over the period 1985-1995 to find that increasing exposure to globalization does not reduce government spending. Political scientist Evelyne Huber and sociologist John Stephens agree with Garrett's conclusion that the welfare state is compatible with global capitalism, while acknowledging that social democratic policies are more constrained today than they were in so-called " golden era" of the 1950s and 1960s. For Garrett, Huber and Stephens and for Fligstein, the welfare state is perfectly viable under the conditions of globalization. Furthermore, it may be able to create social welfare and enhance national competitiveness at the same time. In doing so, they reject the compromise that neoliberals see between social spending and economic competitiveness under the conditions of globalization. However, despite these authors' excellent and well-documented research, the debate in the media and among politicians around the world remains heavily skewed in favor of those who blame the welfare state for declining competitiveness and various social ills.

Is globality different from modernity? Perhaps the most difficult debate about globalization is whether it is just a continuation of the modern trend or the beginning of a new era. On one side of the fence, Giddens argues that "modernity inherently globalizes" and that "globalization blurs the modes of connection between different social contexts or regions

Mauro F. Guillen

across the surface of the earth." This view follows directly from the concept of the "uprooting" or "exaltation" of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their temporal and spatial restructuring", which Giddens sees as a prerequisite for modernization. World social science is on Giddens' side on this point: Globalization leads to a worldwide "sharing" of modernity. On the other side of the fence, British social theorist Martin Albrow argues that globalization is a "transformation, not a culmination" and the "movement into a new era, not the culmination of the old." He proposes a strict distinction between modernity as the "imposition of practical rationality on the rest of the world by the agency of the state and the mechanism of the market, the generation of universal ideas to embrace the world's diversity", and globality as he put it "restores immensity of culture and promotes the infinite renewability and diversification of cultural expression rather than homogenization or hybridization". Other well-known social theorists of globalization also make the same distinction, particularly when it comes to the modern nation-state: "Identity politics replaces nation-building politics." The debate about the relationship between modernity and globality is central to sociologists. If globalism is just the result of intensifying modernization trends, then the recent increase in the number of books and articles on the subject can hardly be justified. However, there is a central theoretical argument for the view that globality is distinct from modernity. Like Mercator's distorted projection, modernity is an outgrowth of the Western worldview. For reasons of theoretical consistency, the terms "globalization", "global" and "globality" should be reserved to denote processes, qualities and conditions that are not triggered or governed by any model, paradigm or any model or worldview paradigm . In its broadest sense, globality concerns a multiplicity of concepts, not a cultural or paradigmatic hegemony; it is the dissemination of cross-border network links of an economic, political, social and cultural nature. This critique is particularly true for writers who see globalization as an inevitable and inclusive process – particularly neoliberals and Marxists – as Fligstein aptly pointed out.

Finally, Kobrin proposed a distinction between late 20th century globalization and the earlier period of economic expansion in the modern world that is empirically useful. Nineteenth-century international economics "connects separate and mutually exclusive geographic national markets through cross-border trade and investment flows". In contrast, the late 20th century global economy is driven by the increasing scale of technology, increased international business collaboration along the value chain, and cross-border integration of information flows. Therefore, globalization has “substantial importance” because this time “national markets have merged transnationally and are not connected across borders”.

Is a global culture emerging? Perhaps the most popular and controversial debate about globalization has to do with the emergence of a global culture. Indeed, few scholars claim that a global culture is emerging. The idea goes back to Marshall McLuhan's slippery concept of the "global village", later adopted by some influential marketing researchers who argued that the world was increasingly populated by cosmopolitan consumers. Sociologist Leslie Sklair writes that a "cultural ideology of consumption" - fueled by symbols, images and the aesthetics of lifestyle and self-image - has spread across the world and is having some major effects, including the standardization of taste and consumer desires. taste and even the fall of the Soviet order. However, other sociologists argue against the homogenizing effect of mass consumption. Zelizer writes that consumer differentiation should not be confused with segregation and posits that in the US economy differentiation is combined with connection: "The same consumer product can have universal and local importance at the same time." Zelizer challenges sociologists to distinguish between the phenomenon of global diffusion and the experience of the receiving end, which despite increasing globalization seems to be becoming increasingly diverse. Similarly, anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argues that “individuals and groups seek to integrate the global into their own modernist practices” and that “mass media consumption around the world

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

provokes resistance, irony, selectivity and more generally freedom of choice. "Using cross-country attitudinal data from 1981 to 1998, Inglehart and Baker find that national cultures and values ​​change over time, albeit in a 'path-dependent' rather than a convergent way that 'reluctantly shy away from a global culture à la McLuhan, while describing world culture as linking society and individuals "through rationalized systems of (imperfectly) egalitarian justice and participatory representation in economics, politics, culture and social interaction", explain the emergence of cross-border interest groups, although the "global governance" of important aspects of cross-border communications has increased since 1850. Political and social theorists and historians have the emergence of what modernists would call "particularist" identities as observed evidence against the emergence of a global culture. Cox writes about globalization producing a “resurgent assertion of identities”, while Waters contrasts a “cultural and religious mosaic” of global cultural production and consumption of music, images and information. Noting that "ethnic sentiments are a strong bond," Mazlish asks skeptically, "What counterpart can there be on a global scale?" Political scientist Deborah Yashar, who rejects the concepts of "global culture" and "global citizenship", criticizes, but also the argument that globalization has led to the spread of ethnic movements. In his comparison of indigenous movements in Latin America, Yashar makes clear that no aspect of globalization – economic, political, social or normative – can explain the rise of ethnic activism since the 1960s. of state structures that activists face when making their demands. Cross-border migration creates an extraordinarily rich laboratory for assessing the emergence of a global culture. Sociologist Alejandro Portes proposes the term “transnational communities” to refer to cross-border networks of immigrants who are “neither here nor there”, but in both places at the same time. However, different transnational communities have different origins, characteristics and problems and certainly do not constitute a monolithic global class of cosmopolitan citizens.

Similar to Portes, Friedman accepts the basic notion of cultural fragmentation proposed by Appadurai, Smith and Zelizer, but argues that the existence of tribal societies in the contemporary world cannot be adequately understood without explaining how they are embedded in global networks. For him, cultural diversity must be seen in a global context. Some of the most convincing arguments against the idea of ​​the emergence of a global culture come from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. He notes that the world is becoming “at once more global and more divided, more completely interconnected and at the same time more intricately compartmentalized [...] , but rather something like the reappearance of family divisions, intractable arguments, constant threats, the notion that whatever happens, the order of difference must somehow be maintained. Like Geertz, sociologist Anthony Smith is skeptical and notes an interesting “initial problem” with the notion of “global culture”: “Can we speak of ‘culture’ in the singular? If by 'culture' we mean a collective way of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, styles, values ​​and symbols, then we can only speak of cultures, never just culture, because a collective way of life [...] postulates different modes and repertoires in a universe of modes and repertoires ahead. the idea of ​​a 'global culture' is a practical impossibility except in interplanetary terms.” The final question about the supposed emergence of a global culture has to do with the emergence of a global language. The spread of Esperanto has certainly fallen short of initial expectations, and the argument that "English is the world's language" seems far-fetched and unjustifiable. As Mazlish notes, English "is becoming something of a lingua franca, [but] there are serious limitations to using English as the everyday language of a global culture." Furthermore, English is being challenged as the dominant language in parts of the United States and the United Kingdom. Even on the Internet, less than 50 percent of the world's users speak English as a first language, and that proportion is steadily decreasing as the new medium spreads globally. It is also instructive to remember that the most successful world language of all time, Latin, after spreading in its various vulgarizations, turned into a mosaic of Romance languages.

Mauro F. Guillen

It forms throughout the territory of the Roman Empire. Smith notes that what we are witnessing is not the emergence of a "global" culture held together by the English language, but rather the emergence of "cultural domains" - not necessarily in contradiction or conflict with each other, as Huntington would say. Thus, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, French, Kiswahili and Chinese have become the common languages ​​of certain groups, communities or strata of the population in countries located in certain regions of the world, namely Latin America, CIS, World Arabic, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa or Southeast Asia.

Towards a comparative sociology of globalization The social science literature on globalization contains important theoretical and empirical differences. Scholars have given very different responses to the five main debates discussed in this chapter. However, opinions seem to be divided. Most research assumes or documents that globalization occurs, and most empirical studies – with the notable exception of the world society approach – find no convergence of political, social, or organizational patterns as a result of globalization. The most compelling empirical work to date suggests that globalization per se does not harm the nation state, nor does it harm the viability of the welfare state. Some empirical evidence also shows that globality is different from modernity. After all, there doesn't seem to be a global culture emerging. Compared to the other social sciences, sociology has contributed to the globalization debate in three important ways. First, social theorists have developed an understanding of the nature and historical implications of globalization. While there is no consensus on whether or not globalization is a continuation of modernity, there is nascent work that outlines in detail the main theoretical perspectives and issues. In addition, sociologists have drawn attention to the cultural, reflexive, and aesthetic aspects of globalization in addition to its economic and political dimensions. Second, world social scientists have developed a sound-based macrophenomenological approach to globalization and the nation-state.

institutional theoretical basis, and they supported their view with systematic empirical evidence from around the world. Third, comparative sociologists have theories about the impact of globalization on differences and similarities between countries. They also provided empirical evidence in the form of rich case studies and quantitative analyses. However, sociologists should continue to read the important contributions that economic historians, management scientists, political scientists and anthropologists make to the theoretical and empirical study of a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as globalization. The analysis and critique presented in this chapter show that globalization is far from a weak phenomenon, but it is changing the nature of the world. However, it is neither an exclusively civilizing nor a destructive force. Although more empirical investigation is needed, there is already enough evidence to reject either extreme. Globalization is neither a monolithic nor inevitable phenomenon. Its impact varies across countries, sectors of society and over time. It is contradictory, discontinuous, even arbitrary. Therefore, one should be open to its unexpected and unintended consequences. One must also consider the role that agency, interest, and resistance play in design. As Pieterse has pointed out, globalization does not necessarily represent a choice between condemnation and celebration, but it begs to be engaged, embraced and shaped. The complexity of globalization certainly invites further research. More theoretical work is urgently needed to clarify the economic, political, cultural and aesthetic dimensions of globalization and their interactions. We also lack theoretical perspectives that fill the micro-macro gap, i.e. H. moving through the levels of analysis from the world system to nation-state, industry, sector, community, organization, and group. Much of the empirical disagreement in the literature is mainly due to the different levels of analysis at which different researchers operate. To understand globalization, we need to collect more and better data about its many manifestations, causes and effects. We still know very little about what exactly causes it and what impact it has on key sociological variables such as organizational patterns, authority structures and the social environment.

Is globalization civilizing, destructive or weak?

Inequality and social movements, to name a few. And sociologists need to work hard with government agencies and other data collection organizations to pay more attention to relationships at different levels of aggregation in their surveys and censuses. In view of recent efforts to understand globalization and the complexity of the phenomenon, it makes sense not only to heighten our interdisciplinary awareness, but also to appeal for a comparative approach to the sociology of globalization. Comparison is at the heart of the sociological enterprise.

We need to do two-way comparative work, using multiple methods of data collection and analysis and applying our theoretical and empirical tools to a variety of research settings defined at different levels of analysis. The differences and similarities between these environments should give us an overview of the patterns in which the causes and effects of globalization change from one environment to another. Without a comparative approach, the literature on globalization promises to remain as enigmatic and contradictory as the phenomenon itself.





Orientalism, colonialism and postcolonialism






Structural Adjustment



nation state






world systems






Network society and informationalism



World risk society and cosmopolitanism



M c W o r l d e Jihad


political economy


His first part of the book assumes that the politician and the

Economic aspects of globalization can and often are separated for analytical reasons

For purposes it makes sense to group them here under the policy heading

economy of globalization. As we will see, many appear to be political in the global context.

Problems have economic effects, and vice versa. We start with civilizations; These are primarily cultural in nature, but all civilizations also have political and economic dimensions. Next, we consider a set of interrelated ideas – orientalism, colonialism and postcolonialism – all with dimensions and implications (as well as others, particularly cultural ones) that are both political and economic. The strongly interrelated ideas of neoliberalism and structural adjustment are usually thought of in economic terms, but all also have implications for the state and politics in general. The nation-state is obviously political, but in many ways it is dominated by economic considerations, if not subordinated to economic interests (e.g., in Marxist theory, the state is part of the “superstructure” that is part of the economic “base”). Transnationalism encompasses a number of dimensions that unite politics and economics, including transnational corporations, the transnational capitalist class, the cultural ideology of consumption, and the transnational state. World systems involve the economic exploitation of the periphery by the center, but political entities are central to the world system. Empire is a new kind of postmodern global system that certainly involves the economic exploitation of the multitude. It is not centered on the nation-state, but is politically controlled by a decentralized constitutional system. The network society involves new global relationships based on informationalism, and this applies to both economic and political organizations and entities. The global risk society is a society in which risks emanate from and affect both economics and politics. Cosmopolitanism involves a broad perspective that is not limited to the nation-state and its particular political and economic interests. McMundo and the associated idea of ​​jihad pose a threat to democratic systems, and therefore implicitly to successful economic systems, since democracy and capitalism tend to be associated.

One of the most controversial theories developed in the post-Cold War era can be found in Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (1993). The central idea is that civilizations, the larger cultural units, shape patterns of cohesion, dissolution and conflict in the post-Cold War international system. Huntington identifies several major world civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. He explains: “In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations.” The former intra-civilizational clashes of political ideas such as liberalism, socialism, anarchism, corporatism, communism, conservatism, Marxism, social democracy and nationalism are being replaced by inter-civilizational clashes of culture and religion. In the new international order, culturally similar societies tend to work together, countries tend to cluster around the "heart" of civilizations, and relations between civilizations will not be close and will eventually lead to conflict, at least between some of them. Huntington's thesis has been widely criticized for its conceptualization of "civilization"; for failing to distinguish between religion, culture, and civilization; for ignoring the integrative processes of capitalism, globalization and modernization; for lack of attention 1

on the importance of nation-states and nationalism; and its lack of scientific validity. As it is impossible to present all the criticisms of Huntington's thesis in this part, we present three representative examples in this chapter. Gray points out that Huntington's description of seven or eight civilizations is inaccurate; this civilizing scheme cannot take into account certain cases. For example, while Jewish culture is linked to Western civilization, Greek culture is not. Gray also identifies another major flaw in the civilization thesis by showing that wars are not fought between civilizations. On the contrary, the history of conflicts in the 20th century shows that there were multiple conflicts, confrontations and wars within the same civilization, as well as alliances between different civilizations. Gray argues that, contrary to Huntington's assumption that cultures cause major divisions in international relations, culture itself is not such a powerful factor. Differing cultural traditions rarely lead to major conflicts between states. It is their interactions with resource scarcity, rival territorial claims and conflicting trade agendas that make cultural differences a source of wars. Therefore, the whole idea of ​​civilizational conflict is a "distorting lens" that prevents us from fully understanding "economic rivalries" and "military conflicts". two


In addition to the problem of the concept of civilization, Gray also criticizes the neglect of globalization and modernization as integrating processes in the civilization thesis. Gray argues that there is a significant link between culture and political economy, as the global economic interdependence of world markets requires constant interaction between cultures. Critics also highlight the political climate in which the civilization thesis was advanced (the end of the Cold War) and its political implications. It is argued that when the Cold War political taxonomy became obsolete, the civilization thesis provided a convenient political ideology that served, among other things, to hold the Atlantic alliance together despite the decline of the communist threat. This has to do with Huntington's identification not only with the Atlantic Alliance, but specifically with its protagonist, the United States. As a result, he offers a distinctly American perspective on the world's civilizations. According to Gray, Huntington's perspective is "an attempt to theoretically frame American thinking about foreign policy in a context where the enduring ideological enmities of the Cold War have faded". 3

Matlock agrees with Gray's critique of Huntington's thesis, arguing that the notion that civilizations are mutually exclusive is misleading. He notes that it is difficult to accept the view that every civilization is somehow pure and harmonious when there are countless examples of conflict, clashes and war within the same civilization. Matlock also criticizes Huntington for endowing civilizations with a reality they lack. He explains that "civilization" is merely a convenient intellectual construct used to define the boundaries of a field or subject of study. In other words, "civilization" is more of an intellectual construct than an objective reality. Matlock focuses specifically on 4

On the difference between culture and civilization. He argues that Huntington confuses culture with civilization and groups cultures into broader civilizations, and this serves to obscure the specifics of cultural differences and similarities. Similarly, Brown challenges Huntington's assumption that civilizations are independent, impermeable territories. Brown argues that cultures are dynamic living organisms that are constantly interpenetrating each other. Brown also argues that physical "fault lines" between civilizations are not predetermined and eternal, as Huntington suggests, but rather man-made and relatively recent in origin. No perspective on globalization has received more attention and criticism than the clash of civilizations paradigm. Some see it as the fundamental perspective on the state of globalization in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Others see it as completely wrong and even offensive. However, even its most ardent critics would recognize that it is an extremely useful perspective, if only because attacks on it serve to shed light on so much about contemporary globalization. Much has been said about the clash of civilizations critique, but let's close with some thoughts from Huntington himself. Starting from a perspective based on Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, Huntington argues that what he has presented is a paradigm or model of global relations. As such, it's not enough to criticize his paradigm; it is up to the critics to develop an alternative paradigm, one that better explains today's global realities than their model. In this sense, it can be argued that while critics have violated the clash of civilizations paradigm, they have yet to produce a better one. The challenge for Huntington's critics, indeed for all researchers of globalization, is to develop such a paradigm.




The clash of cultures.

Nova York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, 29.2

John Gray, "Global Utopias and Clash Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present." International Affairs 74, 1, 1998: 159.


Ibidem, 157.


Jack F. Matlock, "Can Civilizations Collide?" Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143, 3, 1999:439.

The Clash of Civilizations?

Or clash of cultures? Samuel P. Huntington

The next pattern of conflict

My hypothesis is that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The main divisions between humanity and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the main conflicts in world politics are between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of cultures will dominate world politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.


The Nature of Civilizations During the Cold War, the world was divided into First, Second, and Third Worlds. These subdivisions are no longer relevant. It makes much more sense today to group countries not by their political or economic system or level of economic development, but by their culture and civilization. What do we mean when we talk about a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups all have different cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both share a common Italian culture that sets them apart from German villages. European communities, in turn, share cultural traits that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. However, Arabs, Chinese and Westerners are not part of a larger cultural entity. They build civilizations.

A civilization is therefore both the highest cultural grouping of human beings and the broadest level of cultural identity that human beings have, beyond what distinguishes them from other species. It is defined both by shared objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by people's subjective self-identification. People have different levels of identity: an inhabitant of Rome can define himself as Roman, Italian, Catholic, Christian, European, Western with varying degrees of intensity. The civilization to which you belong is the broadest level of identification with which you strongly identify. Humans can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. Civilizations can involve a large number of people, as in China (“a civilization pretending to be a state”, as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, as in the English-speaking Caribbean. A civilization can have several nation-states, as is the case in the Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or just one, as in the case of the Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously intermingle and overlap and can include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two main varieties, European and North American, and Islam has its Arabic, Turkish and Malay subdivisions. However, civilizations are significant entities, and although the boundaries between them are rarely sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they go up and down; they split and merge. And as any student of history knows, civilizations fade and are buried in the sands of time. Westerners tend to see nation-states as the main actors in global affairs. But they've only been like that for a few centuries. The broadest areas of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the world today.

Samuel P. Huntington

Why Civilizations Collide The identity of civilizations will become increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped to a large extent by the interactions between seven or eight great civilizations. This includes Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African civilizations. The greatest conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural divides that separate these civilizations. Why will this be the case? First, the differences between civilizations are not just real; they are basic. Civilizations differ from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and above all by religion. People of different civilizations have different views of the relationships between God and man, individual and group, citizen and state, parent and child, husband and wife, and different views of the relative importance of rights and duties, freedom and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They won't go away anytime soon. They are far more fundamental than the differences between political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences between civilizations have produced the most prolonged and violent conflicts. Second, the world is getting smaller. Interactions between people of different civilizations are increasing; These increasing interactions heighten the consciousness of civilization and the awareness of differences between civilizations and of similarities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among the French, while increasing susceptibility to the immigration of "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react much more negatively to Japanese investment than they do to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Likewise, Donald Horowitz has pointed out: “An Igbo may […] be an Igbo owerri or an Igbo onitsha in ancient eastern Nigeria. In Lagos he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is Nigerian. In New York he is African.” Interactions between peoples of different civilizations increase people's awareness of civilization, which in turn is refreshing.

Differences and animosities that run, or are believed to run, deep into the story. Third, processes of economic modernization and social change around the world are dislodging people from long-held local identities. They also weaken the nation-state as a source of identity. In much of the world, religion has stepped in to fill this void, often in the form of movements labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism and Islam. In most countries and most religions, those active in fundamentalist movements are middle-class, college-educated young technicians, academics, and businesspeople. The "desecularization of the world," observed George Weigel, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The rebirth of religion, “la revanche de Dieu”, as Gilles Kepel called it, provides a basis for identity and engagement that transcends national borders and unites civilizations. Fourth, the West's dual role encourages the growth of civilizational consciousness. On the one hand, the West is at the height of its power. Simultaneously, however, and perhaps as a consequence, a back-to-basics phenomenon is taking place among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly, one hears references to trends of internalization and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of Nehru's legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western notions of socialism and nationalism and with it a "re-Islamization". ” of the Middle East. East, and now a debate about Westernization versus Russification in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the height of its power confronts non-Westerns who increasingly have the desire, will and resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. In the past, elites in non-Western societies tended to be the most engaged with the West, educated at Oxford, Sorbonne or Sandhurst and adopting Western attitudes and values. At the same time, populations in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is taking place in many non-Western countries, while at the same time Western, particularly American, cultures, styles and habits are becoming more popular with the masses.

The Clash of Civilizations?

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less fluid and therefore less easy to reconcile and resolve than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor can become rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azerbaijanis cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the central question was: "Which side are you on?" and people could choose and switch sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" This is a fact that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to Sudan, getting the answer to this question wrong can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion sharply and uniquely discriminates against people. A person can be half French and half Arab and even a citizen of two countries at the same time. It's harder to be half Catholic and half Muslim. Finally, economic regionalism is on the rise. Between 1980 and 1989, the intraregional share of total trade increased from 51 to 59% in Europe, from 33 to 37% in East Asia, and from 32 to 36% in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to increase further in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will strengthen civilization's consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism can only succeed if it is rooted in a common civilization.

[...] When people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an “us” versus “them” relationship that exists between them and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union brings traditional ethnic identities and animosities to the fore. Cultural and religious differences create differences on policy issues ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and the environment. Geographical proximity results in conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most importantly, the West's efforts to promote its values ​​of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military supremacy, and to advance its economic interests provoke a reaction from other civilizations. Less and less able to mobilize support and form coalitions

Ideologically, governments and groups will increasingly seek to mobilize support by appealing to shared religious and civilizational identities. Thus, the clash of civilizations occurs on two levels. At the micro level, neighboring groups along the dividing lines between civilizations often struggle violently for control of territory and each other. At the macro level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle for control of international and third-party institutions, and compete to promote their particular political and religious values.

Fault Lines Between Civilizations Fault lines between civilizations are replacing Cold War political and ideological boundaries as focal points for crises and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain. While Europe's ideological divide has disappeared, Europe's cultural divide between Western Christianity on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other has reappeared. [...] The conflict along the dividing line between Western and Islamic civilization lasts 1,300 years. [..-] This secular military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to abate. It can get more virulent. [...] Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The main beneficiaries of these openings were the Islamic movements. In short, in the Arab world, Western democracy is strengthening anti-Western political forces. This may be a temporary phenomenon, but it certainly complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West. These relationships are also complicated by demographics. Spectacular population growth in Arab countries, especially in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe to downplay internal borders heightened political sensitivity to this development. In Italy, France and Germany

Samuel P. Huntington

Racism is becoming more overt, political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants has intensified and spread since the 1990s. On both sides, the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations . [...]

Historically, the other major antagonistic interaction of Arab-Islamic civilization was with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples of the south. In the past, this antagonism was embodied in the image of Arab slave traders and black slaves. This was reflected in the ongoing civil war in Sudan between Arabs and blacks, fighting in Chad between Libyan-backed insurgents and the government, tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa and political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians. in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to increase the likelihood of violence along this dividing line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993, in which he denounced the actions of the Islamic government in Sudan against the existing Christian minority there. On Islam's northern frontier, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the massacre in Bosnia and Sarajevo, simmering violence between Serbs and Albanians, tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, violence between Ossetians and Ingush , the ruthless mutual slaughter by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the strained relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revitalization of ethnic identities and stokes Russian fears about the security of its southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between Slavic and Turkic peoples on its borders, dating back to the founding of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the millennia-old confrontation of the Slavs with their neighbors to the east lies the key to understanding not only Russian history, but also the Russian character. To understand Russian reality today, you need to have an idea of ​​\u200b\u200bit

the large Turkic ethnic group that occupied Russians over the centuries. The clash of civilizations is profound in other parts of Asia. The historic conflict between Muslims and Hindus on the subcontinent now manifests itself not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India, but also in the intensifying religious conflict within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's sizable Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya Mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the question of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu state. In East Asia, China has open territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. He has pursued a ruthless policy towards the Buddhist people of Tibet and is adopting an increasingly ruthless policy towards the Turkish Muslim minority. With the end of the Cold War, underlying differences between China and the United States in areas such as human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation were reaffirmed. These differences are unlikely to diminish. A "new cold war" is under way between China and America, claimed Deng Xaioping in 1991. The same phrase was applied to the increasingly difficult relationship between Japan and the United States. Here, cultural differences exacerbate economic conflicts. People on both sides allege racism on the other side, but at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes and patterns of behavior in the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic problems between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not carry the same political significance and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are much smaller than the intermediaries. American Civilization and Japanese Civilization. Interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they can be marked by violence. Economic competition clearly prevails between the American and Western European subcivilizations, and between both and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflicts, embodied in extreme cases in "ethnic cleansing", was not entirely accidental. It was more common and violent among groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia, the great

The clash of cultures?

the historical rifts between civilizations are once again in flames. This is especially true along the borders of the crescent-shaped block of Islamic states, from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders. [...]

West vs. the Rest The West is now at an extraordinary level of power relative to other civilizations. Your superpowered opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflicts between Western states are unthinkable, and Western military might is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West does not face any economic challenges. It dominates international political and security institutions and, with Japan, international economic institutions. Global political and security affairs are effectively governed by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic affairs by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which have extraordinarily close ties to each other, except for minor matters. and mainly non-Western countries. Decisions made in the UN Security Council or the International Monetary Fund that reflect Western interests are presented to the world as reflecting the wishes of the world community. The phrase "the world community" has become a euphemistic catchphrase (replacing "the free world") for giving global legitimacy to actions that reflect the interests of the United States and other Western powers. Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations whatever economic policies it deems appropriate. [•-.] The West uses international institutions, military might, and economic resources to govern the world in ways that maintain Western supremacy, protect Western interests, and promote Western political and economic values. At least that is how non-Westerners see the new world, and there is significant truth to their view. power differences and struggles

for military, economic, and institutional power is therefore a source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Cultural differences, ie core values ​​and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that is "suitable for all men". Indeed, on a superficial level, much of Western culture has permeated the rest of the world. At a more fundamental level, however, Western concepts fundamentally differ from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, freedom, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state often find little support from Islamists, Confucians, Japanese, Hindus, Buddhists, or Orthodox. cultures. Western efforts to spread such ideas, by contrast, generate a backlash against "human rights imperialism" and an affirmation of indigenous values, as seen in the younger generation's support of religious fundamentalism in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there can be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea that is in direct contradiction to the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values ​​in different societies concluded that "the values ​​that matter most in the West matter least globally." In the political sphere, of course, these differences are most evident in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to persuade other peoples to adopt Western ideas of democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it developed in non-Western societies, it was usually the product of Western colonialism or imposition. The lynchpin of world politics in the future is likely to be, in the words of Kishore Mahbubani, the conflict between "the West and the rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. These responses usually take one or a combination of three forms. On the one hand, non-Western states such as Burma and North Korea may pursue a course of isolation, protecting their societies from Western intrusion or "corruption" and virtually resisting participation in the Western-dominated world community. However, the cost of this course is high, and few states have it.

Samuel P. Huntington

pursued him exclusively. A second alternative, equivalent to "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to try to align with the West and accept its values ​​and institutions. The third alternative is to try to "balance" the West against the West through the development of economic and military power and cooperation with other non-Western societies, while preserving indigenous values ​​and institutions; in short, modernize but not westernize. [...]

Implications for the West This article does not argue that civilizational identities will replace all other identities, that nation-states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict or even fight among themselves. yes. This article hypothesizes that differences between civilizations are real and important; the consciousness of civilization increases; Conflicts between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; International relations, historically a game within Western civilization, is becoming increasingly de-Western and a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not just objects; Successful international political, security, and economic institutions develop within civilizations, not between civilizations; Conflicts between groups from different civilizations will be more frequent, sustained, and violent than conflicts between groups from the same civilization; Violent conflicts between groups from different civilizations are the most likely and dangerous source of escalation that can lead to global wars; the most important axis of world politics will be relations between "the West and the rest"; elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases will face major obstacles; A central focus of conflict will soon be between the West and various Confucian-Islamic states. This is not advocating the desirability of conflict between civilizations. The aim is to make descriptive hypotheses about what the future will be like. However, if these are plausible hypotheses, their implications for Western policy need to be considered. That

Impacts should be split between short-term benefits and long-term adjustments. In the short term, it is clearly in the West's interest to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, in particular between its European and North American components; Westernizing Eastern European and Latin American societies whose cultures are close to those of the West; promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; prevent the escalation of local conflicts between civilizations into major wars between civilizations; limit the expansion of military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; explore differences and conflicts between Confucian and Islamic states; supporting groups in other civilizations sympathetic to Western values ​​and interests; strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimize Western interests and values, and promote the participation of non-Western states in these institutions. In the longer term, other measures would be necessary. Western civilization is western and modern. Non-Western civilizations tried to become modern without becoming Western. So far, only Japan has been fully successful in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to pursue the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of modernity. They will also try to balance this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Its economic and military strength vis-à-vis the West will increase. Therefore, the West will increasingly have to accommodate those non-Western modern civilizations whose power is converging with that of the West, but whose values ​​and interests are very different from those of the West. This requires the West to retain the necessary economic and military power to protect its interests against these civilizations. However, it will also require the West to develop a deeper understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions that underlie other civilizations and how people in those civilizations view their interests. This will require an effort to identify similarities between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but a world of diverse civilizations, each of which must learn to coexist with the other.

G l o b a l U t o p i a s und Clash Civilizations

Global Utopias and Civilizations in Conflict: Not Understanding the Present John Gray

Huntington strongly criticizes this view. He correctly observes that the individualistic values ​​embodied in the Western understanding of liberal democracy do not find universal acceptance. They express the ethical life of some western societies. They are not relevant to all cultures. Foreign policy that assumes an eventual global consensus on liberal values ​​will be ineffective. This is a scathing critique of Fukuyama's neo-Wilsonian certainty that Western values ​​are universal; but in asserting that the dividing lines between civilizations are the source of war, Huntington misunderstands the present as severely as Fukuyama did. As a result, he misdiagnoses both the potential for tragedy and the opportunities for collaboration that our current circumstances contain.

The familiar logic of territories and alliances often forces members of the same "civilization" into enmity and members of different "civilizations" into common cause. In the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran sided with Christian Armenia, not Islamic Azerbaijan. The kaleidoscope of shifting alliances in the Balkans tells a similar story. Again, some of the crucial conflicts of this century have been 'intra-civilizational in nature'. The Iran-Iraq War and the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi took place within what Huntington understands as separate civilizations. World War I is commonly, and not without reason, referred to as the European Civil War. The Korean War and the Vietnam War were conflicts between states, all based on "Western" ideologies. Huntington's typology of civilizations does not correspond to the history of 20th-century conflict. Furthermore, it is an imprecise, even arbitrary, taxonomy. What justifies the honorable designation "civilization"? Huntington seems to think that the world today contains between six and nine civilizations - Sinic (Chinese), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Buddhist, Orthodox, African and, of course, Western. But he's not completely convinced by this list. It raises some doubts about where Latin America should be placed; after some hesitation, he includes the Jews in a kind of appendix to "Western Civilization", concluding that Greece is not part of it. If one looks up the criteria that Huntington implicitly uses to identify a civilization, one will soon discover that it is an artifact of American multiculturalism: for Huntington, a community or culture counts as a civilization when it establishes itself as an American minority. Otherwise it doesn't work.

Today, as in the past, wars are generally fought between (and within) nationalities and ethnic groups, not between different civilizations. Whether or not directed by agents of sovereign states, the old,

The narrow domestic perspective that informs much of Huntington's analysis provides a clue to its historical provenance. It is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework for American thinking on foreign policy.


Why Wars Are Not Conflicts Between Civilizations Samuel Huntington's thesis on the clash of civilizations is a necessary corrective to a powerful recent trend in thinking about the international system. American foreign policy has long held that the pursuit of peace goes hand in hand with promoting human rights and supporting democratic institutions. More recently, a similar view has been adopted by several other Western governments. Never more than one strand in a country's foreign policy, it is often marginalized by other practically immediate considerations. But as an influence on thinking about international relations, it is probably stronger today than at any other time.

Johannes Grau

in a context where the enduring ideological enmities of the Cold War have disappeared. Unfortunately, Huntington's vision tells us more about contemporary American anxieties than it does about the late modern world. Huntington's catchphrase, "Western civilization," is a well-known refrain in curriculum debates at American universities. It has few points of contact with the world beyond American shores, where "Western" supremacy and even the idea of ​​"the West" become anachronisms. "The peoples of the West," Huntington warned, "must stand together, or they will surely remain apart." This trumpet call assumes that Western civilization - "the peoples of the West" - can be identified easily and without problems. But the well-known polarities of East and West never had a fixed or simple meaning. During the Cold War, “the East” meant the Soviet bloc, animated by a distinctly “Western” ideology; Immediately after the Cold War, in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, it referred to an older divide between Eastern and Western Christianity; it is now used by Huntington and others to chart the United States' relationship with China and parts of the Arab world. When Huntington speaks of "Western civilization," he is not invoking a large family of cultural traditions spanning centuries or millennia. It evokes a Cold War construct with few points of influence in the world forming around us. Huntington rightly rejects the worldview propagated by Fukuyama, in which modernization and westernization are the same thing. In many parts of the world, where countries are modernizing by absorbing new technologies into their native cultures, these are divergent developments. For some countries today, westernizing their economies and cultures would mean a step back from late modernity: not modernization, but a departure from modernity. The global free market project currently being promoted by many transnational organizations aims to reshape the economic life of each society to conform to the practices of a single type of capitalism - the Anglo-Saxon free market. But different types of capitalism reflect different cultures. There is no reason to think that they will converge. Both

Critics of capitalism and its supporters in Western countries take it for granted that capitalist economies everywhere produce or express individualistic values. This assumption was reasonable, since developed market economies were limited to parts of Western Europe, North America and the Antipodes. But the connection she postulated was a historical coincidence, not a universal law. East Asian capitalisms are not the product of individualistic cultures, and there is no reason to believe that they will ever produce such cultures. Different family relationship patterns and different religious traditions are not facets of private life, like tastes in ethnic cuisines, without consequences for economic behavior. They produce radically different market economies. As global markets grow, the world is not unified by a single economic civilization. It becomes more plural. The increasing intensity of global competition is often noted; Less recognized is the fact that, as competition between different cultures increases, the comparative economic advantages of their family structures and religious traditions become more important. It is unlikely that the advantage in this competition always resides in strongly individualistic cultures. What are the economic costs of individualistic family life forms in which marriage is valued as a vehicle for self-fulfillment? How does the cultural understanding of childhood as a tax-free stage of life, very pronounced in some western countries, affect educational success? These cultural differences will be central to the economic rivalries of the next century. Unlike Huntington, however, this does not mean that the world can be divided into static, well-defined civilizations. The emergence of genuine world markets in many areas of economic life makes continuous interaction between cultures an irreversible global condition. What is new in our current situation is the global expansion of industrial production and the consequent end of the global hegemony of all western states. Conflicts between sovereign states over territory, religion and commercial advantages are not new. We must hope that wise policies can prevent a repeat of the Great Game in which the world powers of Central Asia and the Caucasus competed for geostrategic advantages. But these are great power rivalries for control of oil, not cultural differences between peoples.

G l o b a l U t o p i a s und Clash Civilizations

inhabit the eight nations of this region, which probably represent the most enduring threat to the peace of their peoples. Neither economic rivalries nor military conflicts can be understood through the distorted lens of civilizational conflict. Talk of clashing civilizations is wholly inappropriate in an age when cultures - not least the extended family of peoples Huntington vaguely calls "the West" - are in flux. To the extent that such discourses shape the thinking of policymakers, they risk turning cultural differences into what they rarely were in the past – causes of war.

International Relations and Moral Conflicts Cultural differences can make it difficult to resolve international conflicts. They can make liberal democratic institutions, as we know them in Western countries, unattainable or even undesirable. This is one of the reasons why I share Huntington's skepticism about a foreign policy that aims to make liberal values ​​universal. But the biggest obstacle to such a foreign policy does not reside in the obvious fact of cultural diversity. It comes from the uncomfortable truth that even humanly universal values ​​can be rivals in practice. Here I leave aside the suggestion that all human values ​​are purely cultural constructions. This once-fashionable doctrine of cultural relativism doesn't seem worth considering. It may be true that some goods of central importance in Western societies do not have universal value. This does not mean that all human goods and evils are culturally variable. Personal autonomy, the authorship of one's life through one's choices, is an urgent and pervasive demand in late modern Western cultures. At the same time, I'm not convinced that it's a necessary attribute of the good life for people. Most people who have ever lived a good life have done so without getting much out of it. While a wide range of personal choices is one of the necessary ingredients for individual well-being, it is never the only ingredient. The value of the available options is also important. Nor am I convinced that personal autonomy is generally more valued in more modern societies. This seems to be the case in Great Britain, but it is a

Mistakes in making us the model for modernization everywhere. Perhaps, with the multiplication of economic and other risks in late modern societies, people are more willing to trade parts of their autonomy if they can gain more security in doing so. Certainly such compromises sometimes increase the “net” value that autonomous choice has for people. In other cases, there is a true conflict of values, where some autonomy is given up in favor of another good. Compulsory saving for pensions can increase the overall lifetime value of personal autonomy; However, whoever proposes to restrict the freedom of divorce, for example because this could promote the stability of family life, must recognize that the personal autonomy of the spouses is curtailed in favor of the well-being of the child. Every human value has its price in other values ​​with which it may come into conflict. Those who, like me, think that the good of man is not singular but plural, that many human values ​​are not one, will hardly be convinced that this conflict must always be resolved in favor of autonomy. Liberal political philosophies that treat personal autonomy as a universal and overarching value are, or should be, controversial. The value of personal autonomy may well be a cultural construct, not something grounded in our common human nature. But precisely because there is a common human nature, it cannot be said that all our values ​​are cultural constructions. Consider the greatest evils to which humans are prone. Violent death is an evil everywhere. Likewise, premature death from malnutrition. Slavery, torture and genocide inflict injuries on their victims that block their chance at a decent life. The damage to human well-being caused by these evils does not vary appreciably across cultures. One of the central problems of ethical theory with regard to international relations is to determine which values ​​are truly universal and which belong only to particular ways of life. Liberal values ​​owe their influence on contemporary opinion in part to the fact that some of its laws – for example, those prohibiting torture, slavery and genocide – are plausible components of a universal morality. However, it is a dangerous fallacy to identify the universal content of morality with the imperatives of recent Western liberal thought. the hard question

John Gray

it is the universal and the local in the morality of liberal regimes. This cannot be profitably discussed in the jargon of an incoherent debate about "relativism". Cultural differences in political values ​​do not create the most serious ethical dilemmas found in international relations. The most difficult question in the ethics of international relations is how to resolve conflicts between good and evil, which are undeniably universal. This is a subject that has been unduly neglected, in part because of the resurgence of New Wilsonian ideas that try to deny its practical importance. Those who argue that the foreign policies of liberal states should prioritize the promotion of democratic institutions around the world not only claim that liberal democracy has universal authority; They also claim that advancing democratic government promotes international stability. We are often reminded that liberal democracies rarely go to war with each other. As a natural, albeit weak, conclusion from this fact, we are encouraged to believe that a world composed only of liberal democratic regimes will be a world of perpetual peace. From this perspective, the promotion of democracy can never conflict with the pursuit of peace, except perhaps in the short term. I don't think I made a caricature of this conventional view. He marks a real correlation when he observes that wars sometimes arise from the internal needs of tyrannies. Its fundamental flaw is that the links it asserts between peace and democracy are far from immutable. In the real world, these two values ​​are sometimes rivals. Nor are these conflicts so rare or so insignificant in their consequences that they only serve to illustrate a borderline case. Imagine a state in which populations of different nationalities and religious ancestry are kept together under a dictatorial regime. Imagine that, for whatever reason, that regime begins to weaken and demands for democratic institutions become politically irresistible. If the populations of such a dictatorial regime are territorially concentrated, it is reasonable to expect that the advance of democratic institutions will coincide with the fragmentation of the state. We need not delve into the political science literature for an explanation. A functioning democracy requires a high level of trust. When populations are divided by memories of historical enmity, trust is not

easy to set up. When democratic deliberation involves questions of life and death, getting started is difficult. Where secession appears to be a viable option, it is likely to gain support from the population most fearful of rejection on such issues. If such fears prevail, the goal of separatist movements will be to create a state homogeneous enough to allow for trust - and therefore democracy. I am not presenting this abstract scenario as a historical account of the collapse of any state that actually existed. Nothing is inevitable in the process I have described, and in any real historical context a multiplicity of coincidences will play an important, often crucial, role. But without an adequate level of trust, democratic institutions cannot be sustained. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why tyrannies can endure: they are able to salvage trust in ways that democracies cannot. When tyrannical states, which in the past have been able to rely on trust, begin to move towards popular participation in government, they – if they contain geographically concentrated peoples – tend to split. Under fortunate circumstances, these tendencies can develop peacefully. In many contexts, perhaps most, they are at risk of war. This is but an illustration of a truth of some practical importance. While liberal political morality is universal, applying its principles involves addressing fundamental value conflicts. Some of these conflicts are tragic because injustices are committed no matter how they are resolved. Promoting democracy does not always promote political stability. Keeping the peace does not always go hand in hand with promoting human rights. These are not temporary difficulties that we can hope to one day leave behind. They are permanent ethical dilemmas, deeply rooted in conflicts that States will always face and will never be fully resolved. In these cases, liberal values ​​cannot provide definitive guidance. These are not conflicts between morality and expediency, but within morality itself. It is a mistake to think that the most serious ethical conflicts in international relations are conflicts in which the demands of morality collide with considerations of propriety. Such conflicts are undoubtedly recurrent and familiar. But the most difficult dilemmas for sovereign states are not the conflicts between upholding the moral principles to which they are committed and promoting morality.

G l o b a l U t o p i a s und Clash Civilizations

economic interests of its citizens. They are conflicts between the moral principles to which they are committed. In confronting these inevitable ethical conflicts, sovereign states are no different from other moral actors. Liberal political morality contains few solutions to the conflicts it generates. The goods that liberal principles protect are not always compatible. Promoting one usually means sacrificing others. We all know that the best foreign policy can have consequences that involve significant collateral damage. I suggest that sometimes collateral damage is just another name for moral conflicts that cannot be fully resolved. Consider the following examples. There is nothing about freedom of political association that is incompatible with strong government. Some states are lucky enough to enjoy both. At the same time, they are goods that do not always complement each other. Scrupulous adherence to the provisions of its ultra-liberal constitution may have been one of the reasons why the Weimar Republic was short-lived. In this case, a weak democratic state was replaced by a genocidal totalitarian regime. Or consider a case from today's world. China has a long history of recurring state failures. The evils that emanate from anarchy are not hypothetical; they are a common experience for hundreds of millions of Chinese people alive today. Memories of the interwar period and even more of the Cultural Revolution are widespread and vivid. Any regime that avoids the threat of anarchy in China has a powerful source of political legitimacy in that achievement alone. Western opinion leaders, who call for rapid progress towards liberal democracy in China, have not paid much attention to the risks to freedom and security that the failure of the state poses for ordinary Chinese people. But preventing these evils of anarchy is a central feature of liberal political morality, which calls for universal democracy. This is an ethical conflict that has no complete resolution.

Conclusion Enlightenment thinkers who inspired contemporary liberal thought believed that the ethical conflicts arising from the incompatibility of universal goods could be overcome: at some future point in human progress, the species would be relieved of the weight of such tragic dilemmas. This belief in the Enlightenment is an illusion with crippling effects on contemporary thought and politics. The conflicts between universal goods and evils recognized by liberal morality are not symptoms of backwardness that we can hope to one day overcome. They are evergreen and universal. Viewing the world today through the lens of apocalyptic beliefs about the end of history and "the West against the rest" hides these universal and eternal conflicts. It inspires hope that the difficult decisions and uncomfortable compromises that have always been necessary in relations between states will one day be superfluous. There is no rational justification for this hope. A more reasonable goal is that if we understand that some value conflicts are persistent, we will be better able to deal with them. Much is new in our current situation. What they lack is relief from the task of thinking about the difficulties - conflicts of interests and ideals, incompatibilities between the values ​​we hold dear - that traditionally undermine relations between states. For some, this can be a rather depressing result. There's certainly nothing particularly new or original about it; and it contains little to satisfy the laudable need of moral hope. But perhaps these are not quite the shortcomings we commonly imagine. The greatest liberal thinker of our time [Isaiah Berlin] was fond of quoting an observation by the American philosopher C.I. Lewis: “There is no a priori reason to assume that the truth, when discovered, will necessarily prove interesting. Neither, I would add, because I think it will be more comforting.

Jack F. Matlock Jr.

Can civilizations collide? Jack F. Matlock, Jr. [...]

Questionable Points If we examine Huntington's application of the concept of multiple civilizations (as opposed to his discussion of its definition), we find several features that, on closer inspection, appear highly questionable. First, his assumption that there is a high degree of coherence within the civilizations he posits, which permeates the book, despite occasional caveats, is unfounded. The picture of civilizations interacting to the point of conflict is of entities that are sufficiently interconnected to be independent actors on the global stage. But civilizations, even as defined by Huntington, are not. Pitirim Sorokin's critique of Arnold Toynbee's concept is relevant.

broader cultural units", he then assumes, without real evidence, that breadth correlates with intensity of loyalty. Why else do nations with similar cultures tend to cooperate, as he repeatedly claims, while those with different cultures tend to intrude? in conflict? Does the "cultural identity" of the state define its place in world politics? Indeed, within the civilizations that Huntington posits, there are at least as many conflicts as there are between them, and probably more. But even if this were not true, there is no reason to assume that a person's loyalty inevitably extends to what some scholars define as civilization contexts, such as a religious sense of solidarity.

Is Toynbee's assumption valid? I'm afraid not: their "civilizations" are not unified systems, but mere conglomerates of various civilizational objects and phenomena [. . .] connected only by particular proximity, but not by causal or meaningful ties.

Third, Huntington repeatedly observes, without convincing evidence, that cultural differentiation is increasing in today's world. This contradicts most observations about the impact of modernization, industrialization and the communications revolution, all of which are global phenomena. Huntington is certainly right when he argues that modernization should not be synonymous with "westernization" and also that its progress will not erase cultural differences. Let us hope and pray that this will be the case, as cultural differences are not just sources of potential conflict; They are also the spice of life. Many differences are benign, even productive, and the diversity they contribute to individual civilization enriches humanity as a whole.

In practice, Huntington makes the same mistake as Toynbee in assuming that the many disparate elements that make up their "civilizations" form a coherent and interdependent whole. They clearly don't, although there are more causal relationships between the various elements than Sorokin would like to admit. Second, although he repeatedly refers to his civilizations as “the broadest level of cultural identity” or “the

While there is no reason to think that we are falling into a universal culture, it still seems perverse to deny that current trends are creating cross-cultural connections and even uniformities that did not exist before. This applies in particular to important areas of life, such as people's work, their access to information about the world outside their place of residence, and the structure of institutions that shape their economic and social life. Most people really are

By "civilization" Toynbee means not just a "historical field of study" but a unified system or whole whose parts are linked by causal ties. Therefore, as in any causal system in your "civilization", the parts must depend on each other, on the whole, and the whole on its parts. ..]

Can civilizations collide?

they become more alike in some parts of their lives, while maintaining and sometimes emphasizing their differences in others. I was intrigued by many of the claims in Huntington's book, but none confused me more than this one: "Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western their most popular appeals are, and these are usually ethnic, nationalist, and religious." ." I can only imagine how Huntington would characterize electoral competition in the West and where he thinks non-Western countries got the idea of ​​electing political leaders. I can't find it in the Quran or Confucius. Fourthly, Huntington uses these words interchangeably. in practice in many of his discussions, despite his extensive discussion of the difference between a culture and a civilization. This continues to cause confusion, as a conflict triggered or exacerbated by cultural differences may or may not constitute a "civilizational" divide. conflicts in which culture played a role occurred within the civilizations he postulates, and yet we often see one part quoted as if it were the whole, an obvious logical error.Furthermore, the focus on "civilizational" conflict sometimes obscures and masks fully understand the elements of culture that contribute to conflict.Often it is cultural similarity, not difference, that fuels conflict. Cultures that justify the use of violence in discussions with people perceived as somehow different seem to be more likely to resort to violence than those that value accommodation. If two of the first type lived very close together, the likelihood of a conflict would be greater, regardless of whether or not they belonged to different "civilizations". Attributing conflicts a priori to intellectual constructs like "civilizations" can mislead the observer as to the actual causes. [•••]

Cultures, Not "Civilizations" Not only does Huntington's thesis fail to predict the most likely sources of conflict; By grouping cultures into broader civilizations, it obscures what we need to know if we are to understand the implications.

cultural differences and similarities. Francis Fukuyama provides a striking example in his recent book, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Referring to a small-scale industrial boom in central Italy in the 1970s and 1980s, he points to some cultural similarities with Hong Kong and Taiwan: While it may seem absurd to compare Italy to the Confucian culture of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the The nature of social capital is similar in some respects. In parts of Italy and in Chinese cases, family ties tended to be stronger than other types of non-kinship ties, while the strength and number of interstate ties between the state and the individual were relatively small, reflecting a widespread distrust. on people outside. the family. The implications for industrial structure are similar: private sector companies tend to be relatively small and family-owned, while large companies need government support to survive. If we focus only on what Huntington calls "the broader cultural entities," we miss the ability to recognize and analyze specific cultural traits that apply to all civilizations. And yet it is precisely these similarities that help us to predict how quickly particular institutions can spread from one culture to another and what kinds of modifications may result from their transplantation.

Still a useful concept The errors described raise the question of whether the analysis of "civilizations" is of any use. Clearly, if the goal is to understand the behavior of states and nations, understanding the culture of these entities is more important than assuming behavior based on a broader cultural conglomerate. But if we define a "civilization" simply as an object of intellectual investigation, that may be a useful term. As Fernand Braudel said, “A civilization is above all a space, a cultural domain”, and continues: “Whatever the name, there is a distinct French civilization, a German one, an Italian one, an English one, each with its own characteristics and internal contradictions. Examining them all together under the heading of Western Civilization seems too simplistic an approach to me. In fact, the broader the grouping, the more relevant detail is lost, and what is lost can be of greater significance.

Chris Brown

Effect on behavior as common features. However, the scope of the cultural area to be examined is not important. There is nothing inherently wrong with examining "Western Civilization", however defined, for common cultural traits, how they developed and how they are distributed within the area and how they interact with those of other societies. When defining the scope of a study, the definition of a "civilization" can be based on any criteria chosen by the investigator. Braudel, for example, wrote a textbook on the Mediterranean world in the time of Philip II. Never mind that this work merges parts of three civilizations defined by Toynbee or Huntington, as the area had its own coherence based on geography rather than religion or politics. As Braudel put it in his preface to the English translation: “I firmly believe that the Turkish Mediterranean lived and breathed at the same pace as the Christian, that the whole sea shared a common fate, a really difficult fate, with identical problems and general problems tending, if not identical consequences." However, it is a mistake to treat a hypothetical "civilization" as anything other than a convenient intellectual construct used to define the boundaries of a field or subject of study. Even Toynbee, who treats his "civilizations" practically as organisms, observed in his volume of Reconsiderations: "[i]If the use of hypotheses is indispensable, it also harbors at least one imminent danger: 'the habit of treating a mental convenience as if there were an objective thing would be.'" Unfortunately, the Huntington's application of his concept of civilizations is corrupted by this habit.

Any definition of civilization is infinitely more complex than, say, a garden. However, in principle, it is no different to describe it. Every garden is unique, but some have common characteristics that others do not share. Some plants grow well in some soils and poorly, if at all, in others. Some plants can take over when moved to a different environment. Some gardens are strictly geometric; others may resemble wild growth, at least in some places. If the gardener is not careful, the colors of some flowers can clash. Observers can rank the gardens, compare them, discuss whether or not the elements harmonize. Gardens can be described, analyzed and interpreted as civilizations. But one thing is for sure. It would be absurd to speak of a "Clash of Gardens". It is equally absurd to speak of a “clash of civilizations”. If the concept were valid, it would provide a useful shortcut to understanding potential tensions and conflicts in the world. But it is not a shortcut to understanding. Rather, it is a distraction that leads to confusion. If we want to understand where future conflicts are most likely and how best to avoid or contain them, we need to turn our attention to actors on the international stage: states, organized movements, alliances and international institutions. Your culture is relevant, but so are other factors such as geographic location, economic and military strength, and participation in or exclusion from international institutions. We gain nothing by aggregating cultures into larger conglomerates, and we can be seriously misled into assuming that differences necessarily mean hostility. Life and politics are not that simple.

Story Ends, Worlds Collide Chris Brown It's easy to point out holes in Huntington's work, especially in the book version of his argument, which, precisely because it contains so much more detail, is so much more susceptible to criticism - broad generalizations that heap the context of a short film

Items are less tolerable when more space is available. His account of "civilization" is ad hoc and confusing from the start; Civilizations are systems of ideas, and as such it's hard to imagine how they can clash, although individuals and groups who claim to have these ideas certainly can. Furthermore, these systems are

If not civilizations, what?

Ideas are not, and never are, independent or impermeable, a fact that Huntington recognizes but perhaps underestimates its importance. On the other hand, he deserves considerable credit for his attempt to turn the early 1990s into a rather sterile debate about the post-Cold War world. In his response to the critics "If not civilizations, what?" Huntington proposes that the only alternative models for what interests him are the old statist paradigm and an "unrealistic" new vision of a world unified by globalization; this is to be blunt, but there is some justification for this claim. Indeed, Huntington provides a non-state but realistic account of the world that is an interesting addition to the conceptual toolbox of contemporary international relations theory. Part of the problem with Huntington's analysis, however, is that while it is not statist, it remains spatial/territorial. The dominant metaphor in this book is that there are physical "fault lines" between civilizations. There are two problems with this notion; First, the analysis downplays the extent to which major dividing lines are man-made and new - in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the recurrent crises of the 1990s owe more to Milosevic's success in mobilizing political support for the cause. nationalist Greater Serbia than they do many spurious ethnic and religious differences, let alone historical divisions going back to the Middle Ages or earlier. Such differences and divisions certainly exist and always have, but their current political significance is the result of contingency rather than an inevitable process. Second, and more importantly, the "tectonic" notion of civilizations fails to adequately recognize the extent to which civilizations exist.

are already penetrated. The clash of cultures, if it exists at all, will take the form of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition in the world's major cities, rather than violent clashes along so-called "fault lines"; Fortunately, London's policing problems are more characteristic of this policy than ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, although the latter is perhaps frightening. [...] This range of choices gives an idea of ​​what is happening, but overall it obscures more than it illuminates. What is particularly damaging about the way these oppositions are constructed is that they tend to frame the main future issues in terms of a choice between universalism and particularism, with the underlying assumption that the former is the progressive option while the latter, though possibly inevitable, it is regressive and undesirable.

[...] Whether 'civilizations' will clash along specific fault lines depends equally on how the inhabitants of these key areas and their neighbors near and far choose to define themselves or allow political entrepreneurs to define them, and that is a political process, not one that follows a cultural cookbook. In general, the future of globalization will be a product of political practice rather than cultural or economic theory. In short, one way or another, the big questions about the future of the world order discussed in this article will be answered in the coming years, but they won't necessarily be answered on their own terms; the contingencies of political power may have the last word, as so often in the past.

If not civilizations, then what? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World Samuel P. Huntington When people think seriously, they think abstractly; they conjure up simplified images of so-called reality

Concepts, theories, models, paradigms. Without such intellectual constructs, said William James,

Samuel P. Huntington

just "a flourishing mess". Intellectual and scientific progress, as Thomas Kuhn showed in his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, consists in the displacement of a paradigm that has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts by a new paradigm that places these facts in a declaredly satisfactory state. fashion. "To be accepted as a paradigm," wrote Kuhn, "a theory must appear better than its competitors, but it need not, and never does, explain all the facts it may face." For 40 years, international relations students and practitioners have thought and acted within a simplistic but very useful picture of world affairs, the Cold War paradigm. The world was divided into a group of relatively prosperous and mostly democratic societies, led by the United States, engaged in widespread ideological, political, economic and sometimes military conflict with another group of somewhat poorer communist societies, led by the United States. Unity. Much of this conflict took place in the Third World outside these two camps, made up of countries that were often poor, lacking in political stability, newly independent and claiming non-alignment. The Cold War paradigm did not explain everything that was happening in world politics. There were many anomalies, to use Kuhn's term, and at times the paradigm blinded scholars and statesmen to important developments such as the Sino-Soviet split. But, as a simple model of global politics, it was responsible for more important phenomena than any of its rivals; it was an indispensable starting point for thinking about international affairs; it was almost universally accepted; and shaped thinking about world politics for two generations. The dramatic events of the past five years have written this paradigm into intellectual history. There is clearly a need for a new model to help us organize and understand major developments in world politics. What is the best simple map of the post-Cold War world?

A Map of the New World "The Clash of Civilizations?" it is an attempt to portray elements of a post-Cold War paradigm. As with any paradigm, there is much to the paradigm of civilization

inexplicable, and critics will have no problem citing events - even momentous events like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - which they would not have explained and would not have foreseen (though they did foresee the post-March 1991 dissolution of the anti-Iraq coalition). But as Kuhn demonstrates, anomalous events do not distort a paradigm. A paradigm is refuted only by creating an alternative paradigm that explains more crucial facts in equally simple or simpler terms (that is, at a comparable level of intellectual abstraction; a more complex theory can always explain more than a more parsimonious theory). ). The debates that the civilizational paradigm provoked around the world show that it matters to a certain extent; either it matches reality as people see it, or it comes so close that people who don't accept it have to lash out at it. Which groupings of countries will be most important in world affairs and most relevant to understanding and making sense of world politics? Countries no longer belong to the free world, the communist bloc or the third world. Simple divisions of countries into rich and poor, or democratic and non-democratic, may help some, but not much. World politics today is too complex to classify. For the reasons outlined in the original article, civilizations are the natural successors of the three Cold War worlds. At the macro level, world politics is likely to involve conflicts and changes in the balance of power of states from different civilizations, and at the micro level, the most violent, prolonged, and dangerous (due to the possibility of escalation) conflicts are likely to occur. be between States and groups of different civilizations. As the article pointed out, this paradigm of civilization is responsible for many important developments in international relations in recent years, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, wars in their former territories, the rise of religious fundamentalism around the world, the struggles within Russia, Turkey, and Mexico over their identities, the intensity of trade disputes between the United States and Japan, the resistance of Islamic states to Western pressures on Iraq and Libya, efforts by Islamic and Confucian states to acquire weapons nuclear weapons and the means to acquire them, China's continued role as a "foreign" superpower, the consolidation of new democratic regimes

If not civilizations, what?

in some countries and not in others, and the escalation of the arms race in East Asia. [...]

America undone? One function of a paradigm is to emphasize what is important (for example, the potential for escalation in clashes between groups from different civilizations); it is another to put familiar phenomena in a new light. In this sense, the civilizational paradigm may have implications for the United States. Countries like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia that have overcome civilizational failures tend to break up. The unity of the United States has historically rested on the twin foundations of European culture and political democracy. These were the fundamentals of America to which generations of immigrants assimilated. The essence of the American creed was equality for the individual, and historically, immigrants and outcasts invoked and thereby reinvigorated the principles of the creed in their struggles for equal treatment in American society. The most notable and successful effort was the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, however, demand shifted from equal rights for individuals to special rights (affirmative action and similar measures) for blacks and other groups. Such claims go directly against the underlying principles that have been the basis of American political unity; They reject the idea of ​​a "color-blind" society of equal individuals, instead promoting a "color-conscious" society with state-sanctioned privileges for some groups. In a parallel movement, intellectuals and politicians began to promote the ideology of "multiculturalism", insisting on rewriting American political, social and literary history from the perspective of non-European groups. In the extreme, this movement tends to elevate obscure leaders of minority groups to a level of importance equivalent to that of the Founding Fathers. Both demands for special group rights and multiculturalism are fueling a clash of civilizations within the United States and furthering what Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. calls "the disunity of America". The United States is becoming increasingly ethnically and racially diverse. Census Bureau Estimates

that by 2050 the American population will be 23% Hispanic, 16% Black, and 10% Asian American. In the past, the United States has successfully welcomed millions of immigrants from many countries because they assimilated into the dominant European culture and embraced the American creed of freedom, equality, individualism, and democracy. Will this pattern continue to prevail when 50% of the population becomes Hispanic or non-white? Will the new immigrants be assimilated into the hitherto dominant European culture in the United States? If not, when the United States becomes truly multicultural and permeated by an internecine struggle of civilizations, will it survive as a liberal democracy? America's political identity is rooted in the principles articulated in its founding documents. Does the dewesternization of the United States, if it occurs, mean its de-Americanization? When this is the case and Americans stop clinging to their liberal-democratic and European political ideology, the United States as we know it will cease to exist and will follow the other ideologically defined superpower into the ashes of history.

Got a better idea? A civilizational approach explains much and orders much of the "blooming mess" of the post-Cold War world, which is why it has attracted so much attention and provoked so much debate around the world. Can another paradigm do it better? If not civilizations, then what? Reactions to my Foreign Affairs article did not provide a compelling alternative worldview. At best, they proposed a pseudo-alternative and an unrealistic alternative. The pseudo-alternative is a statist paradigm that constructs a totally irrelevant and artificial opposition between states and civilizations: "Civilizations do not control states", says Fouad Ajami, "States control civilizations". But it makes no sense to speak of states and civilizations in terms of "control". States are trying to balance power, of course, but if that were all, Western European countries would have joined forces with the Soviet Union against the United States in the late 1940s. Western European states saw a political crisis and


Samuel P. Huntington

Ideological threat from the East. As my original article argued, civilizations are composed of one or more states, and "nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs." Just as nation-states usually belonged to one of the three worlds during the Cold War, they also belonged to civilizations. With the collapse of the three worlds, nation-states are increasingly defining their identities and interests in terms of civilization, and the peoples and states of Western Europe now see a cultural threat from the South replacing the ideological threat from the East. We do not live in a world of countries characterized by “state loneliness” (to use Ajami's expression) with no connections between them. Our world consists of intersecting clusters of states, brought together to varying degrees by history, culture, religion, language, location, and institutions. At the broadest level, these groupings are civilizations. To deny its existence is to deny the basic realities of human existence. The unrealistic alternative is the world paradigm that a universal civilization exists now or is likely to exist in the next few years. Evidently, humans today and for millennia have shared common features that distinguish them from other species. These characteristics have always been compatible with the existence of very different cultures. The argument that a universal culture or civilization is now emerging takes many forms, none of which stand up to even cursory scrutiny. First, there is the argument that the collapse of Soviet communism means the end of history and the universal victory of liberal democracy around the world. This argument suffers from the fallacy of the single alternative. It is rooted in the Cold War assumption that the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy and that the end of the first produces the universality of the second. Obviously, though, there are many forms of authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism, and market communism (as in China) that are alive and well in the world today. More significant are all the religious alternatives that are outside the ideologically perceived world. In the modern world, religion is a central force, perhaps even the central one, that motivates and mobilizes people. It is sheer arrogance to think that the West dominated the world forever because Soviet communism collapsed.

Second, there is an assumption that increased interaction – more communication and transportation – creates a shared culture. This may be the case. However, wars most often occur between societies with high levels of interaction, and interaction often reinforces existing identities and generates resistance, reaction, and confrontation. Third, modernization and economic development are supposed to have a homogenizing effect, producing a common modern culture much like that of the West in this century. Modern, educated, wealthy and industrialized urban societies clearly share cultural traits that distinguish them from backward, rural, poor and underdeveloped societies. In today's world, most modern societies are western societies. But modernization is not the same as westernization. Japan, Singapore and Saudi Arabia are modern and prosperous societies, but they are clearly not Western. The arrogance of Westerners that other peoples who modernize must become "like us" is a bit of Western arrogance that itself illustrates the clash of civilizations. To argue that Slovenians and Serbs, Arabs and Jews, Hindus and Muslims, Russians and Tajiks, Tamils ​​and Sinhalese, Tibetans and Chinese, Japanese and Americans all belong to a single universal civilization defined by the West is a slap in the face to reality. A universal civilization can only be the product of universal power. Roman power created an almost universal civilization within the limited confines of the ancient world. Western power, in the form of European colonialism in the 19th century and American hegemony in the 20th century, has spread Western culture across much of the world today. European colonialism is over; American hegemony is in decline. The erosion of Western culture continues as indigenous and historically rooted customs, languages, beliefs and institutions reassert themselves. Surprisingly, Ajami cites India as proof of the far-reaching power of Western modernity. "India," he says, "will not become a Hindu state. The legacy of Indian secularism will endure." Perhaps so, but certainly the prevailing trend is moving away from Nehru's vision of a secular, socialist, western parliamentary democracy towards a society shaped by Hindu fundamentalism. In India, Ajami goes on to say, “The upper middle class will defend it [secularism] and keep order intact.

If not civilizations, what?

to assert India's - and her - place in the modern world of nations." Serious? A long story from the New York Times (23) Hindu anger at India's Muslim minority spilled over into India's solid middle-class Hindus - its merchants and accountants, its lawyers and engineers - creating uncertainty about the future ability of adherents of both religions from getting along with one another The Times (August 3, 1993) by an Indian journalist also highlights the role of the middle class: “The most disturbing development is the growing number of senior officials, intellectuals and journalists who have begun to speak the language. of Hindu fundamentalism and protest that religious minorities, particularly Muslims, have pushed them beyond the limits of patience." This author, Khushwant Singh, sadly concludes that while India may maintain a secular facade, India "will no longer be India what we are has been known for the past 47 years" and "the spirit of this will be that of militant Hinduism." In India, as in other societies, fundamentalism is on the rise and is largely a middle-class phenomenon. The decline of Western power will, and is already starting to follow, the decline of Western culture. The rapid growth in economic power of East Asian states, argued Kishore Mahbubani, will lead to increased military power, political influence and cultural assertiveness. A colleague of his wrote this warning regarding human rights: [Efforts to promote human rights in Asia must also take into account the changing distribution of power in the post-Cold War world [...] Western influence in the East and Southeast Asia has become sharply reduced [...] There is much less room for conditionalities and sanctions to enforce compliance with human rights [...] For the first time since the adoption of the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] in 1948, countries have not fully recognized the Judeo-Christian and natural law traditions come first: this unprecedented situation will determine the new international human rights policy. It will also multiply the opportunities for conflict [...] Economic success has led to greater cultural self-awareness. Regardless of their differences, East and Southeast Asian countries are increasingly aware of their own civilizations and tend to localize them.

Sources of their economic success in their own distinctive traditions and institutions. The smug, simplistic, hypocritical tone of much post-Cold War Western commentary and the contemporary triumphalism of Western values ​​irritate East and Southeast Asians. Language is, of course, central to culture, and Ajami and Robert Bartley cite the widespread use of English as proof of the universality of Western culture (although Ajami's fictional example dates back to 1900). However, is the use of English increasing or decreasing relative to other languages? In India, Africa and elsewhere, indigenous languages ​​replaced those of the colonizers. As Ajami and Bartley wrote their comments, Newsweek ran an article titled "English Is No Longer Spoken Here" about Chinese replacing English as Hong Kong's lingua franca. In a parallel development, Serbs now call their language Serbian, not Serbo-Croatian, and write it in the Cyrillic script of their Russian relatives, not the Western script of their Catholic enemies. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan switched from the Cyrillic script of their old Russian masters to the Western script of their Turkish relatives. On the language front, babelization prevails over universalization and further proves the rise of civilizational identity.

Culture is a dream Everywhere you look, the world is at odds with itself. If differences in civilization are not responsible for these conflicts, then what is? Critics of the civilization paradigm have not found a better explanation for what is happening in the world. In contrast, the paradigm of civilization resonates across the world. According to a US ambassador, it is spreading in Asia "like wildfire". In Europe, European Community President Jacques Delors explicitly backed his argument that "future conflicts will be triggered by cultural rather than economic or ideological factors", warning that "the West needs to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying religious and philosophical assumptions to other civilizations and the way other nations see their interests

Samuel P. Huntington

identify what we have in common.” Muslims, for their part, have seen “the shock” as a recognition, and to some extent legitimacy, of the specificity of their own civilization and its independence from the West, and the way people see and experience reality. The story isn't over yet. The world is not one. Civilizations unite and divide humanity. The forces causing clashes between civilizations can only be contained if recognized

different civilizations", as my article concluded, each "must learn to live with the other". Ultimately, what matters to people is not political ideology or economic interest. they will fight and die and therefore the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of world politics, and a civilizational paradigm better than any other alternative offers a useful starting point for understanding and managing conflicting changes in the world.

This chapter deals primarily with one topic, Orientalism, which has its roots in literary theory, but it also allows us to address, at least briefly, a number of other ideas closely related to globalization, including colonialism and postcolonialism. Literary theory, as the name suggests, involves the study, reflection, and theorization of literature. In the case of globalization, the most relevant part of literary theory involves the study of literature that was produced in areas or deals with the experiences of people who lived in areas usually colonized by the great western powers (especially Great Britain). . This literature is generally categorized under the heading Postcolonialism, or “a systematic discourse devoted to the study, analysis, and deconstruction of knowledge structures, ideologies, power relations, and social identities that were authored and authorized by the imperial West in a dominant world. and authoritative representation of the non-West for the past 500 years." 1


Edward Said's Orientalism is "the founding document of postcolonial thought". Although not written with the idea of ​​globalization in mind and written before the current era of globalization, it has powerful implications for contemporary thinking about globalization. Orientalism has several interrelated meanings for Said. First, it is an academic interest area (a discipline) 3

with "Oriental Studies" schools. Therefore, "the Orient was a learned word." Second, it is a "style of thinking based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between 'the East' and (mainly) 'the West'". about the Orient." It was the basis for how European culture "could manage and even produce the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively".




Orientalism was (and still is) a diverse cultural enterprise that included, among others: the imagination itself, all of India and the Levant, biblical texts and biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies, and the long tradition of the colonial administrators. , a considerable corpus of scholars, numerous oriental "experts" and "hands", an oriental professorship, a complex set of "oriental" ideas (Oriental despotism, oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many oriental sects, philosophies and wisdoms tamed to local European use. 8th

Despite this diversity, and although it is much more than just ideas/discourse, Orientalism is above all a set of ideas expressed in a given discourse. Following

Orientalism, colonialism and postcolonialism

Michel Foucault (and Friedrich Nietzsche), Knowledge cannot be separated from power; and it was largely the result of Orientalism that Europe and the West in general were able to exert power over the Orient. To approach Orientalism as an idea/discourse, Said examines a large number of "texts", including not only scientific works on the subject, "but also literary works, political pamphlets, journalistic texts, travel books, religious books and philological studies ". The Orient that emerges from these texts “is less a place than a topos, a set of references, an accumulation of traces that seem to have their origin in a quote or a text fragment or a quote from a work of the Orient or a bit of earlier imagination, or a mixture of all these." The ideas associated with Orientalism are, for the most part, repeatedly reproduced (though not wholly false) fictions, rarely, if ever, based on observation, let alone empirical study. careful 9


Said's fundamental problem with Orientalism, beyond its disastrous impact on labeled Orientals, is that it is an idea marred by prejudice, ignorance, lack of knowledge, stereotypes, standardized views, and fiction. Orientalism reflects the power of the West and has little to do with the reality of life in the East. Negative stereotypes about Orientals abounded and were shaped by Western stereotypes about themselves. Westerners produced biased and limited "texts" about the Orient, and it was these texts, not life as it actually existed in the Orient, that were taken as the basis of the "truth" about the Orient. There are a variety of intellectual problems with Orientalism that stem from its "disregarding, essentializing, stripping away the humanity of another culture". People in the East were not discussed individually or humanistically, but collectively or abstractly. Furthermore, for those in the West who think about it, analyze it, manage it, and try to tame it, the view of the East has remained more or less the same across time and space. It's as if nothing has changed or will ever change in the East. More generally, Said argues, "The West is the spectator, judge, and jury of all facets of Eastern behavior." In the West, knowledge about the East accumulated that often remained unchanged for long periods of time, and this was closely related to the West's accumulation of people and areas of the East. 11


Said reserves his most scathing indictment of Orientalism in relation to Islam. It is characterized by its "backward position in relation to the other humanities (and even the other branches of Orientalism), its general methodological and ideological backwardness, and its relative isolation from developments both in the other humanities and in the real world of historical science. , economic circumstances , social and political." 13

Orientalism was and is a highly influential book, but it has also received a lot of criticism. Sadik Jalal al-'Azm offers some of the most important of these criticisms. First, Said is seen not limiting his analysis to the modern world, but tracing Orientalism back to the ancient Greeks and then up to and including the work of Karl Marx. The problem with this is that, instead of being the product of a particular history, Orientalism tends to become essentialist. That is, Said's work "simply reinforces the essentialist categories 'East' and 'West', which represent the indelible distinction between East and West that Edwards [Said's] book seeks to destroy".

Perhaps a more important criticism is that Said gives too much power to literature and culture in general. He seems to imply that they are the "true source of Western political interest in the East". The West's political and material interests in conquering and controlling the East are downplayed. For example, France and Great Britain were not interested in controlling the Suez Canal because of "Orientalism", but because of the political, military and economic benefits that such control would bring them. As al-'Azm puts it, "If academic Orientalism turns the reality of the Orient into a matter of texts..." 15


Rattansi places Orientalism in the context of postcolonial studies in which it played a central role. On the one hand, postcolonialism refers to a period after the colonial period, that is, after the independence of the colonies from the Western imperial powers. (Colonialism is the creation by a colonial power of an administrative apparatus in a colonized country or geographic area to administer its internal affairs, including its settlements.)

Orientalism, colonialism and postcolonialism

On the other hand, postcolonialism is a “distinct form of theorizing and analysis” that is not limited to this period or these specific places. In this way, Rattansi tries to distinguish between postcolonialism as a form of intellectual inquiry and postcolonialism as historical epochs. The crucial thing about postcolonialism, that is, postcolonial studies, is that it “involves the study of the mutually constitutive roles of the colonizer and the colonized... in shaping... the projects of the West.” “In this context, Rattansi argues that Orientalism can be seen as “the founding text of modern postcolonial studies”.



Rattansi examines some key works of Postcolonial Studies. A first sentence deals with the mutual constitution of identities between the colonizer and the colonized. A second addresses the ambivalence surrounding the relationship between colonizer and colonized and the resistance that arises, at least in part, from the instabilities of this relationship. Rattansi also examines the relationship between the colonial/postcolonial and a range of related ideas, such as the imperial/post-imperial, the neocolonial, and the anticolonial. More importantly for our purposes, Rattansi considers the relationship between the idea of ​​globalization (in this case, referring to the general process of space-time compression) and postcolonialism. He concludes that the concept of postcolonialism remains useful because it reminds us that "imperial expansion and colonialism were essential constitutive features and indeed launched globalization and Western capitalism and acted as continuing drivers." 20

Rattansi concludes by rejecting the idea that postcolonial studies are limited to those conducted by scholars associated with former colonizers; Rather, he argues that such studies have become a truly international endeavor. He rejects the notion that postcolonial studies have ignored material forces such as Western capitalism. However, Rattansi also expresses reservations about Postcolonial Studies, including the work of

Called. For example, he fears that this critical work does not present an alternative vision of the future to that of the orientalists and colonialists. While Postcolonial Studies has its weaknesses, it is an important new body of work. We close this chapter with Peter Marcuse's effort to relate Orientalism to the contemporary world, particularly globalization. More specifically, Marcuse seeks to relate Orientalism to what he calls "globalism". While 'Orientalism' has been used to describe and categorize a particular geographic region, its people and culture, 'Globalism' is used 'to indicate the way in which certain real-world processes are often referred to on an international scale. presented in academic and popular circles." Globalism is a specific view of globalization held by governments, academics and intellectuals. From this view, globalization tends to be seen as something new, dominant, that is, a process that is free of choice individual is inevitable and largely beneficial. As Marcuse puts it: "Globalism is to real globalization what Orientalism is to colonialism. Globalism is the hegemonic metaphor through which the real process of globalization is seen/represented by development driven by the "developed world", thus following the "East" (when it can) to the superior form of development of the "West". “ Marcuse goes on to reiterate a number of other similarities between Orientalism and Globalism. For example, just as Orientalism was a distorting lens for looking at the world, globalism is a distorting lens for looking at globalization. That is, globalization is seen as inevitable and unconditionally accepted. Such a view serves to neutralize resistance to globalization. Said's work is considered useful here because it has been "a potent weapon on the side of social justice and the struggle for a humane world". Marcuse sees a similar role for critics of globalism such as the World Social Forum. 21







em Jan Arthur


Ibidem, 177.

Scholte and Roland Robertson, eds., Encyclopedia

Shaobao Xie,



Ibid., 108. Ibid., 109.

of globalization. New York: MTM, 2007, 986-90.


Among other key figures are Homi Bhabha (The


Ibidem, 261.

culture place. London: Routledge, 1994) and


Sadik Jalal al-'Azm, "Orientalism and Orientalism

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (In other worlds: essays

vice-versa." Em A. L. Macfie, ed. Orientalism: A

in cultural policy. New York: Routledge, 1987; A

Menor. Nova York: New York University Press, 219.

Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History


Ibidem, 220.

the present that disappears. Cambridge, MA: Harvard


Ibidem, 221.

University Press, 1999).


AN Rattansi, "Postcolonialism and Its Dissatisfaction".

Joana Acocella,

"A better place." New Yorker

Economy and Society 26, 4, 1997: 481, kursiv in

February 2008: 68-9. 4


Edward W. Said, Orientalismo. Nova York: Vintage,


1979/1994, 92.


Ibidem, 483.

Ibidem, 2.


Ibidem, 492.


Ibidem, 3.



Ibidem, 3.


Ibidem, 4.


Ibidem, 810.


ibid, 23.


Ibidem, 816.


Ibid., 481, italics in the original.

Peter Marcuse, "Said's Orientalism: An Important Contribution Today." Antipode 2004: 809.

Orientalism: Introduction

Orientalism: Introduction Edward W. Said

I On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975/76, a French journalist wrote lamentably of the burned city center that "once looked as if it belonged [...] to the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval". He was right about the place, of course, especially for a European. Almost a European invention, the East has been a place of romance, exotic beings, haunted memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences since ancient times. Now it's gone; somehow it happened, its time passed. Perhaps it seemed irrelevant that the Orientals themselves had something at stake, that even in the days of Chateaubriand and Nerval the Orientals had lived there, and that now they were the ones suffering; For the European visitor, it was a European portrait of the Orient and its contemporary destiny, both with a privileged common meaning for the journalist and his French readers. Americans will not think so much about the East, which they tend to associate very differently with the Far East (mainly China and Japan). Unlike the Americans, the French and the English - minus the Germans, Russians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians and Swiss - have a long tradition of what I will call Orientalism, a way of dealing with the Orient based on the special position of Orientals in experience. European-Western. The East doesn't just border Europe; It is also the site of Europe's largest, richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural competitor and one of its deepest and most recurrent images of the other. Furthermore, the East helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, its idea, its personality, its experience. But none of this East is just imaginative. the east

it is an integral part of European civilization and material culture. Orientalism expresses and represents this part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, images, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will appear considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indo-Chinese adventures should now create a more sober and realistic "Oriental" consciousness. Furthermore, America's vastly expanded political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) places great demands on our understanding of that East. It will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer in the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of which I believe are interdependent. The most readily accepted term for Orientalism is academic, and indeed the label is still used in a number of academic institutions. Whoever teaches, writes or studies the Orient, be it an anthropologist, sociologist, historian or philologist, whether in its specific or general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he does is Orientalism. Compared to Orientalist or regional studies, the term Orientalism is less favored by practitioners today, both because it is too vague and general and because it suggests the autocratic attitude of the executive branch of 19th and early 20th century European colonialism. Despite this, books are written and conventions are held with a focus on the "Orient", with the Orientalist, in his old or new guise, being the main authority. The point is that Orientalism, although not living as before, lives academically through its teachings and theses about the Orient and the Oriental. Related to this academic tradition, their fortunes, transmigrations, specializations and transfers

Edward W disse

form part of the object of this study is of more general importance to Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between "the Orient" and (mainly) "the West". Thus a very large group of writers, including poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, took the basic distinction between East and West as a starting point for devising theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts of the Orient, its people, customs, "spirit", destiny and so on. This Orientalism may include, for example, Aeschylus and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction, I will deal with the methodological problems encountered in such a broad "area". The interchange between the academic meaning and the more or less imaginative meaning of Orientalism is constant, and since the end of the eighteenth century there has been a considerable, reasonably disciplined, perhaps even regular, interchange between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is more historically and materially defined than the other two. Starting with the end of the 18th century as a very rough starting point, Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution of dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, allowing opinions about it, describing it, teaching -it sets itself up to govern it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I found it helpful here to use Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, as described in Archeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punishment, to identify Orientalism. My view is that, without examining Orientalism as a discourse, it is impossible to understand the enormously systematic discipline through which post-Enlightenment European culture governs—and even produces—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively. . . Furthermore, Orientalism occupied such an authoritarian position that I believe that no one who writes, thinks or acts about the Orient could do so without considering the limitations of thought and action that Orientalism imposes on him. In short, the Orient was not (and is) a free subject of thought or action because of Orientalism.

This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole web of interests that inevitably comes into play (and is therefore always involved) on any occasion that that particular entity "own" it. Orient” appears. . This book attempts to demonstrate how this is done. It also tries to show that European culture gained strength and identity by opposing the East as a kind of substitute and even subterranean. Historically and culturally, there is a quantitative and qualitative difference between Franco-British engagement in the East and – until the time of post-World War II American ascendancy – the engagement of all other European and Atlantic powers. To speak of Orientalism, therefore, means mainly, but not exclusively, to speak of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions embrace areas as diverse as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the biblical texts and the biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable body of scholars, numerous oriental "experts" and "hands", an oriental professorship, a complex set of "oriental" ideas (Oriental despotism, oriental splendour, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies and wisdom domesticated for local European use - the list goes on more or less indefinitely. My argument is that Orientalism derives from a special closeness experienced between Britain, France and the Orient, which until the early 19th century really meant only India and the biblical lands. From the early 19th century until the end of World War II, France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; Since World War II, America has dominated the East and is closing in on it as France and Britain once did. From this proximity, whose dynamic is enormously productive, even if it always demonstrates the comparatively greater strength of the West (British, French or American), emerges the large body of texts that I call Orientalist. It should be said at the outset that, despite the generous number of books and authors I review, there are far more that I simply had to leave out. However, my argument is also not based on an exhaustive catalog of texts dealing with the East.

Orientalism: Introduction

nor to a well-defined set of texts, authors and ideas that together form the canon of the Orientalists. Instead, I have relied on another methodological alternative - the backbone of which is, in a sense, the series of historical generalizations I have made so far in this introduction - which I now wish to discuss in more analytical detail.

II I started from the assumption that the Orient is not an inert natural phenomenon. It is not just there, just as the West itself is not just there. We must take seriously Vico's great observation that people make their own history, that they can know what they have done and extend it to geography: as geographical and cultural entities - not to mention historical entities - as places, regions, geographic sectors how "East" and "West" are man-made. Thus, like the West, the Orient itself is an idea that has a history and tradition of thought, images and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographic entities support and thus mirror each other to some extent. That said, you need to provide a number of reasonable qualifications. First, it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea or creation with no corresponding reality. When Disraeli said in his novel Tancred that the Orient is a career, he meant that an interest in the Orient is what bright young Westerners would find an all-consuming passion; it should not be interpreted to mean that the East is just a career for Westerners. There have been - and are - cultures and nations located in the East, and their lives, histories and customs have a brutal reality that is evidently greater than anything that can be said about them in the West. To this fact this study of Orientalism has very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly. But the phenomenon of Orientalism, as I examine it here, is not primarily concerned with a correspondence between Orientalism and the Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the Orient as a career) despite or over any correspondence or the Missing out, with a "real" Orient. My point is that Disraeli's statement applies to the East

mainly to this created consistency, this regular constellation of ideas, like the pre-eminence of the Orient, and not its mere being, as Wallace Stevens says. A second limitation is that ideas, cultures, and histories cannot be understood or studied seriously without also examining their power, or more specifically, their configurations of power. To believe that the Orient was created - or, as I call it, "Orientalized" - and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination is hypocritical. The relationship between East and West is one of power, domination, hegemony complex to varying degrees, and is quite appropriately implied in the title of KM Panikkar's classic Asia and Western Dominance. The Orient was not just Orientalized because it was found to be “Oriental” in all the ways the average 19th century European would. For example, there is little agreement that Flaubert's encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, never acted out her feelings, presence or history. He spoke for them and represented them. He was a foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical mastery facts that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically, but also to speak for them and tell his readers how "typically Oriental" they were. My argument is that Flaubert's situation of strength against Kuchuk Hanem was not isolated. It represents very well the pattern of relative strength between East and West and the discourse about the East that it allowed. This brings us to a third restriction. It must never be assumed that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or myths which, if the truth were told about them, would simply be destroyed. I myself believe that Orientalism is particularly valuable as a sign of Euro-Atlantic power over the Orient rather than as a true discourse about the Orient (which it claims to be in its scholarly or scholarly form). What we must, however, respect and try to understand is the sheer intertwined strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to socioeconomic and political foundations.

E d w a r d W . named

Institutions and their dubious durability. Finally, any system of ideas that can remain unchanged as teachable wisdom (in academies, books, conventions, universities, foreign service institutes) from the time of Ernest Renan in the late 1840s to the present in the United States must be something more. formidable than a mere collection of lies. Orientalism, then, is not a flimsy European fantasy about the Orient, but an edifice constructed of theory and practice in which considerable material investment has been made over many generations. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering the Orient into Western consciousness, just as the same investment multiplied - indeed made it truly productive - the statements that flowed from Orientalism into general culture. widespread. Gramsci made the useful analytical distinction between civil society and political society, in which the former consists of voluntary (or at least rational and not forced) affiliations such as schools, families and unions, the latter in state institutions (army, police, the central bureaucracy). ). ) whose role in the community is direct control. Culture is found, of course, within civil society, where the influence of ideas, institutions, and other individuals works not through domination but through what Gramsci calls consent. In any non-totalitarian society, therefore, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci identified as hegemony, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony in action, that gives Orientalism the durability and strength I have been talking about. Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of ​​Europe, a collective notion that identifies "us" Europeans against all "those" non-Europeans, and indeed it could be argued that the main component of European culture is precisely it's That's what that culture that is hegemonic both inside and outside Europe is made of: the idea of ​​a European identity as superior to all non-European peoples and cultures. Added to this is the hegemony of European ideas on the Orient, which in turn reinforce European superiority over Oriental backwardness and tend to nullify the possibility that a

More independent thinkers or skeptics may have different opinions on the matter. Orientalism bases its strategy quite consistently on this flexible positional superiority, which places the Westerner in a whole range of possible relations with the Orient without ever losing relative dominance. And why should it have been any different at the time of Europe's extraordinary rise from the late Renaissance to the present? The scientist, scholar, missionary, merchant or soldier was in the East or was thinking about it because he could be there or think about it without the East offering resistance. Under the umbrella of knowledge of the Orient and under the aegis of Western hegemony over the Orient, a multifaceted Orient emerged in the period from the late 18th century onwards, suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office. , for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial and historical theses about man and the universe, for example economic and sociological theories about development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. Furthermore, imaginative engagement with Oriental issues rested more or less exclusively on a sovereign Western consciousness, from whose undisputed centrality an Oriental world arose, first according to general notions of who or what an Oriental was, then according to a detailed logic that governed not simply by empirical reality, but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments and projections. If we can point to great orientalist works of genuine scholarship, such as Silvestre de Sacy's Chrestomathy arabe or Edward William Lane's Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, we must also note that the racial ideas of Renan and Gobineau arose from the same impulse, as he wrote many Victorian pornographic novels (see Steven Marcus's analysis of "The Lustful Turk"). And yet one has to ask the question again and again whether what matters in Orientalism is the body of ideas that challenges the bulk of the material - who could deny that it is imbued with doctrines of European superiority, various kinds of racism, imperialism and such things as dogmatic views on "the oriental" as a kind of ideal and immutability

Orientalism: Introduction

Abstraction? - or the much more diverse work of almost countless individual authors, which would be taken as individual instances of authors dealing with the Orient. In a way, the two alternatives, general and specific, are actually two perspectives on the same material: in both cases, we would have to deal with pioneers in the field like William Jones, with great artists like Nerval or Flaubert. And why wouldn't it be possible to use the two perspectives together or one after the other? Is there not an obvious danger of distortion (exactly the kind to which academic Orientalism has always been prone) if an overly general or overly specific level of description is systematically maintained? My two fears are bias and vagueness, or rather the kind of vagueness that comes from overly dogmatic generality and overly positivistic local focus. In trying to address these questions, I have tried to engage with three main aspects of my own contemporary reality that seem to guide me out of the methodological or perspective difficulties I have been discussing, difficulties that might compel someone in the first B. to write a crude polemic in a level of description so unacceptably general that it is not worth it, or, in the second case, writing a series of analyzes so detailed and atomistic that one loses sight of the general lines of force that the field also informs and gives it its special validity . So, how to recognize individuality and reconcile it with its intelligent context, nothing passive or just dictatorial, general and hegemonic? [•••]

My idea is that European and later American interest in the East was political, according to some of the obvious historical accounts I have given here, but that it was the culture that created that interest, dynamic along with raw politics, played out in the economy and at the grassroots. militaries to make the Orient the diverse and complicated place it evidently was in the realm I call Orientalism. Therefore, Orientalism is not a mere issue or political field passively reflected by culture, science or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of any nefarious "Western" imperialist conspiracy to dominate the "Eastern" world. Instead, it's an outpouring of geopolitical awareness into it.

aesthetic, scientific, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a fundamental geographic distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, East and West), but also of a whole range of "interests" that are explored through such means as scientific discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, not only creates it but maintains it; it is a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even integrate, instead of expressing, an apparently different (or alternative and new) world; is first of all a discourse which is by no means in direct and corresponding relation to political power in the raw state, but arises and exists in an unequal exchange with different kinds of power, which is to some extent shaped by the exchange with power. political. (as in a colonial or imperial establishment), intellectual power (as in mainstream sciences such as comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern political sciences), cultural power (as in orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as in ideas about what "we" do and what "they" cannot do or understand as "we" do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is - rather than simply representing - a significant dimension of modern politico-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than with "our" world. Since Orientalism is a cultural and political fact, it does not exist in an archival vacuum; on the contrary, I think it can be demonstrated that what is thought, said or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps appears along) certain clear and intellectually recognizable lines. Here, too, a considerable amount of nuance and elaboration can be seen operating between the broad impressions of superstructure and the details of composition, the facts of textuality. I think most humanities scholars are perfectly comfortable with the notion that texts exist in contexts, that there is something called intertextuality, that the pressures of convention, background, and rhetorical styles limit what Walter Benjamin once called "the crushing of the productive person". in the Names [...] from the principle of 'creativity', which the poet believes to have produced his work by his own strength and pure reason. However, there is a reluctance to accommodate political, institutional and ideological constraints

E d w a r d W . named

same way in the individual author. A humanist will think it an interesting fact for any interpreter of Balzac that in the Comédie humaine he was influenced by the conflict between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, but the same kind of pressure on Balzac from a deeply reactionary monarchism felt vaguely humiliating. its literary "genius" and therefore less worthy of serious study. Likewise, as Harry Bracken has tirelessly shown, philosophers will conduct their discussions of Locke, Hume, and empiricism without ever considering that in these classical authors there is an explicit connection between their "philosophical" teachings and racial theory, the justification of slavery, or arguments for colonial exploitation. These are common ways in which contemporary science keeps itself pure. It is perhaps true that most attempts to rub the nose of culture in the filth of politics have been grossly iconoclastic; perhaps the social interpretation of literature in my own field has simply not kept up with the enormous technical advances in detailed textual analysis. But there is no escaping the fact that literary studies in general, and American Marxist theorists in particular, have shied away from efforts to seriously bridge the gap between superstructural and fundamental levels in textual historical scholarship; On another occasion I went so far as to say that the literary-cultural establishment as a whole has declared the serious study of imperialism and culture taboo. For Orientalism directly opposes this issue - that is, recognizing that political imperialism controls an entire field of study, imagination and scientific institutions - in such a way that avoiding it becomes an intellectual and historical impossibility. However, there will always be the perpetual escape mechanism of saying that a literary scholar and a philosopher, for example, are trained in literature and philosophy, respectively, not politics or ideological analysis. In other words, the technical argument can effectively block the broader and, I think, more intellectually serious perspective. There seems to be a simple two-part answer here, at least as far as the study of imperialism and culture (or orientalism) is concerned. First, almost all nineteenth-century writers (and the same goes for writers of earlier periods) were extraordinarily well aware of the fact of empire:

Not a well-studied subject, but it won't take a modern Victorian scholar long to admit that liberal culture heroes like John Stuart Mill, Arnold, Carlyle, Newman, Macaulay, Ruskin, George Eliot, and even Dickens had clear views on race and imperialism, which are easily found working on their writings. So even an expert has to deal with the knowledge that Mill made it clear, for example in On Liberty and Representative Government, that his views cannot be extrapolated to India (he was an India Office official for much of his life after from that). ), because the Indians were civilizationally, if not racially, inferior. The same kind of paradox is found in Marx, as I try to show in this book. Second, to believe that politics, in the form of imperialism, influences the production of literature, science, social theory and history is in no way equivalent to saying that culture is therefore a downgraded or denigrated thing. Rather, I am just saying that we can better understand the persistence and permanence of satiating hegemonic systems like culture when we recognize that their internal constraints on writers and thinkers have been productive rather than unilaterally restrictive. It is this idea that Gramsci certainly, and Foucault and Raymond Williams, have tried to illustrate in very different ways. Even a page or two by Williams on "The Use of Empire" in The Long Revolution tells us more about the cultural riches of the nineteenth century than many volumes of analysis of Hermetic texts. I therefore study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the great political corporations shaped by the three great empires - British, French, American - in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writings arose. What interests me most as a scholar is not the broad political truth but the detail, because what interests us in someone like Lane or Flaubert or Renan is not really the undeniable truth (for him) that Westerners are superior to Easterners. , but what was deeply worked and modulated is evidence of his painstaking work within the vast space opened up by that truth. It is enough to remember that Lane's Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians is a classic of historical and anthropological observation for its style, for its extremely intelligent and brilliant detailing, and not for its simple reflection on racial superiority, to understand what I mean. to say. say here legend.

Orientalism: Introduction

The political questions that Orientalism raises, then, are these: What other intellectual, aesthetic, scientific, and cultural energies were channeled into the emergence of an imperialist tradition like the Orientalist one? How did philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic theory, novels and poetry come to serve the broadly imperialist worldview of Orientalism? What changes, modulations, refinements and even revolutions are taking place in Orientalism? What does originality, continuity, individuality mean in this context? How is Orientalism transmitted or reproduced from one era to another? How can we treat the historical-cultural phenomenon of Orientalism in all its historical complexity, richness of details and value as a kind of voluntary human work - not as a mere unconditional justification - without at the same time the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the State and the specific realities of domination? Guided by such concerns, a humanistic course can responsibly turn to politics and culture. This does not mean, however, that such a study establishes a fixed rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics. My argument is that any humanistic investigation must articulate the nature of this connection in the specific context of the study, the subject and its historical circumstances.

[...] Much of the personal investment in this study stems from my awareness of being an "Oriental" growing up in two British colonies. All of my education in those colonies (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States was Western, but that early deep awareness remained. In many ways, my study of Orientalism was an attempt to inventory about myself, the Oriental subject, the traits of the culture whose mastery was such a powerful factor in the lives of all Orientals. So for me the focus should be on the Islamic East. I cannot judge whether what I have accomplished meets Gramsci's prescribed inventory, although I have thought it important to try consciously to create it. Throughout my journey, I have tried, with the greatest rigor and rationality possible, to maintain a critical awareness and use the instruments of historical, humanistic and cultural research that my training made me the happy beneficiary of. In

None of that, but I have already lost the cultural reality, the personal involvement in being constituted as “Orient”. The historical circumstances that make such a study possible are quite complex, and I can only enumerate them schematically here. Anyone who has lived in the West since the 1950s, especially in the United States, will have witnessed an era of exceptional turmoil in East-West relations. No one will have forgotten the fact that "East" has always meant danger and menace in this age, even if it meant both the traditional East and Russia. At the universities, a growing establishment of cultural studies programs and institutes made the scientific study of the Orient a branch of national policy. This country's public affairs include a healthy interest in the Orient, both for its strategic and economic importance and for its traditional exoticism. If the world has become directly accessible to a Western citizen living in the electronic age, the East has also become closer to him and is perhaps less a myth today than a place permeated by Western interests, especially American ones. One aspect of the postmodern electronic world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes with which the Orient is seen. Television, movies, and all media resources have compressed information into increasingly standardized forms. As for the Orient, cultural standardization and stereotypes increased the influence of academic and imaginative demonology from the "mysterious Orient" of the 19th century. Nowhere is this truer than in the way the Middle East is mapped. Three things have helped to make even the simplest perception of Arabs and Islam a highly politicized, almost turbulent affair: first, the history of anti-Arab and anti-Islamic popular prejudice in the West, which is directly reflected in the history of Orientalism; second, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism and its impact on American Jews as well as liberal culture and the general population; third, the almost complete absence of any cultural positions that would allow one to identify with Arabs or Islam, or to discuss them dispassionately. Furthermore, it hardly needs mentioning why the Middle East is now so closely identified with great power politics, the oil economy, and the simplistic dichotomy of democratic, freedom-loving Israel and Israel


Sadik J a l a l a l - 'A z m

Evil, totalitarian, terrorist Arabs stand a depressing chance of seeing anything remotely clear about what they are talking about when they talk about the Middle East. My own experiences with these subjects are, in part, what prompted me to write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, especially in America, is frightening. There is almost unanimous agreement that he does not exist politically and, if allowed, then as a nuisance or an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism and dehumanizing ideology that reigns over the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web that every Palestinian feels as his uniquely punitive destiny. It made matters worse for him to observe that in the United States no person who studied the Middle East academically - no Orientalist - identified culturally and politically with Arabs; Identifications certainly existed on some level, but they never took on an "acceptable" form like the liberal American identification with Zionism, and were often discredited for their association with political or economic interests (oil companies and State Department Arabists, for example). ) or with religion. The nexus of knowledge and power that creates "the Oriental" and, in a sense, erases him as human

For me, therefore, being is not an exclusively academic question. However, it is an intellectual question of obvious importance. I was able to apply my humanistic and political interest to the analysis and description of a very mundane issue, the rise, development and consolidation of Orientalism. Literature and culture are often seen as politically, even historically, innocent; it has always impressed me in another way, and certainly my study of Orientalism has convinced me (and I hope my literary colleagues) that society and literary culture can only be understood and studied together. Furthermore, and by almost inevitable logic, I found myself writing the story of a strange and secret participant in Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed in its Islamic offshoot, Orientalism are very similar is a historical, cultural, and political truth that only needs to be mentioned to a Palestinian Arab for its irony to be fully understood. But what I also want to contribute here is a better understanding of how cultural domination works. If this inspires a new way of dealing with the East, yes, if it does away with 'East' and 'West' altogether, then we are in the process of what Raymond Williams has called the 'unlearning' of the 'inherent'. more dominant way."


Orientalism and Orientalism in Contrast Sadik Jalal al-'Azm I Orientalism Edward Said, in his highly debated book, presents us with the theme of "Orientalism" from a broad historical perspective that places Europe's interest in the Orient in the context of general history expansion of modern bourgeois Europe outside its traditional borders and at the expense of the rest of the world in the form of its subjugation, plunder and exploitation. In this sense, Orientalism can be seen as a

complex and growing phenomenon arising from the general historical trend of modern European expansion, comprising: a whole set of progressively expanding institutions, a created and cumulative body of theory and practice, an adequate ideological superstructure with an apparatus of complicated assumptions, beliefs, conceptions, literary productions and rationales (not to mention the underlying basis of vital commercial, economic and strategic interests). I will call this phenomenon institutional orientalism.

Orientalism and Orientalism in reverse

Edward Said is also concerned with Orientalism in the narrower sense of a developing tradition of disciplined learning whose primary function is to "scientifically explore" the Orient. Of course, this cultural-scientific Orientalism makes all the usual pious claims about its "disinterested search for truth" about the Orient and its effort to study the peoples, cultures, religions, and languages ​​of the Orient with unbiased scientific methods and non-techniques. judgment. Not unexpectedly, most of Edward's book is devoted to cultural-academic Orientalism in an attempt to discover the connections that linked him to institutional Orientalism. In doing so, Said deflates the self-righteous claims of cultural-scientific Orientalism for qualities such as academic independence, academic detachment, political objectivity, etc. , scientific discoveries and creative contributions by orientalists and orientalists over the years, mainly at the technical level of completion. He is primarily concerned with conveying the message that the general picture of the Orient constructed by cultural-scientific Orientalism from the perspective of its own technical achievements and scientific contributions to the field is permeated by racist innuendos, poorly camouflaged mercenary interests, reductionist explanations and misanthropic. prejudices. It can easily be shown that, when properly examined, this picture can hardly be the product of truly objective scientific investigation and impartial scientific discipline.

Critique of Orientalism One of the most pernicious aspects of this picture, as Said has carefully pointed out, is the entrenched belief - shared by cultural-academic and institutional Orientalism - that there is a fundamental ontological difference between the essential natures of East and West. , to the crucial advantage of the latter. It is said that Western societies, cultures, languages ​​and mentalities are essentially and inherently superior to those of the East. In the words of Edward Said, "The essence of Orientalism is the indelible distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority." According to this reading of Said's initial thesis, Orientalism

(both in its institutional and cultural studies forms) can hardly be claimed as a structured phenomenon and an organized movement prior to the rise, consolidation and expansion of modern bourgeois Europe. Thus, at one point, the author dates the rise of Academic Orientalism to the European Renaissance. But sadly, Edward Said's stylist and polemicist often runs alongside the systems thinker. As a result, he does not consistently adhere to the above approach in dating the phenomenon of Orientalism, nor in interpreting its historical origins and rise. In an act of retrospective historical projection, Said traces the origins of Orientalism to Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides, and Dante. In other words, Orientalism is not really a completely modern phenomenon as we used to think, but the natural product of an ancient and almost irresistible European way of thinking that distorted the realities of other cultures, peoples and their languages ​​in favor of the West. self-assertion, domination and superiority. Here the author seems to be saying that from Homer to Karl Marx and A.H.R. Gibb, the "European mind" is inherently striving to distort all human realities except its own and for the sake of its own enlargement. It seems to me that this way of constructing the origins of Orientalism simply gives force to the essentialist categories "East" and "West" which represent the indelible distinction between East and West that Edward's book is supposed to seek to destroy. Likewise, it lends to the ontological distinction between Europe and Asia, so characteristic of Orientalism, the kind of credibility and respectability normally associated with continuity, persistence, ubiquity, and distant historical roots. That kind of credibility and seriousness is obviously misguided and undeserved. For Orientalism, like so many other distinctly modern European phenomena and movements (nationalism in particular), is a truly recent creation - the product of modern European history trying to gain legitimacy, credibility and support using ancient roots and claimed classical origins. Certainly Homer, Euripides, Dante, St. Thomas and all the other authorities that one might want to mention supported the more or less standardized distorted views that prevailed in their midst about other cultures and peoples. However, it is equally true that the two

Sadik J a l a l a l - 'A z m

Forms of Orientalism have built their relatively modern repertoire of systematic conventional wisdom by appealing to the views and prejudices of such notable figures, drawing on ancient myths, legends, images, folklore, and simple prejudice. While much of this is well documented (both directly and indirectly) in Said's book, his work remains dominated by a unilinear view of "Orientalism" that somehow flows directly from Homer to Grunebaum. Furthermore, this unilinear, quasi-essentialist account of the origins and development of Orientalism does a great disservice to the essential concerns of Edward's book, namely, to prepare the ground for addressing the difficult question of "how to study other cultures and peoples." libertarian or non-repressive and non-manipulative perspective' and for eliminating both 'East' and 'West' as ontological categories and classifying concepts with marks of racial superiority and inferiority in the name of a common humanity. As a corollary of Said's tendency to see the origins and development of Orientalism in terms of this unilinear constancy, I find the task of combating and transcending its essentialist categories in the name of this common humanity even more difficult. Another important result of this approach concerns Said's interpretation of the alleged relationship between cultural-academic orientalism as representation and disciplined learning, on the one hand, and institutional orientalism as an expansionist movement and socioeconomic force, on the other. In other words, when Said relies heavily on his unilinear conception of "Orientalism", he produces a picture that suggests that this cultural apparatus known as "Orientalism" is the true source of Western political interest in the Orient, that is, that it is the true source of modern institutional orientalism. Thus, for him, European and later American political interest in the Orient was really created by the kind of Western cultural tradition known as Orientalism. Furthermore, according to one of his representations, Orientalism is a splitting of the consciousness that the world consists of two unequal halves – East and West – into aesthetic, scientific, economic, sociological, historical and philosophical texts. This consciousness has not only a whole range of Western "interests" (political,

economically, strategically, etc.) in the East, but also helped to preserve them. Thus, for Said, the relationship between academic Orientalism as a cultural apparatus and institutional Orientalism as an economic interest and political force is seen as an "absurd transition" from "a purely textual understanding, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the implementation of all that. in practice in the East." '. On this interpretation, Said's phrase "Orientalism overcame the Orient" could only mean that the institutional Orientalism that invaded and subjugated the Orient was really the legitimate child and product of that other kind of Orientalism that seems so intrinsic to minds, texts, aesthetics, representations , traditions and images from Westerners to Homer, Aeschylus and Euripides! To correctly understand the subjugation of the East in modern times, Said repeatedly refers to earlier times, when the East was just a conscience for the West, a word, a representation, a lesson: What we have to tell is a big problem and a slow process of appropriation through which Europe, or the European consciousness of the East, was transformed from textual and contemplative to administrative, economic and even military. Thus, Edward Said sees the "Suez Canal idea" as "the corollary of Orientalist thought and effort" rather than as the result of Franco-British imperial interests and rivalries (although he is not ignorant of the latter). One cannot help feeling that, for Said, the emergence of Oriental observers, administrators and invaders like Napoleon, Cromer and Balfour was somehow inevitable by "Orientalism" and that the political orientations, careers and ambitions of these figures are best understood. d'Herbelot and Dante for immediately relevant and mundane interests. Consequently, it is not surprising that when Said addresses the role of the European powers in deciding Near Eastern history in the early twentieth century, he emphasizes the "peculiar epistemological framework through which the powers viewed the Orient." ', built on the long tradition of Orientalism. He then claims that the powers in the East acted in this way

Postcolonialism and its Discontents

they did so because of this peculiar epistemological framework. Presumably, the long tradition of cultural-scientific Orientalism has produced a less quirky, more sympathetic, and truer epistemology.

Frame, then the powers that be would have treated the East more kindly and viewed it in a more favorable light! [...]

E2 Postcolonialism and Its Dissatisfaction Ali Rattansi The structure of this article reflects its overall purpose: to provide critical commentary on a rapidly growing area of ​​research that I will characterize as “postcolonialism” or “postcolonial studies”. The work consists of two interconnected parts. The first will provide a preliminary definition of the idea of ​​"postcolonial" and examine some achievements in the field of "postcolonial" research as they have developed in cultural studies. The second part will highlight a number of important problem areas in this field that have been the subject of considerable international debate.

1 In Praise of Postcolonial Studies Defining and Theorizing the “Postcolonial” Like all the “postcolonials” that are all the rage in current discourse, the idea of ​​“postcolonialism” faces formidable problems in mapping a terrain , an object of study that is both coherent and coherent can compel the consent of those supposedly working in the field. Many of the relevant issues are examined in the second half of this essay. First, a tentative set of boundaries and content must be defined. For the time being, postcolonialism can be pinpointed as a period in global time-space when most of the former colonies of Western imperial powers achieved formal independence. It must be emphasized that the “postcolonial” is by no means a singular moment. The reference must refer to a series of transitions that occur between and within moments of colonization/decolonization. This emphasis on

Diversity is key. While a certain British or Northern European ethnocentrism has been tempted to confuse the postcolonial with the post-World War II era, one need only think of the “Latin” American and even North American context to appreciate the importance of internal heterogeneity in understanding the period. postcolonial, which covers a period from the end of the 18th century in the “North” or “West” to the 20th century as a whole. As Said reminded us in Culture and Imperialism, on the eve of World War I in 1914, the "West" owned about 85% of the world in various possessions. One of the peculiarities that postcolonialism shares with that ubiquitous other “post,” postmodernism, is that it marks both an alleged historical period and a particular mode of theorizing and analysis. The similarities do not end there, as, as fields of inquiry, both eschew traditional disciplinary boundaries and conventional notions of time, narrative, and spatiality. In the case of postcolonial studies, a heady and eclectic mix of poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, feminism, Marxism, and postmodernism itself fills the field in varying combinations. Fanon, Freud and Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Jameson and Gramsci compete for positions in the works of the great postcolonial writers - Said, Spivak and Bhabha, for example. Elsewhere, in discussing postmodernism, Boyne and I have suggested that it is useful to distinguish between postmodernism as a set of cultural and intellectual currents and postmodernism as an epoch in historical time that includes postmodernism as one of its elements. A similar conceptual distinction would help here as well: so I propose to use postcolonialism

Ali R a t t a n s i

and postcolonial studies, to refer to a particular form of intellectual inquiry, and postcoloniality, to index a range of historical periods (the meaning of the plural is explained below). I argue that the central defining theme of postcolonialism, or postcolonial studies, is the study of the mutually constitutive roles of colonizer and colonized, center and periphery, metropolitan and 'native', affecting in part the identities of both the dominant power and the subalterns who became involved in the imperial and colonial projects of the "West". Thus, postcolonialism sees the “West” and the “rest” as interconnected, albeit with due attention to the fundamental axis of inequality that defined the imperial process. The emergence of nations and 'national cultures' in the center and peripheries is thus analyzed as a consequence of the imperial project and the resistance against it, leading to the formal independence of the colonies and the beginning of the 'postcolonial' through different space-times of 'postcoloniality'. By attributing a certain reciprocity to the processes of subject and identity formation between the colonizer and the colonized, the postcolonial studies project actually deconstructs the Manichean vision of a binary opposition between the imperial and the subaltern, as it finds a dismantling of the notion of colonialism and imperialism are processes that wound and scar the psyche, cultures and economies of the colonized, leaving metropolises economically enriched and culturally dominant, stable and, in fact, stronger formations. In other words, postcolonial studies assume that the cultures and psyches of the colonizers were not yet defined and were just waiting to be fully formed and imposed on the hapless victims of the colonial project. The notion of the “West” as white, Christian, rational, civilized, modern, sexually disciplined and, of course, masculine was imposed in a long process in which the colonized Others were defined against these virtues. The construction of "natives" as black, pagan, irrational, uncivilized, pre-modern, impulsive, unrestrained, effeminate, and childlike established Europeans' self-image as superior and not only capable of ruling but also as possessors. governmental and "obligation of civilization".

However, as we shall see, the idea of ​​intertwining identities actually goes beyond this. For the postcolonialist claim is that an even more complex tangle of identity information was at play, in which the Others against which European identities were pitted were not only outside but also within the nation-states at the center. The processes that led to the emergence of Western modernity also involved inferiority and rule or regulation and discipline of other inmates, such as women, children, and the rapidly expanding urban working class. Thus, "internal" questions about the ways in which these subalterns were incorporated into national culture and politics were mixed and overlapped with questions related to the ways in which the "natives" of the colonies would be registered and discursively governed. It is now quite clear that, viewed in this light, imperial and colonial projects cannot simply be analyzed reductively in terms of a crucial economic logic that chronicles the formation of colonial cultures and politics as just another version of the well-known transition from feudalism to capitalism, except in this period, imposed from above by the powers of the big cities, in which class formation, class interests and class conflicts remain the main drivers of transformation. A properly "postcolonialist" analysis, by contrast, requires recognition of a set of processes in which cultural formation spreads along a set of axes of potentially corresponding importance - class, certainly, but also sexuality and gender, racism , family relationships, religion discourses, childhood ideas and upbringing practices and therefore also requires an understanding of the underlying processes of psychological development and "warping". The societies created by colonial encounters can no longer be discursively appropriated by a grid that reads them as repetitions of an often told linear narrative of transition from one mode of production to another, whether in Marxist or Weberian vocabulary, and certainly not as a simple story. of “modernization” as functionalist sociology, mainly American, would do. Very important: what holds for colonial formations seems to hold for metropolitan societies as well, and for the same reason, so to speak, because how could the seminal role of sexuality, gender, race, nation, family, etc. be ignored

Postcolonialism and its Discontents

political formation at the center given the growing understanding of the imperial project as entangled and mutually enmeshed? And it also raises the question of how to understand the profound meaning of the tremendous growth of "knowledge" fostered in the processes of colonization, which seemed to have seeped into the heart of the forms of government through which colonial rule pursued anthropology, the systematizations of languages ​​and oriental histories, racial studies and eugenics, for example - and which also call for a rethinking of outdated notions of "base" (material or economic) and "superstructure" (cultural and ideological) that crop up in even the most sophisticated versions of the metaphor, in Ultimately, they see these forms of knowledge as epiphenomenal and therefore lose their defining, not just mirror, importance for forms of colonial rule.

However, it would be disingenuous, not to say naive, and certainly hardly post-structuralist, not to note that all these theoretical devices were not simply "neutral" frameworks for capturing the "truth" of the effects of colonial encounters between the colonizer and the colonized. . For the concepts that structured the archive of postcolonial studies were, of course, crucial in influencing how studies constructed the essence of this relationship between colonizer and colonized and analyzed postcolonial cultures as forms of repression and postcolonial identities as forms of repression. particularly fragmented. A simple mirroring relationship, in which the "truth" of colonial encounters was now simply not available through previously unexplored means or - in the case of Foucault and sometimes even Freud.

Given Foucault's attention, it is not surprising that in Orientalism, which can be considered the founding text of modern postcolonial studies, Said turned to Foucault's poststructuralism to provide an alternative "approach" to questions of the relationship between power and power. and knowledge and the entanglement between the formation of knowledge and its role in government, and also for the insights contained in Foucault's work in analyzing how European identities were formed in a process of what Foucault called "normalization", which categorized and separated a variety of internal figures, those in the development of western modernity were labeled as “others” – criminals, supposed madmen, sections of the urban poor and so on. And it should also be understandable why, through Fanon in particular, Freudian and Lacanian emphases have been prominent in a field of study that has tried to understand the profound psychological effects of colonial inferiority on both colonized and colonizer. A variety of uses of feminist approaches and appropriations by Freud, Lacan, and Foucault, in turn, understandably provided critical intellectual resources for unraveling the complex relationships between sexuality, class, race, and relations of imperial and domestic domination and subordination, a task shared by gramscian perceptions about processes of hegemony and, in another register, about derridian theories of identity, otherness and difference.

In other words, it should come as no surprise that the specificity of a postcolonial approach to these questions has been the subject of sometimes quite acrimonious debate. I comment on these controversies in the second part of this post. For now, I refer the reader to an important exchange between O'Hanlan and Washbrook and Prakash, where many of the issues surrounding the legitimacy of specifically postcolonialist and Marxist "assumptions" about narratives of colonialism and its consequences are illuminatingly essayed.

Authority and Identity For the moment, it is worth examining, even briefly, some "typical" (Post-Oriental) postcolonial scholarship to support my contention that there are indeed commendable elements in postcolonial scholarship. The number of such studies today is extraordinarily large, in part because of the American graduate machinery which, with many students from the former colonies of Africa and India taking part, entered the field and began to plow it. with a burst of unusual energy, enthusiasm and excellence. Some indication of the extent of cultivation can be gleaned from the extensive, indeed daunting, literature in a study such as Stoler's, which reframes Foucault's work on sexuality in the light of postcolonial studies, and in Said's own sequel, Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism.

Ali Rattansi

Investigations that illustrate the most general and fundamental theme of the field, namely, the complex ways in which aspects of the cultures and national identities of the “West” and the “rest” were shaped by fateful colonial encounters, is an obvious starting point for ( b) commendable postcolonial studies. Gauri Viswanathan's analysis of the emergence of English literary studies in India and its subsequent growth in the academies of the imperial heartland is a particularly fruitful application and extension of Said's seminal arguments in Orientalism. Viswanathan's research exemplifies the motivations behind postcolonialism, demonstrating, among other things, that: (a)

At the same time, a much-needed cadre of “native” English-speaking administrators and civil servants will be created.


That this was always a self-confident strategy to sustain and mask the other British project of economic exploitation of the subcontinent under the guise of a "civilizing" mission. (c) That, in developing English language teaching, the British were aware of the importance of education in creating hegemony, as this was an ongoing project in Great Britain, where a whole range of strategies were put in place to contain the potential threat of English from the growing urban working class, schooling being one of the key pillars, although the attempt in this case was steeped in a Christian ethos which the British knew needed to be treated with caution in the Indian context. Here one can see the point about the interrelationship between one of the internal Others of the bourgeois West – the urban working class – and the attempt to govern and exploit a range of external Others that threaten subalterns, strategies of containment being learned and passed on. mutually between the two become largely separate domains. (D)

Which, ironically, was the project of establishing English literary studies in India.

who had a strong formative influence on the development of literary studies as a university subject in Britain in the latter half of the 19th century, when English began to replace Latin and Greek languages ​​and texts as a key medium of education and secondary school subject and upper-class Englishmen. This last point is particularly crucial. Considering the way in which English literature has worked and continues to work to define English, as well as the great success of English literature as a university subject in India and the importance of English literature in the education and Anglicization of the contemporary middle class. postcolonial point about the interweaving of identities through the colonial encounter - albeit in the context of a fundamental asymmetry of power - seems to be well confirmed. And, of course, the emphasis on knowledge, power, and dominance and their effects on creating a subject and identity. At various points in the discussion so far, I have alluded to the importance of class and gender in postcolonial studies. For example, by referring to the urban working class as an internal Other, the relation of otherness implies that "otherness" acts dyadically towards the ruling classes of Victorian Britain or, more broadly, of Europe. And this, of course, was of particular importance in shaping imperial masculinities in academia, given the gendered nature of educational access, the role of English and education in general, although the way in which the imperial project shaped a particular notion of the role of women. also as reproductive organs of an imperial "race" is well documented. Furthermore, the “feminization” of the colonized man naturally also took place in the context of thinking about the masculinity of imperialism and the dominance of men in the metropolitan order of things. It is therefore appropriate to turn to another recent contribution to postcolonial literature, which highlights many of these themes particularly well. I refer here to the research of another Indian woman, Mrinalini Sinha, whose Colonial Masculinity provides a brilliant account of the changing configurations of Indian – and particularly Bengali – and British imperial masculinities in context.

Postcolonialism and its Discontents

of the complex economic, social and governmental transformations in this part of colonial India. From a complex and dense narrative, only a few relevant arguments can be highlighted here: (a)

That the conception of the 'effeminate' Bengali male in British colonial discourse in India – effeminate is a common and common discursive strategy of inferiority in the imperial project – nevertheless underwent significant changes with the changing class structure of colonial Bengal. Effeminacy was initially attributed to all Indian men, then focused on Bengali men, and later became particularly focused on western-educated middle-class Bengali men, who began to make uncomfortable political demands of the colonial authorities. Interestingly, the Bengali man was ridiculed not only for his alleged lack of "manliness" but also for his alleged poor treatment of "his" women! The combination was enough, in the eyes of the colonial authorities, to prevent the unfortunate Bengalis from participating in the government.

(b) That Bengalis have developed complex classifications around their own sense of masculinity and emasculation. Again, this was related to class, with small workers and later decadent rentiers finding themselves effeminated by the subservient nature of their work and their impoverishment, respectively, the latter in an indigenous cultural context where masculinity was strongly linked to property. (c) That at the same time a process of construction of English masculinity was taking place in the metropolis around public schools, Oxbridge etc., in deliberate contrast to what was seen as the femininity of colonial man. This was to a large extent a specifically English rather than a British project, as there was considerable prejudice against recruiting Scottish and Irish university staff.

crucial elements of identity for both colonizer and colonized in a variety of geographic and national-imperial contexts. While it is somewhat indelicate to single out specific research from such a rich field, it is perhaps worth citing some other work that confirms the general themes of postcolonial studies: for example, Catherine Hall's work on the emergence of British national culture and citizenship. related to the construction of colonial "experiences"; David Arnold's research on the construction of knowledge and 'Indianized' Western medical practices related to the introduction of Western medicine to India and the way in which this was implicated in the formation of Eastern and Western notions of bodies; Niranjana's discussion of how English, as well as Indian, identities were formed through specific translations of important traditional Indian texts, with the English being able to construct Indianness and, alternatively, Englishness from a selective reading of these texts, with the Indians being fed likewise, a version of herself that conformed to English notions of her venality; Mudimbe's exploration of Western conceptions of Africa and the problems of 'restoring' and creating authentic African knowledge; Martin Bernal's Black Athena, which attempts to challenge the crucial element of Greek versus Egyptian origin in shaping Western identity; and the important essays in the collections edited by Breckenbridge and van der Veer, Prakash and Chambers and Curti. The continuing persistence of colonial discourses in Western scientific, sociological, anthropological, and administrative knowledge and practice is explored, for example, in Mohanty's essays on Western writings on "Third World Women," Watney's essays on the Western AIDS narrative, and Rattansi about the sexualized racism that drives the British state's reaction to immigration from the colonies immediately after World War II.

Ambivalence and Resistance Viswanathan and Sinha's research is just the tip of the iceberg. A wide range of other scientific evidence could be used to illustrate the interaction of class, gender, ethnicity, family conceptions, etc. in the dynamics of the process that was established

If the idea of ​​the mutual constitution of identities provides one important set of themes for the architecture of postcolonial studies, notions of ambivalence and resistance provide another. Discussions are broad and include Bhabha's explorations of

Ali Rattansi

Mimicry, speculation about the functioning of the imperialist sexual desire for the Other and readings of the peculiarities of white women's perceptions of the colonized. It may seem inappropriate to bring together such a disparate work under the banner of ambivalence and resistance. But what may connect them is, I think, a specific element of postcolonialism that needs to be emphasized in a way that has not always been made explicit. That is, there is an aspect of this research that points to a chronic cultural and psychological instability at the heart of the colonial project, a kind of intrinsic dynamic of destabilization whose mechanisms revolve around a complex tangle of self/other relationships as they are operationalized , formed through sexuality and sexual difference. In the process of explaining this body of ideas in this way, I will read or reread some postcolonial works, particularly those of Bhabha, in a way other than the explicit letter of the text, or, to be more precise, I will read this work and adapt it. it to better fit my own interpretation of the psychological and sexual dynamics of colonization. Elsewhere I have discussed what I call the sexualization of colonial discourses in much more detail than is possible in this essay. Here I will only sketch the main lines of how sexuality and gender functioned to destabilize relations between colonized and colonizers in ways that posed a constant threat to the strict separation between the two on which the imperial project inevitably rested. Let us first take representations of "primitive" sexuality among "natives" in North American and African countries. The supposedly "observed" free and apparently natural sexual expression was a source of fascination, attraction as well as fear and revulsion, with African and North American "Indian" men and women functioning as sexual others onto whom the fears and desires of the individual were projected. European man. In pictorial representations, the homeland was often an attractive, half-naked woman inviting the European emperor to incur, while the local man was often portrayed as effeminate, without body hair, for example in the case of the North American "Indian" - and as the excess of his wife's sexuality. This kind of exotic eroticization of the native was an important element in its creation and recovery.

sexualities and gender relations at home. The white woman was, in many ways, considered closer to the native than to the white man. She allegedly shared the natives' inferior intelligence, excess of emotion and potential sexual debauchery - especially if she was of working-class origin - and therefore required the same subordination and control, but for the same reason, "protection" from men and the natives of the colony and their own sexual desire for others and other men, allowing for a legitimation of patriarchal gender relations at home and abroad. What is indisputably evident here are the projections of white male - especially male - desires and fears which constantly threatened to breach the all-important dichotomy between colonizer and native and which, in practice, were naturally breached by pervasive sexual attachments between the two, which have become increasingly the subject of investigations in recent years. Note also the importance of homoeroticism, sometimes under the surface, sometimes overt, as in the case of so many homosexuals who fled confinement at home to fulfill their desires and fantasies in the East. In a way, the worst fears of the white colonizer were realized in the persona of this strange creature, the white traveler, who, contrary to nineteenth-century expectations, decided to roam the colonies on his own, so to speak, to "see" himself and then the others committing the greater transgression of writing about their "experiences". Women traveling to colonies, imperial outposts, and soon-to-be-colonized "virgin" territories tended to write in a different register than that produced by the imperial gaze of the male "explorer" and adventurer. As Mills pointed out, women's travel writing had more in common with that other tradition of travel writing, which Pratt categorized as a "sentimental" rhetoric in which the narrator is prominent and relationships with "natives" become a crucial feature. of the narrative. Women's travel literature, produced in the gaps of two opposing thematic positions - one that referred to the privacy of care and emotional labor, and the other that demanded a certain imperial authoritarian and authoritarian distance - was often even more related to native sympathies'. As such, it often functioned as a counterdiscourse, hegemonized by

Postcolonialism and its Discontents

Subject to imperial assumptions about the “civilizing” mission and significant ambivalence, particularly when the appeal of the suffrage movement conflicted with the demands of the campaign to abolish slavery, it can be seen as potentially undermining the colonizer/colonized binary in a destabilizing way. It is not entirely clear how the "memsahibs" reacted to the Western educated Indian middle and upper classes. But it's time to revisit the importance of the effeminacy of these local men, an issue that organized Sinha's already discussed work. Smoothing can be seen as a way of downplaying a very particular threat posed by such natives. Both the threat and the response to it must be seen in the context of women and natives alike who chronically live as potential nightmares for upper-class colonial men's desire for control not only over relations between themselves and others, but also over the potential fragmentation of the internally torn male self. Here, an adaptation of Bhabha's brilliant insights into the effects of 'mimicry' provides an understanding of other mechanisms that destabilized the colonial project from within. Macaulay's famous Minute on Indian Education, which was the immediate catalyst for the development of a form of education to form "a class of people Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, opinions, morals and intellect". who would act as "interpreters between us and the millions we govern", as Macaulay himself put it, were very successful, but not necessarily with all the consequences he intended. For the Anglicized Indian, the acquisition of taste and the attainment of some heights of English intellectual achievement also implicitly challenged the inherent inferiority of the native. He may have mastered the nuances, and especially not the pronunciation, but this only served to produce in the colonies what Bhabha calls "the bifurcated language of English colonialism", a source and form of chronic ambivalence, for the colonialist was now permanently confronted with a kind of grotesque shadow, which returned the gaze of the colonizer, partially suppressing it. Mimicry, then, is both a successful outcome of a technology of power and discipline, an "English creation", but also a "threat", a threat which - and this is a point which

Bhabha implicitly leaves behind - it was no small influence in the formation of intellectuals who demanded the freedom that many who opposed the teaching of English feared as a result of the teaching of English in the colonies. The history of nationalisms in the colonies could, with some exaggeration, be told as the history of the production of subjects who, through "English" education, both in the colonies and in the center, appropriated some of the cultural resources to be contested and eventually overthrow the state of submission. This is mimicry as agency and empowerment, initiated through an almost inevitable process given the demands of imperial rule. One might legitimately doubt the political significance and effectiveness of ambivalence as a form of resistance – Bhabha is symptomatically silent on this issue. And at this point we are immediately confronted with other difficulties, paradoxes and ironies: Why the continued influence of "English" education in the former colonies, the differentiation of these societies as national states, etc., also sharply raises the question of the meaning of the idea of “postcolonialism” or “postcolonialism” can indeed be attributed and provides a convenient bridge to the second part of my discussion, which raises a number of questions that threaten to defeat the whole idea of ​​“postcolonial studies”.

2 The “post” and the “colonial” in postcolonial studies: some thorny issues On closer examination, the idea of ​​“postcolonial” reveals a chronic set of difficulties often shared with other fashionable “posts” today, namely “postmodernism”. (more on that later). First, consider an apparent confusion between "imperial" and "colonial". In previous works, I used the terms almost synonymously. But it erases an important distinction. Indeed, for some analytical purposes, it seems important to distinguish between colonialism, as a particular form of direct domination, most often involving colonization by a foreign power, and imperialism, which can be reserved as a label for a more extensive expansionism. diffuse. Despite the obvious overlap, the two could be discussed with

Ali Rattansi

have different dynamics and different consequences for the "periphery" and for the "center". Usage would have to depend on specific contexts, as in many general discussions it is clear that "imperial" might be allowed to include the specifics of "colonial". But that just raises another question. Given that the term 'post-colonial' seems to have prevailed over the more general term 'post-imperial', when is the 'post-colonial' moment supposed to start? Some authors argue that it starts at the same moment as the beginning of imperialism, which is used interchangeably with "colonial", since "post-" means above all resistance and active differentiation of imperial constraints. For others, the term is essentially an alternative to the ubiquitous Western term "postwar" (referring to World War II). It does not seem useful to argue that at the moment of resistance to the imperial encounter, that is, almost at the beginning of the imperialist onslaught, we are already in some kind of “postcolonial” period. This aims to homogenize very complex historical structures and time periods. While all conceptual distinctions can only be preliminary and related to specific analytical projects, I would argue that the notion of "postcolonial" must be qualified in terms of historical periodization, unless strong arguments speak against it about spacetimes passing through history. Formal independence of former colonies from Western powers was opened. This implies that specifically "postcolonial" writing can emerge after the end of formal colonialism. What we have before this formal separation are forms of colonial a»fi writing that obviously cannot reflect the structures and events triggered after independence. Even historical writings on colonialism written after the end of formal colonialism can bear traces of the postcolonial experience and can therefore be characterized as part of a postcolonial work, although they do not always qualify as postcolonial in the specific sense. of "postcolonial studies". . as described in the first part of this essay. But isn't 'neocolonial' a preferable term to postcolonial, as it more clearly indicates the many forms of continuity between periods of colonialism and formal independence? Furthermore, as Young points out, the concept can have the benefit of drawing attention to the present, away from an endless

Reenacting the colonial encounters of the 18th and 19th centuries. There is something to this argument. However, I do not believe that the reasons given are convincing enough that “neocolonial” can replace rather than complement “postcolonial”. On the one hand, we are still learning a great deal from the new ways in which the colonial encounter is reenacted in postcolonial studies. Second, the problem with the term neocolonial is its connotation of a relationship between ex-colony and ex-colonizer, which seems to posit a rather conspiratorial role for imperial power in the new period, and which also passively implies a role for those who govern the now independent states of Africa, Asia and so on. At this point in the discussion, it is appropriate to invert the argument we have just considered and ask whether the designation “postcolonial” for certain periods and nation-states does not in fact exaggerate the effects of colonialism on the societies of both colonized and colonizers. The simple answer, I think, is that the term may indeed imply exaggerated effectiveness. Fostcolonial as a label can distract from the myriad other influences in shaping these societies. This is a question I will return to at the end of the article. Incidentally, this is also a suitable point to argue that, in view of the thesis of the mutual interdependence of cultures and identities developed in Postcolonial Studies, the term postcolonial should also be considered relevant to societies of excolonial powers for the former. -colonies. Now it's time to address another issue that becomes relevant in this context. Is it useful to group African, Asian and Latin American societies/national states, Australia, New Zealand and sometimes Canada and the US as “postcolonial” when they have shaped and occupy such different histories? disparate time periods in the world's current cultural, economic, and geopolitical order? It obviously isn't. The concept of postcolonialism can only provide the most general framework for analysis. Clearly, what is also needed is historical imagination and contemporary analysis that is aware, to take just one example, of the sense of marginality felt by white Australians and Canadians.

Postcolonialism and its Discontents

Metropolis-related writers are not of the same magnitude as indigenous African and Asian writers, though it is true that all of them have suffered a certain stigma by being lumped together as part of what is known as "commonwealth literature" worthy but not quite. (to adapt a sentence from Bhabha's suggestive analysis of native "imitator" status). The point must be extended to any analysis of the general issue of the relative marginalization and peripheralization of the former White Dominions and those of sub-Saharan Africa and India in relation to Britain and the United States. But the legitimacy of the term "postcolonial" can still be seriously questioned when viewed from the perspective of indigenous peoples in North and South America, Australia and New Zealand, who are still fighting what they may see as anti-colonial struggles. Here, too, an extreme sensitivity to historical ruptures and the peculiarities of space-times is crucial for the idea of ​​the “postcolonial” to retain a certain analytical value. It is about recognizing the productivity of chronic ambivalence and potential destabilization within the discourse of 'postcolonialism', an argument effectively explored in Prakash. Finally, to bring this type of conceptual groundwork to a tentative conclusion, one might ask whether globalization is a better concept than postcolonialism, especially as it is broader and includes within its scope nation-states that do not have significant formal modern history of colonialism, but who are nonetheless participants in the current world order. However, in my view, it would be a mistake to create this type of binary bet. We need both concepts, one to signal a very general process of space-time condensation - to borrow Harvey's inelegant but succinct phrase - and the other to remind those who insist on interpreting the narrative of globalization in this way by writing, as if the process had started from the internal dynamics of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the West, that imperial expansion and colonialism were essential constitutive features and, in fact, launched both globalization and Western capitalism and as continuing driving forces. The credibility of the idea of ​​“postcolonialism” has been tentatively established by the discussion thus far, or so I would say, though not without depriving it of certain presumptions that would otherwise be possible.

make the concept vulnerable to rejection. However, a number of difficult questions remain and will continue to confound those who intend to work in the ground opened up by the insights of postcolonial studies. [...]

Finally, not that this is the end of the story. Ahmad, for example, has argued that much of what passes for postcolonial scholarship, so often undertaken by scholars whose origins are in the former colonies and who are now established in some of the elite metropolitan universities, poststructuralism as merely a List used some sort of science to ally itself with some of the hottest but non-threatening fashions. This allowed academics to achieve lucrative positions and gain prestige in the field, while at the same time disentangling themselves from the realities and political complications of their home countries. Others (Dirlik, for example) go even further, arguing that postcolonialism involves a serious neglect of the role of global capitalism in perpetuating global inequalities in the present, and that postcolonial studies can merely serve the cultural demands of capitalism. global. There is probably a grain of truth in all the irritation. But no more than a grain. Postcolonial scholarship is an international enterprise, and one of its most impressive aspects is the way in which it has inspired younger scholars in the former colonies, as well as younger researchers in the metropolis, to undertake studies of the colonial encounter that are startlingly new and are profound, and are endeavors in which the holy trinity of Said, Bhabha and Spivak, to name the most prominent target of criticism, has served as an admirable source of inspiration. While there are always dangers of academic monopolization, Ahmad's Marxism has not escaped this insidious institutionalization. Furthermore, Ahmad seriously underestimates the long-term importance of critical intellectual work. There is an important point about the disappearance of the general intellectual of the previous type, for example, Sartre or C.L.R. James, which Said laments about in Culture and Imperialism, but this is an altogether more sophisticated argument than the one presented by Ahmad.

Peter Mark

And, to get to Dirlik's dissatisfaction, it is simply wrong to say that global capitalism has been ignored in postcolonial research, despite an apparent concern to find non-reductionist ways of relating global capitalism to the cultural politics of colonialism and, indeed, colonialism. find structures that allow imperial and colonial enterprise to be seen not as external appendages of global capitalism, but as essential building blocks (see Hall for a detailed critical reading of Dirlik, which reveals its internal contradictions). Said's "Culture and Imperialism", Viswanathan's "Masks of Conquest", Spivak's "In Other Worlds", Niranjana's "Situing Translation", Sinha's "Colonial Masculinity", Chatterjee's "Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World" - only some of those in my work The Works Cited – have distinct but clear emphases on the constitutive relationship between imperialism, colonialism, class relations and global capitalism. However, there are some caveats I would like to add. Although postcolonial researchers have been sharply critical of the consequences of nationalist policies in former colonies, it is not clear what kind of alternative vision they want to promote. In the last part of Culture and Imperialism, Said makes a bold but, in my opinion, ultimately feeble attempt to promote a kind of politics of cultural hybridity that tries to summon some optimism and finds an important role for postmodern intellectual work. -colonial, but remains vague and perhaps naive. On the other hand, it is also naive to expect that any politics, whether emancipatory or conservative, will be read within the postcolonial framework in the same way that there is no necessary political affiliation with postmodernism (an argument Boyne and I elaborate in another place). . ). . However, related to this, and this may be why so much postcolonial scholarship is undertaken by historians and literary critics,

little attempt is made to connect contemporary "development" problems. But it is precisely here that sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and economists with a postcolonial sensibility can make important contributions to a field of development research that is in crisis. In conclusion, it should be noted that any imperialist mission on the part of postcolonial studies must be deflated. Postcolonialism is just one way of looking at the formation and dynamics of today's world. It cannot function as a totalizing perspective, indeed it cannot, for it cannot remotely provide all the intellectual frameworks needed for any kind of analysis, cultural or otherwise. Just one example: labeling contemporary Indian or African cinema as “postcolonial” allows for only limited insights. There's so much more to say. . . The undertaking of Postcolonial Studies is, therefore, little problematic. But it is still the site of very fundamental new insights. At the risk of paradox, it can be said that it provides a non-essentialist but essential, non-fundamentalist basis for mapping the past, present and future in an era of transition. The proliferation of so many "stains" in the social and human sciences is symptomatic of a widespread recognition that the old categories are no longer enough, even if the refusal to name something positive, the tendency to just point out the passage of something familiar testifies to a profound uncertainty on how to portray the future. And, to reinforce an earlier argument, postcolonialism signals a more general decentering of the West, both from within and without – an internal dissolution as the Enlightenment project is challenged on multiple fronts, and an external transformation as the Western hegemony comes in The world order is under severe pressure.

Said's Orientalism: An Important Contribution Today Peter Marcuse Edward Said Analysis of Orientalism was a powerful critique showing how a concept was worked out

academic writing and popular discourse practically acquired hegemonic status, although both were wrong

Said's Orientalism

and support relations of domination and exploitation at the international level. His conclusion hardly needs demonstration today, when policymakers in the United States question Middle East policy as undertaken "to obtain empirical evidence, to test an assumption" that "the Arab-Islamic world is inherently allergic to democracy." Said's Orientalism, perhaps his most important book, is an impressive model of engaged intellectual work in which the connection between profound scholarly endeavor and immediate political reality is ever-present. Much can be learned by trying to apply the same critical approach to other hegemonic concepts of our time. What follows is a first attempt to do this with the concept of globalism. I would like to argue that the richness of Said's approach can be extended directly to an analysis of the concept of globalism, which in this sense is the heir to the mantle of Orientalism. Just as 'Orientalism' has been used to describe and categorize a particular geographic region, its people and culture, I would like to use the term 'globalism' to indicate the way in which certain real-world processes are common at the international level summarized under the term "globalism" term globalization, are discussed and presented in academic and popular circles. Edward Said defined Orientalism as the hegemonic view in the "West" of the inferiority of the "Orient", a view that anticipates and justifies a colonial relationship between dominant and subordinate, expressed in culture, language, ideology, social science, media, etc. the political discourse. In Said's highly influential book of that title, he sets out in vivid and often controversial prose the minute details of how Orientalism permeated the worldview of leaders in European and American societies, not as deliberately malicious racism, but as often unconscious and sometimes benevolent, an intended set of attitudes and prejudices arising from power relations. While Orientalism predated 19th and 20th century colonialism by several millennia, its earlier expressions encouraged its later direct use in support of imperial policies in England, France, and eventually the United States. Said begins his analysis with a scathing look at a 1910 parliamentary speech by Arthur Balfour, which reveals the condescending treatment of 'Orientals' and the unquestioned belief in 'Western' supremacy. He then proceeds to trace the manifestations of the same views in an implicit and even covert, yet penetrating way.

Literature, films, public speaking and works of art. Said's work is an excellent example of what Pierre Bourdieu would call human capital at the service of power. “Globalism” is an apt term for the recent manifestation of the pervasiveness of power relations in the political and cultural understanding of our time. I use the term in a very specific and limited sense. Globalism is the lens (trope, metaphor, set of implicit assumptions, worldview, discourse) that underpins almost all current policies of most governments in the international arena. She regards the process of globalization as new, as the dominant feature of our time, as a structural process that is independent of specific choices, inevitable in its current form, and beneficial to all, although certain distributional inequalities may be seen as in need of correction. It is the lens through which much of the scholarly and intellectual discussion of globalization views its subject. Globalization in its current form is the greater internationalization of capital, accompanied by and using significant advances in communication and transportation technology, with recognizable consequences for cultural, domestic and international political relations, changes in capital-labour power relations, labor processes, national roles, governments, urban standards, etc. Globalism is to real globalization what Orientalism is to colonialism. Globalism is the hegemonic metaphor through which the current process of globalization is seen/represented. It sees development in the "developed world" as inevitably following the superior path of development of the "developed world", just as Orientalism sees the "Orient" following (if it can) the superior form of development of the "West". Replacing the West with the G7 and the East with the Third World allows us to fruitfully apply Said's insights, keeping in mind the different roles of racism, geographic coverage, and cultural biases associated with the parallels. Globalism accepts the inevitable dominance of global interests – especially of globally organized capital over all areas of life and all countries of the world – as obviously true and without need of proof. Just as Orientalism paralleled and legitimized colonialism, imperialism, and Western domination over “Third World” countries, so too does globalism parallel them.

Peter Mark

and legitimizes the priority of global capitalism over all forms of social organization and the dominance of capital over labor. Wie Said, in a subtle discussion, recognizes the significant contribution that Orientalist scholars have made in gathering facts and expanding knowledge about other societies little known to Western audiences, namely, the contribution of globalist scholars in expanding knowledge and understanding. of the scope and functioning of global capital must be recognized. However, in both cases, the underlying assumptions correspond to the needs of the established power. Indeed, Orientalism and globalism intersect in critical ways: the implicit racism/chauvinism and the unconditional acceptance of developed nations' value systems and finances (implicit in the acceptance of what "development" means) feed both and serve to sustain the dominance of both at home nations and between them. Globalism, like Orientalism, is effective because it pretends not to be an ideology, just a science or description of the world as it is. As Pierre Bourdieu said: "It goes without saying because it is self-evident." As Said argues, "the Orient" is an artificial concept, largely created by scholars and writers to describe a subject that does not exist in reality - or rather, something that exists in reality, to bring it into a form that makes a difference. difference is manageable and manipulable by the great powers located predominantly in the western industrialized countries - so "globalism" is an artificial term that packs a series of developments whose real etiology is hidden in a single something, which must be accepted as a "force", as an actor to whom a whole series of outcomes can then be attributed, for which no one or group is responsible, which simply become part of reality, a given object to be examined and understood, described and needs to be quantified. But globalization is not an object, just as eastern countries are not; both are names, concepts created artificially in a specific social, political and historical context and serving a specific social, political and historical purpose. There is as little "force" of globalization as there is a "place" called the Orient. The role played by Balfour in Said's account is comparable to that played by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan with politics in the rise of globalism.

Advisors like the former Jeffrey Sachs and institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and discussions like the one in Davos played an important role. In the social sciences, the line that Said meticulously follows could be traced in the case of globalism, with WW Rostow as an early exponent and Manuel Castells in his current work, or Anthony Giddens today as one of its last and most challenging; Francis Fukuyama presents the worldview in a more raw form, as well as Thomas Friedman. The policies that Said attributes to the lords of the British Empire in the 19th century find their direct counterpart in the lords of the Washington Consensus of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. But Edward Said's true contribution is not to document the explicit prejudices and stereotypes of the colonialists, but rather to draw the subtler but pervasive and hegemonic parallels of colonialism in the language, metaphors, discourse and cultural production of his time. Indeed, language, metaphors, discourses are points in an ever-widening spectrum of representation that is Said's basic theme: a lens through which the world or parts of it are viewed is the simile he himself uses. Globalism deserves equal attention today as the lens through which globalization is viewed and represented. The problem is not with the science that studies the operations of global capital, nor with the science that studies the history or culture of colonial societies. Rather, it lies in the unconditional acceptance of the adequacy of what is being studied, the penetration of its reality, just before its inevitability. Assurances of the inevitability of global capital's growing dominance over all other forms of economic and social organization contribute to this dominance, just as guarantees of the inevitability of imperial relations contribute to their continued dominance. The uses of globalism are myriad; they support and legitimize globalization and neutralize resistance to it. Globalism is the response of the World Economic Forum in Davos to the challenge of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre; Where Porto Alegre's slogan is: "Another world is possible", Davos responds: "TINA, there is no alternative: a truly existing globalization is inevitable". Globalism is the underlying understanding of world trade

Said's Orientalism

The organization's response to Seattle and its successors, which frames the advocacy of NAFTA and the FTAA in the United States, empowers employers in their dealings with unions everywhere that justify low wages in developing countries. Globalism can also be used locally, supporting a unique coalition in which purely local interests, such as homeowners, local political leaders or locally connected residents, support a location marketing strategy that emphasizes a location's key position in global exchanges. . The fact that global and local constraints are often as complementary as they are at odds has been emphasized often enough; both rely on globalism when it suits them, and neither is internally homogeneous. Said's nuanced discussion of Orientalism suggests a similar caution in describing science related to globalization. In both cases there is an underlying and important reality that calls for investigation, and in both cases key figures in its exploration have contributed greatly to the knowledge of the subject. Just as Said praises Vico and the authors of the Napoleonic expeditions, scholars such as Friedmann and Sassen have contributed greatly to understanding new developments on the world stage. The issue is not so much the merits of this effort as whether the underlying current, categorized here as globalism, has not undermined the very usefulness of the term. A similar situation comes to mind with the term "underclass", which William Wilson used to describe actual developments in the inner cities of the United States. After considerable criticism from, for example, Herbert Gans and reflection, Wilson dropped the term altogether and replaced it with the less memorable but more clearly defined term "ghetto poor". Likewise, in the absence of hegemonic globalism, the term "globalization" may slowly be abandoned in favor of the more apt, if less elegant, "internationalization of capitalism". A problem with this presentation of Said Orientalism and globalism here is that both the worldview being criticized and the material for its critique come from similar, sometimes even identical, sources. Much of the material Said cites comes from Westerners, from the Western side of the Orientalism lens. Likewise, much of the material that provides the most scathing critiques of globalism comes from writers, researchers, and activists who are on the side of globalism.

victims of globalization. Their sympathies are on the other side of the lens of globalism, even if their "real" position is on the viewer's side. So it is with Said: among the shrewdest materials he cites is that of observant Western observers, whose shrewdness he generously acknowledges. One would expect the real representatives of the East to provide material for Said's indictment: why is there so much support for his position in the work of Western scholars and leaders, from eleventh-century Christian writers through Napoleon to the present? One would expect Franz Fanon; but the chair holders at elite universities in the United States? The answer perhaps lies in Said's use of the term "Orientalism" in a grammatical discrepancy with the term "Orientalist". It results from a differentiation that I would like to make explicit here. Much of the argument against Orientalism actually comes from Orientalists; This term is used to denote those who study the discourse of Orientalism and the realities artificially subsumed under the term, rather than proponents of the Orientalist point of view. Likewise, many, including some of the most prominent writers on globalization, attack the implications of globalism. One can distinguish three types of authors, both in the case of orientalists and globalists: (1) those who adopt the point of view of orientalism or globalism, the Balfours and the Rostovs; While Said uses the term orientalist more broadly, in the case of globalism the term "globalist" could be applied specifically to this group - the legitimizers of globalization, the globalists par excellence; (2) those who study, describe, document, analyze the processes taking place in the "East" or "Globalization", who implicitly accept the principles of the subject, but who view their results critically and who can provide accurate and useful information to be Comprehensive ; also orientalists in Said's terminology, here perhaps (a little more complicated) the "globalization scholars"; and (3) students, writers, and activists on issues of orientalism and globalism who engage in critiques of globalism, but who often move in circles that overlap with those of the scholar. Said would certainly also describe himself as an Orientalist, but in the sense of a critic of Orientalism, an Orientalist in the sense of (3), not (1), but circulating in many of the same circles as (2), scholars of the Orient. and for sure

Peter Mark

Many who study globalization see themselves as concerned with the same issues and in the same circles as students of globalization. The dividing lines are not sharp here. Globalists celebrate globalization and are in no doubt about its existence, but their work may involve an academic examination of aspects of the underlying reality. Scholars of globalization may reveal some of its negative realities, but they generally do not question its fundamental principles in their work; and critics of globalism often contribute to its scholarly analysis. But at the extremes, the roles are clear.

Limn. If anyone were as learned as Said, he could go back still further and look at the depictions of the poor in Victor Hugo, or in Shakespeare's Coriolanus, or perhaps even in Cicero; I don't think it's found in the classical Greeks, because here the poor were simply excluded from consideration as slaves. In any case, today, through the lens of globalism, the representation of the poor turns into a discourse about included and excluded, developed and underdeveloped, industrial and not yet industrial, rich and poor - and thus the global and the non-global or globalizing. .

Said speaks of Orientalism as an external view of the colonies, a Western lens adapted to Western needs. If the difference between "West" and "East" is a reality - and it is - is there a parallel with views on globalism? It is Westerners who, on the one hand, look through the lens of Orientalism and, on the other hand, see a distorted reality; They are not on either side of the lens. None of us, in "developed" or "developing" countries, is outside the reality of globalization that lies behind the lens of globalism, the reality of the internationalization of capital, which indeed affects all economies, all policies, all cultures, all languages, all ways of life, albeit in very different forms. But the lens of globalism is not generalized, created without actors and without any specific purpose. It is a view from above, of those in power capable of dominating and exploiting. They are as active in "developing" countries as they are in "developed" countries, just as Orientalists are as common in countries of the East as they are of the West. The purpose it serves is to distort the reality of the ruled and exploited, the oppressed, the subordinate. This is a reality that defenders of globalism do not share, do not know. As with Said's Orientalism, this lens was formed long before the lens was perfected in its current form and use, long before some who are globalizers and some who are globalized spoke of it. It draws on an image of the poor that the rich or their apologists have developed over the centuries: on the distinction between the worthy and the unworthy poor, the images of slum life that Jacob Riis described as depraved, Karl Marx's characterization of the lumpen proletariat, the thesis of the culture of poverty by Oscar Lewis, the descriptions of the poor and criminals so well described by Frances Piven and Michel Foucault and so well described by Bertold Brecht

It seems churlish to push the parallel further with poverty scholars and say that their aim is to facilitate control over "the poor", just as the aim of the Orientalists (in Sense 1) was to facilitate control and enlightenment of "the Orient". But there are parallels. In the Manhattan Institute's attack on the homeless, the approach is to categorize the poor in order to control them, separately addressing the troubling characteristics of each individual; not even a tendency to housing injustice or desperate poverty is visible. The same applies to some initial studies on poverty and even to some projects like the settlement houses (certainly the houses of the poor) of the past. Loic Wacquant attacks some recent studies on poverty in the same way, although he makes no distinction between intention or motive and objective effect. But the motives of many Orientalists were also benevolent. To the extent that the poor in early British Studies and the Pittsburgh Study are portrayed as exotic and studied as alien objects, the parallel is true. But of course the critical view is also strong; Barbara Ehrenreich's most recent book aims precisely at de-exoticizing the poor. Orientalism's plans seem clear enough, from the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt to British actions in the Middle East at the beginning of the century. So do the projects of globalism, from the Bretton Woods Agreement to the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Interestingly, the Bush administration's actions in Afghanistan and Iraq today seem closer to Said's orientalism than Davos' globalism; Palestinian policy even more. Is the desire for empire the successor to globalism? Indeed, in many ways it seems to go against the globalist policies of the past; its unilateralism,

Said's Orientalism

Reliance on brute force and protectionism at home contradict what globalists have long advocated. Is the drive towards empire just a temporary aberration, or does it now represent a new constellation of forces and, if so, one within or in place of the relations of globalism? Because the process is linked to real historical movements, it is also a process of counter-moves, exposing distortions and presenting alternative narratives. Said also played a decisive role in this countermovement. One of Edward Said's outstanding contributions was the clarification of the intellectual basis upon which colonial relations between "West" and "East",

imperial and colonial powers were (and are) being built. The Orientalist worldview continues into the period of globalization; it is not replaced by globalism, but complemented by it. In the ongoing conflict between the forces of exploitation and domination, Edward Said's multifaceted contributions have been a powerful weapon on the side of social justice and the fight for a humane world. The struggle against globalism, exemplified by movements such as those represented at the World Social Forum, is not a substitute for, but a continuation of, the struggle in which Said played such a prominent role. We miss him already.

Despite being heavily attacked in the global economic crisis that raged in late 2007, neoliberalism has arguably been the most influential theory in globalization studies (and underpins the next chapter on structural adjustment). She has strong supporters and vocal detractors. However, critics have now gained the upper hand, at least for now, as much of this economic crisis is tied to neoliberal beliefs and policies of free markets and deregulation. It was the deregulation of banks, financial institutions and various markets that led to the collapse of high-risk companies (subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, derivatives, etc.), leading to the crisis. However, one cannot understand globalization without understanding neoliberalism. It was a key factor in creating the global age, and the problems it caused certainly had global implications. As the crisis deepened in Europe, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said, "It [neoliberalism] is a global problem and must have a global response."

Neoliberalism is a theory that has implications for globalization in general and for many of its elements. It is particularly applicable to the economics (particularly market and trade) and politics (the nation-state and the need to limit its participation in and control over markets and trade) of globalization.

Not only is it important in its own right, but it has also greatly influenced other thinking and theorizing about these two areas, as well as globalization in general. Several well-known scholars, particularly economists, are associated with neoliberalism. We begin this chapter with some ideas from a neoliberal economist - William Easterly - to give the reader a sense of this perspective. Easterly is opposed to any form of collectivism and state planning as advocated and practiced in the Soviet Union or as practiced today by the UN, other economists, and so on. Collectivism failed in the Soviet Union and Easterly believes it will fail today. It will fail because it inhibits, if not destroys, freedom; and freedom, particularly economic freedom, is strongly correlated with economic success. This is because economic freedom "enables the decentralized pursuit of success that is the hallmark of free markets." Economic freedom and the free market are the great favorites of neoliberal economists. two


Easterly offers several reasons why economic freedom is related to economic success. First, it is extremely difficult to know in advance what will and will not succeed. Economic freedom allows for a multitude of attempts and failures are eradicated. Over time, successes remain and serve to enable a high standard of living. Central


Planners can never be as knowledgeable as countless individuals who strive for success and learn from their mistakes and those of others. Second, markets provide continual feedback on what is successful and what is not; central planners lack this feedback. Third, economic freedom leads to relentless reallocation of resources to the successful; Central planners often have vested interests that prevent such redistribution. Fourth, economic freedom allows for large and rapid growth in size through financial markets and corporate organizations; central planners lack the flexibility to make large-scale changes quickly. After all, individuals and companies are willing to take big risks because of sophisticated contractual protections; central planners are risk averse because of their personal vulnerability when things go wrong. Much of the contemporary criticism of neoliberalism, particularly as it pertains to economics, can be traced to the work of Karl Polanyi and his 1944 book, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. He is the major critic of a narrow focus on economics, particularly economic liberalism's focus on the self-regulated or unregulated market, and basing everything on self-interest. In his opinion, these are not universal principles, but unprecedented developments that accompany the rise of capitalism. Polanyi shows that the laissez-faire system arose with the help of the state and was able to continue to function through state action. Furthermore, left to its own devices, the laissez-faire system threatened to destroy society. Indeed, it was such threats, but also real dangers, that led to reactions by society and the state (eg socialism, communism, New Deal) to defend itself from the problems of a free market, in particular the protection of its products and its products, to protect those who worked on it. The expansion of the laissez-faire market and the backlash against it is called the double movement. Whereas economic liberalism saw such reactions (including any form of protectionism) as "mistakes" that disrupted the functioning of economic markets, Polanyi saw them as necessary and desirable responses to the ills of the free market. Polanyi pointed out "the absurdity inherent in the idea of ​​a self-regulating market". He also described as mythical the liberal idea that socialists, communists, New Dealers, etc. they were involved in a conspiracy against liberalism and the free market. 4

What happened was not a conspiracy, but a natural, "spontaneous" collective response by society and its various elements threatened by the free market. Polanyi sees a reversal of the tendency towards social dominance of the economic system of his time: "Within nations, we are witnessing a development in the course of which the economic system ceases to dictate the law to society, and the primacy of society over this system is guaranteed." This promise to end the evils caused by the dominance of the free market system and also to produce more freedom instead of less. That is, Polanyi believed that collective planning and control would create more freedom, more freedom for all, than was available in the liberal economic system.

David Harvey argues that among the problems with neoliberalism as a theory is the fact that it assumes that everyone in the world desires very narrow and specific kinds of economic prosperity (economically prosperous, if not wealthy) and political freedom (democracy). . The fact is that there are huge cultural differences in how well-being (eg, not having to work too hard) and freedom (eg, not being impeded by the state, even if not democratically elected) are defined. Neoliberalism often reaches out to the North, US and/or global organizations (eg World Bank, International Monetary Fund) trying to impose its definitions of well-being and freedom on other parts of the world. Furthermore, there are large differences between individuals in each of these societies, with the result that these definitions are different from at least some of them, but still imposed on them. Another problem is that the theory obscures or obscures the social and material interests of those who direct such an economic system with its corresponding technological, legal and institutional systems. They are not being pursued because everyone around the world wants them or will benefit from them, but because some, particularly in the North, are heavily favored by them and therefore push them. Harvey makes a number of other criticisms of neoliberalism, including that it has caused financial crises in various countries around the world (eg Mexico, Argentina and now around the world); its economic record is dismal, having redistributed wealth (from the poor to the rich) rather than creating new wealth; turned everything into merchandise; helped


deteriorate the environment; In addition, there are signs that it is failing, such as deficit spending in the US and China, symptoms of an impending crisis (e.g., rising budget deficits, bailouts of financial institutions, the current recession), and evidence that the global hegemony of the USA is falling apart. Aiwha Ong makes an important contribution to our thinking about neoliberalism by distinguishing between neoliberalism as an exception and exceptions to neoliberalism. An example of neoliberalism as an exception is the creation of special economic zones in different parts of the world, largely separated from the rest of society and free from state control, and in which the market has more or less free rein. These are "exceptions" because the market is not as free in other parts of society. For example, early in its transition from a communist economic system, China established "special economic zones" and "special administrative regions" (as well as "urban development zones"), characterized by "special labor markets, investment opportunities and relative freedom." While the state retained formal control of these zones, de facto power resided with the multinational corporations (MNCs) that established themselves there. It was these companies that controlled 6

Migration to the zones and the way people live and work in the zones. Ong calls the political result of the construction of these zones graded sovereignty. That is, rather than governing the entire geographic area of ​​the nation-state, the national government retains complete control in some areas but cedes varying degrees of control in others to corporations and other entities. While the creation of these zones can bring a number of economic benefits, it can also create problems for the nation-state, which no longer has full control over its own borders. (This is another indication of the decline of the nation-state: see Chapter 6.) Ong is primarily concerned with neoliberalism as an exception, but she also deals with exceptions to neoliberalism. These can be double-edged. On the one hand, such exceptions can be used by the state to protect its citizens from the ravages of neoliberalism. In this way, subsidized housing can be maintained even if a city's budgeting practice is dominated by neoliberal authorities and processes. On the other hand, they can be used to exacerbate the effects of neoliberalism. For example, companies may exclude certain groups (such as migrant workers) from improvements in living standards associated with a free market economy.


Edward Cody, „No Joint European Strategy on

Beacon, 1944, 145. This much-quoted observation

Banks.” Washington Post October 5, 2008: A20.

was reworked in part in the output





present book.

"Chapter 2: Freedom vs.


collectivism in foreign aid i d . “Economic freedom of



Ebd., 251. Aiwha Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations

the world: annual report 2006 35.

in citizenship and sovereignty. Durham, NO. duke

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Politics

University Press, 2006, 19.

economic origins of our time. boston, massachusetts:

Freedom versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid

Liberty Versus Collectivism in Aid William Easterly 1 The New Collectivism Marx was right about at least one thing: "History repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce." 20th century catastrophes. Fortunately, the new collectivism is much more tepid - less extremist, less powerful and less coercive than the ideologies that caused so much tragedy in the communist bloc in the 20th century. The collapse of communism in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the great success of the centrally planned move to markets elsewhere, such as China and Vietnam, which remain nominally communist (along with the poverty of unrepentant communist states in Cuba and Korea of the North) discredited once and for all the communist notion of comprehensive central planning. Yet, in a not-so-amusing irony for its intended beneficiaries, the new absurd collectivism still lives on in the places that can least afford it - the world's poorest nations that receive foreign aid. Instead of the Berlin Wall, we have a “relief wall” behind which poor nations must move out of poverty through a collective top-down plan. Instead of individual freedom to prosper in markets, the successful approach of now rich nations, the poor must leave it to international experts to find the collective solution to their misery. St.



Through my academic research and field consulting work, I have gradually come to understand the tremendous power in the hands of our generation to end the massive suffering of the extremely poor [...] our markets Prosperity depends at least as much on collective decisions to combat disease, promote good science and universal education, provide critical infrastructure, and act collectively to help the poorest of the poor... Act collectively, through effective government action. education, infrastructure and, if necessary, foreign aid underpin economic success. Sachs says every poor country should have five plans, such as an "investment plan that shows the size, timing and cost of investments needed" and a "financial plan to fund the investment plan, including calculating the funding gap of the Millennium Development Goals, which is part of the financial need that donors need to fill." These plans have the helpful backing of the "international community": every low-income country should benefit from a unified and effective United Nations national team that oversees the work of UN agencies, the IMF and the world in one place. Coordinated In each country, the UN country team should be led by a single UN-based coordinator, reporting to the UN Development Programme, which in turn reports to the UN Secretary-General.

Jeffrey Sachs and The End of Poverty Lest you think I'm exaggerating, consider some of the statements made by Jeffrey Sachs, the most prominent and extreme pro-poverty speaker of the new collectivism. In his 2005 book The End of Poverty he recites from the first few pages:

It will all fit into a grand global plan to be led by the "UN Secretary General [who] must ensure that the Global Compact is put into operation". Like his collectivist predecessors, Sachs sees the acquisition of wealth primarily as a technical problem: “I think the most important reason for this

W I l l sou oriental

Prosperity spreads and why it spreads further is the transmission of technologies and the ideas on which they are based [...] science-based ideas for organizing production." "Africa's problems [...] are [...] resolvable with practical and proven technologies". He sees a kind of scientific specialist - the doctor - as a model for solving the problems of poverty: Development economics today is not like modern medicine, but it must strive for this. It can improve dramatically if development economists use some by adopting the most important lessons of modern medicine, both in the development of the underlying science and in the systematization of clinical practice, at which point science acts on a given patient as goods public goods that require solving a collective action problem to provide them. The state has a duty to provide such goods. However, Sachs (and the other collective approaches described below) seem to make little distinction between the lack of public goods and the lack of private goods, which is called poverty.

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals The United Nations is the main official promoter of today's collectivist fantasies. These are known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and are described on the United Nations website as follows: The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), ranging from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV /AIDS and providing universal primary education by the target date of 2015 is a blueprint that all countries of the world and all of the world's leading development institutions have agreed on. They made unprecedented efforts to address the needs of the world's poorest. Secretary-General Kofi Annan uses the collectivist "we": We will have time to achieve the Millennium Development Goals - globally and in most or even all countries - but only if we break with the usual scheme. We cannot win overnight. success will be

require sustained action over the decade on time. It takes time to train teachers, nurses and engineers; build roads, schools and hospitals; to grow the small and large companies that are capable of creating the necessary jobs and income. So we have to start now. And we need to more than double global development assistance in the coming years. Nothing less helps to achieve the goals. The general secretary uses "growth" as an active verb for business, something "we must start now". Somehow collective action will create jobs and income, in contrast to the decentralized efforts of individual entrepreneurs and companies operating in free markets. To the extent that private entrepreneurs are mentioned in the MDG campaign, they are “partners” subject to “our” determination: We further resolve to: […] work [...] building strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations civil society in pursuit of development and poverty eradication. One reason for this campaign is not only to help the world's poor, but also to help the United Nations, as Kofi Annan made clear at the World Summit on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2005: “It is also an opportunity to help the United Nations Nations revive the nations themselves. In doing so, it was successful, at least in the World Bank and IMF. These two organizations have long preached the merits of free markets and ignored the statist rhetoric of the UN bureaucrats who take on much of their planning. palace coup in favor of collectivist planning as follows: In the 1990s, the field of international development entered an era of reform and reshaping as disparities between rich and poor countries widened. World leaders, working with the UN and other multilateral institutions, have recognized the need for drastic action to ensure that developing countries benefit from globalization and that development aid funds are used fairly and effectively to achieve the global development goals, embodied in the UN

Freedom versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other national development goals.

and anti-poverty strategies. International organizations can support this process with technical assistance.

In their 2006 Global Monitoring Report: Millennium Development Goals: Strengthening Mutual Accountability, Aid, Trade and Governance, the IMF and World Bank make it clear that they are approaching MDG planning as a whole: “Donors and financial institutions international financial institutions must increase aid flows, improve the quality of aid and better align their support with country strategies and systems." like the World Bank and the IMF] still place emphasis on lending and reporting, not development results." I can't help but emphasize credit a few pages later and apologize because "in 2005, lending through BMD concessions have decreased".

In sector programs and projects, partner countries and development agencies use the MfDR when planning assistance programs or individual projects based on country outcomes and priorities set out in national or sector development plans.

They plan to change their approach to "implementing the results agenda":

It doesn't get any better than reading the rest of the MfDR Sourcebook. In [a] table [in] the MfDR Sourcebook states the sensible principle: "Keep measurement and reporting of results as simple, economical and user-friendly as possible." and easy-to-use measurement and reporting of results. The old collectivists were mortal; the new collectivists simply bury the questions of life and death under six layers of bureaucracy. Examples of tools used to manage results in development agencies M&E systems, plans and policies (with MIS) Audit and risk management frameworks Performance measurement frameworks Program/project monitoring frameworks

The 2004 Results Round Table in Marrakech called for a monitoring system to assess the results orientation of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs); this system is COMPAS, the Common Performance Assessment System, which builds on MDS frameworks and action plans to implement Management for Development Results (MfDR).

Managing for Development Results ( MfD R ) What exactly is MfDR? It is summarized in Principles in Action Managing for Development Results: Emerging Good Practice Guidance (MfDR Handbook), prepared by the OECD and the World Bank. To clear up any confusion, the MfDR Sourcebook states that "performance management is a holistic, cultural shift." More specifically, the MfDR seems to involve a lot of central planning, such as the following: At the national level, the MfDR is involved in the planning and implementation of national results-based plans,

Audit tools and guides Assessment tools and guidelines Risk analysis tools and guidelines Training and guides for indicator design, data collection and analysis

All MDG planners often use the word "accountability" without understanding what "accountability" is. Unlike the individual responsibility every producer faces in free markets (you keep the customers happy or you close the deal), the pursuit of the MDGs has something called "mutual responsibility". This obscure notion seems to involve accountability, not to the intended beneficiaries, but to the other bureaucracies involved in the MDG plan, all of which have an interest in the continuity of the current system, regardless of the results. Instead of individual responsibility, we have collective responsibility: “Development agencies, in close dialogue with national governments, are creating results-based country assistance strategies [...]

W I l l sou oriental

In this process, multiple agencies negotiate a collaborative process to support country outcomes.” A system where everyone (various agencies and governments) are collectively responsible is equivalent to a system where no one is individually responsible. If there are disappointing results, you can always blame someone else. Collective responsibility is the responsibility that collective farms have for individual property rights.

2. Liberty versus Collectivism in Economic Development: The Empirical Record The empirical record of the difference between the economic performance of liberty and that of collectivism is clear enough to anyone after the events of the last half-century. There was a period between the 1930s and 1950s when the rapid growth of the Soviet Union (since considered grossly exaggerated) left observers uncertain which system produced better economic results. Unfortunately, these were the formative years of development economics and aid policy that led many early development economists to recommend that poor countries imitate the collectivist model, emphasizing forced saving and investment to achieve growth and planning. national economy (somewhere in the underworld between central planning and the free market). Although the World Bank and IMF abandoned central planning as a recommended approach for poor countries in the 1980s, foreign aid has never shaken its collectivist origins. On the one hand, the World Bank and the IMF continued to function as important planning organizations; only the plans, guided by top-down experts, now included the assumption of free market liberalization (known as "structural adjustment"). Top-down planning by foreign experts and bureaucrats about how to implement free markets did not produce good results in the areas where it was most practiced, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and (ironically) the former Soviet Union. This has led to the unfortunate backlash against free markets that we see in many parts of these regions today. To protect themselves, aid organizations withdrew from the MDG planning described in the first section.

This is ironic, because the fall of the Berlin Wall and the increased access to information about the Soviet Union and its satellites made it clear how the most extreme version of collectivism had failed. Even before that, it was quite obvious that free societies were dramatically superior to collectivist ones, as made clear by the most cursory knowledge of comparisons between East and West Germany, North and South Korea, or between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Link Between Economic Success and Economic Freedom Even today, long after the collapse of communism, there are still great differences between free and unfree societies. To formalize the obvious, economic success is strongly correlated with economic freedom. I use the 2002 metric published in Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report to compare it with the most recent year for which a large sample of income data is available. Of course, there is a big problem of possible reverse causality - wealthier people may demand more economic freedom. Critics of the measures published in Economic Freedom of the World may also claim that they were constructed by people who previously held strong beliefs that economic freedom is associated with prosperity, and therefore the indices may be unwittingly skewed to include countries from which it is derived. known for giving higher scores to success stories. (I know of no reason to doubt the index published in Economic Freedom of the World, which uses only third-party data and contains no subjective judgments, but I am inclined to anticipate possible criticism.) Any such bias would introduce a second kind of reverse causality. To counteract these possible objections, I show an instrument variable regression in Table 1. Since the institutions of economic freedom originated in Europe and then spread to other temperate regions where Europeans settled (with some exceptions), I use the distance from the ecuador as a tool for economic freedom. Since several legal traditions (particularly the British) have favored economic freedom while others have not (obviously the socialist legal tradition), I use legal provenance as another set of freedom instruments. Test statistics on the validity of the instruments are mostly satisfactory, and we still show a very strong association between economic freedom and per capita income.

Freedom versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid

Table 1 IV Regression of Logarithmic Per Capita Income (Ipcy) in 2002 in the 2002 Ipcy2002 Economic Freedom Classifications of Economic Freedom in the World (from Economic Freedom of the World:

1.343 (8,48)**

Annual Report 2004) Constant

-0,495 (-0,47)



Sargan overidentification test: p-value


First-level F statistic on excluded


Instruments Instruments of economic freedom: distance from the equator, British, French, socialist or German legal origin. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

The “poverty trap” and the “big push”

An economy with twice the capital stock per person means an economy with roads that work all year round, rather than roads that are destroyed every rainy season; Reliable 24/7 electrical power instead of sporadic and unpredictable electrical power; Employees who are healthy and have their jobs versus employees who are chronically absent due to illness. The likelihood is that doubling the stock of human and physical capital will actually more than double income levels, at least at very low levels of capital per person.

Sachs gives the example of a road that is half paved and half impassable because of lack of bridges or faded sections. Repairing the impassable sections would double the road's length, but more than double the road's performance. "This is an example of the threshold effect, in which the stock of capital only becomes useful when it meets a minimum standard."

While economic freedom seems well established as a path to prosperity, advocates of collectivist solutions to global poverty argue that poor countries are trapped in a "poverty trap". The poverty trap would prevent poor nations from growing economically even if they had economic freedom, which would require a collectivist bailout. Again, Sachs is the leading proponent of the "poverty trap" hypothesis. In The End of Poverty he proposes three main mechanisms. First, the poor don't save enough.

The role of foreign aid is to increase the capital stock enough to break the threshold of what has become known as "The Big Push": "If foreign aid is significant enough and lasts long enough, the capital stock will increase enough to move up." Families above subsistence level [...-.] Growth becomes self-sustaining through household savings and public investment supported by household taxation.” Without outside help, Sachs said, "many reasonably well-governed countries are too poor to support the investment that must be made to climb the first rungs of the ladder."

When people are completely destitute, they need all or more of their income to survive. There is no margin of income above survival that can be invested for the future. This is the main reason why the poorest of the poor are more likely to fall into the trap of low or negative economic growth. They are too poor to save for the future and accumulate the capital that would lift them out of their present misery.

Before testing this hypothesis, it is important to note that these ideas are not new. Indeed, they were part of the founding ideas of development economics in the 1940s and 1950s, and development economists used them to insist that foreign aid was necessary for economic growth, just as Sachs is now doing half a century later. After $568 billion in aid to Africa, combined with the continent's economic stagnation over the past four decades and the success of poor countries receiving far less than a percentage of their income in aid to East Asia, one would think there was a little bit of skepticism associated. before repeating the ideas of the 1950s.

Sachs' second reason for the poverty trap "is a demographic trap, when impoverished families choose to have many children." Population growth is so high that it is outpacing savings (which was already very low for the first reason). The third element is to increase the return on investment with low initial capital per person (and low income per person):

Given the publicity these old aid ideas are getting, let's examine the poverty trap hypothesis and the need for the "Great

W I l l sou oriental

Table 2 Testing the poverty trap and economic freedom hypotheses for economic growth Instrumental variables

Dependent variable: per-


Head growth, 1960-2002

economic freedom in the world,


Average over 1970-2002


Log of Initial Per Capital Income

-0,014 (2,21)*


0,001 (-0,05)



S a r g a n overidentification test: p-value


F first level statistics on excluded instruments


Instruments of economic freedom: distance from the equator, British, French, socialist or German legal origin. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Push" against the claim that countries prosper with economic freedom. The poverty trap hypothesis would say that poor countries have low growth and rich countries have high growth, so there would be a positive association between initial income and growth. whether the country is "reasonably well governed" (for example, if the government is facilitating economic freedom) make reverse causality possible: A high value (the average level of) of economic freedom relative to initial income indicates that potential income (if the economic freedom hypothesis is true) is high compared to real income and therefore predicts faster growth.The results are shown in Table 2. The Poverty Trap Hypothesis Loses Crucially to the Declaration of Economic Freedom for the Rich Indeed, once economic freedom is controlled, poor countries initially grow faster than rich ones.What about the role of foreign aid in starting growth out of poverty? Does a "big push" of development aid lead to growth? There is a vast empirical literature on aid and growth, with the most recent judgments being that aid has no measurable impact on growth. I go back to the well again

to see how foreign aid flows affect the simple hypothesis tests presented in Table 2. In Table 3, I add foreign aid received as a proportion of the recipient's gross national income as an explanatory variable. Again, there is the problem of reverse causality. I use the population register as a tool for aid, exploiting a quirk of the aid system: small countries receive large portions of their income in aid, regardless of their economic performance or needs. Instrumentation for two trailing variables at the same time leads to more complicated identification problems and weak instruments, so we consider this exercise illustrative rather than definitive. Taking into account initial income and not economic freedom, the subsidy has no significant impact on economic growth. Once you are in control of economic freedom, aid has a negative and significant impact on growth. I hesitate to overemphasize this finding, as previous literature has generally found that subsidies have no negative, but zero, effect on growth. Much more robustness testing is needed before the negative result can be taken too seriously, and the problem of weak instruments also needs to be looked at much more deeply. However, at least this illustrative exercise agrees with the earlier literature that has no help. positive effect on growth.

Freedom versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid

Table 3 Per Capita Growth 1960-2002 as a Function of Aid, Initial Income, and Economic Freedom: Regressions Instrumental Variables Regression 1 Aid/GNI 1960-2001

-0,001 (-1,43)

Early income record, 1960

-0,001 (-0,29)

economic freedom in the world. Average 1970-2002

Regression 2 -0.003 (3.32)** -0.024 (2.68)** 0.024 (2.09)*

constant observations






S a r g a n Überidentifikationstest:

65 0,5718

P-value Instrument of Assistance: Population register in 1980. Instrument of Economic Freedom: Distance from the equator, British, French, Socialist or German legal origin. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

3 Hayek and the iPod: Why a World of Uneven and Unpredictable Economic Success Needs Economic Freedom What the collectivist view often overlooks is that success is rare, failure common. Economic success is always very uneven and unpredictable, in almost every conceivable unit of analysis. Economic freedom allows for the decentralized pursuit of success that is the hallmark of free markets. What will succeed is rarely known in advance. Many thousands of researchers make numerous attempts, which will please consumers. A free market system provides quick feedback on which products are successful and which are not, and researchers adjust accordingly. Successful activities attract more financial resources and more production factors and can be greatly expanded; those activities that consumers do not like are discontinued. Planners don't have a seek-and-feedback mindset; Instead, they implement a preconceived notion of what will work and continue to implement it regardless of whether it works or not. Economic success stories are often unexpected and unpredictable. MP3 players were invented a few years ago and looked promising as a great innovation.

Opportunity for music lovers to listen to massive amounts of their favorite music. Despite that promise, none of the early MP3 players caught the eye of consumers. (I was an early adopter and bought one of these at a high price to see it die quickly.) Apple Computer, Inc. was best known for its odd failures in the PC market. It came as a surprise when Apple Computer suddenly found a big hit in the iPod digital mobile device, which had a 7.8% market share of MP3 players in March 2006. So far, Apple has sold 50 million iPods. iTunes' corresponding application for selling music online by downloading it to an iPod accounts for 87% of legal music downloads in the United States. Ray Kroc was a salesman in the 1950s, selling multimixers, a machine that mixed six milkshakes at once. His original idea was to sell as many multimixers as possible. In 1954 he visited a restaurant called "McDonald's" in San Bernardino, California. He noticed that the McDonald brothers had eight multimixers running at full speed 24 hours a day. Initially, he wanted to recommend his methods to his other customers, thus increasing the demand for his multimixers. But then he changed his mind: he saw that making hamburgers, fries and milkshakes on an assembly line was one way to run a successful chain of fast-food restaurants. He forgot all about multimixers and the rest is


W I l l sou oriental

Golden arches as far as the eye can see. How many Ray Krocs has foreign aid lost to its emphasis on plans? Many US consumer markets are similarly dominated by a small number of successful brands. Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola together hold 7.5% of the US soft drink market. In third place is Dr. Pepper/Seven Up with another 15%. The remaining 10% of the market is made up of a large number of much smaller companies. Casual observation suggests many examples of brand dominance: Microsoft*, Starbucks,, Borders*, Barnes and Noble, etc. companies (as we'll see shortly), perhaps reflecting the kind of coincidence illustrated by the iPod and McDonald's


The uneven success of products is closely related to the uneven success of companies. Only 0.3% of companies in the United States accounted for 6.5% of all company sales in 2002. It is known that company size obeys Zipf's law (also known as power law), where the logarithm of the size is a negative linear function of the number of times the size occurs (or, equivalently, rank). Power laws have attracted a lot of attention; For the purposes of this article, suffice it to say that great successes are rare, while failures are common. In other words, the frequency distribution of firms (or of whatever unit we're interested in) has a long, thick tail on the right-hand side, of which there are many special cases, such as a lognormal distribution and a power law (distribution). Pareto). In other words, most of the distribution is concentrated at a median level, so there are a small number of companies that simply fall completely off the charts - well above what anything like a standard bell curve would predict. While big companies dominate the market, being a big company is not that easy. Of the top 100 companies in the world in 1912, some like Procter & Gamble* and British Petroleum were many times larger in 1995. They were the exception, however, as the 100 Great Companies of 1912 also included dinosaurs like Central Leather and Cudahy Packing in the United States. Only 19 of the 1912 Top 100 remained in the Top 100 in 1995, and 48 of the 1912 Big 100 disappeared completely by 1995. Business Books Reveal the Secrets of the Success of Some of the Great Companies Celebrated by the Author

to see companies going through hard times after the book was published. Business journalists celebrated Enron* for its innovative, up-to-the-minute approach. Even the most successful business gurus have their embarrassment: Tom Peters' 1982 mega-bestseller In Search of Excellence included among its acclaimed companies some that later went bankrupt, such as Atari Corporation, Wang Laboratories and Delta Air Lines. The difficulty of achieving and maintaining success is not unique to large companies. Each year, about 10% of existing businesses of all sizes go out of business. Not that opening a new company to replace those that are closing is so easy. More than half of all new businesses in the United States fail within four years of starting. Economic success and failure of individuals are also known to follow the same unbalanced trends. The distribution of individual income within countries generally follows a log-normal distribution for most of the income range (covering 9.7 to 9.9 percent of individuals), with a power law covering the 1 to 3 percent Richer. Of course, turning to international data, economic development is spectacularly uneven across countries and over time. High-middle-income observations have recently been confined to a few countries, and much of the world and much of human history has been devoid of this achievement. A small minority of episodes generate very high income, but this drops almost vertically as we move down the rankings.

Manufacturing exports per capita A development indicator that shows even greater differences between countries is manufacturing exports per capita. This reflects many different factors: the transition from agriculture to manufacturing as countries develop, the many factors that affect openness to international trade and competitiveness in international markets, the gravitational pattern of trade flows, and so on. However, on a more fundamental level than as a trade indicator, manufacturing exports reflect something that all countries can potentially do and all compete in the same global market. As an indicator, it also has the advantage of being valued at world market prices, as opposed to national income at different domestic prices, which are notoriously difficult to compare. In addition, exports of manufactured goods

Freedom versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid

are predominantly private sector dominated and, unlike some components of GDP, are subject to a market test such as Export success in manufactured goods ranges from over $25,000 per capita in Singapore to 2

Rough Figure 2 The relationship between English-rough and something-nothing with exemplary (non-)places, (non-)things, (non-)people and (non-)services

They represent a central point of tension and conflict in today's world. Obviously, there is great pressure not to overdo it, and often just the glocalization of something stands in the way of achieving global hegemony. We will return to this conflict and its implications below. While the other two quadrants (two and three) are clearly of a residual nature and of secondary importance, it must be recognized that there is, at least to some extent, a glocalization of nothing (quadrant two) and a grossization of something (quadrant 2). . three). Whatever the tensions between them, they are far less important than those between the stultification of nothingness and the glocalization of something. However, a discussion of the glocalization of nothing and the grossization of something makes it clear that grossization is not an unqualified source of nothing (it can contain something) and that glocalization should not be seen only as a source of something (it can contain nothing). ). The close and crucial relationship between (1) coarseness and nothing and (2) glocalization and something leads to the view that there is an elective affinity between the two elements of each of these pairs. Derived from the historically comparative sociology of Max Weber, the idea of ​​elective affinity is meant to imply that there is no necessary, legal

causal relationship between these elements. That is, neither in the case of grossization and nothing, nor in the case of glocalization and something, one of these elements "makes" the other exist. Rather, the development and spread of one tends to go hand in hand with the other. In other words, grossization/nothing and glocalization/something are mutually supportive; they tend to bond with each other. It is therefore much easier to coarsen nothingness than something: the development of the gross creates a favorable ground for the development and spread of nothingness (and nothing is easily coarsened). Likewise, it is much easier to glocalize something than nothing: the development of glocalization creates a favorable terrain for the development and spread of something (and something is easily glocalized). The situation is more complex than that, however, as we can also see support for the argument that glocalization can sometimes involve something (e.g. Culatello ham; touring symphony orchestras and rock bands performing in venues around of the world) and that glocalization sometimes doesn't involve anything it can (e.g.

rethink globalization

local souvenirs and trinkets for tourists from all over the world). However, we would not claim that there is an elective affinity between coarseness and something and between glocalization and nothing. The existence of examples of rudeness of something and glocalization of nothing makes it clear why we should think in terms of elective affinities rather than in terms of legal relationships.

The rudeness of something Some types of something were rude to a significant degree. Gourmet foods, crafts, custom clothing and Rolling Stones concerts, for example, are now much more readily available around the world and are more likely to move transnationally than at any other time in history. In a very specific example in the arts, a recent series of "Silk Road" concerts brought together Persian artists and music, an American symphony orchestra and Rimsky-Korsakov's "Scheherezade" (Russian). Returning to Figure 2, as examples of the pervasiveness of somewhat itinerant art exhibitions (Thing) of the works of Vincent van Gogh, we have the museums around the world that host such exhibitions (Location), the knowledgeable guides that provide visitors with show, use highlights from the exhibition (person) and the detailed information and insights they can provide in response to questions from gallery visitors (service). Despite the existence of such examples, why is there comparatively little affinity between coarseness and something? First, there is simply far less demand for most forms of something around the world, at least compared to the demand for nothing. One reason is that the distinction of something appeals to much more limited tastes than nothing, be it gourmet food, crafts or a concert by the Rolling Stones or Silk Road. Second, the complexity of something, particularly the fact that it is likely to contain many different elements, means that it is more likely to have at least some characteristics that will alienate, or even offend, large numbers of people from many different cultures. For example, a Russian audience at a Silk Road concert might be disturbed by the juxtaposition of Persian music with that of Rimsky-Korsakov. Third, the different forms of

Something is usually more expensive - often much more expensive - than competing forms of nothing (gourmet food is much more expensive than fast food). Of course, higher costs mean that far fewer people can afford it. As a result, global demand for expensive forms of something pales in comparison to cheap versions of nothing. Fourth, because prices are high and demand is comparatively low, much less can be spent on advertising and marketing something designed to keep demand low. Fifth, something is much more difficult to mass-produce, and in some cases (Silk Road concerts, Van Gogh exhibitions) impossible to produce that way. Sixth, since the demand for something is less price sensitive than nothing (the relatively small number of people who can afford it are willing, and often able, to pay almost any price), there is less need to produce it. it in bulk (assuming it could be done that way) to drive down prices. Seventh, the cost of shipping (insurance, careful packing and packing, special shipping) of something (gourmet foods, Van Gogh's paintings) is often very high, which drives up the price and therefore reduces demand. It could also be argued that the fact that something's grossness occurs to a lesser degree (compared to nothing) helps to distinguish something from nothing. By being relatively scarce, something retains its status and distinction from nothing. If something were mass-produced and crude, it would likely move toward the nothing end of the continuum. This raises the intriguing question of which comes first – nothing or the gross and the mass production that goes with it. That is, does a phenomenon begin as nothing? Or will it be reduced to nothing by mass production and thickening? We will return to this issue below.

The Grossness of Nothing The example of the Grossness of Nothing in Figure 2 is a journey to one of Disney's worlds. Each of Disney's worlds is a non-place, filled with a vast array of nothings (like hats with mouse ears) occupied primarily by non-persons (the "performers", costumed or otherwise) who provide non-services (the what is offered is often dictated

Georg Ritzer

through rules, regulations and scripts followed by employees). The main reasons for the strong elective affinity between rudeness and nothingness are basically the opposite of the reasons for the lack of such affinity between rudeness and something. Above all, there is a much greater demand around the world for nothing than for something. This is because nothing is cheaper than everything (although this is not always the case), with the result that more people may pay for the former than the latter. Large numbers of people are also much more likely to want the various forms of nothing because their relative simplicity and lack of distinction appeal to a wide range of tastes. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, what is nothing – largely devoid of distinctive content – ​​is much less likely to upset or offend people in other cultures. After all, because of the far greater revenue potential, far more money can and is spent on advertising and marketing nothing, creating even greater demand for it than for anything else. Given the high demand, it is much easier to mass-produce and mass-distribute the empty forms of nothing than the substantially rich forms of something. In fact, many forms of something are better suited for limited, if not one-off production. An experienced potter can make a few dozen pottery pieces and an artist one or two paintings in perhaps a week, a month or even a year(s). While these crafts and works of art can pass from owner to owner in different parts of the world over time, this movement is rarely recorded in global trade. Of course, there are the rare masterpieces that can be worth millions of dollars, but for the most part, they are small pieces. In contrast, thousands, even many millions, and sometimes billions, of Nothing variants are mass-produced and sold around the world. For example, the worldwide sale of Coca-Cola, Whoppers, Benetton sweaters, Gucci handbags, and even Rolex watches is a far greater revenue driver than the international sale of artwork or tickets to the Rolling Stones' recent world tour. Furthermore, the cost of the various forms of nothing can range from a dollar or two to thousands, even tens of thousands of dollars. The cumulative sum is enormous and infinitely greater than global trade in anything.

Furthermore, the market economy demands that the vast amount of nothing produced be grossly marketed and sold. On the one hand, economies of scale mean that the more that is produced and sold, the lower the price. This means that US producers of nothing (and they are by far the world's leaders in this) will almost inevitably become dissatisfied with the US market, no matter how large, and will aggressively seek a world market for their consumer goods. The larger the raw market, the lower the asking price. This, in turn, means that even greater amounts of nothing can be sold and more parts of the world in less developed countries can be reached. Another economic factor stems from the stock market requirement that companies that produce and sell nothing (indeed all companies) increase sales and profits from one year to the next. Companies that simply match last year's profitability or experience a decline are likely to be penalized in the stock market and see their stock prices drop precipitously at times. To continually increase profits, as Marx long ago understood, concern is forced to constantly look for new markets. One way to do this is through constant global expansion. On the other hand, since something is less likely to be produced by corporations, let alone the big publicly traded companies, there is much less pressure to expand the market for it. In any case, as we saw above, given the limited number of these things that can be made by artisans, skilled cooks, artists, etc., there are profound limits to such expansion. This, in turn, brings us back to the question of price and refers to the price advantage that nothing usually has over something. As a rule, different types of nothing cost much less than something. The result, of course, is that nothing can be marketed more aggressively globally than something else. Even when it comes to worldwide shipping, nothing has an advantage. These are things that can usually be packed and moved easily and efficiently, often over large areas. Lunchables, for example, are compact, prepackaged snacks, primarily for school-age children, that don't need to be refrigerated and have a long shelf life. Also, since the unit cost of these items is low, it doesn't matter much if they get damaged, lost, or stolen. In contrast, it is more difficult and expensive to package something - say, a

rethink globalization

a handmade piece of pottery or an antique vase - and losing, being stolen or breaking these things is a disaster. This makes it much more expensive to insure something than nothing, and this difference is another reason for the cost advantage that nothing has over something. It's these kinds of things that serve to severely restrict global trade in items that might fall under something. It is important to remember that most of our examples in this section are non-things, but they also include non-places (franchises), non-people (fast food counters) and non-services (ATMs). While in the broadly defined area of ​​consumption the grossness of nothing is dominant, we find fields - medicine, science, pharmacy, biotechnology, education and others - where the grossness of something is much more important. While these realms have experienced their share of nothing grossness, they are also characterized by a high degree of something grossness. For example, the global scientific community benefits from the almost instantaneous dissemination of important scientific knowledge, often today through new journals on the Internet. So our focus on the grossness of nothing must not obscure the existence and importance, especially in areas like this, of the grossness of something.

The Glocalization of Nothingness Just as historically there has been a tendency to romanticize and glorify the local, there has been a similar tendency in recent years among globalization theorists to overestimate the glocal. It is seen by many not only as an alternative to the evils of grossness, but also as a fundamental source for much of what is worthwhile in today's world. Theorists often privilege the glocal something over the gross nothing (as well as the glocal nothing, which rarely appears in their analyses). For example, Jonathan Friedman associates cultural pluralism with "a disorganized and inhomogeneous world, incapable of any previously imposed policy of assimilation or cultural hierarchy". Later, he connects the “fall of hegemony” with “the liberation of the world arena for the free play of the already existing but oppressed”.

Projects and potential new projects.” Then there are James Watson's McDonald's essays in East Asia, which focus primarily on glocal adaptations (and generally downplay gross impositions) and tend to describe them positively. Although most globalization theorists are not postmodernists, the widespread acceptance of many postmodern ideas (and the rejection of many modern positions) has helped to lead to a positive attitude toward glocalization among many globalization theorists. Friedman is the one who explicitly promotes “cultural pluralism” and the “postmodernization of the world”. For example, the work of de Certeau and others on agent power in the face of greater powers (such as grossization) fits with the view that indigenous actors can create unique phenomena out of the interplay of the global and the local. De Certeau speaks of actors as "unacknowledged producers, poets of their own business, pioneers in the jungle of functionalist rationality." More generally, a postmodern perspective is associated with hybridity, which in turn makes modern perspectives such as essentialism and homogeneity "subversive." The interest in and preference for glocalization among globalization theorists, while well founded, is clearly exaggerated. For one thing, grossization (especially of nothing) is more pervasive and powerful than glocalization (especially of something). Second, glocalization itself is a significant source of nothingness. One of the best examples of the glocalization of nowhere can be found in the field of tourism, particularly where the raw tourist encounters local manufacturers and retailers (where they still exist) in the production and sale of glocal goods and services (this is shown in quadrant two of the Figure 2). Certainly there are cases - perhaps many of them - in which tourism stimulates the production of something: well-made, quality handicrafts for demanding tourists; Meals carefully prepared by local chefs using traditional recipes and the finest local ingredients. However, far more often - and increasingly over time - raw tourism leads to the glocalization of nothing. Souvenir shops will likely be full of trinkets that offer a little food for thought.

Georg Ritzer

the local culture. These souvenirs are increasingly being mass produced - perhaps using components from other parts of the world - in local factories. If demand grows enough and opportunities for profit are high enough, cheap souvenirs can be manufactured by the thousands or millions in other parts of the world and then shipped back to the local area to be sold to tourists (who may not notice or care, like the "Made in China" label embossed on his replicas of the Eiffel Tower). Employees at these souvenir shops tend to behave like non-humans, and tourists tend to help themselves. are faithful to the region are or really integrate local elements. Such meals are likely to be found in "tourist" restaurants near the non-place end of the continuum and served by non-humans who provide little service. Another important example concerns the production of local shows - often with traditional costumes, dances and music - for the uncouth tourist. While they can be anything, there is a very strong tendency to turn them into nothing in order to please the boorish tour operators and their clientele. As such, these shows are examples of the glocalization of nothingness as it becomes centrally conceived and controlled voids. They are often diluted, if not destroyed, by removing esoteric or possibly offensive elements. The presentations are designed to please the tourist crowd and scare as little as possible. They occur with great frequency, and the interchangeable actors often appear to be moving in a random fashion. That, in turn, is all rude tourists want in their (and the tour operator's) rush to catch a performance, eat a replacement local meal, and then move on to the next stop on the tour. So in the field of tourism - in souvenirs, performances and meals - we see the glocalization of nothing rather than something.

The glocalization of something The example of glocalization of something in Figure 2 (quadrant 1) comes from the domain of indigenous handicrafts, such as pottery or weaving. such crafts

they are things and are likely to be displayed and sold in places like craft barns. The craftsman who makes and demonstrates his wares is a person, and customers generally receive top-notch service. These glocal products will likely stick around for a while, though there are certainly countless examples of glocal forms of something converted into glocal—and in some cases gross—forms of nothing (see below for a discussion of Kokopelli figures and Matryoshka dolls). In fact, there's often a sort of progression here, from something glocal to not glocal as demand grows, and then to raw nothing when an entrepreneur thinks there might be a global market for such products. However, some glocal forms of something are able to resist this process. Glocal forms of something tend to stay that way for a variety of reasons. For one thing, they tend to be expensive, at least compared to their mass-produced competitors. High prices tend to keep demand low locally, let alone globally. Second, glocal forms of something are loaded with distinct content. This means, among other things, that they are more difficult and expensive to produce and harder for consumers to understand and appreciate, especially in other cultures. Furthermore, their idiosyncratic and complex nature makes it more likely that people from other cultures will find something about them that they don't like or even find offensive. Third, unlike the big makers of nothing, those who create glocal forms of something are not pressured to expand their businesses and increase their profits to please shareholders and the stock market. While artisans are not immune to the desire to earn more money, the pressure to do so is internal rather than external, and not as great or unstoppable. In any case, the desire to earn more money is mitigated by the fact that each craft product is time consuming to manufacture and only a limited number of them can be made in a given amount of time. In addition, handmade products are even less suitable for mass marketing and advertising than for mass production.

What comes first: nothing or your generalization? At this point, we have to deal with a difficult question: is it possible to determine which comes first - nothing

rethink globalization

or its coarseness? The key components of the definition of nothing – core design and control, lack of distinctive content – ​​mean that we don't associate anything with the modern age of mass production. Finally, the mass production system features centralized design and control and is capable of producing a large number of products without differentiated content. While there were undoubtedly isolated examples of nothing before the Industrial Revolution, it's hard to find many that fit our basic definition of nothing. Thus, as a rule, nothing requires the prior existence of mass production. However, what comes out of mass production systems does not necessarily need to be distributed and sold globally. However, as we've discussed, there's a lot of pressure on those who aren't mass producing anything to market it globally. So today there is a very close relationship between mass production and grossization; The view here is that they both precede and are prerequisites to nothing. Take, for example, historical examples of folk art like Kokopellis from the American Southwest and matryoshka dolls from Russia. Originating from local cultures a long time ago, these were clearly handcrafted products that should have been placed at the end of the continuum. For example, the Kokopelli, often portrayed as a bow flute player, can be traced back to at least 800 AD and traced back to rock art found in the mountains and deserts of the southwestern United States. That rock art is definitely something. But in recent years, Kokopellis have become popular with tourists in the area and are produced in huge quantities in countless forms (statuettes, lamps, key chains, light switch covers, Christmas ornaments, etc.) with less and less attention. to the craftsmanship that goes into making them. In fact, they are increasingly being mass-produced in large factories. Furthermore, offensive elements are removed so as not to dissuade potential consumers anywhere in the world. For example, the exposed genitalia that usually accompanied the arched back and flute were removed. More recently, Kokopellis have left their hometowns in the Southwest and are sold around the world. For them to be marketed worldwide at a competitive price, much of the differential is required.

and the craftsmanship associated with making the Kokopelli is removed. Namely, disgusting Kokopellis brought them even closer to the end of the nothing continuum. A similar scenario played out in the case of the matryoshka doll (from five to 30 dolls of progressively smaller size nested within each other), although its roots in Russian culture are not as deep (a little over a century) as those of the Kokopelli in Southwestern culture. from United States. Originally handcrafted and handpainted by skilled craftsmen and made from birch (or linden), the traditional Matryoshka doll was (and still is) rich in detail. With the fall of communism and the Soviet Union, Russia grew as a tourist destination and the matryoshka doll became a popular souvenir. Today, to meet the growing demand from tourists and even to distribute matryoshka dolls around the world, they are much more likely to be machine-made: auto-painted; low quality unseasoned wood; and greatly reduced in detail. In many cases, the Matryoshka doll has been reduced to the lowest level of schlock and kitsch to increase sales. For example, traditional designs depicting pre-Communist nobles and merchants were complemented by post-9/11 caricatures of world stars such as Bill Clinton, Mikhail Gorbachev and Osama bin Laden. These mass-produced and distributed matryoshka dolls bear little resemblance to the folk art they are based on. The mass production and grossness of these dolls turned what was something into nothing. Many other products have followed this path, and more will do so in the future. Although we have focused here on non-things that used to be things, a similar argument can be made about places, people and services. This means that they are also mass-produced and coarse, especially in the consumer area. This is most evident in pretty much every franchise, for which the settings are pretty much the same across the world (using a lot of mass-produced components), people are trained and scripted to work in pretty much the same way and in the same way. The "Services" are offered in the same way. They are all centrally designed, centrally controlled, and lack distinct content.

Georg Ritzer

Generalization and Loss Generalization involved a spread of nothing around the world. Although it brings many benefits (as does the collection of something), it also brings harm, as local (and glocalized) forms of something are increasingly threatened and replaced by aggregated (and glocalized) forms of nothing. This reality and sense of loss is much greater in much of the world than it is in the United States. As the center and source of many trifles, the United States has also progressed the most towards and away from nothingness. So Americans have long been used to nothing and have fewer and fewer ways of anything to compare. Any new form or breakthrough into nothingness creates little stir in American society. In large parts of the world, however, the situation is different. Countless forms of something remain well anchored and actively supported. The various forms of nothing – often, at least initially, imported from the US – are quickly and easily perceived as nothing, as alternative forms of something, and the patterns they offer are alive and well. Of course, many people in these countries demand and gather for nothing in its various forms, but many others are critical and suspicious of it. The various forms of something that thrive in these countries provide supporters with places, things, people and services to gather in the face of onslaught from nowhere. It is therefore not surprising that the Slow Food movement, aimed at defending "slow food" against the invasion of fast food, began in Italy (in fact, the origin of this movement was a struggle to prevent McDonald's from doing so to open a restaurant at the foot of the Spanish Steps in Rome) and has its widest support across Europe.

The increase in nothing! The death of something? A key idea – even a grand narrative – in this essay is the notion that there is a long-term trend towards nothingness in the social world in general and in the realm of consumption in particular. More specifically, there is a historical movement from something to

Anything. Remember that this is simply an argument about the proliferation of forms that are centrally designed and controlled and largely devoid of distinctive content. In other words, we have a long-term trend from a world where natively designed and controlled forms with distinctive content predominate, to a world where centrally designed and controlled forms, largely lacking in distinctive content, predominate. There is no doubt that nothing increased and something decreased relatively, but many forms of something did not experience an absolute decrease. In fact, in many cases the forms of something increased; they just didn't gain weight at the rate that nothing gains weight. For example, while the number of fast-food restaurants (nonplaces) has grown astronomically since McDonald's was founded in 1955, the number of gourmet and ethnic independent restaurants (places) has also grown, albeit not as fast. It helps to explain why a city like Washington, DC (to cite an example I know well) has seen a massive increase in fast food restaurants over the last half century, while also experiencing a significant expansion of gourmet restaurants and ethnic. Indeed, it could be argued that there is a dialectic here, that the absolute increase of nothing sometimes serves to stimulate at least some increase of something. That is, as people become more and more surrounded by nothing, at least some are driven to seek or create. However, the grand narrative presented here is more about the relative rise of nothing and the relative fall of something than it is about absolute change. Still, at least some forms of something (eg, local food, fast food outlets) have experienced absolute decline and may have disappeared or are on the verge of disappearing. It could be argued that they were all victims of what Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction". That is, although they have largely disappeared, successors such as the fast-food restaurant, the supermarket, and the "dining house" (eg, the Cheesecake Factory) have emerged in their place. While there is no doubt that widespread destruction of older forms took place and that considerable creativity flowed into new forms, one must question Schumpeter's one-sided positive view of this process.

rethink globalization

Perhaps some things - even some creativity - were lost with the disappearance of these older forms. It could be that the destruction wasn't always so creative. However, no general value judgments need be made here; Content-laden forms are not inherently better than content-empty forms, or vice versa. Indeed, there have been and are many substantive forms that are among the world's most abominable creations. For example, we might think of the pogroms so common in Russia, Poland and elsewhere. These were largely locally conceived and controlled and were full of distinctive content (anti-Semitism, nationalism, etc.). On the other hand, forms that are largely devoid of content are not necessarily harmful. For example, as Weber pointed out, bureaucracy is a largely meaningless form (and an ideal type). As such, it is able to function in ways that other, more substantive forms of organizing – those associated with traditional, charismatic forms of organizing – could not. This means that it was created to be impartial - not to (in theory) discriminate against anyone. Especially in the area of ​​consumption, it is strongly argued that we are in the midst of a long-term trend away from something and towards nothing. Incidentally, this implies a prognosis for the future: we will see more increases of nothing and more erosions of something in the coming years.

The Economy of Nothing Several points can be raised about the Economy of Nothing. First, it is clear that, in general, there is an inverse relationship between income and nothing. That said, those with money can still acquire multiple forms of something, while those with little money are limited to nothing. Therefore, only the rich can afford expensive bottles of complex wine or gourmet French dishes with truffles. Those of modest means are largely limited to Coke, snacks, microwaveable meals and McDonald's fries. Second, there is an economic floor: people below a certain income level cannot even afford much of what is categorized here as nothing. There are people close to or below the poverty line

America, who often cannot afford a meal at McDonald's or a six-pack of Coke. More importantly, there are many more people in less developed parts of the world who cannot access and pay for such forms of anything. Interestingly, extreme poverty banishes people from everything available for something – home cooked meals and home brewed beers. However, in this case it is difficult to argue something. These forms of something are often tenuous, and those who confine themselves to them would love to gain access to what has been defined as nothing here and by many people around the world. Third, when looking at society as a whole, a minimum level of wealth and prosperity must be reached before it can afford nothing. This means that there are few ATMs, fast food restaurants and Victoria's Secret boutiques in the world's truly impoverished countries. There is simply not enough income and wealth to not be able to buy anything; Ironically, the people in these societies are doomed – at least for now. As such, they are more barter-oriented, preparing food from scratch at home and making their own sweaters. It is not that they would not readily exchange their something for the forms of nothingness described above, but that they are unable to do so. It seems clear that once the level of prosperity in such a country reaches a certain minimum level, the various forms of nothing will be welcomed and the companies that produce them will eagerly enter in their turn. Fourth, even the richest people usually don't consume anything. On the one hand, as already mentioned, nothing is limited to (not) cheap places, (not) things, (not) people and (not) services. Some forms of nothing — a Four Seasons hotel room, a Dolce and Gabbana dress, the clerk at Gucci, and waiter service at a Morton steakhouse — are very expensive, but still don't count as nothing, as that term is used here. : Relatively empty forms that are centrally designed and controlled. Consumption of this very expensive form of nothing is apparently restricted to the upper echelons of the economic ladder. Fifth, the rich are drawn to many of the same cheap forms of nothing that cater to the masses, even those that would be considered poor or very close. A credit card knows no income barriers - at least at the high end of the spectrum - and

Douglas Kellner

The same applies to ATMs. The wealthy, particularly wealthy teens, are just as drawn to fast-food restaurants as people in virtually any other income bracket. There is no simple relationship between wealth and nothingness.

Generalization versus Glocalization Returning to the topic with which we began this discussion, one of the most important contributions here is the argument that the key dynamic under the broad notion of globalization is the conflict between grossness and glocalization. This is a very different view from any of the conventional perspectives on global conflicts. For example, I believe that a large number of observers tend to see the defining conflict, where it exists, as that between globalization and the local. However, the perspective offered here differs from that perspective in several crucial respects. First, globalization does not represent a side in the central conflict. It is a very broad term that encompasses all transnational processes. It needs further refinement to be useful in this context, as B. the distinction between coarseness and glocalization. This differentiation makes it clear that the comprehensive process of globalization already includes important conflict processes. As globalization contains the decisive poles in this conflict, it is not and cannot be a position in this conflict. Second, the other side of the traditional view of this conflict – the local – is relegated to secondary importance in this conceptualization. That is, the longer the location exists, the less important it becomes.


Fikant is a marginal actor in the dynamics of globalization. Little of the local is untouched by the global. Much of what we tend to think of as local is actually glocal. The more the gross penetrates the place, the less it will remain free from gross influences. What works is banished to the fringes and in-between spaces of the local community. Most of what remains is much better described as glocal than local. In community after community, the real battle is raging between the purely gross and the glocal. A crucial consequence of this is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to find anything in the world that has not been affected by globalization. Ironically, opponents of globalization, particularly the grossization of nothing, seem to be hoping for an alternative form of globalization, glocalization. For most opponents of grossization, this is hardly a hope, but it is the most realistic and viable hope there is. The implication is that those who want to resist globalization, and grossization in particular, must support and embrace the other major form of globalization – glocalization. Still, glocalization is a measure of hope. On the one hand, it is the last outpost of the most persistent (though already corrupted by grossization) forms of the place. That is, important traces of the location remain in the glocal. Second, the interaction of the coarse and the local creates unique phenomena that cannot be reduced to either the coarse or the local. If locale alone is no longer the source of the uniqueness it once was, at least part of the gap has been filled in by glocal. It is even conceivable that the glocal and the interaction of different glocalities is - or at least can be - an important source of uniqueness and innovation.


Dialectic of Something and Nothing: Critical Reflections on Ritzer Douglas Kellner's Analysis of Globalization George Ritzer's The Globalization of Nothing provides aspects of globalization overlooked in many standards, a highly original and illuminating perspective on globalization. Ritzer produces a wide range of grades,

Dialectic of something and nothing

some originals to describe how globalization produces massification, homogenization and standardization of goods and consumption practices. As such, his most recent book is a worthy follow-up to The McDonaldization of Society, Expressing America, and Enchanting a Disenchanted World: Revolutionizing the Means of Consumption, as well as his other recent work on McDonaldization. Furthermore, Ritzer's The Globalization of Nothing articulates the dialectic between the global and the local, between their empty forms, or nothingness in their terminology, and their specific forms of something, of particularity and difference. His recent studies of globalization share many of the qualities of his earlier books, offering a wealth of sociological insights and analysis to a popular audience. The text illuminates and helps to specifically illuminate and develop Ritzer's earlier concepts of McDonaldization, Americanization, and description of new forms of consumption, and adds a wide range of important insights into globalization, while providing useful categories and distinctions to define globalization itself. In these remarks, I would first like to critically examine a point that Ritzer may have raised, which he believes would have greatly strengthened his conceptual optics. Then I'll make some comments about things I like and think are important in the book and point out any disagreements.

Globalization and Nothingness: The Lost Dialectic Ritzer lays out his definition of the globalization of nothingness as "generally centrally conceived and controlled social forms comparatively devoid of distinctive content", such as the shape of shopping malls, airports, hotel chains, credit cards and it is of course McDonald's and fast food restaurants. He presents a dialectic of something and nothing on a continuum of social forms, where 'something' is presented as 'a social form generally natively conceived, controlled and comparatively rich in characteristic substantial content; a form that is highly substantially unique." Both presuppose each other and make "sense only when paired and contrasted with the other." The dialectic of something and nothing is explored through a series of conceptual contrasts between places and non-places, things and non-things, people and wholes

Not people, as well as services and non-services, which include things like credit card companies, telemarketing, fast food manufacturing, and global branding (I'll give more examples and explanations as we go along). He also develops a number of other categories, such as "glocalization" (based on Roland Robertson), whereby global and local forces hybridize, and "globalization", whereby global processes absorb and, in some cases, destroy local artifacts, customs and culture. Ritzer says he will offend fans of many "things" such as products or forms of consumption he criticizes, but I am not in the least offended by this criticism and would appreciate it if Ritzer and others would develop the analysis of nothingness and the destruction of something(s) ) further up. In fact, this brings me to my central criticism of Ritzer's book. In the preface, Ritzer says, "My main interest in these pages is the globalization of nothingness in the realm of consumption," and here I wish Ritzer had devoted himself to the dialectic of production and consumption, engaging critically with both, as he does. for some it makes scope in its analysis of McDonaldization, which is both a form of production and consumption. Ritzer has a brief section on "making nothing" at the end of Chapter I, where he mentions that he won't be dealing with the "development world"; whose residents often cannot afford or do not have access to the trivialities of globalization; nor will it be involved in global production like Nike's shoe factories, which have received much attention and criticism. Ritzer says there has been a "productivist bias" in social theory and that he wants to compensate for what he sees as one-sidedness in that direction. But while there may have been a problem of production bias in the fields of social theory and consumer studies that needs to be corrected, I would argue that production and consumption are so closely and importantly related that a dialectic of production and consumption is needed to unravel them. adequately understand the general processes of globalization. Indeed, within cultural studies and many social theories, there is a burgeoning field of consumer studies, in which Ritzer plays an important role, so I'm not sure whether we should be concerned about a productivist bias in social theory and cultural studies, but we should I prefer to worry about the production deficit (this has been one of my concerns and themes in cultural studies for several years and it reappears here in

Douglas Kellner

context of consumer sociology). But I would also argue that analyzing the dialectic of production and consumption, which is absolutely central to understanding and dealing with globalization, is essential to conceptualizing its key dynamics - just as important, I would argue, and perhaps more important than the dialectic of something and nothing that Ritzer adopts (in fact, I will argue that they fit). To illustrate this, let me give an example from Ritzer's earlier study of McDonald's, surely a sociological classic of our time. One of the main conclusions of this text was the analysis of McDonaldization as a form of production and consumption. McDonald's offers a complete business model (the franchise) and a fast food production and consumption model characterized by the characteristics of efficiency, speed, predictability, predictability and rationalization. This model has spread to many other areas of production and consumption, as Ritzer points out. In fact, it is McDonaldization as a dialectic of production and consumption that makes the company so paradigmatic for corporate globalization. Now, if I were to extend Ritzer's argument about the dialectic of production and consumption to the sphere of work, I would argue that the proliferation, diffusion and impact of forms of production described as post-Fordism, McDonaldization, techno-capitalism or the This network ranges from the global spread of assembly line work, described by Harry Braverman and others, mainly Marxists, as contributing to the deskilling of work, to the forms of work described by Dan Schiller and other critics of digital capitalism. It is true, however, that there are some mentions of production in Ritzer's book, such as a passage on page 177 where Ritzer notes that his analyzes rake in nothing:

This certainly also applies to the other side of consumption – production. For example, we literally could not have wholesale non-things without having systems to produce large quantities of non-things to be sold and distributed worldwide. But even production, or the nexus between production and consumption, is too narrow a field to study the grossization of nothingness. Nothing spreads globally in politics, the church, or the criminal justice system for myriad reasons, many of them specific to each of these areas that have nothing to do with production or consumption.

Far from denying the relative autonomy of politics, the legal system or culture, I am far from denying that all these things are central to production and increasingly to consumption. There is another phenomenon of immense importance that Ritzer's analysis suggests but does not critically address, and that is the substitution of machines for human labor. With regard to one of Ritzer's sets of categorical distinctions encompassing non-places, non-things, non-persons, and non-services (which includes, as examples, credit card companies, telemarketing, and computerized services of various kinds) , this rise of nullity, to be used in Ritzer's terms, involves a fairly large global restructuring of work that both eliminates many jobs and creates a plethora of "Mcjobs" that could serve as paradigms for contemporary alienated work (think telemarketing or all that administrative work that credit cards, airlines do). reservations, sales of all kinds and the like). Well, as Marx argued in The Outlines, replacing human labor with technology can be progressive, but as we've seen, it can also be catastrophic for certain categories of workers, in the sense of wiping out more creative, unionized, and wealthier organizations. safe, paying jobs and creates deadlier, alienating, low-paid, and insecure jobs. This is a vast world historical phenomenon that is at the heart of current concerns about globalization, and I think Ritzer's dialectic of something and nothing could have illuminated this phenomenon in an interesting way and treated it critically. There is a passage where Ritzer mentions that while Marx's analysis of alienation is not particularly useful for talking about consumption (although some might dispute that), "it is probably more relevant than ever to the less developed world, where much of the kind production-oriented work analyzed by Marx is being done more and more." I would agree, but would suggest that alienated labor is also prevalent in the fields that Ritzer looks at, such as telemarketing, computer-assisted services, and most of the clerical and other jobs needed to sustain global production. As an aside, I would like to mention that the film One Hour Photo, which Ritzer uses to illustrate empty forms of consumption, is about empty forms of production and work as well as consumption, and that Robin Williams' character explores the dehumanizing and alienating effects of doing nothing, i.e.

Dialectic of something and nothing

Working in a totally prescribed, impersonal and uncreative way can have distorting effects on a person's personality. But the film can also be read as an indication that even in the most dehumanizing matrices of production and consumption, there are attempts to create human relationships and creative work - that's quite something. As a hopelessly Hegelian dialectician, I appreciate the dialectic of nothing and something in Ritzer's book, as well as the dialectic of glocalization and grossization, but I would like him to delve deeper into the dialectic of production and consumption. I would also note that an important passage and concept was dropped but not developed where Ritzer mentions the "double woes" of those workers in extremely low wage jobs who cannot afford the exact goods they produce. Both afflictions are heartbreaking, but I fear this is a widespread global phenomenon whose development and documentation could strike a sharp critical note on our view of globalization. I suspect part of Ritzer's response would be his statement: Remember that not so long ago the United States was the world's leading manufacturer. In many ways, consumption has replaced manufacturing as the focus of the US economy and has become the country's main export to the rest of the world. It is interesting to think about what it means to go from being the world's leading steel producer to being the world's leading exporter of fast food restaurants and shopping malls. I would agree with Ritzer that consumption has to some extent replaced manufacturing as America's top export, but I think manufacturing is just as important globally as consumption. As post-Fordist theory makes clear, production is moving more and more from one place to another, and this process incorporates something of Ritzer's analysis that forms of production are becoming more and more similar, either by example, sneakers made in Los Angeles, Indonesia, Vietnam or China. In general I would agree with Marx's model in the Grundrisse that there is a circuit of capital involved

production, exchange, distribution and consumption, and although it can be debated whether or not production is the primary moment in this cycle, as Marx claims, I think it is clear that if you look at globalization as a whole, the dialectic of production and of consumption, and the circuits of capital are vital to the process (i.e., without production there is no consumption, and that they are linked in circuits including exchange and distribution, which Ritzer has a lot to do with, so he might as well assume the production to complete the track). Another criticism of Ritzer's analysis of McDonald's that could be leveled against The Globalization of Nothing is that he can't get enough of creative consumption, or the way that something and nothing are hybrids or local variants of global products or ways that McDonald's produces. Hybridization has been seen as a key way of constructing local cultures within globalization, which postmodernists and others, including Stuart Hall and the McDonald's Golden Arches East studies, positively value as a cultural synthesis of the local and global and traditional. and modern. While the hybridizations have been exaggerated and many of the celebrations of the hybridization or local inflection of global phenomena, such as the Golden Arches East studies cited above, ignore elements of cultural imperialism (if I may use an old-fashioned term), the destruction of the traditional and loss, as Ritzer repeatedly emphasizes, however, increasingly global forms can be flexed globally and creative hybrids of the global and the local can be produced. However, Ritzer focuses on the form of consumption and nothingness, minimizing the creative use and active appropriation by the public of commodities, cultural forms or globalized phenomena of various kinds. British cultural studies emphasizes the active public as constitutive of the popular, and while this emphasis may exaggerate consumer subjectivity and power, I think it highlights a potential production of difference, meaning, and creative practice (that is, something) that the Ritzers did not. adequately addressed. He could thus add to consumer activity in the consumption process a dialectic of nothing and something, in which one class or pole of consumers is ideally characterized as largely passive and consumes in a patterned way, while another class or pole may consume in a patterned way. highly creative way. and idiosyncratic forms, which can change

Douglas Kellner

nothing into something (to use Ritzer's dialectic). While Ritzer has a section on making something out of nothing in his chapter on the internet and he values ​​the slow food movement in a final chapter, I think he needs more on active and creative uses of consumption or globalized technologies like the internet. Both Andrew Feenberg and I, in developing theories of technology, emphasize how technology can be reconstructed in such a way that humans can make something out of nothing, to use Ritzer's terminology; that is, they use technology for their own self-exploitation, projects and purposes, not just those of capital or those producing the technology. For example, people are using traditional medicine or natural pregnancy instead of the standardized forms of corporate medicine and have constructed the Internet as a decommodified realm of communication, cultural dissemination, and political organization that often goes beyond the purposes of the technology's creators. .

they are pure forms where there is little or no significant difference in how the cards work, but some people strongly identify with airline brands, cars, clothing lines and other merchandise. Admittedly, the distinction between brands that are something or nothing is often difficult to make: while a Gucci bag may well be considered nothing, as Ritzer claims, where pure form dominates, there are real differences between some fashion houses and lines. fashion houses that have passionate critics and fans. Of course, as piracy and simulation of genuine products show, replication is big business, but the fact that many products are out of stock accurately shows that they are "something" with trademark value.

Furthermore, I find many of Ritzer's concepts and distinctions in the book valuable, such as his analysis "Meet the Nullities," in which he analyzes non-place, non-thing, non-person, and non-service forms of corporate globalization. a conceptual problem with his analysis of non-things, where he writes:

And while there may be some pure models of malls or even mega-malls and other consumer venues that appear as "nothing" (i.e. undifferentiated, interesting, local, etc.), it is precisely these differences that make some malls stand out, such as the Grove and Fairfax Farmer's Market in Los Angeles or the Edmonton Mall in Canada. Although Ritzer doesn't cite the Ford Edsel in the appendix as an example of anything, that seems incorrect: the Edsel symbolizes something else, a product line that failed spectacularly (as did Classic Coke).

Our bodies are covered in a variety of non-things, and even when we go to bed at night we are likely to be surrounded by non-things (Sealy Posturepedic mattresses, Martha Stewart sheets and pillowcases, Chanel perfume or cologne, and so on).

Another problem with Ritzer's categorization is that he sometimes seems too lax in his application of nothing, or at least can raise the question of whether certain phenomena are something or nothing. For example, I would take issue with Ritzer citing the use of audio guides in museums as an example out of nowhere:

While many consumer brands are nothing and therefore arguably "not things" in Ritzer's vocabulary, many brands are important things to many people. Reducing so many consumer brands to nothingness downplays the importance of logos and brands, which Naomi Klein and others say are at the heart of globalization. While Ritzer provides a powerful critique of current forms of branding, I am not convinced that some of the brands Ritzer cites in his text are "nothings." Such a branding concept overlooks the kind of sign value and system of difference in consumption emphasized by Baudrillard and elaborated more concretely by sociologists such as Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson. Well, some of the brands like Visa and MasterCard that Ritzer works with are paragons of brands that

An interesting example of the nothingness trend is the increasing use of audio guides and rental recorders at such shows and in museums generally. While it is true that more and more museums are using similar types of audio guides to accompany their art exhibitions, they vary in quality but, more importantly, allow for qualitatively different aesthetic experiences and uses. Personally, I avoided these audio guides at first as I thought they detracted from the aesthetic experience. However, I found some to be very informative and, if used correctly, could enhance the overall art show experience. Some of them look very special to me indeed. For example, the audio guide

Dialectic of something and nothing

accompanying the 2003 Kandinsky-Schonberg show at the Jewish Museum in New York not only had very informative and intelligent commentaries, but also large sections of music by Schoenberg and others so that one could enjoy Schoenberg's music while viewing his paintings, or just pause, close your eyes and imagine you are at a concert. Another point where one might challenge Ritzer's overly vague use of "nothing" is his assertion that "the media themselves [...] are emptier forms of global news and entertainment (reality TV, headlines, and perhaps at least some American sitcoms), other forms of "soap operas" are arguably very diverse, diversified, local, and therefore presumably something. I've been on telenovela panels at conferences and read articles on the subject that point out the big differences between Latin American telenovelas and American soap operas, as well as the differences between programs of this genre in, say, Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, and Brazil, and even within these countries (Fans can talk a lot about several Brazilian soap operas and a friend lent me tapes of a Cuban telenovela which was quite an interesting political drama using certain formats of American telenovelas but produced something very different and so I would conclude, something.) Incidentally, I would note that Ritzer uses nada, nada, nada and related terms interchangeably, and although Although I have learned to live with and even appreciate the "globalization of nothing" and the concept of "nothing" is fun and enlightening, I cringe a little when I read "Nothing", no doubt due to my early immersion in Sartre and Heidegger and the association out of nowhere with fear, death and disturbing forms of non-being. So I would ask Ritzer if there is a difference between nothing and nothing in his categorizations and why he uses the latter term when carrying a lot of conceptual baggage from existential philosophy. In other words, "nothing" is empty enough of a concept to serve Ritzer's purposes, but "nothing" for me is strongly marked in relation to the existential philosophy of Heidegger and Sartre and does not readily serve as a cognate for Ritzer's nothingness. . Although Ritzer uses a flexible model of ideal types ranging from little to nothing, I think there is room to dispute at least some

their representations of nothing, and at least to hope that more diverse and diverse things can proliferate in a global economy, as opposed to the undeniable proliferation of nothing, the grossness of the local, and the general trends towards standardization, interchangeability, massification is Ritzers' Analysis of virtue about which we are warned.

Globalization and the Contemporary Moment Indeed, Ritzer tells a very dramatic story that comes to life, at least for me, in the titanic struggle between the glocalization of something and the grossization of something and nothing that occurs in the middle of his book. He closes chapter 5 with the statement: We live in an age in which a multiplicity of its basic characteristics has led to an enormous expansion of the stultification of nothingness. Furthermore, current trends lead to the notion that the future will see an even greater proliferation of nothingness across the world. This is a rather disastrous perspective in view of the growing hegemony of the "secularization of nothingness", pure forms or models of production and consumption that could erase the place, singularity, heterogeneity and difference. There are, of course, opposing tendencies, extolled by various postmodern theories and by Roland Robertson, but I think Ritzer provides an important wake-up call that the great trends of globalization are destroying individuality and particularity and producing standardization and homogeneity. To some extent, this is a familiar tale told by many neo-Marxists, Weberians, and other critics of modernity, but it is salutary to repeat the tale as a warning against the overly enthusiastic Globophilic embraces of a globalization that, to match its postmodernism, produces champions. , rich heterogeneity, hybridity and difference. Ritzer claims at the end of the book that his most important conceptual contribution to this history and to the theorizing of globalization is his account of the growing conflict between glocalization and grossization. This look helps balance trends

Douglas Kellner

celebrating and overvaluing the local and capturing the fact that the anti-corporate globalization movement, which seeks to protect the local and the human from corporate domination, or grossization in Ritzer's vocabulary, is itself global in nature and therefore constitutes a form of glocalization. But I think more concrete goals need to be defined, formulated and defended through the anti-corporate globalization movement (this is no longer anti-globalization tout court, strictly speaking, but anti-corporate or anti-capitalist globalization). In particular, anti-corporate globalization (or social justice movement) serves not only to preserve local ownership and control over the global, but also specific goals such as human rights, labor rights, rights of certain groups such as women, gays, etc. or animals, as well as for objectives such as environmental protection, safe food, democratization and social justice. These goals are at least somewhat universal in many conceptualizations, so there is a kind of synthesis of the global and the local in the anti-corporate globalization movement. Therefore, I believe that these universal values ​​and goals are valuable things, and the anti-corporate and anti-social justice movement is important in championing important universal values, preserving places, local cultures and values, and providing innovative alternatives, policies, and practices (although they may, as Ritzer warns, come to nothing if they just repeat the same slogans and actions over and over). I'm not sure that locale can be dismissed as lightly or cheerfully as Ritzer, suggesting that it is gone and cannot be revived, as glocals cannot exist without locales and there are still many places, cuisines, products, peoples and cultures, and the like that are not yet largely glocalized (or so I would imagine, although Ritzer may be right about that in the long run). For example, the day before a panel on Ritzer's book at the Eastern Sociology Association conference in New York in February 2004, I was walking down Lexington Avenue and found Good Old Things, Fine Antiques, and other specialty stores within a block of road. The next block had Indian vegetarian restaurants alongside one that said "Non-Vegetarian Indian" and even "Kosher Vegetarian Indian", as well as a variety of other foreign restaurants. I passed the Arsenal which had the famous 1913 modern art exhibition and was hosting an antiques fair

this weekend. There was a market in Union Square that sold fresh bison meat, ostrich burgers, and freshly brewed hot cider that I tried. On the other side of the square there is still the Strand Bookstore, along with a few other surviving antique bookstores in the neighborhood. Best of all, on the way back, I discovered that the Grammercy Cinema was now the home of the MOMA Cinematique, showing films by top Iranian and Korean directors, as well as two Godard classics for six dollars a day. So while the something and the local are clearly under attack by corporate globalization (and one can do a detailed analysis of New York's grossness starting with the Disneyfication of 42nd Street and the corporatization of Times Square), there are still some places that still remain. exist and must be valued, defended and supported. To move the record, I would also argue about Ritzer's interpretation of the 9/11 attacks and, in general, why a certain type of fundamentalist terrorism is directed against the US. Ritzer rightly calls attention to a growing anti-Americanism and hostility to the coarseness, to use his term, of American culture, values, politics and the military, but he makes no mention of George W. Bush, and so I would argue that the erratic The Growing The anti-Americanism evident in the PEW polls, which Ritzer cites as evidence of growing anti-Americanism, is a specific response to the Bush administration's militaristic unilateralism, nationalistic chauvinism and sheer arrogance. While 9/11 and other jihadist attacks may have occurred regardless of who was president, and while many parts of the world reject American rudeness, as Ritzer suggests, I think that US resentment and reaction is strong, perhaps even dangerous, Bush administration strengthened. Another caveat: when presenting Jihad vs. McWorld by Ben Barber, Ritzer clearly presents McWorld as an example of rudeness or nothing, but in my view, he misrepresents Jihad as something. suggest that terrorism was extremely stereotyped and repetitive (see suicide bombings in Israel or Iraq), much more so than the anti-corporate globalization movement that Ritzer claims is repeating empty forms of Internet connections and protests rather than creating new and protest originals (only partially true in my opinion, but

Dialectic of something and nothing

a salutary prompt to be creative, innovative and surprising when it comes to constructing forms of global protest and oppositional politics). In conclusion, regarding jihad, I would like to argue that Islamic schools or Medreses are as stereotypical as the textbooks and McSchools that Ritzer rightly complains about. Finally, I find George Ritzer's The Globalization of Nothing highly provocative, helpful in its dialectic of something and nothing and glocalization versus grossness in terms of a theorizing of globalization. As I said, I would have liked a dialectic of production and consumption better, which I

I think it would have enriched the project. Someone still needs to rewrite Marx's account of capitalism and the alienation of labor in terms of global, high-tech production and labor and new forms of culture and consumption. Nick Dyer-Witheford of CyberMarx started this venture, and those who wish to continue this theme can use many of Ritzer's categories applied to production and work. Thus, while Ritzer's text is useful for illuminating aspects of consumption and globalization, the dialectic of production and consumption at local, national and global levels still needs to be addressed.

McDonaldization is the main example that Nederveen Pieterse uses to illustrate the cultural convergence paradigm. Indeed, as we will see in this chapter, much of the debate surrounding the "McDonaldization thesis" revolves around the question of whether the model associated with the founding of McDonald's in 1955 is accepted and practiced consistently around the world. We begin with "An Introduction to McDonaldization" from the fifth edition of The McDonaldization of Society. The basic definition of McDonaldization makes it clear that it is seen as a global phenomenon. That is, McDonaldization is defined as “the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant come to dominate more and more sectors of American society, as well as the rest of the world”. It is the last sentence in italics that makes it clear that McDonaldization is a global phenomenon. It's a global phenomenon in many obvious ways: McDonald's and other McDonald's (in and out of the fast food industry) have spread across the world, other nations have developed their own McDonald's and are now exporting their US McDonald's chains to other nations. McDonald's itself has become a global icon, considered by some to be more iconic than the United States itself, or at least its ambassadors and embassies. However, we must bear in mind that 1

McDonaldization is not limited to McDonald's, the fast food industry and even groceries. Rather, it is seen as a far-reaching process that affects many areas of society (eg religion, education and criminal justice). As the above definition makes clear, the keys to McDonaldization are its dimensions: efficiency, predictability, predictability, control and, paradoxically, the irrationality of the apparently highly rational process of McDonaldization. The key point is that at the heart of McDonaldization are these principles and the system or structure they represent and create. From the point of view of globalization, the extent to which these principles and systems/structures have been globalized is questioned. From a globalization perspective, as we shall see, critics of McDonaldization tend to focus on things like the differences in McDonald's meals in different parts of the world. While this is an issue, it does not get to the heart of the question of whether McDonaldization has been globalized or whether it tends to result in at least some degree of homogeneity across the world. The central question is whether McDonald's and other McDonaldised systems, wherever they are in the world, adhere to the basic principles outlined above; whether they are based on the same system or the same framework. Malcolm Waters claims that Ritzer argues that globalization should be seen as homogenization.


However, Ritzer does not equate McDonaldization with globalization; Globalization is clearly a much broader process of which McDonaldization is only one component. Waters' second point is much more interesting and provocative. He recognizes that while McDonaldization can have homogenizing effects, it can also be harnessed by local communities around the world in ways unforeseen by the forces driving them. That is, McDonaldization can be used in a way that encourages heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. James Watson draws a number of conclusions that support Waters' position and critique that McDonaldization is inseparable from homogenization. While Watson acknowledges that McDonaldization has led to small but influential changes in East Asia that have made it and its eating habits more similar to those in the West, his more general conclusion is that "East Asian consumers have quietly, and in some cases persistently, shifted from McDonald's to theirs." Neighborhood in local institutions." This is not just a global inhomogeneity, but resistance to it. 2

One of Watson's most interesting claims is that East Asian cities are being reinvented so rapidly that it is difficult even to distinguish between the local and the global. In other words, the global is being adopted and adjusted so quickly that it becomes part of the local. Therefore, many Japanese children will probably think that Ronald McDonald is Japanese. Nor does Watson see McDonald's as a typical First World-based transnational company. For him, McDonald's is more like "an association of semi-autonomous companies", with the result that the local McDonald's can go its own way, at least partially. For example, locations have accepted some of McDonald's "Standard Operating Procedures" but have also modified or rejected others. McDonald's is going through a localization process where locals, particularly young people, no longer see it as a "foreign" entity. While Watson sees the localization process as a positive development, it can also be seen as more worrisome from the perspective of those concerned about the increasing McDonaldization of the world. If McDonaldization remains an "alien" presence, it is easy to recognize and combat, at least by those who care about it. However, if it's your worms

penetrates the local culture and is perceived as a local phenomenon, it is practically impossible to identify and combat it. Bryan Turner examines how McDonald's has changed to suit different regions of the world: Russia, Australia, Asia and the Middle East. It demonstrates the global power and reach of McDonald's and McDonaldization. Like most other critics, he focuses on the food - not the principles, and concludes that McDonald's has made big changes to its menu in many places. He sees this as a compromise with the basic McDonald's burger and fries model - at least as far as the food is concerned. Turner's limited view is shaped by his view that "at the end of the day, McDonald's is just a burger joint". McDonaldization. Rather, it is a framework of underlying principles that has served as a model for the creation and orchestration of a wide range of social structures and social institutions in the United States and around the world. 3

Bryman understands that McDonaldization is really about systems for doing different tasks and achieving different goals. Indeed, such systems define not only McDonaldization, but Disneyization as well. The key is the basic McDonaldization (and Disneyization) principles underlying these systems. And these principles remain essentially the same regardless of what products and/or services are offered and wherever they are offered in the world. This perspective diminishes the importance of the criticisms of analysts such as Waters, Watson and Turner in particular, as their focus is largely confined to foods and the ways in which they are adapted to different cultures. Uri Ram understands this fact and demonstrates it in a case study of McDonald's in Israel. While McDonald's was successful there, it didn't destroy the local falafel industry. Instead, part of the falafel business has been McDonaldized, while another has been "gourmetized". Pictured is a complex mix of the global and the local, rather than one replacing the other. Ram places this in the context of the one-way debate (e.g. McDonaldization, although this process is now multi-directional and not just US-based).


the rest of the world) and reciprocal models (eg Appadurai's "landscapes") of globalization. Ram creatively responds that both approaches are correct, but on different levels. Structurally, he sees a one-way model as dominant, but symbolically it is a one-way street. Thus, much of Israel's falafel industry was structurally transformed into a standardized industrial system - a McDonaldized system. A two-way system symbolically works, in which the falafel and the McDonald's hamburger coexist and 4

to influence each other. Thus, although Israel is characterized by considerable structural unity, symbolically Israel remains internally differentiated and different from other societies, including the US. However, Ram seems to betray this perspective by arguing that Israeli differences only "managed to perpetuate themselves". Such a formulation seems to indicate that, even for Ram, symbolic differences, like structural differences, can disappear, leading to increasing McDonaldization in both domains.



of society

Scientist 47, 2, 2003: 151. What is more surprising

5ª ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2008, 1,

Part of that claim is that Turner is a Weberian.

Added italics.

The scholar should know better. One of these claims is

James L. Watson, "Transnationalism, Location,

similar to the criticism of Weber's work when he says that "a

and Fast Food in East Asia.” In James L. Watson,

A bureaucracy is simply an organization." Bureaucracy


plays in Weber's work the same paradigmatic role as








MC Donalds



McDonald's does it at Ritzer's.

Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997, 6.3




modern in



Bryan S. Turner, “McDonaldization: Linearity and

Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University

Liquidity in Consumer Cultures." American Behavioral

by Minnesota Press, 1996.

Introduction to McDonaldization

An Introduction to McDonaldization George Ritzer

McDonald's was a resounding success in the international arena. More than half of McDonald's restaurants are located outside the United States (only 2.5% of McDonald's restaurants were located outside the United States in the mid-1980s). Of the 280 new restaurants opened in 2006, the majority (233) were overseas (the number of US restaurants increased by only 47). Well over half of McDonald's sales come from its overseas operations. McDonald's restaurants can now be found in 118 countries around the world, serving 50 million customers every day. By far the favorite as of early 2007 is Japan with 3,828 restaurants, followed by Canada with over 1,375 and Germany with over 1,200. Currently, there are 780 McDonald's restaurants in China (but Yum! Brands operates more than 2,000 KFCs - the Chinese prefer chicken to beef - and 300 Pizza Huts in China). McDonald's will add 100 new restaurants in China each year, with a target of 1,000 restaurants by the opening of the Beijing 2008 Olympics (but KFC will add 400 a year!). In 2006, there were 155 McDonald's in Russia, and the company plans to open many more restaurants in the former Soviet Union and in the vast new areas of Eastern Europe that are being invaded by fast-food restaurants. Although McDonald's has suffered setbacks in Britain recently, that country remains the "fast-food capital of Europe", and Israel is described as "McDonaldized", with its malls managed by "Ace Hardware, Toys 'R' Us , Office Depot and TCBY." Many companies outside the fast food industry, which are heavily influenced by McDonalds, have also been successful around the world. While the majority of Blockbuster's 9,000+ sites are located in the United States, approximately 2,000 of them are located in 24 other countries. Wal-Mart is the world's largest retailer, with 1.8 million employees and more than $312 billion in sales. There are about 4,000 of its stores in the United States (as of 2006). Opened its first international store

(in Mexico) in 1991; Currently, it has more than 2,700 units in Puerto Rico, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Brazil, China, Korea, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. More than 175 million customers visit Wal-Mart stores around the world every week. Other nations have developed their own variants of the McDonald's chain. Canada has a chain of coffee shops called Tim Hortons (merged with Wendy's in 1995) with 2,711 stores (336 in the United States). It is Canada's largest foodservice provider, with almost twice as many McDonald's locations in that country. The chain owns 6.2% of the coffee business (Starbucks is second with only 7% of that business). Paris, a city whose love of fine dining might make you think you'd be immune to fast food, has a huge number of fast-food croissanteries; The revered French bread has also been McDonaldized. In India there is a chain of fast food restaurants, Nirula's, which sells mutton burgers (about 80% of Indians are Hindus who do not eat beef) and also local Indian cuisine. Mos Burger is a Japanese chain with over 1,600 restaurants selling teriyaki chicken burgers, rice burgers and "Oshiruko with Brown Rice Cake" in addition to the regular fare. Perhaps the most unlikely place for a homegrown fast-food restaurant, war-torn Beirut in 1984 saw the opening of the Juicy Burger, with a rainbow in place of golden arches and J.B. the clown replacing Ronald McDonald. Its owners hoped it would become the "McDonald's of the Arab world". Immediately after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, McDonald's clones (sporting names like "MaDonal" and "Matbax") opened in that country, complete with hamburgers, fries and even gold ribbons. And now McDonaldization has come full circle. Other countries with their own McDonaldized institutions began to export them to the United States. The Body Shop, a British chain of environmentally sensitive cosmetics, had over 2,100 stores in 2006

G e o r g e Ritzer -

55 nations, 300 of them in the United States. American companies followed suit and opened copies of this British chain, such as Bath & Body Works. Pret A Manger, a fast-food chain also originating in the UK (interestingly, McDonald's acquired a 3.3% minority stake in the company in 2001), has more than 150 company-owned and operated restaurants, mostly in the UK, but now also in New York, Hong Kong and Tokyo. Founded in Guatemala in 1971, Polio Campero had more than 200 restaurants in Latin America and the United States by mid-2006. The latter had 23 restaurants in several major cities, and the company planned to open 10 more in those cities by the end of 2006 (Jollibee, a Philippine chain, has 10 stores in the United States.) However, while Polio Campero has less of a presence in the United States than US chain Polio Tropical (which has 80 stores in the United States), Polio Campero it is most prominent because of the invasion of the United States, the birthplace of fast food, by a foreign chain. IKEA (more on this major chain later), a home furnishings company based in Sweden (but Dutch owned), had sales of around €17.6 billion in 2006, stemming from more than 410 million visitors to its 251 stores in 34 countries. The 160 million copies of its catalogue, printed in over 44 languages, were also acquired. In fact, this catalog is said to print the second largest edition in the world annually, right after the Bible. The IKEA website offers more than 12,000 products and had more than 125 million hits in 2006. End of 2007. It currently employs more than 60,000 people and sells more than 500 million items per year. Spain-based Inditex Group, whose flagship store is Zara, overtook H&M in March 2006 to become Europe's biggest fashion retailer, with more than 3,100 stores in 64 countries. [...] At the opening of McDonald's in Moscow, a journalist described the franchise as "the ultimate icon of American culture". When Pizza Hut opened in Moscow in 1990, a Russian student said, "This is a piece of America." things

American." Speaking about the popularity of Kentucky Fried Chicken in Malaysia, the local owner said: “Anything Western, especially American, people love it here […] At least in some ways, McDonald's has become more important than America itself. . Consider the following story about a former US ambassador to Israel who officiated at the opening of the first McDonald's in Jerusalem and wore a baseball cap with the gold Wearing McDonald's logo: An Israeli teenager approached him wearing his own McDonald's hat , which he presented to Ambassador Indyk with a pen and asked: "Are you the Ambassador?" Can I have your autograph?” Somewhat embarrassed, Ambassador Indyk replied: “Of course. I have never been asked for an autograph before.” As the ambassador prepared to sign his name, the Israeli teenager said to him, “Wow, what's it like to be a McDonald's ambassador, traveling the world and seeing McDonald's-Opening restaurants everywhere?” Ambassador Indyk looked at the young Israeli and said, “No, no. I'm the American Ambassador – not the McDonald's Ambassador!” Ambassador Indyk described what happened next: “I said to him, 'You mean you don't want my autograph?' And the boy said, 'No, I don't want your autograph,' and he took his hat back and walked away." purchasing power of various world currencies based on the local price (in dollars) of the Big Mac. The Big Mac is used because it is a uniform commodity sold in many different countries. In the 2007 survey, a Big Mac cost an average of US$3.22 in the United States, US$1.41 in China, US$5.5 in Switzerland and the most expensive US$7.44 in Iceland. This metric gives at least a rough indication of where the cost of living is high or low and which currencies are undervalued (China) and which are overvalued (Switzerland). the ubiquity and importance of McDonald's around the world.

Introduction to McDonaldization

The second indicator of McDonald's global importance is the idea developed by Thomas Friedman that "no two countries that have a McDonald's have ever fought a war, since they both have McDonald's". Friedman calls this the "Golden Arch Theory of Conflict Prevention." Another ironic idea, suggesting that the path to world peace lies in McDonald's continued international expansion. Sadly, it was proven wrong with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, where there was a McDonald's at the time (as of 2007, there were 16 McDonald's). For many people around the world, McDonald's has become a sacred institution. At the opening of McDonald's in Moscow, an employee spoke of it "as if Chartres Cathedral [...] were a place to experience 'heavenly delights'". the modern "consumer cathedrals" where people go to practice their "consumer religion". Likewise, a visit to another central fixture of McDonaldized society, Walt Disney World, has been described as "the hajj of the middle class, the must-visit to the sunny holy city." [...]

The Dimensions of McDonaldization Why has the McDonald's model proved so irresistible? Eating fast food at McDonald's has certainly become a "sign" of being in tune with the contemporary lifestyle, among other things. There is also a kind of magic or enchantment associated with such foods and their settings. However, the focus here is on the four compelling dimensions that are at the heart of the success of this model and of McDonaldization in general. In short, McDonald's has been successful because it offers consumers, workers and managers efficiency, predictability, predictability and control. [...]

Efficiency A key element of McDonald's success is efficiency, or the best way to get from one point to another. For consumers, McDonald's

(your drive-through is a good example) offers the best available route to go from hunger to satiety. The fast-food model provides, or at least appears to provide, an efficient method of satisfying many other needs. Woody Allen's Orgasmatron offered an efficient way to move people from tranquility to sexual gratification. Other McDonald's-inspired institutions offer similar efficiencies in exercise, losing weight, lubricating cars, getting new eyeglasses or contact lenses, or filling out tax forms. Like their customers, McDonaldized systems employees work efficiently following the steps of a ready-made process.

Predictability Predictability emphasizes the quantitative aspects of products sold (portion size, cost) and services provided (time to receive product). In McDonaldized systems, quantity has become synonymous with quality; a lot of stuff or fast delivery of something means it has to be good. As two observers of contemporary American culture put it: "As a culture, we tend to have a deep-seated belief that, in general, 'bigger is better.' to be a more nominal amount of money (best exemplified by McDonald's recent "Dollar Menu", which played a key role in pulling McDonald's out of the doldrums and steadily increasing sales in recent years). In a recent ad for Denny's, a man says, "I'll overeat, but I'll never overpay." However, this calculation misses an important point: the high profit margins of fast-food chains suggest that owners, not consumers, are getting the best deal. People also calculate how long it will take to drive to McDonald's, serve the food, eat it and go home; They then compare this interval to the time it takes to prepare the food at home. They often conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a visit to a fast food restaurant takes less time than eating at home. This type of calculation is particularly useful for in-house suppliers such as Domino's and other chains that value saving time. A notable example of time savings on a different kind of network is LensCrafters, which promises people “glasses fast, glasses in an hour”. H&M is known for its "fast fashion".

Georg Ritzer

Some McDonaldized institutions combine the emphasis on time and money. Domino's promises half-hour pizza delivery or the pizza is free. Pizza Hut serves a custom pan pizza in 5 minutes, or it's free too. Workers in McDonaldized systems also emphasize the quantitative rather than the qualitative aspects of their work. For example, because the quality of work can vary little, workers focus on how quickly tasks can be completed. In a situation similar to the customer, workers are expected to do a lot of work quickly for a small wage.

Predictability McDonald's also offers predictability, the assurance that products and services will remain the same over time and in all locations. The Egg McMuffin in New York will be identical in every way to Chicago and Los Angeles. Also, those eaten in the next week or next year are identical to those eaten today. Customers have peace of mind knowing that McDonald's offers no surprises. People know that the next Egg McMuffin they eat won't be awful, though it won't be exceptionally delicious either. The success of the McDonald's model suggests that many people prefer a world where there are few surprises. "This is odd," observes a British observer, "since [McDonald's] is the product of a culture that honors individualism above all else." Workers in McDonaldised systems also behave in predictable ways. They follow company rules as well as the directives of their superiors. In many cases, what they do and even what they say is very predictable.

Control The fourth element of McDonald's success, control, is exercised over the people who enter the world of McDonald's. Queues, limited menus, few options and uncomfortable seating mean customers do what management asks - eat quickly and leave. Additionally, the drive-through window (in some cases the walk-through window) invites diners to leave the restaurant before eating. In the Domino's model, the customer doesn't even enter.

People working in McDonaldised organizations are also subject to a high level of scrutiny, often more openly and directly than customers. They are trained to do a limited number of things exactly as they are told. This control is reinforced by the technologies used and by the way in which the organization enforces this control. Managers and inspectors make sure workers obey the rules.

A critique of McDonaldization: The irrationality of rationality McDonaldization offers powerful benefits. Indeed, efficiency, predictability, accountability, and control by non-human technology (i.e., technology that controls humans rather than being controlled by them) can be seen not only as fundamental components of a rational system, but also as powerful advantages of such a system. system. However, rational systems inevitably produce irrationalities. The negative side of McDonaldization is dealt with more systematically under the keyword irrationality of rationality; Indeed, the irrationality of rationality can paradoxically be seen as the fifth dimension of McDonaldization. [...] In fact, the criticism can be applied to all facets of the world of McDonaldization. For example, at the opening of Euro Disney, a French politician said that it would "bombard France with uprooted creations that are to culture what fast food is to gastronomy". Although McDonaldization offers many benefits [. . . ] , this book focuses on the high costs and enormous risks of McDonaldization. McDonald's and other fast-food suppliers spend billions of dollars every year detailing the benefits of their system. Yet critics of the system have few outlets for their ideas. For example, no one sponsors commercials between Saturday morning cartoons warning children about the dangers associated with fast-food restaurants. Still, a legitimate question can be asked about this critique of McDonaldization: is it inspired by a romanticization of the past, an impossible desire to return to a world that no longer exists? Some critics base their criticism on nostalgia for a time when life was slower and held more surprises than at least some people (those who were better off economically).

Introduction to McDonaldization

they were freer and dealt more with a human being than with a robot or computer. While right, these critics undoubtedly exaggerated the positive aspects of a world without McDonald's and certainly tended to overlook the disadvantages associated with earlier eras. As an example of the latter, consider the following anecdote about a visit to a pizzeria in Havana, Cuba, which in some ways lags behind the United States by decades:

Not much to rave about the pizza - they skimp on the tomato sauce and the dough gets soggy. It was about 7:30 pm and as usual there was only standing room and people squeezed in two to open a stool and a queue spilled out onto the sidewalk. The menu is equally spartan [...] There's tap water to drink. That's it - no toppings, no soda, no beer, no coffee, no salt, no pepper. And no special requests. Few people eat. Most are waiting [...] Fingers tapping, flies buzzing, the clock ticking. The waiter wears a watch on his belt, but he rarely wears it; Obviously, time is not his main concern. After a while, tempers begin to crumble. But now it's 8:45. I've been waiting for two cupcakes at the pizzeria for an hour and a half. Few would choose such a restaurant over the fast, friendly, and varied offerings of, say, Pizza Hut. More importantly, past-worshipping critics don't seem to realize that we're not returning to that world. In fact, even in Havana there are already fast food restaurants (and after Fidel Castro's death there will probably be many more). The growing number of people populating the planet, the acceleration of technological change, the increase in the speed of life - all this and much more make it impossible to return to the world of homemade meals and traditional restaurants, if there ever was dinner, food quality, dishes full of surprises and restaurants run by chefs who give free rein to creativity. It is more correct to criticize McDonaldization from the perspective of a conceivable future. Unrestrained by the limitations of McDonaldized systems, but with the technological advances they make possible, humans may have the potential to be much more thoughtful, dexterous, creative and versatile than they are now.

In short, if the world were less McDonaldized, people would be better able to realize their human potential. We need to look at McDonaldization as both an "enablement" and a "constraint". McDonaldized systems allow us to do many things we couldn't do in the past; However, these systems also prevent us from doing things that we would otherwise do. McDonaldization is a “double-edged sword” phenomenon. We must not lose sight of this fact, even as this book focuses on the limitations associated with McDonaldization—its "dark side."

Illustrating the dimensions of McDonaldization: the case of IKEA An interesting example of McDonaldization, especially since it has its roots in Sweden rather than the United States, is IKEA. Its popularity stems from the fact that it offers modern furniture based on well-known Swedish designs at very reasonable prices. It has a large and loyal clientele all over the world. What's interesting about IKEA, from this book's perspective, is how it fits into the dimensions of McDonaldization. However, the similarities go further than that. For example, as with the opening of a new McDonald's, there is great anticipation for the opening of the first IKEA in a given location. The mere rumor that it would open in Dayton, Ohio led to the statement: “Here in Dayton we are peeing our pants together waiting for the IKEA announcement.” IKEA is also a global phenomenon – it is already present in 34 countries (including China and Japan) and selling in these countries both its branded products and those more suited to local tastes and interests. In terms of efficiency, IKEA offers a one-stop shop for furniture with an exceptional range of furniture. In general, there is no need to wait for your purchases, as each store has a huge attached warehouse (you often enter through the warehouse) where practically everything is stocked in large quantities. Much of IKEA's efficiency comes from the fact that a lot of work is expected of customers: •

Unlike McDonald's, there are relatively few IKEA's in a given area; As a result, customers typically spend many hours driving long distances to reach a store. This is known as an "IKEA road trip".

Georg Ritzer

Upon entering, customers are expected to pick up a map to guide their way through the vast, intentionally labyrinthine store (IKEA, like Las Vegas casinos, expects customers to "get lost" in the maze and spend hours wandering around, and in doing so it, go to spend money). There are no staff to direct anyone, but there are arrows painted on the floor for customers to follow. Also, upon entering, customers are expected to pick up a pencil and an order form and write down the shelf and bin numbers for the larger items they wish to purchase. A yellow shopping bag must be picked up at the entrance for smaller items. There are few staff and little help when customers are wandering around the stores. After leaving the showroom and entering the market, customers can switch from a shopping bag to a shopping cart, where they can pick up other smaller items. When customers eat in the cafeteria, they are expected to clean their tables after eating. There's even this handy sign: "Why should I set my own table? At IKEA, setting your own table at the end of the meal is one of the reasons you paid less in the beginning." Most furniture sold is sold unassembled in flat packs and customers are expected to load most items (except the largest) into their own carts. When you get home, you have to dismantle (and discard) the packaging and then assemble the furniture; The only tool you are supposed to need is an allen wrench. If the furniture doesn't fit in your car, you can rent a truck locally to take it home or deliver it, although the cost tends to be high, especially in relation to the price of the furniture. Customers often register online to receive a catalogue.

Predictability is at the core of IKEA, specifically the idea that what is on offer is priced very low. Like a McDonald's "dollar menu", you can get a lot of furniture - an entire room, even an entire house - at a bargain price.

Prices. As with cheap meals, customers feel they are getting value for their money. (There's even a great sandwich shop offering reasonably priced food, including the chain's signature Swedish meatballs and a 99-cent breakfast.) However, as always with McDonald's, low price often means substandard quality, and that's it, too. it is often the case that IKEA products fall apart in a relatively short time. IKEA also emphasizes the sheer size of its stores, which often approach 300,000 square feet, or about four to five football fields. This gigantic size leads the consumer to believe that there is a lot of furniture on offer (and there is) and that most of it will be very affordable given the store's reputation. Of course, there's a lot of predictability in every IKEA - large parking lots, a supervised children's playground (where IKEA provides staff, but only because supervised children give parents more time and peace of mind to shop and spend), the masses of cheap Swedish goods - planned furniture, output through the warehouse and cash registers, boxes to carry furniture that needs to be assembled, etc. An IKEA is a highly controlled environment, mainly in the sense that the labyrinthine structure of the store practically forces the consumer to walk around the entire place and see practically everything it has to offer. If you try to follow a path other than that laid out by IKEA, you will most likely lose your way and lose your way. There seems to be no way out that doesn't lead to the cashier where you pay for your groceries. There are a number of irrationalities associated with IKEA's rationality, most notably the poor quality of most of its products. Although the furniture is said to be easy to assemble, many consider it "impossible to assemble". Then there are the long hours it takes to get to an IKEA, wander through it, drive home, and then gather the groceries. [...]

Global consumer culture

McDonaldization and the Culture of Global Consumption Malcolm Waters Given this [...] Ritzer offers a convincing argument that McDonaldization is an influential current of globalization. The rationalization imperatives of consumption seem to be taking McDonald's and similar companies to all corners of the world to be assimilated everywhere. The imperatives of this rationalization are well stated: consumption is work, takes time and competes with itself, because selecting, transporting, maintaining and repairing the things we buy consumes so much time that we are compelled, time eating, drinking, sex, dressing, sleeping, exercise and relax. The result is that Americans have taught us to eat while standing up, walking, running, driving - and most importantly, never finishing a meal in favor of endless snacking [...] we now have pizza, burgers, roasts and coffee can be as fast as we can fuel our cars. [...] The globalization of "McTopia", an effortless and instant consumer paradise, is also underpinned by its democratizing impact. It democratizes by downskilling, not just downskilling the McWorkers, but downsizing family work as domestic workers. The kitchen is being haunted by frozen foods and microwaves to allow home cooks, often women, to offer McDonald's food at home. Non-cooks, particularly men and children, are allowed to cook together. Meals can be "defamilized" (ie, dedifferentiated) so that all members can cook, buy, and consume the same fatty, starchy, and sugary foods. Consequently, although "America is the only country in the world where the rich eat as poorly as the poor," the appeal of this "gastronomic leveling" may serve as a magnet for others elsewhere. However, we can put into perspective the scaremongering in Ritzer's neo-Weberian proposals for globalization.

lead to a homogenized common consumer culture if we expose them to the full breadth of globalization theory. Globalization theory generally specifies that a globalized culture is chaotic rather than ordered - it is integrated and connected so that the meanings of its components are "relative" to one another, but it is not unified or centralized. The absolute globalization of culture would involve the creation of a common but highly differentiated realm of value, taste and style possibilities that each individual could freely access, whether for self-expression or consumption purposes. Under a globalized cultural regime, Islam would not be tied to specific territorial communities in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, but would be universally available throughout the world and with varying degrees of 'orthodoxy'. Likewise, in the realm of political ideology, the seemingly contradictory political values ​​of private ownership and power-sharing can combine to establish new ideologies of commercial enterprise. On the consumer side, cardboard hamburgers would be available not just in Pasadena, but anywhere in the world, just as classic French cuisine would not only be available at Escoffier's in Paris, but everywhere. A globalized culture thus allows for a continuous flow of ideas, information, engagement, values ​​and tastes mediated by mobile individuals, symbolic signs and electronic simulations. Its main characteristic is to suggest that the world is a place, not because it is homogenized, but because it accepts only social differentiation and not spatial or geographic one. These currents give a special shape to a globalized culture. First, it connects previously isolated and previously homogeneous cultural niches. Local developments and preferences are inevitably shaped by similar patterns found in far distant places. Second, it allows the development of

Malcom Waters

transnational cultures not associated with any particular society-nation-state, which may be new or syncretic. Appadurai's increasingly influential arguments about the global cultural economy identify several of the important areas where these developments are taking place. Fields are marked with the suffix "-scape"; that is, they are globalized mental images of the social world perceived from the flows of cultural objects. Flows include ethnoscapes, the distribution of mobile individuals (tourists, migrants, refugees, etc.); Technoscapes, the dissemination of technology; financial landscapes, the distribution of capital; mediascapes, dissemination of information; and Ideoscapes, the dissemination of political ideas and values ​​(eg freedom, democracy, human rights). McDonaldization seeps into several of these streams, including Ethnoscapes, Technoscapes, Financialscapes, and Ideoscapes. However, its effects are by no means universally homogenizing. The dynamics at work center on processes of relativization, reflexivity, and localization that oppose McDonaldization's supposed ability to order consumer behavior into unified patterns. The return of agency that many authors have identified is not simply a set of isolated and individualized coping responses advocated by Ritzer in McDonaldization, but a general feature of contemporary society that emerges from the intersection of these globalizing currents. Indeed, such developments could be called McDonaldization dysfunctions, in the same way that post-Weberian organizational theorists wrote about bureaucracy dysfunctions [...] The term "relativization" [...] implies that globalizing flows do not simply flood local differences. Rather, it implies that residents of local contexts need to understand their lifeworlds not just by reference to embodied traditions and practices, but also by reference to events taking place in distant places. McDonaldization is such an intrusive and neonist development that it entails choices about whether to accept its potential for modernization and rationalization or to reject it in favor of a revitalization of local products and traditions. In some cases, this may involve restructuring local practices to meet the challenge. Staying at the hamburger world level to find our examples, there is a story about the introduction of McDonald's in the Philippines that may illustrate this point:

Originally, Filipino hamburger chains marketed their products because of their "Americanness". However, when McDonald's entered the field and monopolized the symbols of "Americanness", the indigenous chains began to market their products based on local flavors. It is clear that the relativizing effect of McDonaldization goes much further, because it is not just about the global distribution of certain products, but icons of American capitalist culture. Relativizing reactions, therefore, can include highly generalized reactions to that culture, whether positive or negative. As people become more and more involved in global cultural flows, they also become more reflective. [...] Participation in a global system means that one's life environment is determined by impersonal flows of money and know-how beyond personal or even organizational control. If European governments cannot even control their currency values ​​against speculation, then individual living environments must be highly vulnerable. People who are aware of these risks are constantly on the lookout, seeking information about them, considering value for money and the validity of expertise. Modern society therefore has a specifically reflective character. Social activity is constantly influenced by flows and analyzes of information that subject it to constant scrutiny and thus constitute and reproduce it. "Knowing what to do" in modern society, even in decidedly traditional contexts like parenting or parenting, almost always involves acquiring knowledge about how to do it from books, television programs or expert advice, rather than from relying on the habit of letting mimesis, or authoritative direction from the elders. McDonaldization is involved in this process precisely because it challenges the validity of custom and tradition by instituting cleverly simplified systems, particularly insofar as their ability to commercialize and commodify has never been questioned. The notion of location is linked to the notions of relativization and reflexivity. The latter implies that residents of a local area will make increasingly conscious choices about which values ​​and amenities to emphasize in their communities, and that these choices will increasingly be referenced in global landscapes. Location implies a reflexive reconstruction of the community in the face of

Global consumer culture

the inhumane implications of such rationalizing and commodifying forces as McDonaldization. The activist middle classes, which mobilize citizen initiatives and monument preservation associations, often directly oppose the expansion of McDonald's branches, citing what was once just an imaginary golden age. Returning to more abstract questions, these three processes can assure us that a globalized world will not be McMundo. It is a world with the potential to replace local homogeneity not with global homogeneity but with global diversity. Three developments may confirm this hopeful prognosis. First, one of the characteristics of Fordist systems of mass production, of which McDonaldization may be the prime example, is that they sought to standardize both production and consumption levels. Ultimately, they failed not just because they refused to recognize that responsible, engaged workers would produce more in quantity and quality than controlled and alienated ones, but because markets for standardized products were saturated. The subsequent "flexible specialization" paradigm involved flexibly hired workers who employed multiple skills and computer-controlled machines to adapt products to rapidly changing market demand. Thus, consumer goods took on a new form and function. Taste became the sole determinant of its usefulness, becoming ephemeral and subject to whims. Product demand is driven by fashion, and out-of-date products are disposable. Furthermore, taste and fashion became associated with social position as product-based classes emerged as central features of social organization. The result has been a relentless search by manufacturers for niche marketing strategies that allow them to multiply product variation to meet market demand. In many cases, this has forced the downsizing of companies that can maximize market sensitivity. So affluent consumers embark on a relentless quest for authenticity. The intersection of these trends implies a multiplication of products and production styles. The world is becoming both a giant bazaar and a consumer factory. One of the most striking examples of consumer and producer resistance to rationalization is the French bread industry, which is as little influenced by McDonalds as possible. [...] Consumers and manufacturers fought with the charge

active against invasions by industrialized bakers, the first to preserve the authenticity of their food, the second to preserve independent businesses. Baking is an artisanal production that reproduces the traditions of the rural house. About 80 percent of baking (apart from Ritzer's croissants) is still done in small workshops. The product is obviously the envy of middle-class global consumers. This diversification is accelerated by an aestheticization of production. As is known, the history of modern society brings with it a growing production of mass cultural goods. For much of this century, this production had a Fordist character, an obvious example being its transmission by large private or state television networks in closed markets. Three main features in the current period are the deregulation of markets through the introduction of direct satellite and broadband fiber optic technology; the vertical disintegration of aesthetic production to create "a transactional nexus of markets connecting small businesses, often run by freelancers"; and the trend towards producer-consumer de-differentiation within emerging multimedia technologies associated with the Internet and interactive television. The implication is that a growing share of consumption is aesthetic in nature, that aesthetic production takes place in an increasingly refined market, and that these aesthetic products are less and less susceptible to McDonaldization. A huge variety of individualized, unpredictable, inefficient and irrational products can be inspected simply by browsing the Internet. The most recent development that may refute the thesis of a homogenized world culture is the way in which globalization has unleashed conflicting forces of opinion, attachment, and interest that many observers perceive as a threat to the fabric of society and even global security. One is the widespread religious revival, often expressed as fundamentalism. Globalization carries the dissatisfaction of modernization and postmodernization (including McDonaldization) with religious traditions that previously might have remained encapsulated. [...] Religious systems are forced to relativize themselves in relation to these global trends of postmodernization. This relativization may involve the adoption of postmodern standards, an abstract and humanistic ecumenism, but also the

Malcom Waters

form of a negative search for original traditions. The latter produced both Islamic fundamentalism and the [...] New Christian Right. Globalization also contributes to ethnic diversity. It pluralizes the world by recognizing the value of cultural niches and local skills. Importantly, it weakens the putative bond between nation and state, liberates absorbed ethnic minorities, and allows for the reestablishment of nations across former state boundaries. This is particularly important in the context of states that are confederations of minorities. Indeed, it may change the mix of ethnic identities in any nation-state due to the influx of economic migrants from relatively disadvantaged to relatively disadvantaged sectors of the world. Previously homogeneous nation-states later moved to multiculturalism.

Conclusion The paradox of McDonaldization is that, in trying to control consumers, it recognizes that human individuals are potentially autonomous, a feature notoriously found in “cultural imposters” or “television potatoes” theories about the spread of consumer culture. Horrible as they are, fast food restaurants only accept cash in exchange for humble, nutritious and tasty meals. They don't try to manage their clients' lives, although they might try to manage their diets. They attract rather than force, so one can always opt out. Indeed, advertising sends the message, albeit a dubious one, to consumers that they are making a choice. It can therefore be argued against Ritzer that consumer culture is the source of the heightened cultural efficacy often cited as an accompaniment to globalization and postmodernization. To the extent that we have a consumer culture, individuals are expected to make choices. In such a culture, politics and work can alike become consumer goods. A liberal-democratic political system can only be possible where a consumer culture exists, precisely because it offers the possibility of choice - even if that democracy itself tends to become McDonaldized as leaders become images of photo opportunities and juicy phrases in the media. media and themes are designed in overly simplified packages. in the same way work

it can no longer be seen as a duty or a calling, or even as a means of creative self-expression. It is to be expected that the choice of occupation, even the choice to work, will become more and more a question of status and less a question of material advantages. Ritzer is almost right in suggesting that McDonaldization is an extension, perhaps the ultimate extension, of Fordism. The implication, however, is that it should come as no surprise that McDonaldization is seeping into the far reaches of the world, just as we are now more likely to find a Fordist factory in Russia or India than in Detroit, and there are some signs that, in the As far as the restaurant is concerned, there is stagnation, if not decline, at home. McDonaldization faces post-Fordist frontiers, and part of the crisis these frontiers imply involves a transformation towards a chaotic, irrational and potentially threatening global society guided by tastes and values. It will not be harmonious, but the price of harmony would be to accept the supremacy of Christianity or Communism or Fordism or McDonaldism. This chapter, therefore, deals with the position represented by Ritzer. [...] First, there is a single process of globalization and localization in which local sensibilities are fundamentalistically awakened and exacerbated by currents of modernization such as McDonaldization. Even in the fast food sector, McDonaldization promotes the claim to authenticity to the point of vegetarianism fundamentalism. Second, the emerging global culture is likely to exhibit a rich diversity resulting from this intersection. Globalization exposes each locality to numerous global flows such that, to cite food examples again, each locality can accommodate not just hamburgers, but a kaleidoscope of ethnically diverse choices, ordered hierarchically by price and therefore by degree of manufacture. meal versus manufacturing. On the one hand, you can't escape the ubiquity of McDonald's, the golden arches are everywhere, on the other hand, you can just drive by and buy snacks at the market stall or haute cuisine at high prices at the restaurant. So Ritzer is not wrong when he argues that McDonaldization is an integral part of globalization. Rather, he is wrong when he assumes, firstly, that globalization is to be understood as homogenization and, secondly, that McDonaldization only has homogenizing effects.

Mosaico McDonald's

The McDonald's Mosaic: Glocalization and Diversity By Bryan S. Turner There is ample ethnographic evidence that McDonald's stores have adapted to local circumstances by incorporating local cuisine and values ​​into their customer service. The success of global McDonald's lies in organizing and presenting itself as a local business, where it specifically aims to incorporate local flavors and local dishes - the Hong Kong Curry Potato Bun, the Singapore Loveburger (grilled chicken, honey mustard sauce) , as well as the teriyaki burger (sausage dip) and the tukbul burger with cheese for the Korean market. Let's take the Russian example. The Russian experience of Western culture over the past decade has been extremely ambiguous. The apparent lure of Western consumerism that began in the 1970s continued into the early 1990s, with young people in particular rushing to adopt the latest Western goods and consumer habits. Not surprisingly, however, the promise of a widespread democratic consumer culture has not been fulfilled. There is a growing yearning among older Russians for a supposedly Russian "way of doing things" and an associated distrust of Western cultural institutions. In this context of frustrated ambitions and expectations, one would expect that McDonald's would be an obvious target of Russian hostility. Even in western countries themselves, McDonald's is often seen as representative of the harmful, exploitative and pervasive reach of global capitalism. For many critics, McDonald's abuses and poisons workers. Its unimaginative, fast-eating culture is emblematic of the worst aspects of consumerism. From a Russian point of view, the characteristics of McDonald's are decidedly Western, including its style such as its distinctive forms of graphic design and food presentation, its emphasis on customer service and education, and its patterned global presence. Russia is a society where, because of its communist heritage, personal service,

Friendliness and helpfulness are still corrupt bourgeois customs. Interestingly, however, Russians have a decidedly ambivalent view of McDonald's, in part because they respond pragmatically to Western influences. Seventy years of Soviet rule taught them to deal rationally with principles because they learned to live with inconsistencies and contradictions. McDonald's offers an abundance of cultural contradictions because, despite the overtly western style of McDonald's, there are also numerous ways of convergence with Russian customs and values. First, there is the compatibility of McDonald's Fordist work process, food process and purchasing protocols with those developed in Soviet-era Russia and continued into post-communism. These processes and protocols, while often different in content, are consistently Fordist in form and structure. Both at McDonald's and in the post-communist environment, there are clear expectations of standardized and predictable products, product delivery, employees and their uniforms, and consumption protocols. In both scenarios, production and social interaction are guided by rules and governed by authoritarian decision-making processes. Second, the formally standardized structure and operation of a McDonald's restaurant is underpinned by an egalitarian ethos. In particular, the egalitarian ethos in Russia manifested itself in contempt for the outward appearances of a service culture (as a sign of inequality) and currently manifests itself in widespread contempt for the ostensible consumption of “new Russians”. McDonald's presents its food as food for "ordinary people". Furthermore, the style of eating, using hands instead of knife and fork, appeals to the common people in a country where haute cuisine has been and continues to be

Bryan S. Turner

defined as a form of cultural right. McDonald's service culture is based on a commitment to formal equality between customers and service employees. Finally, the actual content of McDonald's food definitely appeals to Russian tastes. For example, McDonald's dishes such as buns, sauces and even meat tend to be sweeter than your average European or Asian cuisine. Desserts are usually milk-based and contain extremely sweet sauces. French fries and fried chicken appeal to the Russian preference for foods fried in saturated fat over grilled or undercooked foods. Although McDonald's can be seen as harbingers of the worst of Western cultural imperialism, the pragmatic Russian is generally willing to visit McDonald's restaurants because the food is of good quality and in line with Russian tastes and the environment and delivery process are familiar. However, the cost of McDonald's food in Russia is prohibitive and for many a luxury item the average family should save up for. In contrast, the culture of McDonald's in Australia is very compatible with a society that has embraced egalitarianism to the point where it explicitly rejects cultural distinctions in popular expressions such as "chopping big poppies" and emphasizing camaraderie. Historically, Australian food consumption has contained a high proportion of meat, particularly lamb and beef. Nutritional innovations such as replacing lard with canola resulted in a 50% drop in sales at Sydney stores. McDonald's has been particularly successful in the Down Under, where, according to Weekend Australian, one million Australians consume more than $4.8 million worth of burgers, fries and drinks every day at McDonald's 683 outlets. McDonald's arrived in Australia in 1971 and opened 118 stores in its first year. The company has had a major impact on services in Australia, where it has pioneered the modernization of labor practices, corporate culture and philanthropy. Its business strategy included developing educational and community connections through Rotary clubs and churches. McDonald's successfully resisted many local criticisms of American cultural imperialism and developed educational programs aimed at kindergartens and schools. McDonald's built playgrounds and distributed toys. Through the development of McHappy Day, donate generously to hospitals and charities. Also developed Ronald McDonald

House Charities, which raised $2.4 million for charity in 2001. Ray Kroc's Four Commandments - Quality, Service, Cleanliness and Value - have been adopted as central elements in a two-part educational diploma obtainable in secondary schools selected Australians as part of their educational experience. While it was a huge commercial success and now controls 42% of the fast food market, it peaked in the mid-1990s when 145 stores opened in 2 years. Sales numbers are stagnating, customer satisfaction is slipping, and McDonald's is under public scrutiny. McDonald's suffered economically when John Howard's liberal government introduced the GST (general sales tax) and McDonald's hamburgers were not exempt. The result was a 10% drop in sales, and they fell short of their goal of 900 stores by 2000. McDonald's responded to this decline in a number of ways, including diversifying its products into McCafes and shifting to more upscale Mexican products. stylish restaurants and snack bars. In Asia, McDonald's stores have been successful in penetrating local markets. However, McDonald's products changed in the process. The doctrine that societies linked by trade do not go to war is put to the test in the cases of China and Taiwan. For example, there are 341 McDonald's restaurants in Taiwan and 326 in the People's Republic of China. The new Chinese elite, in their quest to industrialize and modernize society, embraced McDonald's stores because McDonald's is seen as the epitome of healthy eating based on nutritious ingredients and scientific cooking. Although the party is still in control and formally promotes communist ideals of loyalty and devotion, young people have embraced the Ronald McDonald backpack as a sign of modernist consumerism. McDonald's entered Taiwan in 1984, where it now sells 92 million hamburgers and 60 million McNuggets to a population of 22.2 million. McDonald's became ubiquitous, in part by adding corn chowder to its regular menu after realizing that no meal is complete without soup. McDonald's in Taiwan also abandoned its no loitering policy after accepting that students viewed the air-conditioned McDonald's as an attractive and cool place to study. Other changes in this densely populated society followed, such as the construction of three-story stores that could accommodate more than 250 people at a time.

Mosaico McDonald's

South Korea is another society that McDonald's has embraced with enthusiasm. The first store opened during the 1988 Olympics in Apkujong-dong in Seoul and quickly expanded to become the second largest fast food service retailer after Lotteria. The World Cup presented McDonald's with important marketing opportunities, and the company looked to expand its branches and add an additional 100 restaurants. The company started a "Player Escort" program to select Korean children for participation by accompanying soccer players to the Football Dome. The current president of McDonald's, Kim Hyung-soo, adopted the sociological term "glocalization" to describe the adaptation of McDonald's menus to meet the demands of local customers, offering Korean-style burgers such as bulgogi burger and developed kimchi burger. Another promotional strategy was to make the internet available in its restaurants, which are located in famous Korean youth hangouts, such as ASEM Mall and Shinohon. The market in Asia is also diversifying as more westernized products and lifestyles are imported. [...] The growing demand for coffee in Asia, where it is now beginning to challenge the cultural hegemony of tea. [...] in the last 5 years Starbucks is as common as McDonald's. [...] McDonald's responded by founding McSnack. [...] Offers chicken and beef curry rice, bagels, and English muffin and waffle sandwiches. It also offers nine different hot and cold coffee drinks. The important feature of the coffee craze is that Korean customers look forward to frequenting the outlets, which are used as meeting and learning points. McDonald's employees tolerate customers who sit for hours in the restaurant or on chairs outside and buy almost nothing. During university exams, students are placed on McSnack, so real customers often have a hard time getting a spot. Customers also bring food from other restaurants to McSnack to eat in the nice, clean, air-conditioned stores. These national case studies show us how McDonald's fast food outlets interact with local cultures. Perhaps the best example of these local tensions is in the Middle East, where 300 McDonald's opened, mostly after the Gulf War. McDonald's has been successful in Saudi Arabia, where McDonald's has spread rapidly despite regular fundamentalist boycotts and where its stores close five times a day.

prayers. The company now intends to open McDonald's in Afghanistan. In Turkey, McDonald's started opening branches in Istanbul and Ankara in the 1980s. Although McDonald's has grown to around 100 branches, almost half of them are in Istanbul. There is a McDonald's in Kayseri, the center of Islamic voting in Istanbul. The only notable protest against McDonald's was at the Middle East Technical University, when it tried to open a branch there in the 1990s, but that protest came from socialists, not Islamic students. Ironically, Muslim couples often use McDonald's as a hangout because they know their traditionalist parents wouldn't eat there. McDonald's in Turkey also respects Islamic norms and offers Iftar, a dinner served during Ramadan. In Egypt, McDonald's has also become popular, serving sandwiches, Egyptian boulettes and other local products. Although Egyptian intellectuals denounce Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's as examples of Western corruption of local tastes and cuisine, McDonald's now coexists without conflict alongside street vendors and local cafes. Paradoxically, despite strong anti-American sentiments, McDonald's branches are popular in many Muslim societies because parents recognize them as places where alcohol is not served. In addition, the slightly exotic taste of the burger and fries is an alternative to local dishes. Indonesian youths use McDonald's the same way Western youths prefer malls. With temperatures consistently in the 30°C (90°F) range and humidity often in excess of 80%, McDonald's is simply a comfortable, clean and cool place. The company has once again adapted to local tastes with the introduction of sweet iced tea, savory burgers and rice. The economic downturn in early 1998 forced McDonald's to experiment with a cheaper menu as hamburger prices soared. McDonald's customers stayed with the company to consume McTime, PaNas and Paket Nasi. For many years, McDonald's has advertised its products as halal, assuring its Muslim customers that its products are religiously clean. Similar to Egyptian McDonald's, in Indonesia during Ramadan, a post-sunset meal is offered as a "special". To avoid any criticism of Americanization, McDonald's is a local Muslim-owned business whose advertising banners in Arabic proclaim that McDonald's Indonesia is wholly owned by McDonald's Indonesia.

James L. W a t s o

an indigenous Muslim. Owners will also be proud of their Muslim status using post-pilgrim titles such as Haji.

Conclusions: Cultural Liquidity These local case studies show how McDonald's rational model adapts to local cultural preferences, but the result is a downsizing of the original McDonald's product (hamburger and fries). Because the more the company adapts to local conditions, the more the attractiveness of the specifically American product can be lost. Ultimately, McDonald's is simply a burger joint. Therefore [...] we must distinguish between specific studies on McDonald's and macro studies on McDonaldization as a rationalization. [...] The global reach of McDonald's is hardly up for debate, and I've tried to illustrate some of the complexity

of them range across various McDonald's vignettes in Russia, Australia, the Middle East and Asia. The proliferation of McDonald's clearly shows that McDonaldization was a powerful force behind administrativeism in modern societies. With globalization, rationalization has become a global dimension of the basic social processes of every modern society. In this sense, the McDonaldization thesis is also a powerful case for the enduring relevance of Weber's general sociology of modernity. Basically, McDonald's diversification through its interaction with local cultures produced new management strategies, consumer cultures and product ranges that radically depart from the Fordist linearity of the original model. McDonald's is slowly disappearing under the weight of its fragmentation, differentiation and assimilation. [...] The unstoppable march of McDonald's through urban society has come to an end.

Transnationalism, Location, and Fast Food in East Asia James L. Watson Is the spread of fast food undermining the integrity of indigenous cuisines? Are food chains helping to create a homogeneous global culture better suited to the needs of a capitalist world order? [...] We do not celebrate McDonald's as the epitome of capitalist virtue, nor do we condemn it as an evil empire. Our aim is to produce ethnographic accounts of the social, political and economic impact of McDonald's on five local cultures. They are not small cultures in imminent danger of extinction; We are dealing with economically resilient and technologically advanced societies known for their haute cuisine. If McDonald's manages to gain a foothold in these societies, one might be tempted to conclude that it may indeed be an irresistible force for global culinary change. But is another scenario not possible? People in East Asia Conspired to Change, Change McDonald's

adapt this seemingly monolithic institution to local conditions? [...] The interaction process works in both directions. McDonald's made small but influential changes to East Asian eating habits. Until the introduction of McDonald's, for example, Japanese consumers rarely, if ever, ate with their hands [...] this is now an acceptable way of eating. In Hong Kong, McDonald's has replaced traditional teahouses and street stalls as the most popular breakfast spot. And among Taiwanese youth, French fries have become a staple thanks almost entirely to McDonald's influence. At the same time, East Asian shoppers have quietly, and sometimes persistently, turned their neighborhood McDonald's into a local institution. Indeed, in the United States, fast food may imply fast consumption, but this is certainly not the case.

Fast food in East Asia

general. For example, in Beijing, Seoul and Taipei, McDonald's restaurants are treated as leisure centers where people can escape from the stresses of city life. In Hong Kong, high school students often sit in McDonald's for hours - studying, gossiping and picking out snacks; For them, restaurants are the equivalent of youth clubs. [...] At this point it must be said that McDonald's is not always in charge.

Globalism and local cultures [...] The operative term is "local culture", an acronym for the experience of everyday life lived by ordinary people in specific places. In using it, we seek to capture the feelings of appropriateness, comfort, and correctness that drive the construction of personal preferences, or "flavors." Dietary habits, attitudes towards food and ideas about what constitutes a proper meal [...] are fundamental to the experience of daily life and therefore an integral part of maintaining local cultures. Readers will notice [...] differences in class, gender and status, especially in relation to consumption practices. One surprise was the finding that many McDonald's restaurants in East Asia have become havens for women who want to avoid male-dominated environments. In Beijing and Seoul, new categories of yuppies are treating McDonald's as an arena for conspicuous consumption. Anthropologists working in such environments must pay special attention to rapidly changing consumer preferences. Twenty years ago, McDonald's supported the children of Hong Kong's wealthy elite; The current generation of hyperconsumers in Hong Kong have long since given up on the golden arches and made their way to pricier hangouts (eg Planet Hollywood). Meanwhile, McDonald's became a mainstay for the working class attracted by its low cost, convenience and predictability. One of our conclusions [...] is that East Asian societies are changing as rapidly as cuisines - there is nothing immutable or primitive about cultural systems. In Hong Kong, for example, given the propensity of Hong Kong people to embrace new foods, it would be impossible to isolate what is specifically "local" about cuisine. Hong Kong cuisine, and with it the local Hong Kong culture, is a moving target.

Hong Kong is the quintessential postmodern environment, where boundaries of status, style and taste are dissolving almost as quickly as they formed. What is “in” today will be “out” tomorrow.

Transnationalism and the Multilocal Corporation It has become an academic cliché to say that human beings are constantly reinventing themselves. However, in places like Hong Kong, Taipei and Seoul, the pace of this reinvention process is so fast that it defies description. In the field of popular culture, it is no longer possible to distinguish between "local" and "foreign". Who says Mickey Mouse isn't Japanese or Ronald McDonald isn't Chinese? To millions of children who watch Chinese television, "Uncle McDonald" (also known as Ronald) is probably more familiar than mythical characters from Chinese folklore. We enter the realm of the transnational, a new field of research that deals with the "deterritorialization" of popular culture. [...] The world economy can no longer be understood assuming that the original producers of a commodity necessarily control its consumption. A good example is the spread of "Asian" martial arts in North and South America, encouraged by Hollywood and the Hong Kong film industry. Transnationalism describes a state where people, goods and ideas literally cross national borders and are not identified with a single place of origin. One of the leading theorists in this new field argues that transnational phenomena are best perceived as building blocks of "third cultures" that are "oriented beyond national borders". Transnational corporations are popularly seen as the clearest expression of this new adjustment, as business, manufacturing and marketing operations are often spread across dozens of corporations around the world. At first glance, McDonald's appears to be the epitome of transnationalism. On closer inspection, however, the company has not lived up to expectations; resembles a federation of semi-autonomous companies. James Cantalupo, former president of McDonald's International, says that McDonald's goal is "to become as much a part of the local culture as possible".

James L. W a t s o

He protests when "[people call us multinational. I like to call us multifocal," which means that McDonald's goes out of its way to find local suppliers and partners when new stores open. [...] McDonald's International owns at least 50 percent of its East Asian businesses; the other half belongs to local operators.

Changing Menus and Local Sensitivities: McDonald's Adapts The key to McDonald's global success is that people everywhere know what to expect when passing through the Golden Arches. However, that doesn't mean the company has resisted change or refused to adapt when local customs demand flexibility. McDonald's restaurants in India serve vegetable McNuggets and a lamb-based Maharaja Mac, necessary innovations in a country where Hindus don't eat beef, Muslims don't eat pork, and Jains (among others) don't eat meat of any kind. type In Malaysia and Singapore, McDonald's has been subjected to stringent inspections by Muslim clerics to ensure ritual cleanliness. The chain was awarded a Halal certificate (“clean”, “acceptable”), which indicates that it does not use any pork product. Many parts of the world have variations of the original American-style McDonald's menu: frozen yogurt drinks (ayran) in Turkey, espresso and cold pasta in Italy, teriyaki burgers in Japan (also in Taiwan and Hong Kong), veggie burgers in Turkey , Holland , McSpaghetti in the Philippines, McLaks (grilled salmon sandwich) in Norway, Frankfurters and beer in Germany, McHuevo (hamburger with poached egg) in Uruguay. [...] Despite local variations (espresso, McLaks) and more recent additions (carrot sticks), the structure of the McDonald's menu remains essentially the same around the world: main course hamburger/sandwich, fries and a drink - predominantly Coca-Cola. The cornerstone of this winning combination is not, as many observers assume, the Big Mac or even the generic hamburger. It's the fries. The entrée can vary widely (fish sandwiches in Hong Kong, veggie burgers in Amsterdam), but McDonald's signature innovation - thin, oblong French fries made with red potatoes - is ubiquitous, consumed with great relish by Muslims, Jews, Christians and Buddhists,

Hindus, vegetarians (now using vegetable oil), communists, conservatives, marathon runners and armchair athletes. [...]

Conclusion: McDonaldization versus localization McDonald's has become such a powerful symbol of the standardization and routine of modern life that it has inspired a new vocabulary: McThink, McMyth, Mcjobs, McSpiritually, and of course, McDonaldization. George Ritzer, author of a popular book entitled The McDonaldization of Society [...] treats McDonald's as the "paradigm case" of social regimentation and argues that "McDonaldization has shown every sign of being an unstoppable process sweeping away seemingly impenetrable parts of the world". Is McDonald's really the revolutionary and disruptive institution cultural imperialism theorists think it is? The evidence [...] could be used to support such a view, but only at the risk of ignoring the historical process. Indeed, there is an "intrusive" first encounter when McDonald's enters a new market, particularly in an environment where American-style fast food is largely unknown to the average consumer. In five cases, McDonald's was treated like an exotic import - a touch of Americana - in the early years of operation. In fact, the company took advantage of this connection to establish itself in the foreign market. But a mature company cannot sustain this initial euphoria. Unlike, for example, Coca-Cola and Spam, the standard McDonald's offering (the hamburger and fries combo) could not be incorporated into existing East Asian cuisines. [...] Spam quickly became a staple of Korean cuisine after the Korean War; It was a recognizable form of meat that required no special preparation. Coca-Cola was also a relatively neutral import when it was first introduced to Chinese consumers. In the 1960s, residents of rural Hong Kong treated cola as a special drink reserved primarily for medicinal purposes. It was most commonly served as bo ho la, Cantonese for "boiled cola", a savory mixture of fresh ginger and herbs served in boiling cola - an excellent remedy for colds. Only later did the drink begin to be consumed pure, first at banquets (mixed with liqueur) and later on special occasions such as visiting

McDonaldization and Disneyization

Relative. There was nothing particularly revolutionary about Coke or Spam; Both products were quickly adapted to local needs and did not require radical adjustments by consumers. McDonald's is something else entirely. Dining at Golden Arches is a total experience that takes people out of their ordinary routines. A "go to" a McDonald's; it does not reach the consumer and is not taken home. [...] From this point of view, it appears that McDonald's may indeed have been an intrusive force, undermining the integrity of East Asian cuisine. However, a closer look reveals that consumers are not the machines many analysts would have us believe. The initial encounter soon begins to fade as McDonald's loses its exotic appeal and gradually gains acceptance (or rejection) as a common meal for busy consumers. The combination of hamburger and fries ends up becoming one more alternative among so many types of ready-to-eat dishes. The localization process is not a one-way street: it involves both changes in the local culture and changes in the company's standard workflows. Key elements of McDonald's industrialized system - queuing, self-catering, self-placement - were adopted by consumers across East Asia. Other aspects of the industrial model were rejected, notably those of time and space. In many parts of East Asia, consumers have turned their local McDonald's into recreation centers and after-school clubs. The meaning of "fast" was subverted in these attitudes: it refers to the delivery of food, not its consumption. Resident managers have no choice but to take these consumer trends and turn them into virtues: “Students create a good atmosphere

it's good for our business," one Hong Kong executive told me as he watched a sea of ​​young people chatting, learning and eating at his restaurant in the Golden Arches. When the children of these original consumers enter the picture, McDonald's is no longer perceived as a foreign company. Parents see it as an oasis of cleanliness and predictability. For children, McDonald's represents fun, familiarity and a place to share their being Being able to choose food for oneself - something that may not be allowed in home.[ . . . ] Localization is not a unilinear process that ends the same everywhere. and Hong Kong.It is so local that many younger consumers are unaware of the company's overseas origins.In China, where the branches McDonald's are still considered exotic outposts and sell more of a cultural experience than food, the localization process has barely begun.At the time of writing, it is unclear what will happen with the expansion effort in Korea; The political environment there is such that many citizens will continue to see the Golden Arches as a symbol of US imperialism. In Taiwan, the bewildering and exciting pace of identity politics can backfire on American corporations in an unprecedented way. Regardless of these uncertainties, McDonald's is no longer dependent on the US market for its future development. [...] As McDonald's enters the 21st century, its multi-location strategy, like its famous double arch logo, is being copied by a multitude of companies eager to emulate its success. In the end, though, McDonald's can be difficult to clone.

Global Implications of McDonaldization and Disneyization Alan Bryman One way in which Disneyization and McDonaldization can rightly be seen as signs of globalization. Ritzer can be seen as parallel processes, which can make this point regarding McDonaldization at its point.

Alan Bryant

more recent work, and shows that the dimensions of Disneyization [...] are spreading across the world in a similar way. What is striking about both concepts, however, is that they do not specifically refer to the global distribution of products. Much of what is written about globalization is filled with exaggerations about the global spread and recognition of well-known brands: Nike, Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Pizza Hut, KFC, Benetton, The Body Shop and so on. And, of course, one could hardly ignore the golden arches of McDonald's or Mickey's ears and Walt's signature, as they have been involved in brand tours around the world. But that is not what McDonaldization and Disneyization are about: it is essentially about the proliferation of modes of delivery of goods and services. McDonaldization primarily refers to a form of delivery in terms of producing goods and services. It's a means of delivering an efficient and highly predictable product in a way that would appeal to both Ford and Taylor. It belongs to an era of mass consumption that is not disappearing, but whose focal points are becoming less and less central to modern society over time. Disneyization is a form of delivery in the sense of placing goods and services for consumption. It provides a context for increasing the attractiveness of goods and services. Indeed, it may be that one of the reasons for the increased use of external narrative themes in some McDonald's restaurants has to do with the limitations of McDonaldization itself. McDonaldization's emphasis on standardization fits awkwardly into an increasingly post-Fordist era of choice and diversity. Creating themes becomes a means of reducing the sameness and thus increasing the attractiveness of products.

Far from the strident but not always insightful reports on the global reach of prominent brands. There can be little doubt that there are several high-profile brands that have sprung up across much of the world, but schemes like Disneyization and McDonaldization are, in a sense, more significant than that. arrival of McDonald's restaurants or the imminent arrival of a new Disney theme park in Hong Kong. The focus on the product obscures the more fundamental issue of disseminating the underlying principles by which goods and services are produced and then put into the mouths of people and families. Although McDonald's restaurants were the focus of anti-globalization activists and Disney showed a decidedly Gallic cold shoulder among intellectuals in France when Disneyland Paris was in the planning stages, prompting the famous "cultural Chernobyl" commentary to spread the basic principles can to be guessed from an examination of what McDonald's and Disney's theme parks illustrate is much less likely and perhaps less likely to be the subject of comment.

Important for such a proposal is that it is crucial to understand that McDonaldization and Disneyization are both systems, that is, they are ways of producing or presenting goods and services. One of the problems with associating the names of these systems with well-known icons of popular culture—McDonald's and Disney—is that it's easy to get bogged down in an argument just about McDonald's and Disney. This is a mistake, as the two companies are just emblems of the underlying processes associated with their respective systems.

Viewed this way, it is striking how poorly Disneyization and McDonaldization fit Appadurai's influential description of various forms of "-scape," that is, contexts for the flow of goods, people, finance, and other things around the globe. Appadurai distinguished between five landscapes; Ethnoscapes (movement of people), Technoscapes (movement of technology), Financescapes (movement of capital), Mediascapes (movement of information) and Ideoscapes (movement of ideas and ideals). Waters argued that "McDonaldization is seeping into several of these streams". However, such a view does not do justice to the importance of McDonaldization and therefore Disneyization. In a sense, we need a new conceptual term for them, which we might call "system landscapes", to indicate the flow of contexts for the production and presentation of goods and services. Although they contain elements of the five scapes, as Waters suggests, McDonaldization and Disneyization are something more than that, as they represent important models for the production of goods and services and their display for sale.

By highlighting the processes associated with Disneyization and McDonaldization as systems, this is possible

Of course, we have to take into account the accusation that we are signing a simplification here.

McDonaldization and Disneyization

Thesis on globalization or Americanization depicting icons of American culture spreading across the world through design, ruthlessly disregarding local conditions and practices. Research on McDonald's, which can be considered the locus classicus of McDonaldization, suggests that it is dangerous to think of a simple process of including foreign cultures. Not only has McDonald's adapted to local tastes and dietary needs and preferences, but it is also used in different ways in different cultures. It is sometimes seen as a sophisticated dining environment for special occasions or couples get-togethers, a hangout, a study area, and so on. Similar observations can be made regarding Disney theme parks when they were ported overseas. Regarding Tokyo Disneyland, Raz notes that while it always claims to be a copy of the American original, it has actually been Japaneseized. For example, the Mystery Tour at Tokyo Disneyland Castle is a Disney version of the Japanese haunted house. The Meet the World Show is like [...] "a show about and for the Japanese". A similar adaptation can be seen at Disneyland Paris, where after a disappointing start, the company was forced to adapt the park to European tastes. In particular, the ban on alcohol had to be lifted. Such local adjustments and adaptations are often and correctly captured by critics of a simple globalization thesis. They also assert that the world is not becoming a single homogenized empire, as there are signs of resistance, even in the face of the momentum of two figures revered in popular culture. While reassuring, these references to the continuing importance of location for McDonald's and Disney theme parks should not blind us to the fact that while McDonald's is used differently in Taipei and Tokyo Disneyland has adapted many attractions to meet Japanese sensibilities, that's not the point of McDonaldization and Disneyization. As mentioned earlier, these are principles related to the production and delivery of goods and services. What researchers tell us about the different ways in which McDonald's has adapted or been differently appropriated by different cultures is how McDonald's has been adapted and appropriated to them, not McDonaldization as such. In some ways, Disneyization and McDonaldization are more troubling to critics.

Globalization as a homogenizing force rather than the arrival of the golden arches in much of the world or the translocation of Disney theme parks abroad. They are more worrisome because Disneyization and McDonaldization are potentially more insidious processes, far less visible and immediately obvious in their formation than the appearance of golden arches or magical kingdoms at the doorsteps of nations. As Ritzer points out regarding McDonald's, "Basic operating procedures are essentially the same across the world," a view widely held by the company's employees. Robert Kwan, then managing director of McDonald's in Singapore, is quoted by Watson as saying: "McDonald's [...] sells a system, not a product." In other words, the search for local adaptations and uses of McDonald's and Disney theme parks should not lead us to believe that it means, or even necessarily implies, local adaptations and uses of McDonaldization and Disneyization. As for Disneyization, particularly in relation to McDonald's, none of the above should be interpreted as implying that there are unlikely to be local processes of adaptation or resistance, or specific uses of culture related to Disneyization. Emotional labor was a particularly prominent site for resistance, as studies of local McDonald's front desks show. Watson noted that in the early stages of the restaurant's arrival in Moscow, people waiting in lines needed to be given information about things like ordering. They also had to be told, "The staff inside will smile at you. That doesn't mean they laugh at you. We smile because we love to serve you." Watson also notes from her fieldwork in Hong Kong that overly nice people are viewed with suspicion, so smiling is not necessarily seen as a positive trait. Furthermore, consumers showed no interest in crew friendliness. Not surprisingly, therefore, the display of emotional labor is not a significant feature of the behavior and behavior of Hong Kong McDonald's counter workers. Watson says, "Instead, they project qualities that are admired in the local culture: competence , frankness and imperturbability. […] It is assumed that workers who smile at work are having fun at the expense of the consumer (and management)”.

Uri Ram

Fantasia's report on McDonald's reception in France offers a slightly different perspective. There, McDonald's appeal to young people was what he calls the "American environment." To the extent that displaying emotional labor is part of this environment, it may be that French enthusiasts do not respond positively to emotional labor per se, but in the context of McDonald's they do respond positively to the total package, of which smiling counter staff is one. component. In other words, as authors who emphasize local adaptations to global processes point out, local consumers often harness the forces of globalization in their own culturally appropriate ways. The above argument clearly carries risks. In an age when writers on globalization prefer to emphasize "glocalization" or "creolization" as ways of dealing with the different ways in which global forces must navigate the challenge of local cultural conditions and preferences, it is unfashionable to acknowledge these impulses. suggested by union states move around the globe. Indeed, as the evidence for emotional labor cited earlier suggests, we must consider how these global influences find their way and operate.

integrated into local cultures. But Disneyization is a more invisible process than the arrival of brands in foreign lands. It aims to maximize consumers' willingness to buy goods and services that, in many cases, they may not have been encouraged to buy. Theming provides the consumer with a narrative that acts as a point of attraction, providing an experience that reduces the meaning of an economic transaction and increases the likelihood of purchasing goods. The de-differentiation of consumption must give the consumer the greatest possible number of shopping opportunities and, therefore, keep him at the amusement park, mall or elsewhere for as long as possible. In many ways, emotional labor is the oil of the whole process: in differentiating otherwise identical goods and services, as an enactment of the theme, and as an environment to increase willingness to buy goods. Emotional labor can be ignored or ineffective, as in Russia and Hong Kong. However, these are rather minor reactions to the proliferation of these consumer tools. And to the extent that we can view McDonald's as a Disneyized institution, the Disneyization process has a high-profile partner who is likely to facilitate the global dissemination of its underlying principles.

Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local - McDonald's in Israel Uri Ram One of the most controversial aspects of globalization is its cultural implications: Does globalization lead to universal cultural uniformity, or does it leave room for particularism and cultural diversity? The global-local encounter has produced a complex polemic between "homogenizers" and "heterogenizers". This article proposes to shift the terrain of the debate from the homogeneous-heterogeneous dichotomy to a structural-symbolic construction. Here it is argued that, although homogenization and heterogenization are dimensions of globalization, they occur at different social levels: homogenization occurs at the structural level

institutional level; Heterogenization, in the symbolism of expression. The proposed structural-symbolic model allows a realistic assessment of global-local relationships. While global technological, organizational and commercial flows need not destroy local habits and customs, but can in fact preserve or even revitalize them, the global tends to subsume and appropriate or, as it were, consume the local. , sometimes to the extent that the apparently local symbolically becomes a pattern of the global structure. The starting point of this analysis is the McDonaldization of Israeli culture. McDonald's opened its first


outíet in Israel in 1993. Since then, he has been involved in a variety of symbolic encounters [...] [in] the meeting between McDonald's, the epitome of global fast food, and the local version of fast food, namely falafel [ ... ] local languages ​​thrived, if only symbolically. At the structural level, they were included and appropriated by global social relations.

Global trade meets local eating habits: McDonald's and falafel The industrialized hamburger first arrived on Israel's shores in the late 1960s, although the chains involved didn't make much of an impression at the time. In 1972, Burger Ranch (BR) opened a local hamburger place that only became a chain in the 1980s. However, it took the advent of McDonald's for the "great gluttony" of fast hamburgers to begin. McDonald's opened its first store in October 1993. It was followed by Burger King (BK), the second largest hamburger chain in the world, which opened its first store in Israel in early 1994. Between the arrival of McDonald's and the year 2000 , sales in the hamburger industry increased by 600%. In the year 2000, the annual revenues of fast food chains in Israel reached NIS 1 billion (about 200 million US dollars at the 2002 exchange rate). McDonald's is the leading chain in the sector with 50% of sales, followed by BR with 32% and BK with 18%. In 2002, the three chains totaled 250 stores: McDonald's, 100; BR, 94 and BK, 56. McDonald's, like Coca-Cola - both major American brands - has gained frontline positions in the war for the Israeli consumer. The same applies to many other American styles and brands such as jeans, t-shirts, Nike and Reebok sneakers, as well as mega stores such as Home Center Office Depot, SuperPharm, etc. [. . .] As for eating habits, alongside the proliferation of fast-food chains, other Americanisms have also found a growing niche in the Israeli market: frozen “TV dinners”, whether in family packs or individually, and a boom in fast food deliveries. -food . These developments stem from the change in the way of life of families, since more and more women are no longer (or are no longer just) housewives, the increase in single

Families and increased family income. All of this, combined with accelerated economic activity, has increased the demand for quick or easy-to-prepare foods. As elsewhere, technological advances and commercial interests have set the stage for changes in Israeli eating habits. Another typical development was the mirroring process that accompanied the expansion of standardized fast food, that is, the proliferation of specific cuisines and ethnic foods, as evidenced by the emergence of restaurants that catered to culinary curiosity and opened pockets of a new yuppie class in Tel Aviv. Aviv. , Herzliya and elsewhere. As in other countries, the “arrival” of McDonald's in Israel raised doubts and even concerns about the survival of the local national culture. A common complaint against McDonald's is that it encroaches on local culture, which manifests itself primarily in real and symbolic local eating habits. If Israel ever had a distinct national equivalent of fast food, it was falafel - deep-fried chickpea fritters served in a flatbread “pocket” with vegetable salad and tahini (sesame) sauce. Falafel, a Mediterranean delicacy of Egyptian origin, has become Israel's "national dish". While falafel was mainly eaten by the young and poor in the 1930s and 1940s, by the 1950s and 1960s family visits to the falafel stand for a quick, hot meal became commonplace, much like visiting McDonald's today. Falafel has even become an Israeli tourist symbol, serving as the national dish at formal State Department receptions. Indeed, a kiosk in Tel Aviv advertises itself as "'powerful' falafel for a powerful people". Despite the decline of falafel in the 1970s and 1980s compared to other fast foods such as shawarma (skewered lamb or turkey), pizza and the first hamburger stands, and despite the unhealthy reputation they developed, it is estimated that 1,200 falafel restaurants are currently based in Israel. In total, they serve about 200,000 servings a day to the 62% of Israelis who are self-confessed falafel eaters. The industry's annual turnover is around NIS 600 million - not far behind that of the hamburger industry. Surprisingly, the presence of McDonald's, or rather the general McDonaldization of Israeli eating habits, in the late 1990s led to falafel's rebirth, not its demise. The comeback of falafel, vintage 2000, comes in two forms: gourmet and fast food. The clean, refined,

Uri Ram

Aimed primarily at yuppies, Tel Aviv's gourmet specimen was launched in 1999 - five years after McDonald's landed in the country - at a prestigious restaurant owned by two women known as Orna and Ella. Located in the financial district, which is rapidly becoming gentrified, it is known as "The Falafel Queens" - a modern and ironic feminist version of the well-known "Falafel King" - one of the most popular names of Israeli falafel together, always taking the male form. The new "improved" gourmet model is available in different flavors. In addition to the traditional "brown" variety, Queens offers original "red" falafels based on roasted peppers, as well as "green" falafels based on olive paste. Drinks are varied, including orange campari and grapefruit sorbet. Owner Ella Shein rightly observes that the renaissance of falafel reflects a global and local trend: we opened ourselves up to world cuisine, we were exposed to new raw materials, new techniques, a process that occurs simultaneously with a kind of return to origin, to the roots. In addition to its "gourmetization", falafel also underwent a "McDonaldized" standardization. Israeli franchise Domino's Pizza opened a new falafel chain and set a goal of 60 locations across the country. Furthermore, the purported intent is "to take news about Israeli fast food abroad". With that, falafel was rescued from meanness and became the global figurehead of “Israeli fast food” or, as one observer put it, from “food” to “brand”. Indeed, the Ma'oz chain already operates 12 falafel joints in Amsterdam, Paris and Barcelona, ​​and most recently in Israel. The new chains have developed a 'clean, fresh and healthy' 'concept', with global implications because: 'If you get an inferior product at 'Ma'oz' in Amsterdam, you won't step foot in the Paris branch' nor . Unlike the traditional falafel stall that sits on the street, sucking up the smoke and grime of the street, the new falafel is served indoors in smart, air-conditioned shops, where portions are wrapped in designer bags and the sauces flow from stylized fonts. In the case of falafels, balls are not formed manually, but dispensed by a mechanical device at a speed of 80 balls/minute. There are two types - Syrian and Turkish zafur

baladi. And, as befits an industrial product, the new falafels are “designed” by food engineers and tasted by focus groups. Like any self-respecting post-Fordist commodity, the falafel of the new networks is not just a matter of material, but, as we said, of concept or, more precisely, of fantasy, making the past nostalgic or retro. The branches are designed in a nostalgic style - to spark nostalgia in the main destination industry - and carry old-fashioned lemonades in the name of "retro". This is the local Israeli habit, sprinkled, "marked" and "designed" to be marketed as a standardized commodity. Another trending aspect of the new falafel is the link with new environmental or nutritional discourses. The owner of Ma'oz notes that “Salads, tehini and falafel are healthy foods, and we keep up with the health issue by also offering wholemeal breads. The health issue is becoming so central that we are now thinking about opening a falafel branch that only offers organic vegetables.” If in the past every falafel king prided himself on the unique taste [of his own product, the secret of] which was sometimes passed down from father to son and which gained a reputation that attracted customers from far and wide to [new] chains, the taste was always the same. Uniqueness and authenticity would be lost in favor of quality and free market rules. A major change in Israel's culinary habit as a result of its McDonaldization, therefore, is the end of the old "authentic" falafel and the emergence of the new commodity "Falafel 2000". But McDonald's had another – no less challenging – culinary hurdle to overcome: the meat-eating Israeli palate. [...] In the face of this desire for meat, particularly grilled meat, the McDonald's hamburger seemed rather insignificant, and the Israeli consumer was more likely to prefer Burger King's fried product. In 1998, McDonald's catered to Israel's appetite by changing both the preparation and size of its hamburgers. He switched to a combined fire and charcoal technique and increased the serving size by 25%. the israeli customer


now has the differential of being served the largest hamburger (120 grams) sold by McDonald's worldwide. But the most impressive fast-food modification of the Israeli habit is the "combina" (the Hebrew equivalent of "combo") introduced by Burger Ranch in 2001 - a pre-packaged meal for four eaters that caters to the local custom of "sharing". . and, to quote the marketing blurb, it allows for "a group experience while maintaining the individual expression of the meal." From this it can be concluded that the correlation between McDonald's and falafel is not just a contrast between local decline and global rise. Rather, they are a complex mix, albeit certainly under the banner of the global. In fact, the global (McDonald's) has done something to revitalize the local (the falafel). In the process, however, the global also changed the nature and meaning of the local. The local, in turn, caused a slight shift in the taste and size of the global, leaving its basic institutional patterns and organizational practices intact. The "new falafel" is part, on the one hand, of a standardized mass consumption market and, on the other hand, of a niche postmodern consumption market. This relationship between McDonald's and falafel, in which the global does not symbolically abolish the local but structurally restructures or appropriates it, is typical of the global-local entanglements embodied by McDonald's.

Discussion I: "One-way" or "Two-way"? How, then, are we to envision the relationships between global trade and local languages ​​based on this case analysis? The literature on the relationship between the global and the local presents a variety of cases. Heuristically, the lessons learned can be summarized in two competing – almost diametrically opposed – approaches: one places greater emphasis on globalization, which it sees as promoting cultural uniformity (or homogeneity); the other places more emphasis on location, which it sees as preserving cultural plurality or cultural "differences" (or heterogeneity). [. . .] The former is also known as cultural imperialism and McDonaldization [...] The latter is also known as hybridization. [...] Because of that

For simplicity, we will call the first the "one-way" approach, i. H. see effect radiating from global to local; and the latter as a “two-way” approach, i. H. see the effect as a trade-off between the global and the local. The most prominent exponent of the one-way approach is George Ritzer in his book The McDonaldization of Society. Ritzer is primarily responsible for the term that describes the social process of McDonaldization. [...] In contrast to this one-sided approach [. . .] The literature offers a different perspective, which we call here the two-way approach. This view sees globalization as just a single vector in two-way traffic, the other vector being location. The second suspends, refines or disseminates the reception of the first so that traditional and local cultures do not dissolve; Instead, they absorb global currents and turn them into digestion. Arjun Appadurai, for example, argues that it is impossible to conceive of processes of cultural globalization in terms of a mechanical flow from the center to the periphery. Its complexity and fractures allow for a chaotic dispute between the global and the local that is never resolved. [...] A significant omission typical of the two-way perspective is its disregard for power imbalances. positing 'localization' as a counterweight to globalization rather than an offshoot, some of the cultural studies literature is indeed rich in texture and subtlety in portraying the encounters of global trade with local popular cultures and the everyday life. This literature is at its best when it recognizes that its task is to "turn the stick the other way," from a top-down political-economic perspective to a bottom-up cultural perspective. However, it fails when it attempts to wholesale replace the top-down approach with a bottom-up approach without weighing the relative power of top and bottom. The last step is evident in an ethnographic study of McDonaldization carried out in Southeast Asia by a team of anthropologists. Overall, they argue that even though McDonald's has changed local customs, customers have still managed to convert McDonald's to local establishments in their areas; This led them to conclude that McDonald's is not always in charge. They claim that within popular culture it is no longer possible to distinguish

Uri Ram

between the 'native' and the 'external' Who, they protest, is to say whether Mickey Mouse is Japanese or Ronald McDonald Chinese; perhaps this testifies to a “third culture” that does not belong to one nationality or the other, but represents a transnational culture. This ethnographic discussion emphasizes the variety of complementary dishes that McDonald's has included in its menu to accommodate diverse local cultures. Applying this approach to our case study, the new falafel, for example, can be seen as a manifestation [...] of the hybridization of McDonald's. The new falafel assimilated some of McDonald's practices, but adapted them to local traditions and tastes. The two-way approach of the global-local encounter is often criticized and defended by radical social scientists because it “increases” the sustainability of local cultures and promotes local identities. [...]

Discussion II: “Both ways” [...] We propose the following solution to the issue of homogenization vs. heterogenization in global-local relations: (1) both perspectives are valid; (2) nevertheless, they apply to individual levels of society; and (3) the unilateral approach is limited to one level of social reality, the structural-institutional level, i. H. standards and practices registered in institutions and organizations; the reciprocal approach is limited to the symbolic-expressive level of social reality, that is, the level of explicit symbolization. Finally (4) we propose a global-local-structure-symbolic model in which the unidirectional structural homogenization process and the bidirectional symbolic heterogenization process are combined. Our theoretical solution is based, heuristically speaking, on the distinction between two different levels, the structural-institutional level and the expressive-symbolic level. Although each of the competing perspectives in the global-local encounter is attuned to only one of these levels, we propose to see globalization as a process that is simultaneously unilateral and bilateral, but at two different social levels. In other words, at the structural level, globalization is a one-way street; but at the symbolic level it is a one-way street. In the case of Israel, for example, this would mean that symbolically

Falafel and McDonald's coexist side by side; Structurally, however, falafel is produced and consumed as if it were a standardized industrialized (McDonaldized) hamburger or its artisanal "gourmet" equivalent. [...] The two-way approach to globalization, which emphasizes the persistence of cultural 'differences', contains more than a grain of empirical truth. On a symbolic level, it explains the diversity that does not succumb to homogeneity - in our case, the falafel goes back to steaming from the pita; the Israeli hamburger is larger than other national specimens of McDonald's (and kosher for Passover [. . . ] ). On a symbolic level, the "difference" that makes the place unmistakable managed to maintain itself. At the same time, on a structural level, this great balance of “equality” prevails everywhere: falafel is McDonaldised. [...] A strong structuralist argument sees symbolic 'differences' as not just tolerated, but actually functional to structural 'sameness', ostensibly concealing the underlying sameness of structure and promoting niches of consumer identity. In other words, the diversity of local cultural identities that are “licensed” under global capitalist commercial expansion obscures capital's unique formula, thus promoting legitimacy and even sale. [...] A multitude of observers - all intent on "giving voice" to the "other" and the "subaltern" - may unknowingly achieve the opposite effect. . . Exclusive attention to explicit symbolism can divert attention from implicit structures. Transnational corporations are quick to embrace multiculturalism, postcolonialism and ethnography, and exploit genuine cultural concerns to their advantage. A former Coca-Cola marketing executive is worth quoting at length:

We haven't changed the concept. What we do is maybe change the music, maybe change the execution, certainly change the cast, but in terms of how it sounds, how it looks and what it sells, at one point we kept it more or less standardized. [...] [our activities] are all focused on a local basis, overlaid by an umbrella of global strategy. We looked at different ethnic demographics with a general concept. Recently [...] the company moved to a more


fragmented approach based on the assumption that the media today is fragmented and that each of these groups approached by this media core must be communicated in its own way with its own message, with its own sound, with its own visualization. [...] The case study presented here showed a number of examples of the process by which global goods appropriate local traditions. To summarize the “new falafel” example, McDonaldization did not lead to its demise, but actually contributed to its resurgence by confirming the two-way perspective, so to speak. On the one hand, however, the new life of falafel is based on McDonald's, that is, a standardized and mechanical mass product; or, on the other hand, responds to it in a "gourmetized" and "ethnicized" commercial product. In both cases, global McDonaldization asserts itself structurally, while at the same time allowing for a local symbolic reach. [...] In fact, from the point of view of the final consumer or individual consumer, a certain explicit symbolic "difference" can be a source of great emotional gratification; but from the point of view of the social structure, the system

of production and consumption, exactly the opposite matters, that is, the implicit structural homogenization. The issue of global homogenization versus local heterogenization cannot be exhausted with reference to symbolic differences, as the two-way approach attempts. "McDonaldization" is not only or mainly about manufactured objects - hamburgers - but, above all, about the deep social relations that are linked to their production and consumption - that is, about commodification and instrumentalization. In the broadest sense, McDonaldization here represents a robust commodification and instrumentalization of social relations, production and consumption and, therefore, an appropriation of local cultures by global flows. This study [. . . ] proposes to see the relations between the global and the local as a composition of the structural and symbolic levels, a composition in which the structural inherently appropriates the symbolic without explicitly repressing it. [...] This is what is meant by glocomodification, global commodification that combines structural uniformity with symbolic diversity.

The idea of ​​world culture revolves around the work of John Meyer and a group of sociologists, some of whom were students of Meyer. They encompass a variety of phenomena under the heading of world culture, ranging from a growing global consensus against genocide to local chess club-like educational systems where the game is played by global rules. In contrast to Marxists and neo-Marxists (such as Wallerstein; see Chapter 8), world culture theorists Marxistically focus on the superstructure (culture) rather than the base (the material, the economic). This chapter begins with several excerpts from World Culture: Origins and Consequences by Frank Lechner and John Boli. In the first section, they outline various dimensions of world culture. First, world culture is global, at least in its potential reach, although some parts of the world may (yet) be unaffected. Second, world culture is different, although it does not supersede or replace local culture. Third, world culture is complex: it is not one-dimensional. Fourth, world culture is seen as an entity "with its own content and structure", but it is not a reified entity with narrow boundaries that clearly separate it from other cultural phenomena. Fifth, it is cultural in the sense that it is “socially constructed and socially shared symbolism”. Sixth, it is dynamic and tends to grow over time; is "open to new ideas, prone to


subject to new conflicts and constant reinterpretations”. Finally, world culture matters, it “is important for the world as a whole and for the world in all its different parts. Under the heading "world culture as an ontology of world society", Lechner and Boli argue that "organizations in a given domain experience the same institutional pressures, they are likely to become more similar over time". become more rational become. The latter, in the case of education, means that school systems around the world, for example, are likely to implement certain "procedures and curricula, certain styles of teaching and learning", use professional teachers and textbooks, etc. This "institutionalist view" (Education is an institution that suffers institutional pressures to be like other educational systems around the world) has several components: 4




• •



World culture is the culture of many nation-states; of a decentralized world state. "It contains rules and assumptions that are often unspoken and taken for granted, built into global institutions and practices." It can be seen as a 'script' that is the joint product of many different people (eg professionals and organizational leaders) from many different parts of the world. 8th

world culture

World culture is “universalist”: “The same assumptions, the same models are relevant, even valid, all over the world.” This does not mean that they are the same across the world, but local practices depend, at least in part, on global norms. 9

Much of today's world culture has its origins in the West. It contains ideas about "individual value and autonomy, the importance of rationality in pursuing secular processes, and the status of states as sovereign actors". However, world culture has meanwhile become global "because its essential structural elements are similar throughout the world and because they are considered to be of universal application". The result is global isomorphism, "the growing institutional similarity of differently situated societies" in areas such as organized science and women's rights. 10



Despite increasing similarities across the world, world culture theory recognizes that differences exist across the world due to incomplete institutionalization, resistance to world culture in some areas, its acceptance and practice mainly by powerful societies, and the differences, even contradictions , basic principles can be traced back to it (for example, between equality and freedom). In "World Culture Differentiation", Lechner and Boli focus on how much world culture is feared in many parts of the world (especially France) and what a threat it poses to the world.

Differences. In that context, they touch on many of the other topics covered in this book, including McWorld (Chapter 12), McDonaldization (Chapter 15), and MNCs and TNCs (Chapter 7). Lechner and Boli do not reject these views, but point out that these processes result not only in global similarity, but also in diversity and "cultural cross-pollination"; that local people respond creatively to these global processes; and this world culture is not a single piece. They go even further, arguing that diversity is fundamental and embedded in world culture. Also in this context, Lechner and Boli argue against the idea that the nation-state is being eroded or destroyed by globalization. Rather, they see world culture and the nation-state as intertwined; Indeed, the characteristics of the nation-state have become part of world culture. 13

Finnemore is critical of the world culture perspective for several reasons. First, it focuses on the effects of world culture but tells us little about the causes or mechanisms of its spread. Second, it tends to emphasize the dissemination of a harmonious Western culture, particularly its rational systems. What is ignored, however, are the conflicts and tensions within that culture, particularly those between progress and justice and between markets and bureaucracies. Third, the world culture perspective is silent on the ability to act. Finally, it neglects the role of power and coercion, that is, of politics, in the diffusion of world culture.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5

Frank Lechner and John Boli, World Culture: Origins and Consequences. Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2005, Ibid. 27, Ibid. 27, Ibid. 28, Ibid. 28. It is an ontology because it is a “deep structure underlying global practices”. This structure includes rules, principles, institutions, etc.

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Lechner and Boli, World Culture, 43. Ibid, 44. Ibid, 44. Ibid, 44. Ibid, 46. Ibid, 46. Ibid, 46. Ibid, 141.

Frank J Lechner

World Culture: Origins and Consequences Frank J. Lechner and John Boli

The Case for World Culture This [reading] proposes a view of world culture as a global, distinct, complex, and dynamic phenomenon, and supports this view by analyzing its various dimensions with concrete examples. As a prelude to our main chapters, we now summarize our perspective on world culture.

World culture as global When we speak of "world" culture, we really mean it as global, the world culture of real world society. While the distinction between "worldwide" phenomena as properties of large geographic areas and "global" phenomena of truly planetary scope may have played a role, world and global in this sense practically converged. [...] [What matters for our purposes is that certain ideas and principles present themselves as globally relevant and valid, and are recognized as such by those who adopt them. In any case, the statement need not be empirically correct (e.g. not all parts of the world need to be equally enthusiastic about chess[...]) to be useful as a working hypothesis (e.g. why the subculture of chess chess is based on common assumptions [••• ]).

World culture as a culture in itself The assertion that the world has a culture can diminish the diversity that still prevails today. Our point, however, is not that world culture obliterates all others, replaces local culture, or makes the world one in the sense of complete similarity. However, from our

From an analytical point of view, although it has its own coherence and content, empirically this does not mean that the world is moving towards a tipping point monoculture. Nor does he rule out the possibility of a “clash of civilizations”. [ . . . ] We propose that world culture grows in parallel and in complex interaction with the most particularistic cultures in the world. With regard to world culture, the more particular ones are also changing. For example [...] the civilizations central to Huntington's argument are always already embedded in a global global civilization that to some extent constrains their interactions and bridges their differences. Within world culture, civilizations cannot be self-evident, self-centered practices, if they ever were. Actual cultural practices in particular places, as well as the thinking of particular individuals, are likely to exhibit mixtures of "secular" and more local symbolism. In treating world culture as distinct, we do not intend to encompass the full range of these practices. As our reasoning about the distinction of world culture implies, world culture is not the sum of all things cultural.

World culture as complex From another point of view, our analysis of world culture may seem too complex, too focused on provoking tensions and differences. After all, the monocultural scene has countless supporters. According to the popular “McDonaldization” argument, for example, the institutional forces that push for efficiency and control threaten to impose a way of life everywhere. We believe that the direction indicated by this argument is partially correct: rationalization is powerful, and indeed a certain type of rationality has become an influential cultural model. But rationalization isn't a dead end on the food scene either. The fast food experience takes many forms, and individual food production models come in many forms.

World Culture: Origins and Consequences

Versions, dishes and flavors mix around the world. From our point of view, the McDonaldization thesis is not so much wrong as one-sided. World culture spans many areas and contains tensions between its various components. Global consciousness doesn't come in a Styrofoam box.

World culture as a unit We have already attributed some properties to world culture. Whenever we say that world culture "does" X, the specter of reification lurks. In some cases, of course, it is a matter of convenience to speak of world culture as an active whole, saving us the need to dissect it into components or the actions of people using the symbolic resources at their disposal. Treating it this way does not mean separating it from other areas of human activity. As we have already indicated in our discussion of “real world” institutions, we think that the analytical step in distinguishing between culture and, say, politics and economics should allow us to see how these aspects of human activity mutually constitute each other. However, we don't want to concede too much to critics of reification. Ultimately, we argue that a distinct and recognizable world culture is emerging as a phenomenon with its own content and structure. We do not draw rigid boundaries. In examining which issues sensibly fall under the heading of world culture, we turn to the side of inclusion.

World culture as culture As we explained, we have a particular vision of culture. We see it as socially constructed and socially shared symbolism. Our position is “holistic” and “constructionist”. This rules out subjective or purely textual conceptions of culture - it is not (only) in people's heads nor (only) in esoteric documents. It also casts aside popular notions of culture as a way of life. However, it contains many other perspectives from which we generously borrow. Our holistic constructionism draws attention to how culture is created and consciousness shaped. It suggests that cultural forms, once created, have a dynamic of their own. Requires an analysis of how cultural elements are shared, particularly through the work of institutions that do so

put abstract ideas into practice. He points to fault lines and tectonic stresses that can become sources of change. We have argued [elsewhere] that this perspective builds on and complements much earlier work on world culture. We apply this perspective heuristically. Our objective [...] is to pool available resources to illuminate our problems, not to engage in academic polemics defending one theory over others. We hope that our perspective on culture is sufficiently ecumenical to be useful to a wide readership.

World culture as dynamic Our example of opening up global sport showed how the rules, ideas and symbolism around this transnational practice have grown over the years. World sports culture is constantly being built and rebuilt. The point applies more generally. World culture is not just a ready-made structure, a done deal. Certainly, some patterns of world culture show continuity over many decades, as shown by the world's commitment to the nation-state form. But world culture is open to new ideas, prone to new conflicts, and subject to constant reinterpretation. Even the apparent rapprochement of people and countries from many regions on the merits of liberal democracy as a model for organizing societies is hardly considered "the end of the story". As much as we value the value of the model itself, we lack the Hegelian confidence to see contemporary world culture as the full completion of humanity's ideological evolution, or as the irreversible progress of reason that created a system opposed to future contradictions is immune.

World culture is significant Of course, we consider world culture to be significant in many ways. We argue against the notion that it is a facade, a set of rather abstract concepts that have only varying degrees of relevance in the lives of real people. It could be argued that examples such as the backlash from globalization still point to the concerns of a relatively small elite. Models such as neoliberalism or even the nation-state seem irrelevant in West African countries on the verge of collapse. We agree that the relevance of world culture can vary in this way, but that does not diminish its importance.

Frank J. Lechner

as a feature of world society. Without understanding world culture, we could not understand the direction of world events, as we have already indicated. However, in certain places it is also much more ubiquitous than ever. Anti-globalization discourse is influencing African dealings with international organizations, neoliberalism is shaping the development strategies of even resource-poor countries, and the nation-state has become the operating model for groups not inherently prepared to live in a political system. . More concretely, as our previous examples show, many regular activities now incorporate world culture in some way. World culture is important for the world as a whole and for the world in all its different parts. [..-.] [...]

World culture as an ontology of world society In the 1970s, John Meyer and his colleagues were intrigued by the global spread of formal education. Why, they wondered, would countries with very different needs and resources adopt very similar educational institutions and methods, even when they obviously did not suit their particular situations? Meyer's earlier work on educational organizations suggested a way to approach the problem. He argued that organizations in modern societies are less deliberately designed tools to solve problems than institutions driven by external pressures to implement practices defined as "rational". Organizations are "dramatic enactments" of rules that permeate a certain sector of society. By solemnly adopting these rules, operating within the official "myths" of rationality, organizations increase their legitimacy. As all organizations in a given area face the same institutional pressures, they are likely to converge over time. The insight that Meyer and his colleagues brought first to education, and eventually to world culture as a whole, is that this "institutionalist" approach also works on a global scale. What, then, are the rules and assumptions built into the globalization of formal education? In the first place, education became a duty of the States. The states themselves are

compelled by global rules to act rationally for the sake of progress: according to prevailing global models, states have ultimate authority in many areas of life and must exercise that authority by building "rational" institutions that promote "growth". Formal public education is one such institution. Every modern state must have it, even if, as in the case of Malawi and similar countries, the country has few resources to support it and its people have basic needs that are not met by this foreign import. Second, education seems so attractive in part because it is inseparable from larger collective goals. According to the global roadmap, learning increases human capital, investment in education increases growth, the dissemination of knowledge is the path to progress. Third, education must take a certain form. A "rational" system is not specifically designed to produce growth and educated citizens in a way suited to a particular country, but one that implements specific types of practices and curricula, specific styles of teaching and learning. So Malawi strives to implement a modern curriculum with professional teachers exercising authority in their classroom, however difficult it may be in the absence of books and pens. In globalized education, form is king. Fourth, education reflects certain ideas about the people involved, particularly students. They should be treated as learning individuals, entitled to opportunities and willing to broaden their horizons. Education must promote individual growth, but it must also connect students to their country: it is always a form of citizenship education, implicit and explicit. All over the world, formal education is a great lesson in citizenship. Here, too, Malawi is a good example, even if individuality is probably not encouraged by mass teaching in draughty classrooms. The example shows several features of world culture as institutionalists see it. It is the culture of a decentralized "world state" in which many states are legitimate actors but no one controls the rules of the game (this representation is therefore often referred to as "world state theory"). It contains rules and assumptions that are often not taken for granted, built into global institutions and practices. When [elsewhere] we illustrated how many features of world society are "deeply cultural", for example in the case of world chess, we were already applying an institutional insight. Furthermore, no person, organization or

World Culture: Origins and Consequences

the state chooses the rules it follows; these are, to a large extent, exogenous features of world politics as a whole. Partly for this reason, institutionalists sometimes describe world culture as composed of "scripts". Of course, a roadmap does not create itself, but is the joint product of faculty and administrators, ministerial officials and advisers, UNESCO officials and NGO advocates. Like many aspects of world culture, it is at the center of many specialist professional activities, particularly in international organizations. After all, world culture is universalist: the same assumptions, the same models are relevant, even valid, all over the world. Returning to our example, this does not mean that actual educational practice exactly conforms to a single global model, but institutionalists claim that the power of world culture is evident insofar as local practice depends on global norms. As these scholars see world culture as a deep structure underlying global practices, they describe it as a kind of "ontology". By using this term, they do not imply that global actors routinely speculate philosophically about the nature of being, but believe that there are now powerful and globally shared ideas about what is "real" in world society. In its sense, ontology comprises a series of rules and principles that, among other things, precisely define the actors who can legitimately participate in world events. "Culture has an ontological aspect, which attributes reality to actors and actions, means and ends, and a meaning-bearing aspect, which gives meaning and legitimacy to actors and actions, means and ends." It "includes the institutional models of society itself". It determines what components of world society are and what things should be considered valuable. This culture forms the set of authoritative organizations that carry out their missions. As the world cultural order shapes not only the nation-state system but also other organizations and even human identities, Meyer and her colleagues ultimately portray the world as an enactment of culture. actors, the product of competing groups in a particular system; it does not necessarily endorse a particular kind of political economy or justify the position of actors in it, as the materialist account would. World culture cuts deeper. What is the content of this ontology? As the educational example shows, a fundamental principle of world culture

is that the world is made up of states - corporate actors who control territory and people, are invested with sovereignty, are charged with myriad responsibilities and are expected to act rationally in pursuit of globally defined progress. Although states encounter many difficulties, the idea has a strong impact on global practice. But States are not the only actors, because the second fundamental principle of world culture, which again becomes clear in the example of education, is that the world also consists of individuals, human actors endowed with rights and needs, possessing a strong subjective conscience and go through a community curriculum and act as voters and decision makers. Of course, Meyer does not mean that world culture somehow produces flesh-and-blood people. However, how we understand and express ourselves as individuals, how we assert our rights and needs, depends on globally relevant ideas. States and individuals are inextricably linked by a third principle, the overarching principle of citizenship, which is the cultivation of individual capabilities as a basis for social growth, respect for the equal rights and status of all members of society, and the creation of a ground common among them requires individuals as a means of integrating society. In short, how we belong in society is not simply an accident of birth or the result of personal choices; To some extent, belonging fits into a global scheme. However, individuals are not just citizens of states: since everyone has, in principle, the same rights and duties, is free to pursue their own interests and contribute to the solution of collective problems, they are understood as citizens of the state. worldwide. The origins of this world culture clearly lie in the central Western cultural history, which stems from medieval Christianity. Notions of individual worth and autonomy, the importance of rationality in the pursuit of secular progress, and the status of states as sovereign actors are deeply rooted in European history. Even in the 19th century, these basic ideas were mostly used by and for Westerners. However, this culture is now effectively global, both because its main structural elements are similar across the globe and because they are considered universally applicable. It became global due to a process of institutionalization that lasted decades. Intergovernmental organizations have enshrined many of the principles described, for example, in international conventions and declarations [ . . . ] . After World War II,

Frank J. Lechner

State building largely followed global scripts, resulting in a world of sovereign, rational, and nominally equal states. Institutions focused on nurturing individuals grew rapidly. This includes, of course, the educational institutions mentioned in this chapter, but also many others [ . . . ] . International non-governmental organizations - voluntary associations of interested individuals - have increasingly influenced the formulation of global principles. In short, many people, groups and institutions have done the work of world culture. A central consequence of this work is global isomorphism, the increasing institutional similarity of differently situated societies. Where materialist accounts of the capitalist world-system would expect differences according to economic status and historical course, institutionalists find homogeneity, for example, in the way organized science spreads to all corners of the world or in the way rights of women are recognized in many states. Since institutionalists see world culture as constitutive of reality, as a symbolic structure that shapes the way people act and feel, they need not assume explicit and widespread agreement on the foundations of world culture. They would suggest that even ostensible critics of established world culture, such as environmentalists or feminists, end up adhering to important principles. This is not to say, however, that world culture is a continuous web. On the one hand, institutionalization is always incomplete due to numerous local constraints, as we have already noted in the case of formal education in Malawi, which only resembles the putative global script in some respects. World culture also provokes real conflicts. For example, the assertion of equal rights for women by Islamic groups has been challenged as incompatible with their tradition. The notion that world culture today is global, universally shared and applicable is itself contested in practice because it is disproportionately the product of powerful states. An example is the expansion of education, at least in part a consequence of the exercise of American hegemony. World culture may not be perfect by any means, as many of its tenets are contradictory, as evidenced by the well-known tensions between equality and freedom, efficiency and individuality, and expectations of states to “be themselves” and “act alike”. . "

World culture thus creates a culturally dynamic world: “Ironically, the structuring of world culture generates more mobilization and competition between various types of similarly constructed actors than would be the case in a truly segmented world. Growing consensus on the meaning and worth of individuals, organizations, and nation-states leads to more numerous and intense struggles for independence, autonomy, progress, justice, and equality." Institutionalists agree with Wallersteinians on some empirical features of the world-system modern, but they explain the origins and reproduction of this system in different ways. As our brief synopsis shows, institutionalists give much greater weight to culture. It becomes, so to speak, a base and not a superstructure. From the point of view From an analytical point of view, this has its own risks. This is how tempting it is, for example, to find evidence of deep culture at work in the activities of various institutions and then use that understanding of culture to explain the evidence that served To generate variable cultural independence in the first place, we rely in part on the institutionalist argument for guidance. [...]

Differentiation of World Culture: National Identity and the Struggle for Diversity [...] From this point of view, world culture is simply the globalization of the West. Like deterritorialization, McDonaldization, coca-colanization and Americanization, the cultural imperialism argument points to a single world with a single culture. While this scenario contains important kernels of truth, it is very crude. In many respects, globalization itself is an “engine of diversity”. For example, McDonaldization, much ridiculed by French activists, captures only part of global food trends. As Asia transitions to burgers and colas, Europe and North America embrace Oriental cuisine; Despite being a less standardized product, sushi is as global as the golden arches. Globalization therefore encourages many kinds of cultural cross-pollination. Within certain countries,

World Culture: Origins and Consequences

it often expands the individual's "menu of choice," freeing him from the constraints of the place, as French consumers of jeans, jazz, and Japanese electronics—as well as hamburgers and "fries" can attest. This also applies to the language. Through translation, certain languages ​​and literatures are increasingly building 'beachheads' to other places, as evidenced by the success of Latin American novelists in France. Immigration and cultural contacts introduce impure innovations, a form of linguistic diversity that the official French opposition to ff anglais ironically tries to suppress. With a global audience, globalization encourages cultural experimentation. Even in the industry that has provoked the most French ire, the feared homogeneity generated by American dominance is far from absolute: Hollywood still has to compete with other centers of film production like Bollywood in India; its worldwide success depends in part on its ability to attract non-US talent and adapt to non-US preferences; and promotes the development of its own niche productions. As these examples suggest, the “creative destruction” of global competition also has mixed consequences. Even if we implausibly assume that all place-based culture is doomed, there is no reason why supposedly deterritorialized communities should be culturally uniform. Underground dance club lovers are different from professional football players or fruit fly researchers; the proliferation of its multiple connections encourages new kinds of transnational diversity. While duplicating empirical examples of diversity “on the ground” takes us a long way toward exploring the complexities of the much-feared process of globalization, our first response to naysayers simply that the world is still a very diverse and amazing place is unlikely. suffocate in a goulash culture. Our second reply is more closely related to the agenda of this book. As we describe world culture, some of its basic substance is quite abstract. McDonald's-style rationality, American neoliberalism, and Western universalism offer only very general models for social action. At least two of the theories we have discussed argue that the implications of such models drive creative adaptations by specific groups in specific locations. Robertson calls this glocalization Hannerz creolization. Global cultural imperatives become socially real by being integrated into locally located practices. hong kong too

McDonaldizes slightly differently than Peoria; neoliberal privatization is different in India and Britain; Democracy works differently in Mexico and the Czech Republic. Certain types of pop music may be popular internationally, but its vibe still depends on how musicians make that music part of their own traditions. The result of the Robertson/Hannerz line of thinking is that groups and societies mix and match, borrow and combine, learn and revise. Due to its universal validity, world culture gives rise to very different interpretations. Furthermore, world culture is not a single piece. Even the elements in the homogenization scenario are not identical: although McDonald's serves cola, McDonaldization and Coca-Colanization metaphorically capture different forms of homogenization. While the "America" ​​that has shaped world culture is a reality, the "West" is a vague community of values. McDonald's and Cola, America and "the West" - the forces that evoke these terms are very different. However close the affinities of these components may be, a rationalized culture a la McDonald's, dependent on the tastes of unsuspecting consumers, influenced by popular culture and permeated with false universal aspirations is not a self-consistent whole. Components define different aspects of global reality; They vary in strength and scope. More generally, as we have seen, Appadurai described the "differences" between the various dimensions of world culture. World culture contains diverse groups of universally applicable and influential ideas that operate at different rhythms, creating diverse tensions and unpredictable overlaps. For example, two of the central ideas identified with American cultural imperialism – namely, a fully liberalized market and democratic governance – can have contradictory implications when applied globally: one encourages the unregulated pursuit of self-interest, the other emphasizes conscious collective control. about society. matters . World culture, therefore, cannot and cannot dictate a single course of action to be followed by everyone, everywhere. Indeed, the globalization process itself is shaped by conflicting views about how it should be structured. [...] disjunction and dispute preserve diversity. We [have seen] that these different interpretations and disjunctions are a common theme in many recent sciences. Remember the book by Breidenbach and Zukrigl

Frank J Lechner

the "dance of cultures", which uses a wealth of ethnographic examples to show how people around the world integrate global products and practices into their own worldviews, adapt new categories like "feminism" to their own needs, "respond" They are the supposed sources of cultural currents and offer resistances of all kinds. Or recall Berger and Huntington's volume on “many globalisations”, which shows how a supposedly universal process takes different paths depending on the local cultural context. Both in his book on cultural globalization and, more systematically, in earlier work on cultural imperialism, Tomlinson has criticized the argument from cultural imperialism, opposing the notion that the cultural “synchronization” produced by the proliferation of modern institutions is a destructive impertinence. that can be . As we have pointed out, not all of these scholars share our view of world culture. But we see a convergence in their work on a fundamental point, namely that any emerging world culture will inevitably be refracted in complex ways through the prisms of particular groups and societies, and that diversity will inevitably thrive through the multiple ways in which it interrelates. . to such a comprehensive world culture. We can go one step further. Difference thrives not only on how an emerging world culture “impacts” in practice, but also as the organizing principle of world culture. Returning to the example with which we began, the tone of the French-speaking conference, while defensive, also urged recognition of diversity as a value in its own right. She advocated for the mutual recognition of cultures and their right to equal participation in the "Concert of Nations". Although his concern was French, his appeal was universally formulated and related in particular to support for international organizations such as UNESCO. The indigenous peoples and movements that work on her behalf also claim the right to preserve their particular heritage. The importance of “cultural survival” per se, to use the defense's name, has become common wisdom. The very concept of indigenity points to a growing global respect for the heritage of minority groups. Both national and indigenous difference advocates have pinned some of their hopes on UNESCO, and this organization has become a linchpin in the globalization of diversity as a value. So far, it has done its part in making a difference by issuing reports that map the culture

Diversity in world culture, celebrating diversity as a goal for the world community and establishing programs to protect the world's cultural heritage. The cause of diversity thus became stronger among leaders, movement activists and IGO staff. In Western academic circles, these trends were aided by the discourse of "multiculturalism", which spread across the world, valuing different cultures as equals and promoting coexistence rather than dominance. However justified the fears of indigenous groups are in practical terms, the globalizing diversity industry is pointing out that world culture is more complex than the imperialist scenario allows. Diversity was anchored as a counterpoint to homogenization. Particularism is universalized, as Robertson suggested. Of course, this is not to say that "mere" rhetoric helps the French build a bulwark against Hollywood blockbusters. However, it is intended to suggest that world culture itself nourishes the seeds of difference. In other words, difference is constructed. This more nuanced view of world culture flows directly from the work of Robertson, who makes contrasting definitions of the global situation the hallmark of world culture, and the work of anthropologists such as Hannerz, who treat world culture as the organization of diversity. However, the same idea also appears in world systems theory, which postulates that the geographic division of labor within a single world market depends on competition between culturally distinct entities within the system. In contrast to these perspectives, Meyer and his colleagues place more emphasis on the way in which similar institutions are enacted around the world, while also presenting world governance as internally differentiated. So the scientific pendulum is swinging away from the kind of fear that dominates much of public discourse. But rather than dismissing fears of cultural loss, our view of world culture helps put it in perspective: as world culture grows, some differences may fall by the wayside, others need to be redefined, and still others are constantly being created. In summary, while fears of a worldwide cultural goulash are understandable, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical about where such fears originate: The process of globalization, which is seen as forcing homogenization, actually has different effects ; The process takes place in the context of an existing world culture to which individual groups belong.

World Culture: Origins and Consequences

and societies are related in many ways; and world culture itself encourages difference through the principles it contains and the institutions it legitimizes. This argument implies that fears of American hegemony, so common in French responses to world culture, are being exaggerated. To make our case more concrete, let us now turn to a particular form of difference that is often seen as threatened, of the kind that the French-speaking example we started with is about, namely, national difference. Our argument implies that nations can flourish as distinct entities under the aegis of world culture. We support this argument by showing how, in one case, the reproduction of national differences takes place. However, we do not seek a panglossic conclusion that this is the best of all possible worlds for nations. While world culture promotes national differences, it also embeds nations in a transnational framework that constrains and homogenizes them.

The difference nations make Is there still a place for nations in the world? Those who fear global uniformity believe the answer could be no for the reasons discussed above. Deterritorialization implies that the nation-state's control over its own affairs is diminished. The result of McDonaldization, Coca-Colanization, and Americanization is the accelerated decline of the national as national distinctions are undermined by transnational rules, tastes, and institutions. Not surprisingly, then, influential writers predict the end of the nation: "The nation is too remote to deal with the problems of our everyday lives, but it remains too restricted to deal with the global issues that affect us." nationalism concludes that today's world “can no longer be contained within the confines of 'nations' and 'nation-states' as previously defined [...] that are adapting to the new supranational restructuring of the world, to be absorbed or displaced by this. As the "isomorphism of people, territory and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes the normative character of the nation-state" has eroded, the nation-state itself "became obsolete and other formations of allegiance and identity took its place". Under the conditions of globalization "[the] centrality of national cultures,

national identities and their institutions are challenged”. While Appadurai and Held et al. cannot derive a picture of a homogeneous world culture from the situation of the nation, the most common diagnosis remains that a uniform culture leaves little room for national differences. We argue against this common diagnosis. As we have already indicated, the "one size fits all" view of world culture is itself misleading. Focusing on the nation allows us to carve out our main points about world culture, namely that it creates differences in practice and principles. It contains differences. Exploring the doomsday scenario allows us to further refine our position, showing how the fear of uniformity is based on questionable assumptions about static national cultures opposed to an oppressive and alien force Let's return to the French example quoted earlier, which is particularly relevant because France, as the “archetype” of a nation-state, has played a large role in the history of nationalism and because, as we have seen, there have been many influential figures who have left their mark on the global debate about the differences used for France as a nation. This intercession is rich with irony. In discussing these ironies, we do not want to convey all the ways in which nations reproduce their identities, but focus only on the extent to which the reproduction of difference revolves around the operations of world culture. The first irony in portraying the nation as a bulwark of cultural difference is that, historically, the drive toward nationality has often erased difference. In most places, nations were forged from previously distinct regions and races. The unity they possessed often sprang from visions of coherence pursued by elites in state control who consciously created "imaginary" communities. According to one interpretation, these views themselves only gained plausibility in industrial societies that valued a common high culture, which was promoted by formal education and facilitated communication between large population groups. Historically, then, a nation must distinguish between monoculture and biodiversity. The French state, for example, has relentlessly homogenized itself, even by imposing the use of standard French throughout its territory. For Britons, the idea of ​​French as a bearer of diversity might seem absurd. This implies that there is an underlying assumption

Frank J Lechner

general scenario is not plausible. Since nations are relatively recent creations, it is misleading to see them as fully formed cultural wholes suddenly confronted with an invading torrent of global cultural material. While it is now common practice to see nations as "made" and "imagined" rather than "primordial", advocates of difference take an ironically primitive view of national identity by treating it as something ingrained and unchanging. But even in seemingly ancient nations, national identity is always in flux. In the case of France, this identity was established by making the "French peasants", as the title of a prominent study put it in the late 19th century, when "long teaching campaigns" taught the inhabitants of France to speak French and to think of them. same as French. The Third Republic of this period was building a new nation through the "forced elimination" of regional diversity and languages, particularly through the establishment of a nationalized system of free public schools. Applied to France itself, the “defense of difference” advocated by the public figures discussed above runs the risk of establishing a reasonably new version of national identity at the expense of further experimentation and the “intertemporal diversity” that can result. Another irony in defending national differences against a global cultural juggernaut is that critics of homogeneity seem to have so little faith in the differences that actually exist. It is as if uniformly unhappy countries were waiting for a common destiny. But even a cursory glance around the globe shows that nations have very different understandings of what it means to be a nation. "Is there really such a thing as a nation?" asks one scholar, explaining that “[each nation-state now on earth can provide a slightly different meaning of the word 'nation', a different official account (perhaps more than one) not only of its own origins and development, but above that the idea of ​​the national identity they claim to embody." In many cases these "different accounts" were deliberately created by elites attempting to draw distinctions between their own nation and their foreign counterparts, and thus different routes to nationality. France, where at least two notions of the nation, one rooted in the views of traditional Catholic monarchy, the other in the revolutionary vision of a secular republic, have been at odds for two centuries, perhaps to be replaced by a third vision that is better attuned

to new social realities. To conclude from the enormous variety of national situations that a single worldview or way of life will prove uniformly devastating is simply implausible. The argument of national differences versus global homogeneity is based on an excessively homogeneous view of national identity. Scenarios that contrast the nation with world culture present them as somehow separate. Far from being independent adversaries, world culture and national cultures have evolved together. [...] the world culture of the 19th century was in part made by and for nations. From the beginning, nationalism was a transnational movement, important first in Latin America and Europe and later in Asia and Africa. The rise of nations has always been accompanied by claims to universal respect for politically organized but culturally diverse communities. Of course, world culture could only become “transnational” when the form and legitimacy of nations were widely accepted. In this interweaving of world and national culture, France really played a central role. France took shape as a nation-state as its revolutionary elite articulated a new creed with universal aspirations. Since then, freedom, equality and fraternity are ideological elements of world culture. By dramatically organizing itself as a nation-state at the time of its revolution, France created a model for others to follow. Ironically, then, the world culture that French intellectuals lament is, at least in part, the work of their predecessors. By presenting this particular nation as the embodiment of universal values, France also created an influential, non-ethnic or "bourgeois" version of nationality to compete with others, such as the German "ethnic" version. This diversity in the way nations formed and established themselves was incorporated into world culture. National differences have long been part of world culture. World systems theorists would modify this point about the intertwining of the global and the national. As we have seen, they regard the existence of politically and culturally separate entities as critical to the system. The worst case scenario for world capitalism, they argue, is the transformation of a differentiated market system into a single world empire. A more successful Napoleon could have ruined this system. So differences are functional, but they hardly produce the kind of tolerant diversity that contemporary critics of world culture envision. Historically, differences were fueled

World Culture: Origins and Consequences

competition and conflict. The rise of nation-states resulted in the reorganization of previously existing regional differences into more politically organized and internally more homogeneous entities suited to global competition. So France's national rise was less about spreading revolutionary belief and more about positioning it for this competition. But this belief also had consequences. For all its universality, it also established a hierarchy among nations. Some countries could fully comply with France's standards, others only partially, while still other groups could not even aspire to nationality. Nationalism, according to Wallerstein, "first arose as a response to the universalizing imperialism of France's revolutionary power". This form of "anti-systemic popular mobilization" later received "particular nourishment from the successive waves of struggle that took place in the semi-peripheral areas of the world economy". An embodiment of enlightened principles, France helped create a world culture that legitimized Euro-American dominance during the colonial period. The irony is that, for nearly two centuries, world culture actually resembled the hegemonic kind of culture that French commentators reject today, a hegemony to which the French actively contributed. Thus, in world culture, not all differences are equal. Given its involvement in establishing a hierarchical version of world culture, France's more ecumenical defense of difference rings a little hollow to world-system theorists today. Global political theorists make the point about the historical intertwining of the global and the national in a slightly different way. They are most impressed with the way in which the trappings of the nation have become truly global norms, applicable equally to all properly constituted societies. In the 19th century, even the ability of European nation-states to control their territory and population was quite limited. Nationalism was always more vision than reality, but the consequences of the nationalist definition of the world situation were real. Once the model was defined, its content expanded significantly, as we saw in the previous chapters. In a way, of course, this has reduced global pluralism. In the year 2000, more countries looked more alike. But the very success of the nation-state model is now also providing global standards for what nations must do to reproduce and globally legitimized tools for meeting those standards. Nation-states cannot be passive. you have to work

do to protect your identity. We have already seen examples of this work in the French case. Media policies that protect France's cultural "exception" depend on global norms that authorize state responsibility in this area. The same applies to your education policy. France's effort to educate children across the country in the same way, striving for closely coordinated education in a single system that aims to make individuals good citizens, is a particularly forceful way of exercising global responsibility. The broader point here is that locally diverse political processes like these are ways of reproducing national identities consistent with world cultural patterns. The preservation of national identity through national institutions is part of world culture. Robertson's theory of globalization also complements our analysis. As we have seen, this theory portrays world culture as stimulating rather than oppressive. In terms of national culture, this works in at least two ways. National and world culture maintain a kind of dialectical relationship. For Robertson, the generalization of a partially French model of nation-states to a globally legitimate status is an example of the "universalization of the particular". But this universalization always provokes the opposite tendency of “particularization of the universal”, in the case of the French, an increasingly anxious attempt to define more actively and precisely what makes France different as a nation. Nations are therefore always caught in the interplay of standardizing uniformity and diversifying particularity. The concern with nationality is one of the rules of the world cultural game. To some extent, nations have always been part of a single "game" that determined their position in relation to certain universal rules and principles. Relativization, to use Robertson's term, is nothing new. However, as world culture has grown along with other forms of global integration, this burden of unique identification has also increased. The popular notion that many French laments stem from the loss of former great-power status is relevant here, since this relativization is particularly true in a society that has been so instrumental in building the world cultural edifice in which it must now find a new place. The concern of the French with the viability of their national identity is therefore rooted in the key process of world culture identified by Robertson. But the Robertsonian argument also suggests that the French can be sure

Frank J Lechner

Perspectives, because the world cultural relativization of the historically different points of view of the nations will lead to very different results. By relativizing, world culture actually drives differentiation. By redefining their role as champions of difference, the French represent a different scenario. Anthropologists like Hannerz emphasize even more emphatically than Robertson the very different interweaving of world and national culture. To illustrate a little with French metaphors, creolization makes national culture a bricolage or mixture of elements of world culture. However, this is not a case of world culture collapsing on hapless nations. Creolization refers to ongoing critical interaction. When France keeps its media quotas while enjoying Hollywood cuisine, when Francophones take over, when Disney icons rival the Eiffel Tower, when adherents of a secular universal faith discover the value of diversity, the result is a national culture that is less primal as its leading intellectuals prefer, yet more pronounced than they are willing to admit. As creolization is a form of interaction, world culture is also affected. In practice, it is a composite as nations understand it. The French way of "making" world culture contributes to the global organization of diversity. Ironically, the French critics of homogeneity refute their point of view with their actions. We argue that world culture contains and encourages difference, but in relation to nations it has not always done so in the same way or to the same degree. Until recently, major nation-states were more concerned with expanding their influence than with securing differences. France, for example, has had few qualms about globalizing its own culture, including using its own language as an international lingua franca. Would the French be just as concerned about uniformity if it were expressed in French? Would French politicians have led La Francophonie in defense of difference if France's once-universal aspirations had been widely accepted? The irony is that our argument, like the position of French intellectuals themselves, depends in part on the outcome of struggles against former French dominance in world culture. It is the success of movements that assert their right to political and cultural independence from the colonizing powers - movements that took different directions - that helped to consolidate and consolidate the right to self-determination

distinctive identities as universal principles in a world culture less characterized by hegemony.

Conclusions As our expanded illustration shows, the global and the local/national are intimately intertwined in the reproduction of difference. By exercising its identity work through public policy, as France did by imposing its cultural exception, the nation-state relies firmly on global cultural principles of great legitimacy. The very definition of the nation is a standard task of the State, taken particularly seriously in France, and in this sense any definition of national identity is always more than national. As the forces of globalization undermine a nation's fixed forms of self-understanding, which is certainly true in France, the magnitude of this task increases. When a nation's responsiveness is called into question, the importance of national identity as a project can be even greater, especially when, as the strong sentiments of many French public figures quoted above show, the relevant cultural elite is heavily invested in it. Nations can show resilience even when they are drawn into battle, as the French example shows. Indeed, the components of French identity – universalist culture, a strong state, aspirations to a role in the world – may make it particularly suited to defending difference, and its defenses may well enrich and broaden French culture. It is clear that the extent to which a nation's identity is contested and the particular way in which it exhibits resilience will relate to the sediments in its cultural base, its global exposure and standpoint, and its own historical development shaped by the interplay between globalizing forces. and national sediments. The global-national dialectic is clearly path dependent. For example, we show how France's own involvement in world cultural history now shapes its critical stance. Other factors, which we can only mention here, will continue to shape the way France deals with the “crisis” of its national identity. Will the growing presence of Muslim immigrants and their descendants lead to a gradual loosening of national ties or to strong assertions of 'traditional' national identities? Will European integration further undermine the sovereignty and internal control of the French state?

N o rm en , Culture and World Politics

Will the relatively small proportion of French people who describe themselves as “very proud” of their nationality, around 40% in 1999-2000, increase or decrease? Since stories depend in part on these "local" factors, no single case like the one we are discussing can shed light on the dynamics of what is now a global experience. The very fact that it is difficult to generalize supports our argument against the homogenization scenario. But even if France no longer serves as a global model, the French are not alone in the situation they find themselves in and the response they have created. The result of our analysis is, once again, that expectations of cultural death or the death of diversity are too simplistic. However, our argument should not completely dispel such notions. The effectiveness of the global cultural legitimacy of difference depends on the practical identity work of different groups, which depends on "local" factors. Therefore, from a general picture of world culture, even combined with strong assumptions about globalization, we cannot derive unambiguous local predictions. Since the observable diversity of world culture stems from the diversity of certain concepts of identity, however much they may be relativized and involved in global circumstances, this diversity is, so to speak, always existing.

Nor can we say that the nation and national identity are secure as the defining form of difference in the 21st century. For all the focus on the national in France, national identity can lose importance over time. This does not mean predicting a happy cosmopolitan future; on the contrary, it is intended to suggest that national differentiation could lose out in competition with other forms of collective identity, other claims to particularized loyalty. The rise of indigenous movements opens up this possibility. Stronger calls for recognition of groups that differ in their sexual orientation and practices are on the horizon. In principle, world culture legitimizes alternative forms of particularism and therefore allows for such a pluralism of differences. We need not, therefore, fear homogeneity, even if it offers little comfort to advocates of a certain kind of unique value difference, such as the French exception. In any case, a world in which hundreds of differences flourish is not necessarily peaceful or pleasant. It may not sustain the kind of difference, like the national one, for which many have given their lives. When it comes to differences, contemporary world culture offers no guarantees.

Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Institutionalism from Sociology Martha Finnemore First, institutionalist research has been more concerned with documenting the effects of the structure of the cultural world than with examining its causes or the mechanisms of change in the cultural structure itself. Institutionalists tend to construct global correlative studies whose structure and logic follow Meyer and Rowan's early insights into isomorphism given different task requirements. Institutional studies usually proceed from collecting quantitative data on a large number of entities (usually states) and show that, rather than correlating with local task requirements,

The properties or behavior of entities correlate with the properties or behavior of other entities or with global phenomena (eg, international conferences and treaties or world historic events). These analyzes are often quite sophisticated, using historical analysis of events and other techniques that seem exotic to most political scientists. However, once a correlation is established, world cultural causes are assumed. Detailed process tracing and case study analysis to validate and draw conclusions based on correlation are lacking. Research to discover the processes and mechanisms by which world cultural norms would spread and evolve

Martha Finnemore

has at least two effects. The first would be to enrich the institutionalist argument. Such research would open up a truly dialectical relationship between agency and structure and would allow for more compelling accounts of the origins and dynamics of the structure of world culture. Detailed case studies of the mechanisms by which cultural norms develop and spread are also likely to challenge the cognitive basis of institutionalist theory. Institutionalists justify their arguments about how culture works in social psychology. Meyer credits Erving Goffman, Guy Swanson, and C. Wright Mills with linking this social psychology literature to institutions. A close study of the cases of dissemination of Western culture is likely to show that its triumph is not due solely, or even primarily, to cognition. Institutionalist studies paint a picture in which world culture marches effortlessly and facelessly around the globe. Little attention is paid to argument or coercion. For any political scientist (or historian), any account of the rise of the modern state in the West and its expansion across Africa, Asia, and the Americas that omits conflict, violence, and leadership is grossly incomplete. Likewise, the implication that human rights or civil liberties or even market economies establish and spread in a peaceful and orderly manner through knowledge alone is untenable for anyone with detailed knowledge of the case. The lack of case study analysis or local investigations into the mechanisms by which world culture generates isomorphism obscures the role of politics and power in world history and normative change. The cognitive processes pointed out by institutionalists are important, but they are by no means the only processes at work in international life. Destroying cultural competitors, both figuratively and literally, is a time-honored way of establishing cultural dominance. The treatment of native populations in North America is an example. Attempts at ethnic cleansing in Nazi Germany, Bosnia, Rwanda and elsewhere are another. Cultural rules are often not established through persuasion or cognitive processes of institutionalization, but through coercion and command. Over time, forcibly established cultural norms may indeed become institutionalized in the sense that they take on a 'considered' quality that shapes action in the ways described by institutionalists. Instead, for example, emphasize the institutionalized quality of sovereignty and its effects on world politics.

it must not obscure the role that force and coercion play in enforcing the rules of sovereignty and deciding their continued development. A case where violence and military might be particularly relevant to institutional concerns concerns the Reformation and eventual Protestant dominance in the West. Institutionalists trace their Western cultural norms back to medieval Christianity without saying a word about the impact of the Reformation or Protestantism on these cultural norms. Given the intellectual debt these scholars owe Max Weber, this is a surprising omission. Many of the cultural norms institutionalists emphasize—individualism and markets, for example—have strong ties to Protestantism in particular, not Christianity in general. One could argue that the Western culture spreading across the world is actually a Protestant culture. Protestantism could not dominate Europe through knowledge and conviction alone, as centuries of religious wars demonstrate. Western culture can be what it is because of three centuries of Anglo-American (ie, Protestant) power and domination by the West, domination guaranteed by France's repeated military conquests. The second feature of institutionalist research that should interest political scientists is its specification of the content of world culture. Institutionalists focus on Western rationality as a means to progress and equality. Progress is defined as the accumulation of wealth, justice is defined as equality, and rational means in institutional inquiry are usually bureaucracies and markets. Institutionalists tend to treat these elements of Western modernity as at least loosely compatible. Equality in the form of individual rights is spreading across the world along with markets and bureaucracies, and institutionalist research documents the collective and interconnected spread of these cultural norms. The conclusion, which will be suspect to all political scientists, is that all "good" things (in the context of Western culture) can and do fit together. Institutionalists may not have this implication, but both their research and their theorizing consistently emphasize the mutually reinforcing nature of these Western cultural norms. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that elements of world culture, even as specified by institutionalists, contain deep tensions and contradictions that limit isomorphism and constrain stability.

N o rm en , Culture and World Politics

behavioral convergence. Most evident is the tension between the two "ends" of Western world cultural progress, defined as economic accumulation, and justice, defined as equality. The trade-off between equity and growth in the developing economy is well known. When it comes to economic policy decisions, the two pillars of the normative framework often pull in opposite directions. Advocates of redistribution policies invoked norms of equality in their defence. Those pushing for bigger and faster growth will create norms of progress. Politicians often have to make explicit and controversial compromises between the two. Likewise, the two rational means of justice and progress – markets and bureaucracies – can come into tension. Market arrangements can be normatively justified by their efficient contribution to progress (wealth accumulation) and by equality defined as opportunity or access, but they often create outcomes that violate other definitions of equality, particularly equality of outcomes. Markets tend to produce uneven distributional outcomes. The common solution is to bring in bureaucracy, in the form of the state, to fix the markets' crimes of equality. However, bureaucracies can undermine the efficiency of markets and therefore progress. Here, too, progress (wealth) contradicts justice (equality). And again, this cannot be resolved by obvious or balanced arrangements. Contradictions between prevailing cultural norms mean that social institutions are repeatedly challenged, albeit at different times and to different degrees. Unresolved normative tensions in a set of social commitments at a given point in time can be the mobilizing basis for later attacks on that set of social arrangements, as people articulate normative claims that were previously set aside. Furthermore, trade-offs between competing global normative principles may depend on local circumstances and personalities and are likely to reflect local norms and customs to which international norms have had to compromise. Thus, after World War II, Japan was forced (note that the process was not cognitive) to accept a series of Western economic and political agreements that had been forged elsewhere in the United States. Over time, these arrangements were institutionalized in Japan, but in unique ways that reflected local non-Western cultural norms. Japan's subsequent Western success (great economic accumulation with relative equality) led Western companies and Asian states to adopt it.

a set of Japanese practices, guidelines and norms. This kind of cultural feedback from the periphery to the center is neglected by the unidirectional institutionalist model. These processes of contestation for normative supremacy are political. Indeed, the normative debate is, to a large extent, what politics is about; it is about competing values ​​and understandings of what is good, desirable, and appropriate in our collective community life. Debates over civil rights, affirmative action, social safety nets, regulation and deregulation, and the appropriate level of government intervention in citizens' lives are all debates precisely because there is no single stable normative solution. Furthermore, they are all debates involving conflicts between the basic normative goods identified by the institutionalists. Civil rights, affirmative action and, to some extent, social safety nets are debates about the nature of equality – who achieves equality and how is that equality measured? As all solutions involve bureaucratic intervention, these debates also deal with the relationship between bureaucracy and the state in relation to equality. Debates over social safety nets raise specific questions about the relationship between bureaucracies and markets and the extent to which the latter can be compromised by the former in the service of equality. Debates about regulation and government intervention are as much about the extent to which bureaucracy can compromise markets as, on the other hand, about equality and the individual rights that flow from equality. Taking the tensions and contradictions between cultural elements seriously requires research to focus on policy and process. When cultural elements are paradoxically related so that balancing arrangements are constrained or constrained, the interesting questions become which arrangements are adopted where - and why? The institutionalists may be right. Common global norms can create similar structures and prompt people and states to behave similarly at certain times, but unless the body of international norms is fully congruent, these isomorphisms will not be stable. Furthermore, humans may adopt similar forms of organization but show little similarity in behavior beyond that. Botswana and the United States may be organized in the form of a modern state, but the content of those forms and the behavior within them are very different. Isomorphism is not homogeneity; does not produce identical behavioral results. Without a specification of the culture that

Martha Finnemore

preoccupied with contradictions within the overall structure, institutionalists will be unable to explain the diversity or change of that structure.

Conclusions Institutionalist arguments emphasize structure over agency. This has important intellectual benefits. It allows institutionalists to ask questions about features of social and political life that other perspectives take for granted—for example, an omnipresent sovereign state and rising claims by individuals. Furthermore, from an IR theory perspective, the institutionalists' emphasis on structure allows for system-level explanations that compete with other dominant paradigms, thus enriching the body of theories available to solve mysteries in the field. If the neglect of the ability to act were just an oversight, there would be little cause for concern. No theory explains everything. You can always explain a few more data points by adding a few more variables and increasing the complexity of the model. But institutionalists' inattention to agency leads them into more serious mistakes. It causes them to misspecify the mechanisms by which social structures bring about change and the content of the social structure itself. Cognitive processes may dominate organizational change in many empirical areas, but they compete with and are often overshadowed by coercion in many of the empirical areas that affect IR scholars. Educational curricula can change peacefully, driven by cognitive decision-making; State authority structures often do not. Violence is a fundamentally different mechanism of change from cognition. Both mechanisms can operate in a given situation. Often, decisions must be made even within the constraints imposed by violence, but the results imposed by external violence are not captured by a theoretical cognitive framework. Institutionalists are not alone in this tendency to ignore power and coercion when explaining organizational outcomes. Much of organizational theory shares this property. Terry Moe has noted the failure of the new organizational economics to include considerations of power, but even Moe, a political scientist, is not particularly concerned with questions of power.

Violence as they are rare in their own empirical domain - the US bureaucracy. Institutionalist models imply a world social structure composed of largely congruent norms. They emphasize the mutually reinforcing and expansive nature of these norms. They emphasize the emerging consensus around diverse cultural models of citizenship, state, education and individual rights – to the point where these norms and institutions are taken for granted in contemporary life. The implication is that the spread of world culture is relatively peaceful. Institutionalists do not cite sources of instability, conflict, or opposition to the continued expansion of world culture. Yasemin Soysal's work is perhaps the most attuned to the contradictions between the cultural elements of citizenship that she examines. But even in her work, these contradictions only lead to paradoxical arrangements with which people seem to live reasonably peacefully. The result of this specification is that all policy becomes problematic in an institutional framework. When the world culture they point to is so powerful and congruent, institutionalists have no reason to explain value conflicts or normative disputes, that is, politics. A research design that takes into account agency and the processes by which isomorphic effects are produced would have prevented institutionalists from falling into this trap. A greater focus on process would draw attention to contradictions between normative claims and force institutionalists to reconsider both the specification of world culture and its likely implications. These problematic features of institutionalist theory are squarely in the domain of political scientists. Politics and process, coercion and violence, conflicting values ​​and normative debate are our business. Institutionalism would benefit greatly from dialogue with political scientists. Similarly, political scientists can learn a lot from institutionalists. Until now, IR scientists interested in norms have lacked a substantive systems theory from which to formulate hypotheses and conduct research. Institutionalism offers this. Taking his claims seriously can lead to radical revisions of existing sociological theories. It can also generate opposing theoretical arguments. Both outcomes would advance research in both disciplines and enrich our understanding of world politics.

Mauro F Guillen. "Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive, or Weak? A Critique of Five Key Debates in Social Science Literature." Sociology Annual Review 27, 2001: 235-60. Reprinted with permission from Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 27 © 2001 by Annual Reviews, Samuel P. Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, 3, summer 1993: 22-49. Reprinted with permission from Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, Summer 1993. Copyright © 1993 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. John Gray. "Global Utopias and Conflicting Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present." International Affairs 74, 1,1998: 149-63. Jack F. Matlock, Jr. "Can civilizations collide?" Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143, September 3, 1999: 428-39. Chris Brown. "History ends, worlds collide." International Studies Review 25,1999:41-57. © 1999 British Association for International Studies. Published and reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. Samuel P. Huntington. "If not civilizations, then what? Paradigms of the post-Cold War world." Foreign Affairs 72, 5, autumn 1993: 186-94. Reprinted with permission from Foreign Affairs, 72, 5, Fall 1993. Copyright © 1993 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. said Eduardo W. "Introduction." In Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979/1994. "Introduction" from Orientalism by Edward W. Said, Copyright © 1978 by Edward W. Said. Used with permission from Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc. Sadik Jalal al-'Azm. "Orientalism and Orientalism in reverse." In A.L. Macfie ed. Orientalism: a reader. New York: New York University Press, 2001: Chapter 24. Reprinted with permission of Edinburgh University Press, Ali Rattansi. "Postcolonialism and Its Dissatisfaction." Economy and Society 26, November 4, 1997: 480-500. © 1997 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of the Taylor & Francis Group,

Pedro Marcos. "Said's Orientalism: An Important Contribution Today." Antipode 2004: 809-17. © 2004 Antipode Editorial Board. William Osterly. "Freedom Versus Collectivism in Foreign Aid". In Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report 2006: Chapter 2. © 2006 Fraser Institute. Reprinted with permission from The Fraser Institute, Karl Polanyi. The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time (1944). Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. © 2001 by Karl Polanyi. Reprinted with permission from Kari Polanyi-Levitt. David Harvey. "Freedom is just another word..." In A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: Chapter 1. © 2005 by David Harvey. Reprinted with permission from Oxford University Press. Aiwha Ong. "Neoliberalism as an exception, an exception to neoliberalism." In neoliberalism as an exception: mutations in citizenship and sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006: Introduction. © 2006 Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Used with permission of the publisher. Jim Glassman and Padraig Carmody. "Structural Adjustment in East and Southeast Asia: Lessons from Latin America." Geoforum 32, 2001: 77-90. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier. Sara Baby. "The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Current Debate." Sociology Annual Review 31, 2005: 199-222. Reprinted with permission from Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 31 © 2005 by Annual Reviews, M Rodwan Abouharb and David L Cingranelli. "The Impact of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment on Human Rights, 1981-2000." International Studies Quarterly 50,2006:233-62. Vincent Lloyd and Robert Weissman. "How International Monetary Fund and World Bank Policies Undermine Workers' Power and Rights." International

Sources and Credits

Journal of Health Services 32, 3, 2002: 433-42. Multinational Monitor, Online by Vincent Lloyd and Robert Weissman. Copyright © 2001 by Essential Information. Reprinted with permission from Essential Information in textbook format via the Copyright Clearance Center. Gerald Scott. "Who failed Africa? IMF action or African leadership?" Journal of Asian and African Studies XXXIII, 3, 1998: 265-74. © 1998 by Brill Academic Publishers. Reprinted with permission from Brill Academic Publishers in textbook format via the Copyright Clearance Center. Donald N. Levine. "Sociology and the Nation-State in Times of Changing Borders." Sociological Inquiry 66, 3, 1996:253-66. Susan Strange. "The Westfailure System." International Studies Review 25,1999:345-54. © 1999 British Association for International Studies. Published and reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. Linda Weiss, "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State". New Left Review 1/225, September-October 1997: 3-27. © 1997 by New Left Review. Reprinted with permission from New Left Review. Daniel Belo. States of global uncertainty: politics, politics and society. New York: Valor, 2008: 47-54. William I Robinson. "Beyond the Paradigms of the Nation-State: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies." Sociological Forum 13.4, 1998: 561-94. Leslie Sklair. Globalization: capitalism and its alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. © 2002 by Leslie Sklair. Reprinted with permission from Oxford University Press. William I Robinson. "Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State." Theory and Society 30.2001:157-200. © 2001, Springer Netherlands. Courtesy of Springer Science 8c Business Media. Philip MacMichael. "Revisiting the Question of the Transnational State: A Commentary on William Robinson's 'Social Theory and Globalization'." Theory and Society 30, 2001: 201-10. © 2001, Springer Netherlands. Courtesy of Springer Science & Business Media. Emanuel Wallerstein. "Theoretical review". In the modern world system. Vol. 1. New York: Academic Press, 1974: Chapter 7. Leslie Sklair. "Competing Notions of Globalization." Journal of World Systems Research 5, 2, summer 1999:

143-63. © 1999 by Leslie Sklair. Reprinted with permission of the author. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Rich. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. © 2000, President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted with permission from Harvard University Press. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in an interview with Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman. "The Global Coliseum: Into the Empire." Kulturwissenschaften 16, 2, 2002: 177-92. © 2002 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor 8c Francis Group, Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. "Reclaiming the Imperial: Empire and International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, 1, 2002: 109-27. © 2002, Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Reprinted with permission from Sage. David Moura. "Africa: the Black Hole at the Middle of Empire V Rethinking Marxism 13, 3/4, 2001:100-18. © 2001 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor 8c Francis Group, Stanley Aronowitz." The New World Order (they mean it)." TheNation July 17, 2000: 25-8. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. "Adventures of the Crowd: Authors' Response." Rethinking Marxism 13:3/4, Fall/ Winter 2001:236-43 © 2001 by Routledge Reprinted with permission of Taylor & Francis Group, Manuel Castells "Towards a Sociology of the Network Society.” Contemporary Sociology 29.5, September 2000: 693-9 © 2000 Manuel Castells Reprinted with permission from author Peter Marcuse “Depoliticizing Globalization: From Neo-Marxism to Manuel Castells' Network Society.” In John Eade and Christopher Mele eds. "Understanding the City: Contemporary and Future Perspectives", Oxford: Blackwell, 2002: Chapter 7. © 2002 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Ulrich Beck "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited." Theory, Culture and Society 19,4,2002: 39-55. © 2002, Theory, Culture and Society Ltd. Reprinted with permission from Sage. Darryl S.L. Jarvis. "Risk, Globalization, and the State: A Critical Assessment of Ulrich Beck and the Global Risk Society Thesis." Global Society 21.1, January 2007: 23-46. © 2007 Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor 8c Francis Group, Ulrich Beck and Nathan Sznaider. "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda." The British Journal of Sociology 57.1.2006:1-23.

Sources and Credits

Craig Calhoun. "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism." Nations and Nationalism 14, 3, 2008: 427-48. © 2008 by Craig Calhoun. Benjamin R. Barber. "Jihad against McWorld." Atlantic Monthly March 1992: 53-63. © 1992 by The Atlantic Monthly. Reprinted with permission from The Atlantic Monthly in textbook format through the Copyright Clearance Center. Fared Zakaria. "Paris is burning." The New Republic January 22, 1996: 27-30. © 1996 by Fareed Zakaria. Reprinted with permission of the author. Bryan S. Turner. "Sovereignty and Emergence: Political Theology, Islam, and American Conservatism." Theory, Culture and Society 19, 4, 2002: 103-19. © 2002, Theory, Culture and Society Ltd. Reprinted with permission from Sage. Benjamin R. Barber. "On Terrorism and the New Democratic Realism." The Nation January 22, 2002: 17-18. Jan Nederveen Pieterse. "Globalization and Culture: Three Paradigms." In Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange. Rowman and Littlefield, 2003: Chapter 3. © 2003 Rowman 8c Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission from Rowman 8c Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. in textbook format through the Copyright Clearance Center. Ulf Hannerz. "The world in creolization". Africa 57, 4, 1987: 546-59. © 1987, African Institute International. Reprinted with permission. Ulf Hannerz. "Currents, Frontiers and Hybrids: Keywords in Transnational Anthropology." Working Paper Series WPTC-2K-02, Transnational Communities Programme, University of Oxford. ©Ulf Hannerz. Reprinted with permission of the author. Jan Nederveen Pieterse. "Globalization as Hybridization." In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson eds. Global Modernities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995: Chapter 3. Roland Robertson. "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity." In M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson eds. Global Modernities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995: Chapter 2. Jan Nederveen Pieterse. "Hybridism, So What? The Anti-Hybridity Backlash and the Mysteries of Recognition." Theory, Culture and Society 18, 2–3, 2001: 219–45. © 2001, Theory, Culture and Society Ltd. Reprinted with permission from Sage. Marwan M. Kraidy. "The Global, the Local, and the Hybrid: An Indigenous Ethnography of Glocalization." Critical Studies in Mass Communication 16, 4,

1999: 456-76. © 1999 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of the Taylor & Francis Group. Nurse Keith. "Globalization and Carnival in Trinidad: Diaspora, Hybridity and Identity in Global Culture." Kulturwissenschaften 13, 4, 1999: 661-90. © 1999 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor 8c Francis Group, William H. Thornton. "Mapping the 'Glocal' Village: The Political Limits of 'Glocalization'." Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 14, 1, 2000: 78-89. © 2000 by Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor 8c Francis Group, George Knight. "Rethinking Globalization: Glocalization/Globalization and Something/Nothing." Sociological Theory 21, 3, 2003: 193-209. © 2003, American Sociological Association. Reprinted with kind permission of the publisher. Douglas Waiter. "Dialectics of Something and Nothing: Critical Reflections on Ritzer's Analysis of Globalization." Critical Perspectives on International Business 1.4.2005: 263-72. © 2005 Emerald Group Publishing Limited. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission. George Knight. "An Introduction to McDonaldization." In The McDonaldization of Society, 5th Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2008: Chapter 1. © 2008 by Sage Publications, Inc. Books. Reprinted with permission from Sage Publications, Inc. Books in textbook format via the Copyright Clearance Center. Malcolm Waters. "McDonaldization and the Global Consumer Culture." Sociale Wetenschappen 39, 1996:17-28. Bryan S. Turner. "The McDonald's Mosaic: Glocalization and Diversity." American Behavioral Scientist 47, 2, 2003: 137-53. © 2003 by Sage Publications, Inc. Magazines. Reprinted with permission from Sage Publications, Inc. Journals in textbook format through the Copyright Clearance Center. James L. Watson, "Transnationalism, Location, and Fast Food in East Asia." In J.L. Watson ed. Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. © 1997, 2006 by Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees. All rights reserved. Used with permission from Stanford University Press, Alan Bryant. "Global Impact of McDonaldization and Disneyization." American Behavioral Scientist 47, 2, 2003: 154-67. © 2003 by Sage Publications, Inc. Magazines. Reprinted with permission from Sage

Sources and Credits

Publications Inc. Newspapers in textbook format via the Copyright Clearance Center. Uri Ram, "Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local - McDonald's in Israel." Current Sociology 52:1:11-31. © 2004, International Sociological Association. Reprinted with permission from Sage.

Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. World Culture: Origins and Consequences. Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2005. © 2005 by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. Martha Finnemore. "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism." International Organization 50.2, Spring 1996: 325-47.

Abdel-Malek, A. 327 Abkhazians 2 9 3 - 4 aborigines 278 Abouharb, M. Rodwan 118,138-46 absolutism 200,208 religiosity 305 Abu Dhabi 109 Abu-Lughod, Lila 341,342 accidents 266,267 perspective/possibility of 278,2707 housing and eviction 727 housing and responsibility 727 ,85,137,165, 297 concern for 296 economic 126 elected leaders for voters 133 insistence on 155 accounting 96 ace hardware 383 acid rain 164 Acocella, Joan 46n Settlement Act (1701)87 activism 69,87,132 cross-border 138 ethnically based 15 global justice 131 social 142 transnational 133 adaptability 350 adaptation 396,402 negative publicity 358 publicity 183,186,193,193,298-9, 312,368,392 captains of conscience 194 exclusive rights 358 advocacy 187 advertising agencies 186 transnational/international 211, 313-14

Advocacy groups 6,416 Cross-border 5.15 Transnational networks 5,138 Aerospace industry 185 Aeschylus 48, 55,56 Affirmative action 39,423 Afghanistan 70,269,303 Call for military occupation of 234 McDonald's in 395 Northern Alliance 304 Russian invasion 304 US support of "freedom fighters" 233 AFL (American Federation of Labor) 189 Africa 9,59,64,65,76,104,189,216, 234-41,291,344,357 anti-colonial education blackness 352 colonial system 322 contemporary cinema 66 corrupt leadership 118 dealing with international organizations 412 debt problem 163 European worldviews and afro-news from 340 fast food restaurants 314 free markets 78 global capital flows 275 global stock market capitalization 275 IMF equities and 150-6 impact of IMF conditionalities 330 indigenous languages ​​41 limits of Islam in 310 important nationalism in 418 rise of the state and its expansion along 422 spread of AIDS 164

tensions between primitive groups 159 terrorist organizations 266-7 Western views of 61 women who found asylum in France 194 see also East Africa; North Africa; Northeast Africa; Africa south of the Sahara; Western Africa; also under various country names, eg Angola; Chad; Congo; Egypt; Kenya; Lesotho; Libya; Malawi; Nigeria; South Africa; Sudan; Zaire; Zanzibar; Zimbabwe African-American 194,326,327,349 African civilization 21,24,29 Non-Islamic 310 Africanization 323 Afro-Creole celebratory traditions 356 Agamben, Giorgio 113,115-16 agency 14,15,16,88,328 things 255 mimicry as 63 structural 9 agricultural 1.6 1.7 1.7 division of labor between industry and 201 the main site of globalization 315 terms of trade turned against 154 transition to production 82 agribusiness 201,271 Ahmad, Aijaz 65 AIDS pandemic see HIV/AIDS air pollution 163,177,260,264 airlines 185,374


Ajami, Fouad 39:40-1 Albania 26:137 al-Banna, Sheikh Hassan 302 Albright, Madeleine 306 Albright, Madeleine 306 Albrow, Martin 4:12,14 alchemists 263 alcohol 395:401 Alexandrian Empire 281 alienation 222,309,341,391 condition of contemporary work 328 Marx equivalent ' Analysis of 3 young people 302 TV al-Jazeera 304 ecclesiastical loyalties 160 original 160 subnational 159,160 supranational 159 transnational 159 Allen, Woody 385 Allende, Salvador 102, 110 Al-Qaeda 233 Asian or African members 266 Alterity 59, 61 Althusser , Louis 238 Amazon .com 82 , 326 chronicle 63.65 humanitarian agenda 237 radical 238 resistance and 61-3 AmCham 189 American Civil Liberties Union 302 American Civil War (1861-5) 301 American Civilization 26 American Empire 52,234 see also Imperialism of the USA American Films 292 American Philosophical Society 22n American Welfare Reform (1996) 176 Americanization 130,194,269,289, 292,317,373,395,401,414,417 emphasis on role of 362 veiled attacks against 187 supplies of US hegemony 313 Americanism 390 American 40

Amnesty International 238 Appadurai, Arjun 14-15,354,359, Amsterdam 187,319,326,398 382,390,400,405,415,417 falafel eateries 404 Appiah, Kwame Anthony 340 analytic-empirical cosmopolitanism Apple Computer 81 262 appreciation 121,125 anarchism/ anarchy 21,97,295 Aquinas, St Thomas 55 evils flowing from 33 Arab-Israeli war /conflict 104,233 Anatolia 349 Arab World 16,25,40,298,345 ANC (African National Congress) America's Relations with Sections 294 30 Hero's Day for 329 Counter-Threat of US Intervention Ang, Ien 193-4 to 266 Anglicization 60,63 Characteristics Cultural 23 Anglo-American Power 422 of Naturally allergic to democracy 67 Angola 233 McDonald's of 383 fear 264 neopatriarchal society in 327 Anikulapo-Kuti, Fela 323 clerical outrage 352 animists 26,310 perception of 53 Ankara 395 Annan, Kofi 76,306 political reactions and violence against migrants 26 anthropology 263 ,2,320,432,320,432,320,43 reluctance to identify when 397,416 among Westerners 3 5 3 - 4 criticism 312 struggle between Zionism and 53 cultural relativism 311 terrorist 54 transnational 3 2 4 - 6 view of young Maronites on anti-Americanism 378 355 anti-colonial struggle 302 Arabic language 16,353,395 -6 Anti-corn bill (UK 1846) 88 Arendt, Hannah 281 Anti-fascist supporters 222 Argentina 73,105,128,146-7 Anti-globalization activists/companies and protest unions 10 movements 268,272,305,378 McDonald's in 383 Anti-Hybridism Reaction 347-51 Military Takeover 105 Anti-Iraq Coalition 38 Telenovelas 377 Anti-Liberal Conspiracy 91,92,93 Aristocracy 200,317,331,349,350 Anti-Mixing Statutes 349 Wanking 348 Antipodes 30 Armed Deserters 222 Anti-Reductionism 3614 Armenians 25 Back with all the power 34.7 294 Arms race 39 Anti-slavery campaigns 238 Arnold, David 61 Anti-exploitation movement 132.138 Arnold, Matthew 52.101 Anti-syncretism 326 Arnold, Thurman 93 Anzaldua, Gloria 328 Aronowitz, Stanley 216.240-1 Apartheid 317 Arranged Weddings 302 Sinking of 292 Arsenic 279 Emergence of 294 Aryan Thesis 349 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic ASEAN (South East Cooperation Association) 173, 174, 197, Asian Nations) 169,197 330 ASEM Mall 395


Asia 189,291,311,344,357 Adoption of Japanese Practices, Policies and Norms 423 Consequences for the Character of Capitalism Between Europe and 312 Coffee Demand 395 Market Diversification 395 Fast Food Restaurants 314 Inventory of FDI 169 Merger 318,349 Global Capital Flows 275 Trade Intraregional 169-70 Frontiers of Islam at 310 McDonald's at 381,396 Major nationalism at 418 Panic related to the SARS outbreak 277 Particularism of most societies 310 Political autonomy and discretionary maneuverability of the state 274 Rise of the state and its expansion beyond 422 Spread of AIDS 164 Tensions among protogroups 159 Terrorist organizations 266-7 see also APEC; ASEAN; Central Asia; East Asia; South Asia; Southeast Asia Asia-Pacific 244 Asian Americans 39 Asian Financial/Economic Crisis (1997-8) 111, 119,157,263 Asian Tigers 119,312 Asianization 24 Killers 290,295 Assembly Line Work 374 Assimilation 39,137,293,328,352, 367 2 ATMs2 Atlantic ATMs Monthly (d7) 367,352, 367

Auge, Marc 363 Augustine, St 220,362 Aum Shinrikyo 257 Australia 64.65 Disasters 278 APEC establishment efforts 174 Investments as a percentage of GDP 170 McDonald's at 381,394,396 Rejection of social democratic forms of government 276 Savings 170 Government institutions as "midwives" " 274 US-based third-party companies based in Austria 212 Australian Broadcasting Corporation 237 Church and militant supporters 93 Factory inspection 92 Fascism 99 Investment as a percentage of GDP 170 Far-right populist parties 178 Savings 170 Workers' compensation 92 Self-reliance 291 Authenticity 312,327 .331 Demands for 392 Lost 404 Search 391 Authoritarianism 40,110 Auto industry 186 Conglomerates 211 Autocratic European empires 292 Avian flu 178 Aviation safety 268 Destruction of Ayodhya Mosque (1992) 26 Azerbaijan 25,29,41 Babb, Sarah 117-128 Campaign baby milk 181 Bagels 319,326, Bahas322

Baker, Dean 15,149 Baker, Houston 328 Bakhtin, Mikhail 324-5,328 Balance of payments impaired by budget deficits 153,154 Chronic problems 151 Temporary problems 120 Crisis vulnerability 132 Power relations 184 Political left-right 10 Balance sheets 155 Negatively affected 121 Balanced budget 140 Baldwin , Robert E. 11 Balfour, Arthur 56,67,68,69 Balibar, Etienne 341 Balkanization 338 Balkans 27,29 Ball, George 292 Balzac, Honoré de 52 Bangkok 101 Bangladesh 298 Bank Act (1844) 88 Bank failures 163 Insolvency 83,136 Labor markets strained by 135 laws 129,130 ​​bantu philosophy 322 barbarians 312,348 NEW 222,223 Barber, Benjamin R. 160,288-302, 303,304,305-6,317,338, 338,378. 82 Barros, Ricardo Paes de 121 Carnival in Barrow-in-Furness 357 Bartelson, Jens 231 Bartley, Robert 41 Basel 103, 162 Basques/Basque Country 6,178 Separatists 288,293 Bateson, Gregory 327 Bath & Body Works 384 Baudrillard, Jean 351,353,376


BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 291,358 Beck, Ulrich 260,261,262n, 263-85, 286 Beijing 383,397 Beirut 47,383 Beland, Daniel 158n, 175-9 Belgian Congo 232 Belgium 159,178,322 Bell, Daniel 9 Bello, Ahmadu 323 Helium justum3 cf only war Belo Horizonte Ben Jalloun, Tahar 351 Benedict, Ruth 311,324 Benetton 366,400 Bengali masculinities 60-1 Bennett, Louise 346n, 356 Bentham, Jeremy 87, 88,89 Berger, Peter L. 416 Berlin mixed lifestyles among Turks 350 fall of regime stalinista (1989 ) 294 Fall of the Berlin Wall 75,78,222 Events around 277 Berlinguer, M. 104 Bernal, Martin 61 Berube, Michael 328 Bessarabian Ukraine 293 Best Practices 191 Bettelheim, Judith 357 Beverly Hills 90210 (TV series) 353 Bhabha, Homi 46n, 5 7 , 6 1 - 2 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 324,328 Bharatiya Janata Party 290 Bhutan 349 Bible 43,48,263,303 Biculturalism 311 Big business governments and 188 lobbies 165 Piracy like 376 Big Mac 300,384 Big Push 79-80.85 bilateralism 1748 trade negotiations 1749 hidden photos -Group 189

Bilingualism311 Bill of Rights 98 Billington, Michael 341 Billionaires (US dollars) 122 Bills, Scott 231 Biological material 158 Biology 312,327 Biopolitical production 218,225 Biopolitical engineers 238 Avian influenza 178 Birmingham (UK) 92,93,357 BIS (Bank for International Settlements) 103,162, 1ck Otto von 92 BISNIS (Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States) 189 Bistros 299,300 Black Atlantic Concept 356,360 Black Market Tariffs 154 Black Americans 39 Christians 26 Cultural Characteristics 327 Women 194 Blackness 358 Blair, Tony 105 Blame 279 Blitzkrieg 295 Blockbuster 383 Bloody Borders Islam 27,310 West 312 Blue Laws 291 Body Shop 383,400 Boli, John 408,409,410-21 Bolivia 131 Bollywood 415 Bombs 293 Bond Markets 140,170 Booms 164 Boorstin, Daniel J. 193 Boat, Max 234 Border Crossing 137 350-1 Borderless) ( 235 Bookstore) Bosnia 26.26.422 Boston 187

Boulainvilliers, Henri, Comte de 348 Boulding, Elise 159 Border Fetichism 347.348.351 Bourdieu, Pierre 67, 68.351 Bourgeoisie 60, 208.236 Corrupt Custruct Corrupt Custruct2 Global Hangem. products 194,292,376, 404 domain of 82 flagship 403 global status 211,373,400 Braudel, Fernand 35, 36 Braudel Center 212 Braverman, Harry 374 Brazil 212,330 banks 211 farmers want to be part of the 20th century 292 fast food restaurants 384 financial crisis 122 Global (1992 Forum) 340 Hybrid Culture 349 McDonald's in 383 peasants and workers 209 Samba 344,357 Telenovelas 377 French in currency 202 Brecht, Bertolt 70 Breckenridge, Carol A. 59 Breidenbach, Joana 415-16 Bricolage 324,348,420 Great Britain 43 ,48,65,96,160,344 Pre-war clashes with Iraq (2003) 158 BSE crisis 278 Class system 281


Cooperation between US federal agencies and 178 conservative and liberal cabinets 93 Control of the Suez Canal 44 Cultural studies 375 Domestic, foreign, security and defense policy 268 English challenged as dominant language 15 Foreign direct investment stocks 169 Financial regulation and control 163 Crisis financial crisis and IMF bailout (1975-6) 104 GDP per capita 172 Global problems effectively solved by US, French, and 27 government spending 273 imperial tradition 110,185 government indifference to acid rain 164 intelligence reports 109 workers' unity 189 leftists gaining power of the state 105 Literary studies as a university subject 60 McDonald's in 383 monetary orthodoxy 90 national income 106 hegemonic model of the 19th century 201 Orientalism 47.48 carnivals abroad 357 paternalism of closing bars 291 rejection of social democratic forms of government 276 cafeterias 384 sociology 210 State institutions like "midwives" 274 State ownership of key sectors 1047 Taxation 8 Think tanks 169,203 Victorian 60.92 British East India Company 298 British Empire 52,68,161,234,269 Last Days of Weakened Power 310-11

British Petroleum 82 Brook, Peter 326 Brown, Chris 22,36–7 Brown, Nicholas 226–8 Bryman, Alan 381,399–402 BSE (enzefalite espongiforme bovina) 178,278 Beulenpest 277 Buddhismus 26,27,29,310,398 fundamentalistische 24 Gebote gelten unparteiisch für 293 refeito 287 Sinhala349 budget deficits 74,122,155,177 adverse effects of 153,154 large 151 budgets austerity 109 balanced 90 expenditures 122 Bulgaria 25,296 Bull, Hedley231 bureaucracy 371,424 dysfunctions of 390 bureaucratic firms 13 7 bureaucratization 313 Burger King 314,403,404 Burger Ranch 403,405 Burke, Edmund 85,87 Burma 27 Burundi 83 Bush administrations 70,101,106, 112,164,178,266,267,268,269, 306 reaction to militarist unilateralism 378 Business Week 210 Cairo 189 calculability 374,380,385-6,388 Calhoun, Craig 262,285-7 California 81,323 ethnic supermarkets 335 calypso 345,356 Cambodia 231 Cambridge (UK) 187 Camp Keith, Linda 144,145 Canada 64,159,298

BSE crisis 278 Forest damage 164 Cod crisis Ecological disaster 278 Promoted economic integration 175 Edmonton Mall 376 Government spending 273 Intraregional trade 169 McDonald's in 383 Meech Lake Protocols 294 Taxes 169,273 Candomblé 328 Cannes Film Festival (1991) 292 Cantalupo, James 397 Cape Verde 138 capital 218,230 circulation 275 class compromise between labor and 103-4 counter-mobilization against social protectionism restrictions 200 pushing 230 handcuffs to 236 finance 102 global 115,188,196,211,242 imperialism and 229 exploitation of labor 224 to 224 loans to foreign governments 110 loans and equity 170 Marx's theory of 198,375 mercantile wealth crystallized in 200 migrations needed to convert 224 political countermobilization 199 price of 167,170 protests against global institutions 228 returns 109,111 restructuring of 123 short term 280 social relations from 230 to reduced how to work 255 transnationals 180 trend Taxes on 131 repossessed properties of 226


capital's will (continued) to escape the yoke of 241 see also cultural capital; foreign capital; human capital; Share capital; also prefixed "capital" under the following headings capital account liberalization 125,275 capital accumulation 104,114,161, 196,200 capitalist world economy essentially rewards 207 embedded class relations 197 crises 105 revived 106 state decisions on 107 successful defaults 180 capital adequacy rules 162 capital flight 121,130,261,275 jobs potentially created in FEZ vulnerable to 136 threat of 133 capital flows 103,167,168,276 dependence on 125 international/global 122,170,275 liberalization of 120 opening to 122 porosity of state borders in relative to 104 9,272,274,400 almost immediate 163 migration to economic ports 275 less barriers to 129 international 276 less than expected 170 short term 162 systemic financial crisis 274 capital shortage 261,275 capital stock 79 capitalism 21,45,92,93,102,119, 133,162,164,530230 lack of historical theory of 198 advanced countries 301 advanced 104,105,108, 111

aesthetic argument against 297 and communism 312 unlimited 15 collective 253,254 consequences of character 312 critical 30 democratic 291,301 different types of 30 digital 374 discomfort with 300 distorted, dependent 327 diversity and 314-15 emergence of 200 beings from 254 cycles of development in expansion 219 failed 103 financing and profiting from wars 304 problematizing globalization as an immanent connection in the "golden age" 199 of 299 historical forms of 196,359 icons of American culture 390 imposed from outside 269 informational 244,254 entanglements between Europe, imperialism and 229 internationalization of 69 liberals 300,301 Marx's Account of 379 McWorld Culture Enmeshed in National Styles 289 Neo-Marxist Analysis of 183 Non-Citizens Excluded from the Benefits of Development 113 Organizational Principle 199 Political History 199 Political Relations 196 Going Against Their Will 235 Regulatory 117,130 Democracy Relationship and 292 Resistance to 185 Restructuring 257 Secular Development of the Productive Forces 200 Sixteenth-Century Expansion 5

socioeconomic restructuring of the 248 third way between socialism and 295 transition from feudalism to 58.65 transnational 20,314 uneven development of 196 unprecedented developments associated with the emergence of 73 unregulated 288,306 varieties of 10,171 wild 289,306 world systemic 337,359,414,418 global spread of 313 see also ; Capitalization TCC 275 Caracazo 140 Carbon Dioxide 163 Caribbean (Festival) 357,358 Caribbean 128,201 Anglophone 23 Creolization 318,320,326,349 Global Capital Flows 275 Carnival Abroad 344,345,356-9 Rise of Nationalism 357 Consequences1 Haitian Adjustment13 Social Consequences1; Jamaica; Trinidad Caricatures 369 Carlyle, Thomas 52 Carmody, Pâdraig 117,118n, 119-27 Carnegie Endowment 132,135 Carnival 2 5 6 - 9 , 3 4 4 - 5 , 3 5 6 - 9 Carr, E. H. 230 Carrillo, Rental pp. 19 industry 186 Carter, Jimmy 108,109,233 Casino capitalism 170,245 Caste system 317 Castells, Manuel 4,9,68,175,244, 245,246-52,253-9 Castro, Fidel 387 Catalans/Catalonia 6,293,298 Catalytic states 158,172,173,174


Catholics/Catholicism 27,41,92,93, 228 imperatives apply impartially to 293 monarchy 418 Northern Ireland 288, 293 politics and 296 saints 328,330 West African deities fused with saints 326 Cato Institute 131 Caucasus 25,26 Struggle for geostrategic advantage in 30 Caux Round table 189 Censorship 289 Center for Economic and Policy Research (USA) 149 Center-periphery relations 324,325, 329,345,356,359,423 Central America see Central Latin America and Eastern Europe 119,232, 296,383 Fear of new rulers 295 Collapse of communism 190 Forest fires 159 Dissident movements 101 End ideologically shaped states 25 Integration in the West 310 Mass exodus of highly skilled workers 222 Massive wave of privatizations 148 Trend towards renationalization or reethnification 282 Revolutions 291,294 Social inequality 106 WFTU membership 189 Central Asia 9, 27 Struggle for geostrategic advantages in 30 strained Russian-Muslim relations 26 central banks 12, 97,108-9,200 Anti-inflationary fiscal responsibility 108 Legislative changes 129,135 IMF funds to bail bonds 123

Central Leather 82 Central Planning 72.75 Centralization 97.107 Centralized Control 369 Certeau, Michel de 351.367 CFC (CFC) gases 163 Chad 26 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart 348 Chamberlain, Joseph 92 Chambers, Iain 61 Chambers of Commerce 189 Chanel 376 Charities 394 Chase-Dunn , Christopher Chateaubriand, F. R., Vicomte de 47 Chatterjee, p. , free market 292 economic revival 103 US-sponsored covert operations 233 see also Allende; Pinochet Chimney-Sweeper's Act (1863) 92 China 47,169,218,291,296,375 America's Relations with 30 Banks 211 "Chinglish" or "Chamerican" Restaurants 314 Introduction of Coca-Cola into the Communist Party 398 394 Confucian Ethics 312 Cultural Characteristics of Communities 23 Politics Cultural Transnationalism 230

deficit spending 74 economic growth 134,141 rapid rise in economic inequality averted 141 military technology exchange between Pakistan and 310 global capital flows toward 275 great power role 38 IKEA in 387 income and wealth inequalities 106 Islam in 310 arms sales from Israel to 310 jobs moved to 136 unit of work 189 liberalization path 103 market communism 40 McDonald's at 383,384,387,394, 397,399 Middle Kingdom 349 Military relations between Iran and 310 Move away from central planning towards markets 75 Pizza Huts in 383 Pollution risk 164 Poverty alleviation 141 Recurrent state failure 33 Souvenirs made in 368 Special economic zones/administrative regions 74 Territorial disputes with neighbors 26 Threat of anarchy 33 Tiananmen Square 101 China Sea 311 Chinese civilization 310 Chinese language 16.41 Choice 16,37,98,192,208,272,282, 286,305,392 Public taste and 352 Autonomous 31 Calculating 113 Forced 284 , 8 14 difficult 33 economical 2707 institutional rushed 284, 2707


market-driven choices (continued) 114 policy 166 policy 277 unrestrained and unimpeded 301 real 300 corporate 143 structural process independent of specific acts 67 voluntary 284 see also freedom of choice; individual choice Chomsky, Noam 255 Chou, Silas 187 Christianity 392 medieval 413,422 Christian civilization 310 Christian fundamentalism 24,162, 289,303 radicals 302 Christianity/Christians 354,392,398 democratic states 103 discovery of individual uniqueness 100 ethos 60 evangelicals 112 families educating their children at home 305 generation of converts 323 global claims and claims 5 icons of the mediterranean world 330 36 orthodox/eastern 25,26,27,30 ecclesiastical in many modern incarnations 294 redone 287 rise of 228 propagation of 26 writers 69 see also catholics; Maronites; Natal Protestant 317,369 Church 93,350,374 Separation of States and 27,270 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 102,110,221 Strong dependence on the US in 178 Cicero 70 Cingranelli, David L. 118,138-46

CIO (US Congress of Industrial Organizations) 189 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 16,106 Citibank 109 citizenship 61,160,294,424 civil 130,131 democratic, liberalism 12 extended to all 225 total rights 224 global 15,224,240 state-rooted legal status nation 114 neoliberal view of 112 normalizes 115 primitive and narrow-minded view of 112 social states 114,117-18,130-1 that take seriously 216,239 survival for those who care about their 116 established practices of the world 113 283,287 Citroen 299 Civicus 306 civil aviation industry 185 civil liberties 141 defenders of 111 restricted 267 civil rights 111, 112,216,256,423 classic pillars of 239 civil service 61 wages 124,154 civil society 50,76,289,296 global 306,329 legitimacy and 268 hymns to 300 restoration 166 terrorist groups fighting 267 civil war 139,151,000 , consciences of civilizations 1 7, consciences of civilizations 1 7 2 2 , 2 3 - 8 , 3 6 , 37,38,40,42,301,309-13,317, 332,361 encouraged 39 global utopias and 29-33 encouraged the possibility of 410

Class 59,66,122,165,208,230,254, 348,356 Unexplained boundaries 207 definitions of 258 gender processes related to restructuring 123 impacts related to 118 interaction of gender, ethnicity and 61 sociopolitical and cultural conflicts based on 359 structural adjustment increased inequality 136 reflecting in 317 cross-cultural affinities 331 transformations in structures 128, 133-6 transnational coalitions/affinities 126,331 see also bourgeoisie; middle class; TCC; high class; CNN (Cable News Network) 291, 292,341,342,377 Kohle 92,164 Coalition Provisional Authority (Irak) 101,102 Coalitions Anti-Irak 38 International/ Inter-State 174 Public-private 174 Regional 173.174 transnational 126 Coca-Cola 82,211,288,292,298, 299.300.358.371.400.403.406 Klassiker Coke 376 Cola 32,2,15,15. Legal instruments of 220


coffee 383,395 cognition 424 coexistence 317 cola see Coca-Cola Cold War 25,38,40,101,103,292, 298,312 dialectic of 310 divisions 23 ideological enmities 22 program to combat leftist tendencies 102 maintenance of disappeared ideological enmities 30 terrorist threats during 278 US policy in the third world 232 collage 319,324,327 collateral damage 33 collective action 75.76 collective action 75.76 community perspective 329 intentional 256 collective bargaining 104,150 collective insecurity 158,176 global disease and 178 collective responsibility 78 collectivism 75-85 Colombia 304 colonialism ,47,200.6 358 foundational state borders for 217 cultural critique of 324 English, bifurcated language of 63 Eurocentric 349 Europeanization delivered by 313 heyday of 323 parallels of 67,68 psychic and sexual dynamics of 62 realities of administration and domination 232 recolonization 344 propagation of 278 Columbia University 328 Columbus 314 Comintern 189 Comity 294 Command Economy 108,295 Commerce 186,221,291,292 global 403-5 international 292

political and legal regulation 200 transnational 288 labour, services and information 314 progressive 199 commodity chains 4 commodity money 96 common markets 291 commonwealth literature 65 community symbolism 329 communication technologies 292 electronics-based 248,249,250 communication 5,40,214,215,235, 311 advances in 137 borders 15 intercultural 318 Area decommodified 376 Global 195 Interactive 250,292 Intercultural 320,336,345, 355 International 391 Communism 21,38,73,105,189, 242,292,392 capitalism and 312 collapse of 813 ideals and failures 369 Marx. goodbye 294 privatized welfare systems 130 halting global advance 186 threat of insurgency and revolution 110 communitarianism 295,297 COMPAS (Common Performance Evaluation System) 77 competition 26,85,94,132,202,304, 333 promotes economic freedom 83

campaign 35 forced 272 foreign 128,129 global 30,415,419 international 162 markets can be eliminated 289 mercantilist 12 nation-state 281 public works 91 SAPs reinforce emphasis on 125 path to advancement 109 competitive advantage 125 competitive pressure 120 competitiveness 113,114,126 economic 13 export 121 national 13 see also international competitiveness buyer mentality 191 forced vaccination 92 computer programming languages ​​251 computer viruses 267 computer services 374 concentration zones 317 conditionality41,147,148 confederal option 295-7 conflict resolution 220 confrontation 40 civilization/culture/states Confucian 21,24,27,28,38,310,312 see also Islamic-Confucian 35 Confucian states 232,328,322 see also Democratic Republic of the Congo Congress of Vienna (1814) 339 conservation 312 conservatism 21 American, Islamic, and fiscal 301-4 166,170,274 governments conservatives 13 constitutionalism 27,200 liberal 297 consumer culture 289 democratic 393 propagation theories 392


Consumerism 20,165,298,302,313 Control 309,385,380 American 289 Enhanced by Technologies 386 Commercial 305 Unified Management 313 Culture Symbolic of Worst Aspects 226 Hedonistic 303 Cultural 309,317,331,380 Mass 14 Evolutionary 313 Modernist 394 Historical 257 Obvious Seduction of 393 Income 13-4 Consumption 153,154,183,211,354, Institutional 131 361,377,394,407 Plain edging fabrics . 375 Cook, Captain James 5 conspicuous 240 Cooke Committee 162 conspicuous 240,397 cooperation 226,310 dedifferentiation 402 artificial 290 defined as active mode of engagement and 302 relationships 351 economic 97 new media demarcation of international/global 97,178,260, 373 265,268,269 efficient dialectic 3 3616 of efficient new powers 294 social 290,333 empty forms of 374 surveillance states threaten rapid deployment 396 270 fast food model 374 copper 103 global 341,389-92 copyright laws 102 hybridity as 351-2 core states 206,207,208 linkages between markets, democracy education sector 337 and 289 corporate taxes 109 mass 299,300,400 corporatism 21,40,104,105 new forms of 379 social democrats 10.13 reduced production time physical changes 223 and 193 corruption 118,163,299 sociology of government 140 dissemination of certain standards 211 bad 391 broadly standardized gross management of 151 television programs 345 failure of the IMF, the Use of scarce resources for or 152-3 maximization 155 treated inappropriately in the IMF very expensive forms of programs of nothing 155 371 155 371 limiting opportunities for 141 Disease Law Contagious (1864) 92 Local Tastes and Local Cuisine 395 Massive Contracts 151 Vigorously Condemn the Execution of 131,290,291 Western Consumers 303 Legal Guarantees of 202,220 Corsicans 6

Cosby Show, the 292 Cosmopolitan States 261,269,270 Cosmopolitanism 14.15 Aversion to 350 Abração 319 Ethnographic 354 Secular Society 305 Risk and 20,260-87 Cosmopolitanization 261,262, 283, 284,285 Costa Rica 383 COX, Robert 4,9,12,165,166 , Margaret 193 creative destruction 370 credit 110 access to 295 creation and commerce 161 credit cards 186,193,371,373,374 creolization 315,319-20,319-20. 4, 325,332,342,349,362,402, 415,420 Globale Kultur 326 Lateinamerika und Karibik durchdrungen von 318 Begrenzung von 327 durch die Peripherie verursachten 344,356 Kriminalität 237,268,269,358 Umwelt 279 Globalisierung von 259 rassistische Stigmata von Gewalt, Unordnung und 358 Strafjustizsystem 374 Kriminelle 78 1. Earl of 56 grenzüberschreitende Aktivitäten 348 Migration 15 trade 13 crossover 315,320,327,332 ethnic 331 intercontinental 326 intercultural 328 crossed 294 lead crystal 279


CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) 197 Cuba 75,325,377,387 Cudhay Packing 82 cultural assertiveness 41 cultural capital 335, 354 cultural communities 256 cultural differences 73,320,332,336 growing sensitivity/awareness of 309,317-18 unchanging 312 nation as bulwark of 417 one of the three paradigms of 310 considered immutable 309 cultural diffusion 311,313 cultural diversity 15,289,309,312, 402,416 conflict between globalization and 318 collective articulations of 311 cultural division 317 Christianity and Islam 25.27 cultural identity 23,34,269,406 hybrid 354 means of promotion 357 perceived lack of 353 popular globalized5 celebration3 ritual negotiation of 356 cultural imperialism 317,332,345, 355,375,398,405,414,416 american style 415 glocalization and 340-2 harbinger of the worst of 394 local criticism against 394 variations on the theme of 396 396 cultural liquidity cultural niches 389 recognition of the value of 39.4 cultural norms 1.28 cultural preferences 396,402 cultural relativism 311,331 Cultural Revolution (China 1966-76) 14,26,28,47,52,54,195, 210, 262,307-8,322-43 African or African-inspired culture 194 american 301,378 anomalous definition of 311

benign 360 commercial 305 common 40,178 confucian 35 creole 319,320 deterritorialized conceptions of 312 diasporic peoples 301 differences in 25.27 general 300 globalization and 309-21,389 hegemonic 50 ideology and 311 intercivilizational conflicts of religion and 21 introspective 41224 language adoption 3124 “liberal claims of 337 material 247,314 narrative, imperial and 231 national 58,61,206,300,403,417 new forms of 3 79 within civil society 50 outdoors 328 against culture 290 political perspective on 311 postcolonial 59 relationship between nature and 248 linked spatial location 206 territorial 311 translocal 311,315,321,331 transnational 3,332 311 village 23 world 408-24 see also consumer culture; world culture; popular culture culture-ideology 183,184,185,186, 188,190,191,192,193,194 culture of poverty thesis 70 common currency 163,191 291 competing neoliberal defense policies 202 convertibles 140,160,290 destabilizing devaluations 130 devaluations 122,125 foreign 131

overvalued 384 speculative attacks on 171 stabilization 90 turmoil on 162 undervalued 384 unregulated financial flows 111 threatened 111 weakened 202 global foreign exchange reserves 103 restored 123 Curti, Lidia 61 customs and traditions 318,373,393 transformed 405 Cuvier, G. 52 cyberpunk fiction 223 cyberspace 1601,235 Cyrillic script 41 Czech Republic 230,415 Czechoslovakia 295 Dabydeen, David 357 Dahl, Robert 103 Dallas (novel) 194 "Dance of Cultures" 416 Dante Alighieri 48,55,56 Davos see World Economic Forum Dayton 387 Unagricultural 135 Debt 110,242 Costs of repayment 111 external 121,131,132,134,136 large and unsustainable 133 national 298 debt restructuring 163 resources spent on services 131 payments for services 306 see also external debt; HIPC debt creation 109 debt crises 120,121,128,135 decentralization 75,76,81,296 network 248 decision making 248,249 authoritative 393 cognitive processes 424 linked by information networks 248 negotiated 247 risk assumptions 264


Dekolonisation 317.340 Dedifferenzierung 391.402 Deflation 90,131,170,172 Deindustrialization 109,117,120,123 Strukturanpassung Ursachen 121 Deleuze ,73,112,128,144, 216,240,247,270,311,330,415 Angriff auf 91 Konsolidierung neuer Regime 3 8 - 9 kosmopolitische 238 Verdunklung der Zukunft von 294-5 Niedergang von 261 direkte Auswirkungen von 301 Effizienz des Marktes führt nicht zu 288 Wahlkämpfen 125 shaping the character of 228 prolonged destiny of 233 nation-state absolutely linked to the destiny of 297 functioning 32 global 239,289,294,329 high levels of 143 immediately useful example of 286 implications of globalization 330 externally imposed 269 Islam inherently allergic/hostile to 67,289 Islam inherently inhospitable to 298 legitimacy and 268 links between consumption, markets and 289 McDonaldized 392 non-racist 329 participatory 296 problem 301 procedural 133

Proposal to dismantle fundamental aspects of the 112 relationship between capitalism and 292 secular 302 strong 296,297 allegedly contradictory principles and perspectives for 338 workers/shareholders 105 global call for 211 Democratic Party (USA) 105, 111, 178 Democratic Republic of the Congo 215, 237,238 democratization 125,126,127,238 240,378 development requires 306 effects of economic liberalization on 146 long distance 296 struggles over 237 worldwide third wave of 312 demonology 53 Deng Xiaoping 26 Denmark 176,178 Denny's 385 Depelchin, Jacques 237 dependency theory 129,133,136, 317,327 depoliticization 253 depreciations 130 deregulation 72,108,140 deregulation of Märkte 391 Derivathandel 162 Derrida, Jacques 57,59,353 Desertion 222 Despotism 294,295 DEMRITRITRITORIALISION 198,202,218, 312,332,414,415,417 ECOMING ECOUCTION USE WHITE ELIKES. 76 formative years/founding ideas of 78.79

Trade-off between justice and growth in 423 Dewey, John 267,297 d'Herbelot, B. 56 dialectic 221,222,231,235, 265,298,302,304,356, 419,422 action-reaction 361 Cold War 310 empire and emancipation 348 inexorable 301-93 state capital -93 negative and nothing 301 -93 229 Dialects 159 Diaspora 301.356-60 Multiplication 348 Muslim 303 Dicey, A. V. 89.92 Ficken, Peter 274 Dickens, Charles 52.110.133 Communist 294 Corrupt and clientelistism 163 Military 110.126 Nationalistic party 296 Theocratic.party393. Culture 309,312,315,317,322 Differentiation 21,24,396 Cultural Cultural culture 38 GEOGANICAL 389 SOCIAL 389 RAPE 389 DINGWALL, ROBERT 277 DISHOUSS 38 DURIGHITET 370 DIRIGISTE ACCESSED 103 103 DIRIGISTE.


diseases epidemic 164 global spread of 178 UN project to provide responses to 306 disenchantment 309 Disney 186,288,292,299,305,365, 385,386,420 Disneyfication 378 Disneyization 381,399-402 displacement 309 Disraeli, Benjamin 49 dissemination 317 Dissenters 92 dissident movements 101,293 "distanciation" 4 divergence 317 diversification 121,126,394,395, 396,415 combined effect of homogenization and 314 diversity 230.410 biological 309 host of capitalism 314-15 decline of 421 anchored as a counterpoint to homogenization 416 ethnic 392 globalization of 416 glocalization and 361.393-6 intergroups 311 linguistic 415 national 166.170 national identity and search for 414-17 recognition as a value in itself 416 regional, forced elimination 418 replace with another 323 theoretical 322 transnational 415 value 420 world culture 421 see also divine kingdom cultural diversity 317 division of labor 100,180,322 economically 203 extensive 205,203

geographic 416 global 200 international 201,212,254 sexual 225 worldwide 208,209 Dochakuka 335 Dolce and Gabbana 371 domination and subordination 59 Dominican Republic 136 Domino's Pizza 385,386,404 Doremus, Paul 10 double consciousness 360 double movement 73,89,91,94 fear of industrialized countries 1278 government interventions pressure on 158 Dr. Pepper/Seven Up 82 Seca 151 Drug Dealers 163 Drummond, Lee 322 Duménil, Gérard 106, 111 Duncan, Isidora 326,331 Dyer-Witheford, Nick 379 East Africa 16 East Asia 10,12,25 Flow of Arms Between Middle East and 310 Capitalisms 30 Close domestic cooperation between government and business 173 Shared self-understanding of societies 312 Crisis 126 NIC development model 327 Nutritional standards 381,396,397 Economic liberalization 121,125 Escalating arms race 39 Fast-food restaurants 314 Foreign investors in 122 Contained income inequalities 106 military superiority in 28 neoliberal interventions 112 evidence of chauvinism 312 political liberalization 125

rapidly growing economic power 41 rise of 175 societies in transition 397 strategic capabilities 174 structural adjustment 119-27 territorial disputes 26 transnationalism, localization, and fast food 396-9 Western influence 41 zoning technologies 115 see also China; Japan; North Korea; Russia; South Korea; Taiwan East Germany 78 New Forum 294 East Timor 293 East-West Polarity 312 Easternly, William 72,74n, 75-85 Eastern Europe see Central and Eastern Europe Eastern Sociological Association Conference (New York 2004) 378 Easternization317 Eating 300 ecological issues 163,265,292 - 3 economic activity 95 global 277 international location 12 economic benefits 44,74,75 comparative 30 economic collapse (2007) 245 economic conflict 26 economic cooperatives 295 economic crisis 124,395 global 72,120,157 economic development 5,9,23,40, 50,128. 141 alternative forms of 166 threatened areas 186 Positive impact of remittances for 138 freedom versus collectivism in 78-80 human rights conditions needed for 140 bad market liberalization for 134 step needed to encourage 132 impetus needed for 139


economic development (continued) promoting 118,127,133,142,145, 146 SAAs have a stimulating effect on 143 strong government involvement in promoting 127 trade union movements and 150 economic efficiency 5,113,114,151, 288 economic freedom 73,79,105,109 destroying 72 correlation between economic success and 72, 78 collectivism 81 - 5 countries prosper because 80 government facilitation 80 no restrictions 91 . World Economic Freedom: Annual Report 2004 78 economic growth 9,104,133,142, 299 aggregate 141 basis for future achievement 151 efficiently functioning markets facilitating 148 encouraging 141 low or negative 79 necessary condition for 146 negative impact on 139 not all pollution rates falling with 132 orchestration 12 prospects for 147,151 fast 136,140 slow 163 stagnant levels of 134 economic individualization 276 economic insecurity 175,177 global trade and finance exacerbate 178 economic integration 11,175 driving mechanism 168 need to combine cosmopolitan politics with 269 economic interdependence 4.22 political concessions 276 economic interests 33.42 discredited 54 Institutional Orientalism as 56

western, IMF as a representation of 152 economic liberalism 73.86-94 economic interdependencies 276 economic logic 58 economic organization 68 economic production 13.10.80 economic policy/policy 4,423 differences between countries 10 abroad 359 economic power/strength 28.36 rapidly growing 41 economic redistribution 161 economic regionalism 25 economic downturn (2000-3) 277 economic success 41 collective action sustains 75 correlation between economic freedom and 72,78,81-5 uneven and unpredictable 81-5 economies 23,95 communist 74 liberal 73 wage differentials play an essential role in 96 economic transformations 61 economic value 99-100 economy 3,4,7,16,20,21,51,95, 108,268-9 bloodless, bloody jihad and 304 equated with contractual relations 99 international 96, 97 introductory books 75 macro - micro distinction 338 of nothing 371-2 oil 53 rhetoric of 336 risk in 266 trend towards fusion of globalization and 158 see also development economics; neoclassical economics; also titles preceded by “thrifty” Economist, The 102,384 Eden, Lorraine 272 Education 210,323,417 Civic 297

Curricula can be changed peacefully 424 spending cuts in 140 English language 60 expansion of 414 in education of people 63 profession 337 reduced level of equal access 276 importance in creating hegemony 60 spending in 124 distribution around the world 412 global spread of 9 efeminização 59,61 ,62,63 efficiency 313,374,380,385,386,387 see also economic efficiency egalitarianism 247,393,394 Egypt 53,61,70,313,352,403 McDonald's in 395 soap operas 345,354 Ehrenreich, Barbara 70 Eisenstadt, S. N. 303 El Salvador 138 Matanza for the FMLN 329 McDonald's in 383 Elias, Norbert 361 Eliot, George 52 elites 120,133,232,301,394 consumer goods 194 cultural 420 dewesternization and indigenization 24 economic 106,111,360 global 201 hegemonic 327 hegemonic 327 hypocritical smokescreens for the pursuit of power by 291 neoliberals 125 non-western 4160 1 socially positioned 125 Anthony3 Ellington, 3Ellington 277 Theory of Emanation 317


emasculation 61 emerging countries 274,275 emotional labor 402 empire(s) 92,214-43,317 colonialist discourse 358 dialectics of the desire to flourish 348 291 gaps between the nation and 328 intermediary commercial groups 207 mutual deterrence 269 socio-political and cultural conflicts based on 359 see also imperialism; also under the British Empire; Roman Empire Empiricism 52 Employee Participation Plans 295 Employer Responsibility 92 Empowerment 141,156,202 Bureaucratic State Apparatus 103 Dissident 101 Employers 69 Imitators like 63 Women 136 End of Ideology Thesis 301 Images of the Enemy 266,267 Engels, Friedrich 236 England 149 Order of Essential Works Inspection 98 Food Factory Supply 87 Imperial Policy 67 Narrowly Interpreted Laissez-faire 86 Overcoming Monarchy and Feudal Structures 197 Peasants and Workers 209 Resurgent Utopians Nostalgic for English Civilization 290 35 “English” Education 63 English Language 16,186 Attempted Integration with 294 challenged as a dominant language 15 Commerce and science increasing 292 creoles based on 325 education in 60

Latin and Greek supplanted by 60 widespread use 41 of English literature 60 of English public schools 61 English 312 enlightenment 33,281,285,291,309, 338 reflected moral authority 284 universalism 293,294 Enloe, Cynthia 230 Enron 82 entrepreneurship 76,104,107,115, 187,270, 301 mobile fans initiative 16 environmental issues 164,241 deterioration 132,163 hazards 177 diseases 278 organizations/groups dealing with 5.6 protection 288 epidemics 277 Epstein, Gerry 162 EPZs (export processing zones) 132, 136,137 equality 27,39,294 safety care 260 Errington, Frederick 189 Esperanto replaced 6.15 Essentialism 325,329,367 Criticism of 333,344,347-8 Strategic 343 Property tax 106 Esteinou Madrid, J. 193 Estonians 25 Ethics 32,112,286 Shared 269 6 Ethnic movements 309 Spread of 15

ethnic restaurants 370,407 ethnicity 15,25,208,247,286,290, 334,347,356 antidote to essentialist notions of 327 change in symbolic processes of 322 diverse 289 interplay of class, gender and 61 multiple 345,359 politics of 21 sociopolitical and cultural conflicts based on 359 ethnocentrism 57,294 ethnography 113,116,193,194,313, 351-6,323,345,393,396 , 405-6.416 Contemporary Research 303 Criticism 354 Native 345.351-6 TNCs rapidly taking advantage of 406 Ethnomethodology 311 Ethno-National-Tribal Infinities 236 Ethnopadais 390,400 Ethnosociology 311 EU (European Union) 165.172, 173, 4.171,173.174.1, internal borders .24 24 Agricultural policy 201 Strict budget policy 177 Trade with the US 169 Eugenics 59 Eurasia 2 6 - 7 Euripides 55.56 Euro (currency) 202 Eurocentrism 236,317, 328, 348,349 Eurocommunism 104 Eurodisney 386 European-American 327 European Community 41,3030 EU.33 Europeanization 313.32 Evangelical Christians 112 Evans, Peter 138 Evolutionism 313 Ewen,. Stuart 194


exceptionalism 234 exchange rates 121 competitive 153 fixed 103,104,120,171 flexible 122,124 floating 125 overvalued 121,153,154 exchangeability 377 exclusion 221,245,254,256,295 inclusion and 113,354 existential philosophy 377 exit threat 168 exodus 222,242 anthropological 223 exotic eroticization 62 exoticism 331 experts 267 exploitation 186,221,224,225,226, 236,240,256 resistance against 222 will to resist 242 Exports 124,140,169 Weapons 310 Culture 352 Ensuring that producers are not over-exploited 153 Expanding markets 104 Food 364 Foreign dominance 191 Prime 375 Breaking down barriers 120 Extrajudicial killing 118,139,144 Fabian, Johannes 322 Factional homelands 293 Factors of production 154 Factory 154 the Rahbanis 352,354 falafel 381382403-5 Falwell, Jerry 302 family 35 patriarchal 247 family salary 225 hunger 235 fanatic 288,295 Fanon, Frantz 57.69 Fantasy, Rick 402 Far East 47

fascism 99 far-right politicians 161 international organizations 189 the unity of humanity denied by 100 created the conditions for the rise of 109 109 fashion 353,376 Europe's largest retailer 384 fast 385 punk 223 fast food places 82,186,187,268, 290,305,313,314,387,392 Great Britain, the capital of Europe 30 383,391 championing “slow food” against 370 ethnic mixing in employment patterns 331 exporting 375 second largest retailer 395 transnationalism, localization and 396-9 see also Burger King; hamburger ranch; dominoes; Juicy Burger; KFC; McDonalds; mos burger; nirulas; Pizza Hut; Wendy's FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 178,221 FDI (foreign direct investment) 5, 121,125,129,131,133,136,137, 169, 187,272,274-5 Aggregate numbers as representatives of the globalization of production 168 encourages 117 facilitates 102,117 changes affecting 280 governments competitors for 132 Third World countries fear of foreigners 270 Featherstone, M. 32 In, 361 Federal Reserve 126,130 see also Greenspan; Volcker Federalist 218 Federation 97 Fee-for-Service Systems 276 Feenberg, Andrew 376

female circumcision 5 female virtue 115 feminism 57, 59,256,404,416 gender equality within the confines of Islam 115 feminization 60 Ferguson financial failures 162-3 financial institutions 169 bailout 74 private deregulation 196 troubled/mistreated 122,123 see also IFIs financial markets 83,84 dualism seems operation of 170 less restrictions on 129 fragile 125 liberalization of 110 see also global financial markets Finnemore , Martha 409,421-4 Firebaugh, Glenn 134 bombing of workers' freedom on 118,148 restrictions 147 World War I 5,29,94 fiscal crises 177 Keynesian fiscal policy 103,104 power of global finance undermining 170 narrow 129 Fischer, Claude 247,249 crisis of fish stocks 278 Fiss, Peer C. 5 fixed costs 169 Flaubert, G. 49,51,52 flexible specialization 391 Fligstein, Neil 13,14


Fluorine vapors 279 Popular religiosity 303 Ford 129,193,376 Fordism 237,391, 393,396,400 Definitive extension of 392 Foreign Relations (revised) 39 Foreign aid 306 Freedom versus collectivism in 75-85 Access to foreign capital 136 Increased share of 125 External debt 125 Country on the edge Foreign direct investment 146 High level 137 foreign investment 108,129,136, 175,211 Competition for costs 177 from 192 countries desperate for 132 Guests under the auspices of NAFTA 133 Foreign investors 134 Foreign investors 106,122,123,146 Foreign policy 31, 33,186 .268 changed 269 joint restaurants 3,293 foreign portfolio 7 forest depletion/destruction 163,292 fortress states 261,270 Fortune magazine 106,191 annual global conferences 189 Global 500 corporations 185,211 fossil fuels 164 Foucault, Michel 44,48,52,57,59, 70,113,221,228 Welt 322 Widerspenstigkeit 293,294 Märkte sind Feinde der 291 fragmentation 396 France 48,88,90,160,281,296 carnival 357 classic cuisine 389 control of the Suez Canal 44

Home, Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy 268 Passionate Antichurch and Anticlericals 93 Euro Disney 386 Factory Inspection 92 Financial Regulation and Control 163 Competitive Businesses in the World Economy 10 Global Issues Effectively Controlled by US, UK, and 27 Imperial Policies/Traditions Are Resolved 67,110 income inequalities included 106 interference in world cultural history 420 left acquisition of state power 104 loss of former great power status 419 McDonaldization of ridiculed activists 414 McDonald's overthrown in 402 monarchy and feudalism 197 national film culture 305 national radio stations 299 North African immigration 24 Orientalism 47.48 people leaving French culture 300 people “very proud” of their nationality 421 political grievances about American cultural imperialism 341 far-right populist parties 178 provincial languages ​​and dialects 159 racism 2 5 - 6 , 1 9 4 repeated military conquests of 422 responses to world culture 417 rise as a nation-state 419 state ownership of key sectors 104 success of Latin American novelists in 415 suspicion of American influence in Europe 186 Third Republic 92,418 trade unions 189

undocumented aliens residing in 224 universal aspirations 418 women from Africa who found asylum in 194 work compensation 92 see also French language; Paris franchises 367,369,374,384,404 closing 314 enforcing home delivery 296 introduction of 89 limited government reduces functional obstacles of 141 rout in general direction of 76,311 virtues of 76,311 free trade 86,92,94,97,102,103,200, 290,294 international politicians frequently promote 87 8.8758 sanctions against WTO member states 201 see also FTAA; NAFTA liberty 75,270,311,341 civil 236 civil 111 collectivism versus 78-80 decline 261 democratic 289 corporate 107 externally imposed 269 individual 101,107, 111, 113, 352 knowledge 100 moral 98 personal 98,141 expanded and narrow regulation 97


freedom (continued) quest for unprecedented 222 98 see also economic freedom; Market Freedoms Freedom of Association 150 Freedom of Choice 85,101,301 Limited to Social Elites 262 Freedom of Contract 93 French Bread 383,391 French Canada 298 French Civilization 35 French Empire 52 French Language 16,353 Bringers of Diversity 417 Teaching Campaigns Teaching Residents to Speak 418 Freud, Sigmund 57 , 59 Friedman, Jonathan 9-10,15,257, 321n, 347-8,350-1,367 Friedman, Milton 102,107,108 Friedman, Thomas 68,69,385 Frundt, Henry 133 FTAA (Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas) 69 leader principle 295 Fujimori, Alberto 140 Fukuyama, Francis 29,30,35,68, 221,235,267,301,302,313 full employment 288 functional finance 96 fundamentalism 392 capitalist 268 hostility to modernity 289,302, 303 misidentified with traditionalism 302 powerful new parties 290 terrorist 305 see religious fundamentalism, John Furnivall P. 332 G- 7 group of 7) Countries 197,201 G-22 (Group of 22) Countries 197 Galbraith, John Kenneth 164,299 Galileo 362 Galtung, Johan310 Gandhi, Indira 295 Gandhi, M.K. (Mahatma) 295

Gandhi, Rajiv 295 Ganges Plain 349 Gans, Herbert 69,255 Garrett, Geoffrey 10.13 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 341 Uruguay Round 201 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 13, 121, 134,154,169,273 Decrease 122 FDI as a percentage of 5 Percent Investment of 170 per capita 83,132,172 savings ratio for 170 Geertz, Clifford 15,159,160,341-2 Gellner, Ernest 287 community 335 gender 356 colonialist discourse 358 cultural, ethnic combination and 342 interactions of class, ethnicity and 61 social conflicts political and cultural borders 359 strong borders 349 gender equality 115 gender inequality 136 impact of structural adjustment on gender politics 136 309 gender relations 62,120,223 centrality for capital entry into new territories 230 General Motors 159,211 general strikes 147 generational conflict 302 genetic engineering 247 genetically modified foods/organisms 238,264. 270 Genetics 327,348 Geneva 187 Violation of the Geneva Convention 102 Genocide 29,31,33,231,408 Geography 3,119,355 Geopolitics 310 Georgia 2 9 3 - 4 Gereffi, Gary 4 German Civilization 35

German (re)unification 164 problems of economic restructuring 277 first elections 295 Germanness312 Germany 27,160,274,290,336 carnival 357 national and international influence 173 environmental crimes 279 regulation and financial control 163 companies competitive in the world economy 10 investments as a percentage of GDP 170 local culture 335 McDonald's in 383,398 national character 281 racism 2 5 - 6 resurgence, nostalgically dreaming utopians 290 austerity 170 social protection and environmental regulations 131 penetration of superpowers 232 taxes 169 sleeper terrorists identified in the tradition of orientalism 268 47 village culture 23 accidents at work 92 see also Berlin; Oriental Germany; Nazi germany; West Germany Gershenberg, Irving 191 Gestalt311 Gewertz, Deborah 189 Ghettos 69,317 Gibb,A. H.R. 55 Giddens, Anthony 4 , 9 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 6 8 , 337.361 Gil, Stephen 165.201 Gilpin, Robert 4,12,13 Gilroy, Paul 231.360 Gilsenan, Michael 303 Gissinger, Ranveig 143-4 Glasgow 357 g/asnosf 292.295 Glassman, Jim 117.118n, 119-27 Glastonbury Rock Festival 358


Gleditsch, Nils Petter 143-4 global capital 115,196,211,242 interests 188 global capitalism 66,103,106,158, 165,166,180,196,253,361 commercial expansion 406 development of 175 basic institutional supports of 165 fundamental restructuring of 244 groups concerned with 191 culture leadership Consumption ideology 198 in the local mass media 19 plays many roles for 193 McDonald's is often seen as representing 393 postmodernism a solvent for 360 priority over social organization 68 relationship, the 183 reproduction of 197 serious neglect of the role 65 territoriality of 114 triumph of the welfare state 347 defined compatible with 13 world largely structured by 184 global compact 306 global culture 15,16,211,292 consumption 389-92 hybridity and mass identity 356-60 341 global finance 122,171 personal 186 power of 170 crises 264 global financial markets 248,254 collapse of 265 global politics 309 global village concept 14,15,186,194 global warming 9,263 only way to deal with 265 glocalization 160,280,304,313,345, 364,402 defined 319 diversity and 361,393-6 coarseness versus 372,377 hybridity as 35 hybridity

vernacular ethnography of 351-6 nothing/something 367-8 political boundaries of 360-1 popularity of theories 362 time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity 334-43 glocom modification 402-7 gnosticism 317 GDP (gross national product) 187, 211,306 Gobineau, Arthur, Comte de 50,315, 326,348 Goffman, Erving 422 Gold Reserves 104 Gold Standard 88,90,96,97,170,200 Goldman, Robert 376 Bens e Maus 265,266 Goodyear Tire 159 Gorbachev, Mikhail 369 100 Gourmet Restaurants 371,381,4063-40, 4063- Gospels 40, 4063-40, 4063-40, 4063 Governance 64,7,40 Considerable expansion 128,129-248 Corporation 188 cosmopolitan 304 Global 15,166,304,306 Gut 118,145,146 Greatest threat to territorially written forms 168 hierarchy hierarchy hierarchy of social democratic forms 178,272 Two Stages, Belt, and 12 US Standards of 149 and Massive Cuts 148 Governmentality 113,115 Graburn, Nelson H. H. 322 Grammars 316 Gramsci, Antonio 50,52,53,57,59, 165,235 Granovetter, Mark 249 Gray, John 21,22, 29-33

Great Depression (1930s) 5,103,107 Great Powers 3 0 - 1 , 3 8 , 5 3 , 9 6 Greater Serbia 37 Greece 21,29,281 Greek language 60,61 Greeks 312, 349 Greeks 70,312,349 Green Movement 160,277,297,305 Greenfeld, Liah 291288 Greenfeld Liah Gregorian Calendar 5 Granada 221,330 Grossization 345,346,362,363-70, 373,374,375,379 GLOCACISION USE OF GRUSGI VICEIGEN GLOCALISION (MARX) 372, 377 GROSSEWING GELS, GREETINGS (GRUS VIGE TAGEM.), E. Félix 354 Gucci 366,371,376 Guerrilla Insurgency/Warfare 110,140 Guillen, Mauro F.3,10 GulfWar220,330,395 Gunboat Diplomacy 200 Guyana 322 H&M Clothing 384,385 Habeas Corpus Act (Suspension 1794) 88 Habermas, Jürgen Convention Hague3 Convention 302 Hague3 Convention Violation 102 -Box 315,326,331,341,342, 348 Hall, Catherine 61,66 Hall, Stuart 352,355,375 Hamburg 268 Hamelink, Cees 316 Hannerz, Ulf 312,320,321n, 3 2 2 - 6 , 332,333,335 -416,415 -6,415 -6,415


Hardt, Michael 175.214-43 Hardware superiority 292 Harvard University Institute for Strategic Studies 309 Harvey, David 4,65,73,101-11, 360 Havana 325.387 Havel, Vaclav 295 Hayek, Friedrich A. von 8 5 , 1 0 6 - 7 , 108,236 Health 280,404 Expenses 140 Reduction of fair access to services 276 Survey, Dick 352 Hedgefonds Manager 163 Hegel, G. F. 221,375,411 242,377 American 313,417 Bourgeois 196,348 Commercial 200 Cooperative and Immaterial 74 Cultural 50,34,7346,1292. of 60 see also Western Hegemony Hegre, Havard 143-4 Heidegger, Martin 362,377 Held, David 247, 330,417 Helleiner, Eric 163 Helleiner, Gerald 164 Helplessness 171 Herder, J.G. of 312,340,349,350 Heresies 350 Heritage Foundation 108

heroin 304 Herriot, Edouard 93 Herzliya403 heterogenization 319,329,330,332, 334-43,362,381,402,406 local 407 heterosexuality 247 high-tech gear 310 Hindu civilization/culture 21,24,27, 29,310 impartial to 293 militant 41 Hindu nationalist0 Poor parties 2092 Countries) 138,163 Hiroshima 272 Hirsch, Paul M. 5 Hirschman, Albert 4 Hirst, Paul 4,8,12,172,174 Hispanic 39,326,349 Historic Block 165,201, Adolf, Hitler HIV/AIDS 9,61,158,164,261,238, 278 the spread of 76 stop Hobbes , Thomas 268 E. J. 299 Hobson, John 273 Hoffman, Kelly 135 Holland 110 see also Holland Hollywood 194,292,341,397,415, 416,420 Tastes of Hollywood 28 Hollywood Oliver Wendell 301 Holzmann, Robert 150 home center 403 homeless 328,36,2635 comfort food 2635, 6,537

Homoeroticism 62 Homogenization 218,264,341,342, 373,392,401,415 argument against 421 combined effect of diversification and 314 Cultural 206,320 Diversity Diversity serving as a point of contract for 416 Global 292,334,407-difference-407-difference-407-difference-407-difference Menz) MCDONALDRISCH) MACDOCHING TOSETLOT DESSETICISE DESSHRICTED BY DIE 380 MCDONALDISSIONS-DESSULTICTOS DAHLEGE (MACDONALS. 173 schemes worldwide, through MNCs 313 homohomo 223,227 Honduras 383 Hong Kong 187 Coca-Cola at 398-9 Disney at 400,402 explosive global capital growth of 115 flows 39 going to 275 lingua franca 35 McDonald's/McDonaldization 384,393,396,397,398,399,400, 401,402,415 Horn of Africa 26 Horowitz, Donald 24 Hotel industry 277 Hostile takeovers 123 Hotel industry 185 Howard, John 394 Huber, Evelyne, Hugo Victor 70 Human capital .capital 48 ,26,27,175,182,188, 281,294,305,378 Basic 140 compliance 41 impact of World Bank structural adjustment 138-46 efforts to promote 41


state respect for 139 affected groups 6 international cooperation based on 261,270 organizations advocating 5 positive impacts on 118 universal 160,211 deterioration of government practices 140 human rights violations 240,261,284 human rights violations 240,261,284 increased likelihood of 139 humanity 116,215 -16,238 emergency response 278 transnational 115 Hume , David 52,300 Huntington, Samuel P. 16,21,22, 23-9,30,31,34, 35,36-42,299, 301,302,308-13,361,410,416 Hurrell, Andrew versus 164 Hurricane Katrina ( 2005) 178 Hutus 29 assimilation 115,223,374,416 325,327 consumption and 351-2 cosmopolitans like the idea of ​​344 cultural 66,191,303,304,331,332, 348,355 disagreements about meaning and dynamics of 318 double assimilation and subversive impulses 352 standard, 351 global culture 351- g 355 essentialism only makes sense as a critique of essentialism recognizing and acknowledging 347-8 mimicry and 353 nomadism and 3 5 3 - 4 politics of 327-30 globalized popular celebration of 345.360 symptomatic position of 352 postmodern perspective is linked to 367 reactionary model of 328 self-identification and 349

social 348 stereotyping of 351 hybridity talk 349-50,351 hybridization 223, 227,308,315-16, 317,345,348,351,355,405,406 celebrations of 375 cultural 309,314,319,320,330, 333 global 326-33,342,373 hegemony refigured in the process of329 institutional 320 mimicry and simulation 353 multiple ethnicities and cultures 359 structural 320,333 hypernationalism 294 hypertext 247,248 Hyundai 211 IBM World Trade 210 people Ibo 24 Iceland 384 ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) 148,149, 150,189-90 ideal types 303,350,363, 371,377 identity 6,61,159 ancient 293 antidote to essentialist notions of 327 border collapse it becomes a reactive phenomenon of politeness in the name of294 civilization 41 collective 421 ethnic 25,26,230,302,350,392 structure of 287 global culture 356-60 hybrid 345,353,354 hybridism without denial 355 internal vision of 312 local 295 "local" claims of 337 modernists 350 multiple 320 national 24, 40

political 39 postcolonial 59 primary 247 primordialist vision of 329 project 257 regional 350 relationality of 353 resistance 257 social 286 social construction of tradition and 341 struggles for 38 superiors 50 women 257 working class 256 see also cultural identity; Nationality; political identity identity construction 354 identity crisis 353 ideological norms 180 ideologues 246 market economy 299 hybrid 350 ideology 215,292 capitalist 206 bourgeois 297 consumerist 185 culture and 311 dehumanization 54 diffuse 238 hegemonic elite 327 iron curtain 310 multiculturalist 39 nazi 350 neoliberal 9 totalitarian 9 see also western Cultural Ideology Ideoscapes 390,400 IFIs (International Financial Institutions) 130,139,145,147 Policy and Practice 232 see also IMF; World Bank IGOs ​​(Intergovernmental Organizations) 159,162,163, 179 IKEA 384,387-8



Illiteracy 240,306 ILO (International Labor Organization) 124,277 Practices considered abusive with 131 IMF (International Monetary Fund) (International Monetary Fund) 24,68, 70, 73, 75, 78, 102, 103,109,110,111,117,127,131, 14162,162 , 23,162, 23,162,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,183,18 ,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18 ,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18 ,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18,18 18 Systems 163 Program evaluation 151-2 Redemptions 104,130 Controls on capital movements expressly tolerated by the charter 128 Experts not acting under government direction 259 Funds used to pay central bank obligations 123 2006 Global Monitoring Report 77 Initiative HIPC supported by 138 SAAs human rights impacts 145 Conditionality effects 330 insistence on currency convertibility and liberalization 120 justification of policies 121 policies undermine workforce and rights 146-50 encouraging replacement of publicly funded social security systems 130 protests against 228,240 structural adjustment measures criticized 120 unregulated economic liberalization by 140 US advocates government representatives in decision-making bodies 144 Caribbean community immigration responses 358 carnival traditions 357 cultural contact 415 illegal 137 new standards 137

only path, with 265 susceptibility to 24 scapegoats for social and economic problems 178 second-generation immigrants 350 threat to national identity 158 impartiality 291 imperial sovereignty 217,218,223, 230,241,242 model for understanding 221 diversity must find adequate means to undermine 222 imperialism 50, 51, 53 , 58,60,63,64, 317,330,356,360 old orders 220 capitalism 111 colonialism, class relations, global capitalism and 66 certain views about 52 economy 187 eurocentric 349 free trade 200 human rights 27 connections between Europe, capitalism and 229 Marxist analyzes 229,290 Masculinism 60 More open system without colonies 110 New objections to 299 Orientalism, parallelized and legitimized 67 Perfection 219 Political 52,54 Supposed disappearance 229 Racist terror and genocide 231 Radical 93,111 Sexual desire 62 Universalization 419 World politics and 230 See also imperialism cultural; US imperialism Import substitution 102,121,153 Imports 369 Cheap 121,135 Demand met by 126-7 Substitution of 121 Expensive 153

less expensive 352 non-traditional 121 breaking barriers 120 relatively neutral 398 technology 125 impressionism 331 intermediate 349,352 incentives 137,173 income 79,78,80,371 concentration in upper strata of society 106 per capita 11,218 see also national income distribution 121,122 highly skewed 150 top of spectrum 276 -7 deterioration 124,126 income inequality 106,122,123,135, 143,300 rising power 136 increase 143 income tax 176 massive cuts 177 replacement 129 India 27,43,48,52,59,63,65,233, 392 Brahmins 349 British Empire 232. about Cinema Contemporary 66 Economic Growth 134 English Literary Studies in 60 Fast Food Restaurants 383 Film Production 415 Hinduization/Hindu 24,295 Implantation of Western Medicine 61 Indigenous Languages ​​41 Struggle for Power 295 Escalation of Religious Conflicts Within 26 Working Classes 189 McDonald's in 398 Muslims/ Islamists 41,295,298,310 National cinematographic culture 305 National oil film culture 211 Partial movements towards neoliberalization 103


Reputation as the world's largest integral democracy 290 Rivalry between Pakistan and 26 Secularism 40-1 Sikhs 295 Sociology of 210 Tamils ​​295 Transmigrants 137 Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) 278 Native Americanism 61 Indigenism 416 Indigenization of Knowledge 311 Indigenous Chains 390 Indigenous Peoples 309,416 recognized by the UN 341 inditex group 384 individual choice 300 formed 15 intolerance of 297 ridicule 299 process free of individual responsibility 45 112,141 individualism 27,39,85,115,422 methodical 281-2 product of culture honoring 386 social solidarity dissolved in favor of 108 Indochina 47,232 Indonesia 191,266, 35,312.2 Currency turmoil, 2012 dependency problems 125 Economic crisis (1998) 395 International emergency and humanitarian aid 278 McDonald's under military dictatorship 395-6 126 Muslim population 2 9 8 , 3 9 5 - 6 Estimates of poverty 124 Structural adjustment 124 Unemployment 124 Indus Valley 316 Labor relations 258,281 Labor courts 98 Industrialization 127.6136.2.13 Consequence of 315 unit to 394 import-oriented 121 source of capital to 125 Indyk, Martin 384

Inefficiency 152,155 INFACT 187 Infant mortality 164 Inferior product 388,404 Race 312 Infidels 305 Inflation 128 Acceleration 105 Budget deficits and 151,153,154 Double-digit increases 108 Dramatic 124 High interest rates to combat 118 Keeping the rate low 140 Number of people affected by 90 Power purchase 15 eroded by flight 109 rising 104 wage increases to 122 information flows 4 cross-border integration 14 dependence on 292 simple and regular 291 social activity constantly informed by 390 information networks 175,249-51, 292 institutional decision-making linked by 248 technology of information 160.168,,257.277 established 249 imperative 290.291-2 manufacturing logic 258 informationalism/informationalization 236 global 235 network society and 20.244-59 subjects (London)108 institutional transfer 296 institutional transgression 117.130

Institutionalism 421-4 Instrumentation 407 Disobedience 243 Insurance 165,267 Intellectual property rights 102 Commercial negotiations on 165 intellectuals 39,186,300,344,350-1, 420 Indifference between 400 brave assembly of students, workers and 294 KFC and McDonald's condemned by 395 liberals, in Islam 302 Marxists 94 Neoliberals 238 and 228 Production 63 Third World 323 Intelligence 178 Secret Services 267 Principle 266 Interaction 40 Interaction 311,320,325,327, 328,336,345,356 Interdependence 290,330 Conciliation. responsibility 187 international banks 128,291 international business associations 189 international competitiveness 10, 82 lack of 190 minimum wage kept low to promote 13


International Credit Markets 110 International Economic Institutions 27.28 International Financial Assistance Act (USA 1977) 144 International Labor Law Fund 187 International Law 220.291 International Federation of Metalworkers 190 International Standards 423 International Organization of Consumer Associations 187 International Red Cross 293 International Relations 3, 29, 37, 38, 157, 158, 161, 165, 166, 179, 197, 201, 339, 348, 424 attempt to overcome the dualism between nation-state and international system 333 axis of 195 “pulling together in 28 conflicts within morality 31-3 culture and 21,310 empire -theory and 215,220,228-34 exclusion by the aspect of global warfare 29 institutions established to help stabilize 103 neorealistic 12 defined primarily by conflicts between nation-states 304 realistic view of 311 international phone calls 5 international terrorism 177 international trade factors affecting opening to 82 heyday of 5 increased flows of 276 International Food Union and Allies affect labor unions 190 International youth hostel movement 340 internationalism 238 peace and 295 fine varnish peeled off 294 internationalization 5,69,210 adaptability of the nation states 175

advanced 247 impact on state capacity 171 enabler of 172 strong 167 Internet 15,137,175,235,240,250, 376 access to 6-7 dynamic social movements connected via 248 hypertext to 245 McDonald's advertising strategy 395 multimedia technologies 391 predicted number of users 247 Interior system 174,199. 200 Interventionism 93-4,104,112 Alleged driving force 91 Central and controlled 89 Humanitarian 116,237-9 Military 238,239 Moral 238 Intraregional trade 137 Investment banking 107,266 iPod (mobile digital device) 81,82 Iranian Christian Armenia and 29 CIA-organized coup (1953) 110 China-Iran-Iraq War 29 310 Iran-Iraq War 29 Iraq70,101-2,103, 111, 158,294 Anglo-American Sanctions Regime 232 Call for Military Occupation 234 Invasion (2003) 383 Resistance to Western Pressure in 38 Ireland 11.83 Compulsory Vaccination 92 Universities 61 Irish Bagels 319,320,326,331

Iron Curtain 25 Islam 28,29,53,298,309 and American Conservatism 301-4 Anti-Semitism 54 Bloody Borders 27,310 Characterized by Their Declining Position 44 Cultural Divide Between Christianity and 25,27 Diasporic Cultures 303 Existing Political Structures Challenged 303 Feminists Demand Equality of gender within borders 115 fundamentalist threat of 310 global claims and arrogance 5 inherently allergic to democracy 67 interaction between the West and 310 inherently inhospitable to democracy 298 militant 302,304 monolithic and inherently undemocratic 289 negative images of 304 narrow-mindedness in many modern incarnations 294 perception of 53 redone 287 states' resistance to Western pressures on Iraq and Libya 38 scathing accusation of orientalism in relation to 44 combating threats to the integrity of 302 see also Muslims; also prefixed "Islamic" under the following titles Islamic bloc of nations 27 Islamic civilization 21,24,29,310 Antagonistic interaction of 26 Arab, Turkish, and Malay subdivisions 23 Conflict between Westerners and 25 states/Islamic-Confucian alliance 28, 312 Military connection 310


Islamic fundamentalism 24,162,289, 303,392 affinities among Protestants and 302 identification of jihad with 301 periodic boycotts of McDonald's 395 western commentators 302 Islamic schools 379 efforts by Islamic states to acquire nuclear weapons 38 military might of 28 Islamists 26,302,395 isolation 27,112 markets are enemies de 291 social therapy that overcomes separation and 357 isomorphism 9,417,421,422,423,424 global 409,414 institutional 129 Israel 27,349 arms sales to China 310 McDonald's in 381,382,383,384, 402-7 struggle between Arabs and Zionism 53 Istanbul 395 exports Italian civilization 35 Italy. in 104,229 McDonald's in 398 Orientalism 47 Racism 2 5 - 6 Key Sector State Property 104 Tax Collection 273 Trade Unions 189 Village Culture 23 Itinerant 350 Jailbirds 89 Jains 398 Jakarta 164 Jalal al-Azm, Sadik 44,46n , 5 4 - 7

Religious Movement Jamaa 322 McDonald's at 302,381,383,396, Jamaica 138,344,345,356 398,399,401 James, C.L.R. 65 MEJI -Periods 342 James, William 39 Myth of the Japanese. Savings 170 Asianization in 24 Sociology of 210 civic arts 331 State institutions acting as "midwives" to Hollywood film studios 274 292 Superpower penetration of 232 Call to play a naval role in the China Sea Technology imports of 125 and Russian toothpicks for the empire of demanding customers 311 292-3 catalyst for internationalization trade with the US 169 strategies 173 US-based companies challenged the business strategy 360 of others based on 212 communist unions 189 189 Japanese challenge 327 Confucian ethics 312 Japanese civilization/culture 21,23, cooperative relations with 28,310 24,26 ,27,29,310 dependence on labor influx japaneseness 312 224 japonization401 national and international influence Jarvis, Darryl S. L. 261,271-80 173 jazz 415 economic problems between USA and Congo 322 26 ,38 oriental 352 environmental concerns 164 Jefferson, Thomas 218 export expansion Markets 104 Jerusalem 384 Fast food restaurants 314,383 Jesus Christ 100 FDI income 274-5 Jevons, William Stanley 107 Financial regulation and control Jewish fundamentalism 24,302,303 163 Sabbath observance orthodox 291 Companies that are competitive in the Jewish world 312 Jews 27,29,40,349,350 Economy 10 Americans 53 forced to accept western lures 92 economic and political culture 21 agreements 423 foreign investment of 108 fries consumed with great enthusiasm by the concept of glocalization 342 398 houses giant commercials 211 impartial applied commandments to hybridization 315 293 IKEA in 387 legends 100 labor relations 281 Jihadq, 160,164,379 industrial system and rice culture McWorld and 288-306, 317,338, 201 378 influence of art in non-Islamic Europe examples of 288 painting 331 job losses 135 investment as a percentage of BIP John, D i l 4 0 170 John Paul II, Pope 26


Johns Hopkins University 234 Johnson, Lyndon B. 232 Johnson, Paul 339 Joint Ventures 191,212 Jollibee 384 Jones, Quincy 299 Jones, William 51 Jonkonnu Masks 356 Jordan 137 Joseph, Keith 108 Jubilee Movement 138 Fundamentalism of Judaism 24 narrow mind in many modern incarnations 294 see also Jewish fundamentalism; Jews Judeo-Christian tradition 41 Judicial independence 129 Juicy Burger 383 Junk food 314 Jurassic separatists 293 Legal education 214 Legal norms 238 Jus ad bellum 220 Just-in-time production 137 Just war 214,220 Kabila, Laurent 238 Kabuki 326,330-1 Kafanchan, 323 Kantchan , 323 Immanuel 362 Kapstein, Ethan 11,162 Kashmiris 6 Katz,Elihu 193-4 Kautsky, K. 233 Kavolis,Vytautas310 Kellner, Douglas 255,346,372-9 Kelson, Hans 238 Kemalist Turkism 349 Kennedy, Paul 4,11,269 Kennedy Kenny Roger School of Governments 296 Roasters 187 Kent State University 231 Kenya 163,191 Kepel, Gilles 24 Kern, Stephen 339 Kerry, John 178

Keynesian policies 102,103,104,105, 107,108,109,110,164 KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) 288, 314,383,395,400 popularity in Malaysia 384 Khartoum 26 kickbacks 140 Kim Hyung-soo 395 Kimbangism 328 King, Anthony 311,337 King, Martin Luther 39 kinship 35,226,390 Kissinger, Henry 5,102 Kiswahili language 16 Klein, Naomi 376 know-how 163 knowledge and power 259 Kobrin, Stephen 4,5,11,14 Kodak 211 Kokopelli numbers 368,369 Koran 35 Korean War 29,47,398 Kosovo 37,232,238 Kowinski, WilliamS. 385 Kraidy, Marwan M. 345.346n, 351-6 Kristeva, Julia 57 Kroc, Ray 81-2.394 Kuhn, Thomas 22.38 Kundera, Milan 351 Kurdish Independence 293 Kurds 6,293 Japanese Kuril Islands 293 Kuwait 109,238 Kuznets Curve 136 Kwan, Robert 401 Conference of Kyoto (1997) 164 Labor Day celebrations (USA) 357 Labor market flexibility 110,148 Improved 123 Labor markets 10,12,74,86,132 Competitive 88.96 Differentiation from 314 Less regulation to 129 Free 87.93 Impact of trade in 11 Total load for 118 pressure for 135,137 reforms of 149

burdened by the failure of domestic businesses 135 transnationalism among 137 women in 136 labor parties 91 Labor Party (UK) 8,105 Lacan, Jacques 57,59 Laclau, Ernesto 236 Laffey, Mark 215,216n, 228-34 Lagos 24 laissez-faire system 13.73 ,86, 87 ,88, 89,90,92,93,94,238,274,295 Lane, Edward William 50,52 Lange, Oscar 107 language(s) 263,324,328,340,415 ties based on 159 colonial 294 shared national identity rooted in 178 creolization of 319 culture 315 cultural and 41,916,34 English - creole based 325 global 15,186 grammar and 316 indigenous 41 keys to nation 312 provincial 159 regional 418 systematizations of 59 see also english speaking casinos in las vegas 388 lash, p. 32 In Latin (language) 15-16 Displaced by English 60 Latin America 28,29,64,78,65,128,148,189 Coca colonization 313 Creolization 318 Debt crisis (1982) 103 Democratic transitions 133 Economic and social restructuring in NICs under liberalization 121- 2 attempts at economic development 102 built-in liberalism 104 fast food restaurants 384 free markets 78


global capital flows 275 IMF accustomed to negotiating sovereign debt 163 inclusion in the West 310 income inequality 135 indigenous movements 15 miscegenation 349 minimum wages 149 major nationalism in 418 new capital inflows 122 output per person 134 political and economic liberalization 125 repressive military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes 110 common languages ​​16 social consequences of structural adjustment 117 welfare systems privatized over the course of 130 structural adjustments 117,119,124 success of novelists in France 415 syncretism 310, 318 soap operas 345,354,377 unionization 133 the US called to the police 311 the US movement for open markets and privatization 111 "whitening" or Europeanization to 327 see also Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Peru; Uruguay; Venezuela Latin American civilization 21,23, 24,29,57 Laura Ashley 187 Lauren, Ralph 298 Lavie, Smadar 328 Layoffs 118,135,149,236 Mass 148 Mass required before privatization 148 147,148 LDCs (least developed countries) Units transferred from public to hands 129 Debt 128 Pressure on labor markets 135

League of Nations 97 liberal democracy Lebanon defeat of 289 competing identities and call for rapid progress towards worldviews living side by side 33 354 survival of 39 hybrid practices under universal Maronite authority of 32 young people 345 universal victory/triumph of 40, jazz introduced music of 352 313 quintessence of the symbol of 352 Liberal Government (Australia) 394 social change 303 Liberal Party (Canada) 175 Libanization 290,293,338 liberalism 21,25,27,86-94 Lechner, Frank J. 408,409,410-21 conspiracy against 73 Leeson , Nick 162 embedded 104 left (political) 104,105,227,238, political realism and 230 300 universal 237 communist and autonomist liberalization 103,119,124,134,135, traditions 229 137,232 parties 133 capital account 125,275 thinkers 170 feeders 170, economic legitimacy 170,597 406 International credit and finance 27 Markets 110 Military apparatus 220 Political 125 Unsecured No 268 Fast 118,143 Political 33 Unregulated 140 Public sphere, democracy, civil liberation 228,241 Society and multitude 268 230 Supreme source 172 National 235 Territorial control over pursuit of means 222 of 173 liberty 27,39,89,99,296,305 Leigh, Gen. Gustav 102 civic 98,295 Leitch, Vincent 361 thrifty, frustrated 91 leitmotifs 353 ethical 286 Lenin, V.I. Libya 26.38 Leopold II, King of Belgium 238 Licenses 129 Lesotho 137 Darling, Tamar 193-4 Levant 43.48 Lifestyles 292 Levine, Donald N. 157.159-60 Imitation of 353 Levitt, Harold 4 Imports 395 Levy, Dominique 106.111 Mixed 350 Levy, Marion 129 Lilt 358 Lewis, C. 1.33 Limited Government 141 Lewis, Oscar 70 Limited Liability 83 LibelAct(1792)88 Lind, Michael 173


Lindblom, Charles 103 Lingua Franca 15.35, 311.420 Linguistics 208 Creolist 322.326 Lippmann, Walter 89.93 Liquidity 275.283 Culture 396 Basic Education 240 Computers 251 Literary Theory 3.43 Literature 340 Living Condivings 111 Deplorable 155 Costs of , Vincent 118,146-50 Lloyd George, David 93 Localism 338,360 Moderate form of 336 Retracted 361 Triumph of 317 Location 381,390,392,398-9 Global 313 Locke, John 52,329 Lognormal distribution 82 London 24,37,92,108,125, Roller stature 13 See also Notting Hill Los Angeles 164,221,341,375,386 Grove and Fairfax Farmer's Market 376 Lotteria 395 Lower Class Youth 350 Lueger, Karl 92 Lunchables 371 Lusaka Peace Accord (1999) 238 Luton Carnival 357 Luxemburg, Rosa 240 Lyon 93 Lyotard, Francois, 281 Amin 352 Maastricht 5,. 5, 296 Bau.lay 63 Macfie, A.L. 46n Macintosh computers 193,290

Macroanthropology 333 Macroeconomic stability/instability 120,152,153 Macrosociology 12 State centrism in 180 Mad cow disease 263 See also BSE Madison, James 297 Madonna 300 Quranic schools 379 Maffesoli, Michel 361 Mafias 161 Magalhães, Ferdinand 5 Mahabharata 326 Mahathir, Mahomed 124, Maier Jacques 21 Mahoubani Malawi 412,414 Malaysia 187,266 Currency turmoil 162,202 McDonald's in 398 Popularity of Kentucky fried chicken 384 Tensions between ethnic Chinese and Malays 312 Inequality 207 Farmland and mineral resources 291 Evil civilization 360 Malinowski, Bronislaw 325 Malle, Louis 300 Malnutrition 31 Gender 8 32235 Manchester , Nelson 237 Mandeville, Bernard 300 Manet, £douard331 Manouchkine, Ariane 326,330 Manufacturing 122 Absolute decline in employment 121 Exports per capita 8 2 - 5 absorbing labor 121 Transition from agriculture to 82 Mao Zedong 327 Ma' Falafel chain 404 Machinery 122,136 oz

Marcus, Steven 50 Marcuse, Peter 45,46n, 66-71,245, 252-9 Marjoribanks, Timothy 190 market concentration 135 market failure 107 compensation for 202 restoration 105 market freedoms 105 unencumbered 109 market imperative 290-1 market liberalization 134,135 Niche Markets 132 Market Signs 107 Marketing 355 Global 369 Mass 368 Postmodern 240 Marketing 119 Maronites 345, 352-4,355 Marrakech Roundtable on Results (2004)77 Marshall, Alfred 107 Marshall, T.H. 130 Marshall Plan 164 Martha Stewart abandons 376 Martial Arts 397 Martin, Philippe 11 Marx, Karl 44,48, 52, 55,70, 75,107, 182,200,203,253,295,366 Analysis of Alienation 374,379 Capital(ism) 198,379,375 Technology 374 Russian Communes, Marxists 26314 20,21,52,57, 58,65,161,182,183,188,192, 234, 258,299,360,374,408 argumentation between agency and structure 253 analyzes of the international struggle 229 for ideas versus 107 217 critical thinking characteristic of 107 217 cultural studies


global claims and rights 5 theory of imperialism 229,290 intellectuals 94 narratives of colonialism and its consequences 59 scientific predictions about 290 world politics and 230 masculinities 60-1 mass media 187,193 consumption 14-15 computer fusion and 245 ownership and control over 211,212 perceived role in imitation 353 Juicy Photo Opportunities and One-Liners 392 Universal Availability of 195 Mass Production Systems 369,391 Massachusetts Puritanism 291 Massey, Doreen 331,360 Massification 373,377 MasterCard 376 Materialism 336 Secular 305 Matlock, Jack F. Bruce, 5, Bruce, 280 9 ,11,15 McCann Erickson 313-14 McCarthyism 108 McCormick, James M. 145 McDonald's 81-2,186,187,288,290, 292,299,367,371,373 Dollar Menu 385.388 Gründung von (1955) 370.380 wichtige Marketingmöglichkeiten für 395 internationale Expansion 385 nicht möglich, sich der Allgegenwart von 392 Betriebsabläufen 381 Auslandsniederlassungen 300,313,314,370, 381-4,387,390,393-407 to remove predictability from 386

Ritzer's analysis of 374,375, 380-1,389,398 service culture based on commitment to equality 394 McDonaldization 289,309,313-15, 316-17,373,374,380-407,409, 410,411,414,415,417 McHappyDay394 Mcjobs 374,398 McLuhan, Marshall 14,15,186,193 McMichael, Philip 12,183,198-202 McNamara, Robert 117,128 McSchools 379 McSpaghetti 398 McTopia 389 McWorld20,160,409 and Jihad 288-306,317,338,378 MDBs (Multilateral Development Banks) 77 MDGs (UN Millennium Development Goals) 76-7, 85, 306 funding gap 75 means of production 196,226 communication becomes 235 ownership or control of 188 Mecca 323 doctors 2 sans38 media frontières 53,178,183,187,188,212, 214,319,354 Alternative systems 304 American, influence 313 Audiences as nomadic communities theorized 353 America's dominance over 304 Emergence of monopolies in 289 Footage building 358 sexual distortions 358 global, 233 gender distortions 304 Image of Muslims 304 stigmas and stereotypes in 358 see also mass media studies 313 media landscapes 390,400 Mediterranean world 36,403 megastores 403

Melanesia 189 mélange 324,329,348,349,420 global 320,326,327,330, 332 harmonious 352 syncretism as 328 Melucci, Alberto 330 Mendelian genetics 327,348 mercantilism 12,200 Mercator, G. 5 mercenary troops 304 meritocratic elitism 296 mestizaje 315,324,327,348,349 limitation of 327 Metcalfe, Bob 250 methodological cosmopolitanism 262,281,284 methodological individualism 281-2 Métissage 315 Mexico 73,101,105,110,134,191, 212,259,316 wealth of the richest individual in 122 democracy 415 experiences with SAPs 121 US FDI to 136 film culture 305 financial crises 122,125 financial liberalization 130 government bonds 129 hybrid culture 349 122,125 US FDI for 136 film culture 305 financial crises 122,125 financial liberalization 130 government bonds 129 hybrid culture 329 122,125 oil and intraregional trade 1 McDonalds 1691 workers 209 privatization 106,130 real wages 133 identity struggles 38 substantial investments 121 telenovelas 377 trade barriers lifted 133 currency weakened from Mexico 189 Meyer, John 9,13,408,412,413,421-2


MfDR (Managing for Development Results) 7 7 - 8 Miami 13 microeconomic efficiency 151 Microsoft 82,191,288 microwave meals 371 middle class 40-1,60,63,299 activist 391 youth cultural identity 354 effeminate Bengali men 61 fast food restaurants 314 trade union icon 109 rising 300 Middle East 47 arms flows between East Asia and 310 fast food restaurants 314 free markets 78 global stock market capitalization 275 identified with big power politics 53 McDonald's in 381,395,396 "re-Islamization" of 24 territorial integrity threatened 293 US interests in oil region 110 cf also Abu Dhabi; Egypt; Will; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Libya; Palestine; Saudi Arabia Migration Caribbean, peak 357 clandestine 222 continuous 224 cross-border 15 intercultural 318 differences between nomads and migrants 354 spread of Muslim cultures through 303 economic migrant flows 392 global 304 international 5,160,286 workforce 222 en masse 222 migrant networks 118 mature populations for 137 second-generation immigrants 328

trade and 311 transnationals 137 blatant military dictatorships 126 repressive 110 military junta 292,295 military power 28.36 rising 41 general protection of 103 unrivaled 27 militia criminal organizations 176 violent 302 Mill, John Stuart 52,329 Mills, Sara 62 Milosevic, Slobodan 37 mimicry 62,634 62,634 62,634 hybridity as 353 minimum wage 109 frozen or reduced 149 suppressed to promote international competitiveness 133 purchasing power of 122 minorities 26,337 differing opinions 293 global respect for legacy 416 obscure leaders rising to prominence 39 protection of 296 states that are confederations of 392 interbreeding 326,349 Mises, Ludvig Von 89,107 Missionaries 323 Mitchell, Neil J. 145 Mittelman, James 4 Mitterrand, François 164 People of Mixed Race 319 Mixture 341,352 See also MNCS Hybridization (Multinational Corporations). local economy in the hands of 117

Scope of displacement 272 unlimited 166,168 interaction between states and 10 lack of significant national identity 291 local establishments in developing countries 137 most assets are in home countries 8 proliferation of 11 support of 259 seen as harbingers of American modernization 313 global homogenization of sociedades por 313 MNEs (multinational enterprises) see MNCs mobility cross-cultural 318 labor 222,223,224 political economy of 350 unrestricted 257 see also capital mobility modernism (arts) 331,348,350 modernity 3,28,128,215,220,223, 226,236,264,265,266,280,293, 327 advanced 260 approximating 235 being-against in 222 building blocks of 235 crises 221,235 critics of 377 development 59 distinction between modernization and 284 dividing line between tradition and 360 hostile fundamentalism 289, 302,303 globality and4,13,14,16 ideal type 350 industry 271,272,277 multiples 310 postmodernism , tradition and 303 processes that led to the formation of 58 questions about the nature of 138 237 racially inscribed


rationalized 9 reflective 271,275,276,278,279 religious fundamentalism harbinger of 303 withdrawal of 30 peasants almost untouched by slavery 153 and 231 society caught between tradition and 352 intoxicating power 40 traditional alternatives to 287 Weber's general sociology 396 modernization 21,22,24,26 ,31,56, 13,17,32,133,32,133 332 advancing like a steamroller 309 attempting non-westernization 310 dissatisfaction with 391 distinction between modernity and 284 effect of 34 incomplete 360 ​​MNCs seen as precursors of 313 prerequisite for 14 Reflective 271 Represented by TNCs 192 Societal (1950s and 1960s) and 30,40,303 Modernization Theory 9,127,129, 313,333 Good Reasons to Question and Reject 362 Moe, Terry 424 Mogadishu 221 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade 61 Catholic Monarchy 418 Replaced 197. fair 102 Monetarism Defly. non-inflationary 129

monotheism 294 Monga, Yvette Djachechi 194 monopoly 91,107,113 consolidation of 130 abolition 140 money, markets, and 294-5 regulation of 129,131 vehicles to consolidate power 109 monotheism 294 Mont Pelerin Society 106 7,108 assembly 319,324,327 MONTERREY SUMMIT (UN 720 Moore) David 215-16.234-40 Morality 31-3.115 Morita, AKIO313 Mormon Polygamy 323 Morocco 303 Morse, Margaret 363 MOSTONS 383 MOSCOR 291. Mossadeq, Muhammad 110 Non-Aligned Movement 330 Movies 194 MP3 Players 81 MTV (Music Television) 290,342,353 Mudimbinbent 61 Mulatto 348 Multiculturalism 227,311,416 Sham 358 Requirements for 39 Everyday Life 320 Linguistics 292 Crucible 3 Caribbean Carnival 357 The policy of 317 formerly homogeneous nation-states moved to 392 TNCs to rapidly explore 406 afflictions with 351

Multilateralism 269,270,306 Multilocal Corporations 397-8 Multimedia 245,247 Multimixer 81 Multinational 147,148,149 Monitor, 187 Multinational 225 Reappropriation 224,226 Role in World Politics 229 Struggles 216,230,234-5 Communal Commerce 92 Muniz, Albert M. Jr. 13.9 Victoria M Jr. , M Murphy, Craig 5 Museum Audio Guides 376-7 Music 324,327,341,354,365,368, 377 Afro Beat 323 Caribbean 352,345,357 Folk 352 Hybrid Genres 351 Persian 365 Popular 316,415 Worldwide 326,332,351 See also Jazz's Largest Population 24 ,4 Days 302 Muslims, 40,415 world 298 Hindus and 26,41,295 immigrants and descendants 420 imperatives apply impartially to 293 McDonald's and 395 -6,398 number in Europe 304 Orthodox Christians and 26,27 clergy outrage 352 radical women 302


Mutation 223 Hammelburger 383 Mutual Deterrence 269 Myhre, David 199 Mystik 303 Nader, Ralph 187 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 69,131,173,181, 197,201,247,330 Carnegie Endowment Report on the Impact 132,135 of Economic Integration Encouraged by 132. of illegals 3 were invited to immigration under 137 jobs created under 136 US leadership of 174 Nagasaki 272 Naipaul, V.S. 27,328 nanotechnology 267 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France 56,69,70,339,418 nation-states 3,4,14,58,64,65, 72, 157-81,195,205,210,211,213 , 220,361,412 change/weakening of 320 change in mix of ethnic identities of authority 392 3,11 borders collapsed 261 citizenship as legal status converging in 114 competition between 281 border controls 74 control over own affairs 417 structural similarity 9 decline of 247 development is justified by 196 distinction of former colonies as 63 dominated by economic considerations 20 dualism between international system and 333 formation of 237 transformed functions within the order of empire 241 transcending global cities 13

Government of 74 growing number of 5 - 6 imperialism and 219,236 importance of 21,203 internal security is no longer the exclusive domain of 261 international relations, mainly due to conflicts between 30 Islam and limits of 303 macrophenomenological approach to globalization and 16 mature 201 more powerful actors in world affairs 40 mutual deterrence 269 organizing principle of capitalist politics 200 participatory and self-determined 297 formerly homogeneous 392 rebel factions and splinter minorities at war with 293 relationship between and among 215 rising social and political tensions 419 12 sovereignty 217 sovereignty left to transnational trade 288 stubborn different 308 threat 270,297 transformation of 197,259,282 transnational practices created by 182 national borders mitigating the glare of 290 satellite footprints respect 292 national character 309 National Endowment for Democracy 296 national identity 421 challenged 417 concern for viability 419 cultural 420 crisis 206 deeply preserved 302 deeply rooted 178

definition of 420 makes sense, lack of 291 obviously hybrid 349 original vision of 418 pursuit of diversity 414-17 revised and implemented 230 sworn enemies of 350 threats to national income 158,178 82,106,121 convergence in 134 growth in 128 national interests 232,269 national security 268 , 311 National Socialism See Nazi Nationalism 9,40,66,196,290,302, 312,332,338,371,417-19 Adaptation to politics 303 FORMS AGRESSOTOM 334 Ambivalence about 289,298 Chauvinism 378 Cosmopolitanism and 261,2888877777777777777 a methodology 261,288887777777777777 once an integrating and unifying force 293 reaction to universalizing imperialism 419 rise of 91,357 romance 333 stronger than ethnic loyalties 155 undermining 315 nationality 406 nationalization 110 reverse 102 nationality 160,291 push for 417 language as key to 312 reluctant 294 NATO allies North Atlantic Treaty) 247,268 Bombing of Yugoslavia (1999) 385


Natural disaster 278 Natural rights tradition 41 Nazi Germany 349.350.422 Middle East 47.53.54 British actions in 70 Negri, Antonio 175.214-43 Nehru, Jawaharlal 24.40 Neoclassical Economics 107 Consider neocolonialism 312 NEOKONFUZANISCHEM ,72-118,125, 141,142,143,146,170,171,174, 175,178,182,270,411-12,415 slope disturbances and campaigns of structure and policy. Reforms 176 Neo-Marxists 183,377,408 Neo-Spenglerism 264 Nepal 349 Nerval, Gérard de 47.51 Nestlé 187, 211 Holland 160,178 Carnival 357 McDonald's in 398 Network Society 20,244-59 New Christian Right 392 New Deal 73,108,112 New Orleans 6 - Democratic Realism 6 0.5 Second World 189 New Technologies 315 New Testament 100 New World Order 218,240-1,269, 293,338 New World Plantation Societies 325 New York 24,107,115,187,245,306 Arsenal 378 Clashes at Foreign Trade Shows 358

Times Square Corporate 378 Disneyfication on 42nd Street 378 Grossification of 378 Caribbean Carnival in Harlem 357 Indian Restaurants 378 Investment Banks 109,110 Jewish Museum Kandinsky-Schonberg Show (2003) 377 Lexington Avenue 378 Madison Avenue 194,292 Manhattan 250 McDonald's 386 MOMA Cinematique 378 Role and Reputation 378 terrorist attack 301,302; see also September 11 Union Square 378 New York Times 41 New Zealand 64,65,276 Newman, John Henry 52 Newsweek 4\ NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 116,179,189, 247,305,413 activities of 329 democratic 306 humanitarian 239 labor education and land reform 238 technocratic 239 transnational umbrella organizations for 306 see also INGOs Nicaragua 110,138,383 NICs (emerging economies) 123,124,126,169, 173,192,211 East Asia, development model 327 economic and social restructuring 121-2 incentives to finance foreign investment 173 consequences systematic negatives for 119 Nietzsche, Friedrich 44,222 Nigeria 24, 323, 325

linguistic multiculturalism 294 violence between Muslims and Christians 26 nihonjinron 343 Nike 299,305,373,400,403 Niranjana, T. 61,66 Nirula's 383 Nixon, Richard 5,105,233 Nobel Peace Prize 108,238 nobles 208 nomadism 222,235,239,240,350 hybridity as 3 5 3 - 4 nominal wages 124 nonconformity 98 nonpeople 365,367,374,368 nonplaces 363 , 365,367,368,370 non-services 365-6,367,374 non-spaces 363 non-things 376 Norman, Jessye 300 normative-political cosmopolitanism 262 North African immigration to France 24 population growth 25 see also Libya; Morocco Indians of North America 62 North Korea 27, 75, 78 Arms Exports of 310 North-South/Polarity Divisions 169, 312 Northeast Africa 159 Northern Alliance 304 Northern Ireland 178 Catholics 288,293 Northwest Frontier (British India) 232 Norway 238,398 Nostalgia 290,329, 361,393 304,393 Criticism of natives 340 Politics of 312 Notting Hill Carnival 357,358 Nuclear power 260,264 Faith undermined in 268 Power plant explosion 271 Nuclear war/confrontation Most likely route to 2 3 3 - 4 Risk of 261,278


nuclear waste 260,263 abolition of 264 nuclear weapons 233 advent of 278 reduced arsenals 278 efforts by Islamic and Confucian states to appropriate 38 possibility of accidents 278 first use in the US 233 use at the end of World War II 231 Nunley, John W. 357 Nurse, Keith 344- 5,346n, 356-60 obesity 314 objectivity 291 Obrinski, James 238 Occidentalism 312 Occitan France 298 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 77,106,187,197,272 decline in unionization 131 government spending 273 phase out of manufacturing 168 gap between rich and poor 276 Institutional reach of the State 276 Literature on the decline of trade unions 132 Multilateral Investment Agreement 186 Austerity Policies 171 Correlation between Savings and Investment 170 Social Inequality 106 Tax Policies 273 World Trade, Manufacturing and Investment 169 OECD-DAC (OECD) -Development Assistance Committee ) 76 Office Depot 383,403 Offshore Job Relocation 277 O'Guinn, Albert M. Jr.

High power rivalries for production control 121,127,134,155,168 Fine veil 297 Ozone layer 163 Olympic Games 324 Hole in 264 (1988) 395 (2008) 383 Pacha Mama 328 One hour picture (film) 374 Pacific Century 327 Ong,Aihwa 74,110-16,23 Paganism 3230 Paganism 187 Pagans 26 Ontology 220.2326 Pakistan 8.8 World Society 412-14 Military Technology Exchange OPEC (Petroleum Organization between China and 310 Exporting Countries) 291,293 Rivalry between India and 26 304 Palestinians/Palestine 6,54,70,293 Oil Embargo (1973) 404.10 404.10 104.10 104.10 104.10 Society Institute 306 Pan -Karibische Merkmale 344, Offenheit 122,132,133,166,175,269, 356,357,359 323 Panama 330 Einflussfaktoren 82 Panasonic 288 Interaktion von Handelsrisiko und 13 Pandemiebedrohung 178 Organisationsform 10, 83 Panikkar, K. M. 49 Organisationssoziologie 10 Panoptic, Leo 12,13 ORiain, Sean (Bentham) 89,221,239 Orientalism 20:43-71,31,348 Papson, Stephen 376 Restoration/Rebirth 302,304 Paradigm Shift 317,348 Orru, Landmark 10 Paradigms 22,38,40,41,42,99, 110, Ortega y Gasset, Jose 293,295,301 309 -21,391,398 Orthodox cultures civilization 29 marks 376 tensions/violence between alienated contemporary work 374 Muslims and 26.27 convergence 317,380 Ortiz, Fernando 325 modernization 313 Osama bin Laden 369 nostalgia 329 Oslo 238 extra 37,39 Ossetians 393 technological alterity 2497 27 fragmented 328 Pareto distribution 82 Others 58,4221,35.65 Paris 101,228,250,314,326 deeper and recurrent images Disneyland 400,401 of 47 Escoffier's 389 interiors 60 falafels 404 recognition of otherness 270 fast food croissant shops 383 sexual 620 women at McDonald's 87th in the community


parochialism 160,294, 296 favorable conditions for 298 guaranteed 295 markets are enemies of 291 particularism 37,290,302,290,303, 338,419 alternative forms of 421 dogmatic and violent 2 9 7 - 8 expectation and construction of 341 tribal mentality of jihad 302 universalism and 310,334,334,303 4,950, 4,950, 4,334,360, 4,334,360 Pascal, Blaise 362 PATCO (Professional Organization of Air Traffic Controllers of the United States) 109 paternalism 87.91 pub closures 291 path dependency 188 patriarchy 122, 349 crisis 247,256 patriot movement 257 Patterson, Orlando 346n, 3566n, 3566n Louise 276 Paxuperism 276 Pax 87 Americana 4 Britannica 87 Pax Payer, Cheryl 122 Pacifician Localism 361 PC (Personal Computer) Market 81 "Peace Dividend" 310 Peel, Sir Robert 87 Pemex 122 Penang 187 Peng, KhooKay 187 Pension Fund Managers 163 Pension Reforms 147,149 .29 2 Peoria Pentagon Pepsi-Cola/ Pepsico 82,211,400 Perestroika 295 Performance Management 77 Pericles 291 Fringes 120, 206-7,212,237, 265 Importing Cultural Influences 359 Student Contributions from 337

political and economic elite 360 ​​see also core-periphery relations Perkins, John 110 Persecution 295 Persian Empire 161 Personal Autonomy 31 Personality Formation 247 Peru 140 Peters, Tom 82 Petrodollars 109,128 PEW Research 378 Philanthropy 394 Philippines 27,266,329,330,384 McDonald's in 390,398 science of rights.398 118,140,143 abuse of 141,142,144 protection of 139 injuries of 45,146 physiocrats 86 Piaf, Edith 299 Contact cultures Pidgin 322 Pierce, Charles 297 Pierson, Paul 13 Pieterse, Jan Nederveen 16,308, 309-21,324. 1 August 1 Pin 376,39 87 Pittsburgh Study 70 Piven, Frances 70 Pizza Hut 314, 383,384,386,387, 400 Plagues 277,278 Planet Hollywood 187,397 Planetarization 315, 330,332 Planning Burakrome. , Karl 73, 74n, 86-100,199, 200 police action 220,221 smiling and polite 357-8 political prison 118,139,144 respect for the law against 145

political interests 44.56 discredited 54 political philosophy 268 political science 3,4,8,10,11,12,13, 15.16 political society 50 political commitments 276 identity politics 14,309 bloody 301 confusing and exciting pace of 399 subverting purity and authenticity 315 Privilege Policy 237 Campero Polio 384 Pollution 132,162,164,165,279 Air 163,177,260,264 Water 177 Polyarchy 233 Polyethnicity 341,35,35,29 PUCTURS. stylistic convergence in 331 deterritorialization 397 local and external 4 0 5 - 6 lowbrow consumer tastes influenced by 415 imitation 353 honored representative 401 social protests in 360 omnipresence of 355 well-known icons 400 population growth 79 spectacular 25 pork products 398 pornographic novels 50 Portes, Alejandro 15, 135 portfolio investment 129 Porto Alegre see World Social Forum Portugal 105 Revolutionary Transformation 104 Tradition of Orientalism 47 Possession 225-6 Post-Fordism 374,375,392,400,404


Postcolonialism 20,43,44,45,328 and its disaffected TNCs 57-66 are quick to capitalize on 406 postmodernism/postmodernism 7, 20, 53,57,63,66,229,234,240, 334,356, 392 American 218 criticism of 351 global 391 hybridity and syncretism in 227 imperialism 227 Modernity, tradition and 303 transition to 225 quintessence of the environment 397 Resurgent localism 361 Solvent for global capitalism 360 Wide acceptance of various ideas 367 Post-structuralism 57, 327 Poulantzas, Nicos 13, 196,259 Poverty 70,109,117,124,136,1259 Poverty 75. 70,109,117,124. estimated to bend 123 extremes 76,371 globalization of 126,134,306 poor nations to escape 75 unrepentant communist states 75 poverty alleviation 146 grand program 123 poverty line 121,134,135 poverty alleviation 131,146,151 trap hypothesis 7 9 - 8 0 law of power 82, 83 myth of powerless state 166 -75,245 PPP (purchasing power parity) 134 Prague 228,235 Prakash, Gyan 59,61,65 Pratt, Mary Louise 62,325 Prayer 303,305 Predictability 313,374,380,385,386, 397

Oasis of Cleanliness and 399 Prejudice 298 Ethnic 294 Premarital Sex 352 Pret a Manger 384 Price Control Spread of 155 Elimination of 143 Price Stability 140 Price Selling 123 Market 154-5 Oil 120 Primary Education Implementing "User Fees" to 130 Universal 76 Primitive Accumulation 235,237,240 Primordial Groups 159 Private Sector 119,147 Blocking Investment 358 Talented People Released in 141 Technological Change in 162 Privatizations 101,110,117,124,128, 132,135,140,155,295 Aviation Security 268 General Support for 148 Downsizing 13 as a result of open financial interest 118 markets 113 heightened interest in open financial markets financial markets and 11 149 forced promotion 106 layoffs and 118,147,148 neoliberal 415 resistance to 112 World Bank drive to promotion 149 tarnished by long-standing collusion 130 labor protections under 149 Procter 8c Gamble 82,195 production 183,377,407 aesthetics 391 antagonistic forms of 248 chemical and biotechnological capital 2.71 includes 375 command economy models 295 globally coordinated 4

dependent on the influx of work 224 devaluation leads to changes in 153 dialectic of 375 efficient 294 empty forms of 374 fast food 373,374 flexible 244 global 137,216,373, 379 globalized economy based on new systems of 211 high technology 379 information-based 249 knowledge and information combined forces 244 limited 366 mass 369,391 military 304 national bases 169-70 new mode 226 offshore sweatshop 137 proletarian management 226 reduced time between consumption and 193 standardized 391 states less directly involved 129 territorial control over means 173 transnationalization 168 use of scarce resources to maximize 155 see also means of production productive capacity 222 inhibition 151 reduction 121 productivity 128,148,192,206,288 better management and technological increase 129 common 243 cooperative 226 computerized 235 profitability 288,366 profit 186,221 fishing, 1054 private appropriation 205 Adjustment structural 101.10 economic composition for 275


proletariat 225,226,228,230,240 investment flows from the center to the periphery 237 new 224,236 revolutionary vocation 241 ownership 200 cooperation annulled title 226 power sharing and 389 property rights 254 imposition 131 legal guarantees 202 no guarantee mechanisms 208 protection 129 strengthened 129 see also intellectual property rights protectionism 71, 73, 89,128,151, 174 entrenched 86 monopolist 91 national 91 sectoral 12 social 91,200 protestant ethics 312 protestant 93,302,422 prussian 92 psychoanalysis 57,348 psychology 262 industrial 238 market 291 social 422 public blockade of investment 358 well-managed public services Puerto Rico 83 182 849 383 punk fashion 223 purchasing power 122 eroded by inflation 153 see also PPP puritanism 291 biblical fundamentalism 303 purity 348 lineage 317 claim of 349 loss 327 prelapsarian 327 race 315,326

ritual 317 tension between emanation and 317 Putnam, R. D. 139,145 Pye, Lucian 23 pyramids 263 Québécois 6,288,293,294 Quesnay, François 86 quotas 120,140 Koran 303 race/racial theory 50,59,315, 348, 356 52 disorders and stigmas 2 of 3, stigmas of 3, 359 violence and stigmas reflection on 317 unity 340 race relation syndrome 358 race downwards 131,132 racism 54,58,270,315,326,333,348 different roles of 67 eurocentric 349 implicit 68 increasingly open 2 5-6 sexualized 61 replacing tribal war with indigenous war 294 radical libertarians 131 radical nihilists 289,305 radioactivity 272 rainforests 163,265 burning 292 Ram, Uri 382,402-7 Ramadan 395 rational-legal administration 127 rationality 90,98,313,410,412,42,2 shared discourse rooted in 291 economics 95,167 function specialist 291,167

instrumental 336 irrationality of 380,386-7,388 liberal 112 market 115 McDonald's style 415 neoliberal 112,113 practical 14 pursuit of process/secular progress 409,413 rationalization 309,313,314,374, 389, 390,410 consumer and producer resistance to 391 culture as 396,7-4105 Matters raw materials, 390,410 Joseph Reagan 410 , Ronald 5,68,103,109,110, 128,164,233 Real estate investments 162 Real exchange rate rise 121,125 devaluation of 120 real interest rates 170 annual average 151 Real wages fall by 124,133,135 falling 121,126 OR Restriungs high levels of unemployment163. 122,124,171, 172 capital controls to allow 126


Reflexivity 390 Reform 98,422 Refugees 235 Political 222 Reggae 324,345, 357 Regional banks 197, 330 Regionalization 12,169,174,317 Empire, Robert 8 Relativism 32 Postcolonial 238 See also Culture-second and 390 -Relative 390 Religion 54, 54, 44, 44, 4, 5, 4 Religion 54, 54, 54, 54, 54, Religion 540,112,210,210,210,210,210,210,210,210,210,210,2890,2890,2890,20,2890. people 25 ethnic identities reinforced by renaissance 26 globalization shaped by 287 immutable cultural differences based on 312 intercivilizational cultural struggles and 21 rebirth of 24 self-awareness associated with ties based on 159 see also Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism; Islam; Judaism religiosity 303 religious criteria 208 religious fundamentalism 9,24,27, 41,162,256,257, 303 American preachers 302 new expressions of 294 revival often expressed as 391 rise of 38 theocratic 295 see also Christian fundamentalism; Islamic fundamentalism; Religious Movements of Jewish Fundamentalism 309 Relph, Edward C. 363 Remittances 118,125 Positive Effects on Economic Development 138 Growing Importance of the 137 Renaissance 55.98

Renan, Ernest 50,50,52 Renault sedans 299 rent-seeking 155 replication 376 repression 102,110,139,140,143, 144,145,190,224,295 police 220 potential 178 Republican Party (US) 105,111,112 reservations 317 resistance 40,123,131,141,165,185, 222,241,416 aesthetic of 356 ambivalence and 61-3 consumer and producer 391 critical 329 effective 240 emotional labor a prominent place for 401 global 199,381 McDonaldization 314 micropolitical expression of 243 nostalgic 361 past/collective 329 Pazian 360 power preceded 240 ritual of 345 symbolism of 329 targeted 256 trenches of 257 widespread 234 world culture 409 cross-border resistance movements 118 increasing effectiveness of multiplicity 202 allocation of resources 83 efficient 151,154,155 dependence on physical controls for 152 imperative of resources 290,291 resurrection 263 reterritorialization 218 Review (Daily) 212 Ricardo, David 87,107 law (politics) 242,274 radicals 302 rights 99,114 equal citizenship 2.2

global 268 IMF/World Bank policies harm 146-50 individual 111, 424 legal-legal 115 labor 149-50,378 minority 309 reappropriation 225 sacrificed for security 270 social 113 see also civil rights; human rights; physical integrity rights; property rights; Women's Rights Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai 365 Rinso 195 Rio Conference (1992) 164 Risk Aversion 83 Externalities of Risk 271,272 Risk Society Thesis (Beck) 271-80 Taking Risks 266 Aesthetic and Symbolic Rituals 360 Upper Class 300 Ritzer , George 313, 32 In , 345-6, 361- 79,383-8,390,391, 392,398 Rivalry 26,309 Economic 21,30,31 Great power grip on oil 30-1 Hegemonial 317 Robertson, Roland, 160, 319,345-43, 377,415,159-8.419 Robinson 202,233 ROCKEFELLER, John D. 107 Rodrik, Dani4,12,13 Rolex366 Rolling Stones Concerts 365, 366 Roman Empire 16,161,203,218, 228,233 312,331, 333,350, 333,350

Index Rootedness 350 Rootedness 339 Rostow, W. 68,69 Rotary Clubs 189,394 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 243,297,340 Rowan, B. 421 Royal Dutch Shell 159,211 Ruggie, J.G. 179 rule of law 27 universal 296 ruling class executive committee 259 global 195-6 Rushdie, Salman 328,352 Ruskin, John 52 Russia 40,293,392 against militias and criminal organizations 176 cooperative relationships with 28,310 domestic, foreign, security and defense policies 268 Egalitarian Ethos 393 Folk Art/Schlock and Kitsch 369 Growth as a Tourist Destination 369 Growth in the Oil Economy 304 Invasion of Afghanistan 304 Japan Called to Counter 311 Lack of Native Skills 173 McDonald's at 313,314,381,383, 384,393-4,396,401 Nostalgia 393 Pogroms 371 SAAs 141 Small and Powerful Oligarchy 106 Sociology 210 Identity Struggles 38 Subsidized Housing and Social Rights 113 Mistrust of Western Cultural Institutions 393 Tense Relations Between Muslims and the Tradition of Orientalism 26 47 Czarism 161 US Trade Center in the Far East 189 Weakened Currency 202 Language Russian 16 Russification 24 Rwanda 422

Saab 193 SAAs (Structural Adjustment Agreements) 118,139,140,141, 142,143,145,146 Effects of 144 Sabotage 243 Sachs, Jeffrey 68,75-6,79,85,305 Sacy, Silvestre of 50 Saddam Hussein 158, 294 Safari perfume 291 W Safire d, 1 43,44,46n, 47-54, 55,56,57,59,60,65,66,71,232, 304, 328 Saint-Hilaire, Geoffroy 52 Sakamoto, Yoshikazu 12 samizdat 292 Sample, Glen 195 Samsung 211 Samurai 331 San Bernadino 81 Sanctions 41,132 Enforcement 201 Sandino, A.N.C. 110 Santeria 328 Catholic University of Santiago 102 São Paulo 250 Sarajevo 26,221 Sarkozy, Nicolas 72 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 178,261,278 Global panic related to the outbreak, 277 Jean-Sartre Paul 66,261,57,341,57, Jean-Sartre Paul Saudi Arabia 40,109,304 workflow dependency 224 McDonald's in 395 savings deposits 170,172 Saxony 290 Scandinavia 104,105 forests 164 see also Denmark; Iceland; Norway; Sweden Schiller, Dan 374 Schlesinger, Arthur M. 39 Schmitt, Carl 113,114,302 Schölte, Jan Aart 46n

Schoenberg, Arnold 377 Education 60 Schor, Juliet 193 Wardrobe, Andrew 133,136 Schumpeter, Joseph 370 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 300 Science and Technology 292 Scientific Knowledge 247 Scientific Progress 291 Scotland Compulsory Vaccination 92 Identity 6 Universities 61 Scott, Gerald 150-6 Sealy Mattresses 376 Seattle 69,201,235,20,228,22 Secession 32,293 Second World 195,218 World War II 108,231 Sectarianism 293,294 Secularism 40-1,220,297,302 Aggressive 289,305,306 Securities Markets 265 Security 269,310 Aviation 268 Security Sacrificed 268 170 unraveling self-affirmation games 194 Self-determination 270,289,293, 297,298,330 Demand for 293 Right to 282,420 Struggles for 286 Self-fulfilling prophecies 263 Self-government 295 Desire for 296 Self-identification 256 Hybrid 344,347,349,351 Self-organization 2 Self-organization 112,164 Markets 112 ,90,184,98,184,98,164 ,95,96 damage to 91


Autonomy 141 Semiperiphery 203,206-7,212 Sen, Amartya 306 Seoul 395,397 9/11 attacks (2001) 231, 233,260,264,269,289,305 language breakdown that occurred in 263 gruesome photos of New York 267, 268 an obvious sequence of 304 ritzers Interpretations of the language 30 now not Serbo-Croatian 41 nationalist cause of Greater Serbia 37 orthodox 27 latent violence among Albanians and 26 serial polyandry 323 Servan-Schreiber, J.-J. 186 service culture 393 Seurat, Georges 331 seven-day week 5 sexual gratification 385 sexuality 223,356 crisis of patriarchy defines 247 excessive 62 Foucault's work on 59 Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) 110 Shakespeare, William 70,326,330, 341,362 Shanghai 115 3 Sharabi7, Hisham Stock Values ​​304 Shein, Ella 404 Shell see Royal Dutch Shell Shia Islam 303 Shils, Eduardl59 Shinohon 395 Buddhist Shinto Confucius Civilization 310 Shklar, Judith 302 Shock Therapy 106,108 Shocks 121,162 Shohat, Ella 327

Shopping 291,300 Entertainment 299 One-Stop 387 Malls 299,383,376,385 Exporting 375 TV Ads 294 Third World 193 Western Youth Serves 395 Sikhs 295 Silicon Valley 292 Silk Road Concerts 365 Silva, Patricio 135 Simmel, Georg 362 Simulation 251,3 3813 and Singapore 8 4013 and Dissimulation ,83,187,189 Catalyst for internationalization strategies 173 Confucian ethics 312 Reliance on labor influx 224 Explosive growth of 115 GDP per capita 172 Global capital flows towards 275 Identity often referred to as Anglo -Chinese 349 Loveburger 393 McDonald's in 398,401 State institutions as “midwives” act 274 Singh, Khushwant 41 Alternative Unique Fallacy 40 Sinha, Mrinalini 60,61,63,66 Sinhalese Buddhists 349 Sinhalese 40 Sink Civilization 29,312 Sino-Soviet Division 38 SIS (Service British Secret) 178 Six Acts (1819) 88 Sklair, Leslie 14,165,21,165 ,21,165,21 , 184-95,203,204n, 210-13 slavery 31,70,97 abolition 5,63 Arab traders and black slaves 26 camouflage of 99

Reasons 52,93 modernity and 231 social work in the form of 200 Slavic-Orthodox Civilization 21, 24, 26 Slim, Carlos 106 Slovakia 295 Slovenes 40 Slow Food Movement 370 falls 164 see also Great Depression Small and Medium Enterprises 165 Smeeding , Timothy 276 -7 Smith, Adam 85,87,89,95,107,300 Smith, Anthony 15,16 Smith, Michael Peter 257 Smithsonian Institute 231 Chimneys 279 Telenovelas 194,345,354,377 Mass Television Adoption 195 Social Capital 35,225,229 McDonald's Mines Community and 302 Social Change 2850,253 , 80,253 , 303,327 agencies of 251 multidimensional 246,247,248 social democrats 21,103 fiscal savings in the strongholds of 171 social democrats 93 social equality 289 social failure 164-5 social mobility 106,177 social injustice 289,306 powerful social weapon alongside 50 58 294 294 294,372 294,372 social movements 5,105,110,186-7, 211,255-6 cultural 248,257 gays and lesbians 247,257 global 178 private 303 popular 166


radicals 185 resistances expressed by 165 tribal or particularists 303 violently oppressed 102 social myths 165 social networks 249,333 ascension 136 social norms 352 social organization 249 core features of 391 global 9 multiplication of 12 networks a very old form of 248 priority of global capitalism over 68 secular tenets of 90 structural forms of 320 social policy 358 social protection 131,132,200 social reality 198,350,406,418 paradigm of 99 social recognition 194 social security privatization 130,147, 149 social structure 246,247,248,252, 256,257,265,381,407 sea change in 349 theorizing as interactive information networks 249-51 world 424 social theory 195 -202,336,373 productivist bias in 373 social transformations 128 large 299 national 136 apparently irreversible 138 global social wages 236 right to social assistance 224-5 construction of government institutions 131 indicators of 135 institutions promoting/improving 130,133 protest against program cuts 143 performance of the state 132

Socialism 21,73,100,104,105,176, 222,242,395 struggle for ideas against 107 failure of 24 national economies within the framework of world economy 207 possibilities of 182 promises of freedom 99 rise of 91 third way between capitalism and 295 intransigent opponents of 92 utopia 236

Socialist International 189 sociality 311 socialization 195 crisis of patriarchy redefined 247 sociology 3,4,12,13,14,15,47,50, 51,56,61,66,138,158,210,281, 355,374 16-17,180, 364 contribution to transnational studies 179 cosmopolitan 262 criticism 259 functionalist 58 globalization in 7,203,332-3 perceptions of institutionalism 421-4 macro-micro distinction 338 nation-state and 159-60,282 network society 246-52 nineteenth century 95 philosophy transformed into 283 Weber 396 world society approach 9 soft drinks 82,358 software Supremacy 292 Solidarity 165,178,189,190,248, 260, 261,270,295 Based on difference 235 Ethnic 287 Global 216,237,238,239 National 262,287 Politics 286

religious 287 social 108,286 something and nothing concept 361, 362,363-79 Somoza (Garcia), Anastasio 110 Domingo, Selma 303 Sony 211,313 Sorokin, Pitirim 34 Soros, George 162,306 South Africa 237 Apartheid 294 most watched TV programs 292 neoliberal Party members Communist 236 South America see Latin America South Asia 9 see also Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Burma; India; Pakistan; Sri Lanka South Korea 11,78,187,292,383 Anti-neoliberal protesters 111 Attack on powerful unions 123 Catalyst of internationalization strategies 173 Chaebol 125,211 Confucian ethics 312 Companies and unions 10 Foreign debt to finance industrialization 125 Foreign investors can buy shares in companies 123 Investments such as a percentage of GDP 170 auto parts market 124 McDonald's in 393,395,399 military-ruled free market flourished in 292 economies 170 spam is integral to cooking 398 government institutions acting as "midwives" 274 weakened currency 202 South Pacific 291


Southeast Asia 16 Shared self-understanding of societies 312 Embodied liberalism 104 Ethnographic study of McDonaldization 405 Foreign investors included in 122 Income inequality 106 Neoliberalism 112,113,115 Structural adjustment 119-27 Western influence 41 Zoning technologies 115 See also Burma; Cambodia; Indonesia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam Southern Cone (Latin America) 121 Southern Europe 314 Southwest Asia 28 Souvenirs 3 6 4 - 5 , 3 6 7 - 8 , 3 6 9 Sovereignty 114,160,172,214,297, 330 anarchist 97 borders of 222 capital globalized the system of 241 central distinction between autonomy and 269 contradict the basis and raison d'être for 221 de facto as well as de jure 208 state of emergency and 301-4 eroding 420 fear of encroachments on barriers 238 the genealogy 231 of international capital mobility seems entail the loss of 276 locked within territorial boundaries 349 eroded markets 291 monetary 97 new forms of 215 politics 290 popular 286 postmodern 229 see through 229-34 nation-state 240 struggles for 237 supranational 220

exposed to transnational trade 288 Disturbing established practices of 113 see also soviet bloc imperial sovereignty 30 collapse of 222 soviet union 25,39,99,103,108, 296,393 cold war 292 collectivism and state planning 72 splinter movements 101 hyperdecay 293 workers unity 189 copiers and printing machines fax at universities 292 rapid growth 78 US alliance with 108 dissolution/collapse of the Soviet Union 14,38,40,176,190,216,369 disappeared almost overnight 290 units forged from leftovers 295 non-socialist republics 293 nuclear weapons and materials on the free market 233 Soysal, Yasemin 160 space 245,258,259 advertising colonized 299 denationalized 2309 always open 283 depoliticization of 257-8 national hybrid 352 prayer 305 striped 221 transformed 250 Spain 104,105,178,384 companies and unions 10 leftists acquire state power 105 cleansing of blood 3293 separatist traditions of orientalism 4739 Spanish empire 8.39 161 Spanish language 16 special economic groups 39 speculation 171,202 Speenhamland system 87

Spencer, Herbert 89,92 Spinoza, B. 223 spiritual mysticism 303 Spivak, Gayatri C. 46n, 57,65,66,328 Sri Lanka 278,296,349 stagflation 108,109 stagnation 155 standardization 53,336,398 clear expectations 393 consumer goods and practices 373 general,32 industrial trends 38 209 309 McDonaldization emphasizes 400,404 likes and desires 14 worldwide 313 standing armies 131 Starbucks 82,383,395 state autonomy 258-9 state centrism 180,181,185,186, 210,211,212,213 globalization threatens to topple 184 state-owned enterprises 127 see also international privatization 7.5 increase of power changes against meaning of 1,073 state-owned 1,073 acquisitions of the left 104,105 hyperbole 171 reduced and redefined 172 resilience of 175-9 state violence 304 statism 37.39 socioeconomic restructuring of 248 status groups 207-8 status of craftsmen 86 Stavenhagen, Rodolfo 165- 6 Stephens, John 13 stereotypes 68,351 ,359 Arabs 353 cultural 53.54 racial and sexual 358 wandering Jews 350


Stevens, Wallace 49 Stiglitz, Joseph E. 110,148,150 Stigmata 358,359 Stock Exchanges 162,242 Major 275 Stock Markets 140,170, 366 Capitalization 275 Breakdowns 163 Staler, Ann Laura 59 Stonehenge 263 Stopford, John 10,12 Storper, Michael 314 Strange, Susan, 10, 12 -6 strategic alliances 191,244 strong leaders 155 strong states 158,170,171,172,173, 174,195,206,208 structural adjustment 110,147-56 economic impacts/impacts of 117, 141 global 119-20 human rights impacts of 138-46 neoliberalism and 20,721 short-term impacts in Asia 2 short-term impacts in Asia - 6 Social consequences of 117, 127-38 see also SAAs Structural employment crisis 277 Structural functionalism 333 Structuralism 250,406 Stryker, Robin 13 student movements (1968) 101 subcontractors 137 subjectivism 250 subjectivities 235,236,309 collective 226,242 upheaval in 3409 subharasa Africa 16,151,242,244 Output per person 134 Subsidiaries 191 Foreign banks and brokerage houses 123 Subsidies 102,140,154,191 Removal of 143 subsistence farms 207 Sudan Canal 25.46

Suffragettenbewegung 63 Sufismus 303 Suharto, Raden 124.163 Selbstmordattentäter 268 Schwefelverschmutzung 163 Sultan-Galiev, M. K. 327 Sumner, W. G. 89 Sonntagsverkauf von Spirituosen 291 Sunk Costs 125 Sunnitischer Islam 303 SUNYBinghamton212 Super-Pharm 403 Lieferanten 137 supranationale Kräfte/Institutionen 196 -7.247 Überwachungsmechanismen 358 Überwachungsstaaten 261.269 .270 Swamis 324 Swanson, Guy 422 Exploratory Production/Labour 132, 138,236,241 Offshore 137 Sweden 103,160,164,171,387 Carnival 357 Investment Percentage of GDP 170 Rehn-Meidner Plan 105 Savings 270 State institutions as "midwives" . Protection 176 Swedish design furniture 388 Switzerland 160,189,298 carnival 357 McDonald's in 384 formerly closed culture 292 far-right populist parties 178 separatists 293 tradition of orientalism 47 Sydney 394 syncretism 315, 317,319, 320,324, 326,328,332,3270 Latin American and Caribbean celebrations18 Latin American and Caribbean celebrations cultural 270 synergy 324,325 syphilis 277 systemic risks 267

Szeman, IMRE 226-8 SZNAIDER, NATAN 260.261.262, 280-5 TABOOS 315.325.348.352 TAIPEI 397.401 TAIWAN Catalyst for international strategies 173 MILDICING ETHIC 312 MCDONALDS IN 394.396 Idic. “Midwives” 274 Tajiks 40 Talbott, Shannon Peters 313 Taliban 304 Americans 305 Militarized images of 302 Tamils​​40,293,295 Tan, Vincent 187 tariffs 102,129 reduction 124 elimination 137,140 reduction 140 reduction 120 elimination 120,129 tax exemptions 209 tax reduction 124 137,140 reduction 140 reduction 120 elimination 120,129 tax incentives 209 tax evaders 137,140 140 tax havens 163 taxation 131,154,166,268 management of 129 bases in decline 274 elimination 137 exemption of 132 forced competition to reduce 272 reforms 164 reformed systems relatively high 1209 168-9 recipes 273 value creation 129 taylorism247,314BY 383


TCC (Transnational Capitalist Class) 161165182-3184185; 313 Tel Aviv 403,404 telecommunications 165,191,250 new social technologies 315 telegraphic and signaling codes 5 telemarketing 373,374 telenovelas 345,354,377 televisa212 television 211,353 favor of low-cost imports 352 glocalization strategies 342 hybrid genres 3911 large interactive networks large-scale soap opera acquisitions 1 telos 3911 225 trade terms 151,154 territorial communes 256 terrorism 54,158,288,301,305-6 fundamentalists 378 global 176,177-8,261,264 government attempts to separate Islam from 302 increased public awareness of 176 risks 260 threat of 263-70 see also 9/11 attacks Tet 232 Thailand Meeting of the Poor 126

currency turmoil 162, 202 dependency problems 125 financial crisis (1997) 125 foreign investors can buy assets at liquidation prices 123 drop in GDP 122 international emergency and humanitarian aid 278 Thatcher, Margaret 5,68,103,108 theme parks 186 theocracy 162,295,305 theology 317 politics 301 -4 think tanks 9 thirds.26 technologies 108 Wave 200 Third World 38,67,104,191,195, 218,235,322 Advice and support for military and police 233 Capitalism and development perspectives 191 Debt crisis (1982) 128 Democratic experiments in retribalizing societies 295 Bargaining disadvantageous position relative to foreign investors 131 Use of first world countries 186 Escape from 222 Flow of ideas and practices of 341 governments competing for FDI 132 Governments must behave like exceptionally sincere global citizens 130 Major cities 189 Inability or unwillingness to enforce fair labor practices 138 domestic globalizers 192 intellectuals 323 intervention to produce "stability" on the 2000 233rd Anniversary and Debt Service Payments 306 Major Changes 136 Expatriate Malls 193 Number of TVs per Capita 212 Proto-Pros of 337

special manufacturing sectors 132 TNCs211 unions, foundations and universities eagerly cultivating contacts in US Cold War politics 232 WFTU membership 190 world attention turned to the debt problem 138 Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) 294 Thompson, Grahame4,8, 12,172, 174 Thornton , William H. 345,346n, 360-1 Tiananmen Square 101 Tibetans 6,40,349 China's ruthless policy towards TIE (Transnational Information Exchange) 26 187 Tim Hortons (coffee shops) 383 Time 260 Time-binding 258 Time- Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 334 - 43 TNCs (transnational corporations) 125,165,183,184,190,192,210, 330,409 fair competition between national companies and 191 Fortune Global 500 list of 211 global personal financial controls 186 governments and 188 owner-controlling interests 211 -12 non-typical McDonald's 381 needs and needs of foreign leaders and officials 193 dissemination of 159 rapid exploration of multiculturalism, postcolonialism and ethnography 406 sponsorship of festivals 358 subordination of marginal economies to 120 UN work with 189 views of 187


TNPs (Transnational Practices) 180, 184-5 TNS (Transnational State) 183.195, 198-202 Rise of 196-8 Tocqueville, Alexis de 296 Fake Money 96 Tokyo 115.250.314.384 Disneyland 401 Tomlinson, John 330.341.416 Tommy Hilfiger 187 Tonnies, Toronto 3 576,0 , 358 torture 31,92,118,139,144,145 totalitarian regimes 54,289,293,295 genocidal 33 prospect of 305 Toulouse Lautrec, Henri 331 tourism 5,318,319,322,361 disruptions to 277 grobal 367,368,369 imperialism ruining 299 instances in which it stimulates production of something 367 local souvenirs and trinkets 365 major attractions 358 Meeting Growing Demand 369 Townsend, Joseph 87 Toxins 279 Toynbee, Arnold 23,34,36, 310 Toyota 211 Toys 'R' Us 383 Trade Associations 291 Barriers to Trade Elimination 101 Repeal 133 Trade Deficit Elimination 121,127 Trade Liberalization 123,125 Unions rights 93,94 unions 69, 91,96,98,102,104, 108 attacks on 109 communists 189 freedom of contract abused by 93 role in economic development 150 transnational 189 see also CIO; ICFTU; trade union organization; WGB

transculturation 311,324,325,333, 359 affinities 330,331 transmission of technologies 76 transnational cooperative networks 260,261,268,269 Transnational corporations in world development (UNCTC publication) 187 transnationalism 5.15. class 1 political networks 118136-8329 see also TNCs; TNPs; TNS transparency 165 transportation 5.40 advances in 137 travel agencies 250 fast 312 travelers verifications 186 triad regions (Western Europe, North America, Japan) 8,274-5 tribalism 236,294,296,302,303,337, 338 dialectic font of 361 trademarks of 295 trickle-down effect 143 trilateral Commission 189 Trinidad 314,328,344,345,356-60 Tripartite Commission 165 Right, Jacqui 230 trust 266 active 267 not easily detectable 32 violations 152 TUC (UK Trades Union Congress) 189 Turkey/Turks 36 McDonald's 395, 398 migrants/minorities 16.26 struggles for identity 16.26 Women 303 Turkish peoples 23.26 Turkism312 Turkmenistan 41 Turner, Bryan pp. 277-8,282,289, 301-4,381,382n, 393-6

turning point 410 Tutsis 29 TVGlobo212 Twin Towers see September 11 attacks two stage games 139 tyranny 305 ukiyo school 331 Ukraine 293 see also Chernobyl Ulamas 115 Ulster 159 ultra-imperialism 233 Umkhonto we Sizwe 329 UN/United Nations 6,72, 75,137, 197,238 department of Economic and Social Affairs 187 Earth Summit 340 Fully Recognized Indigenous Peoples (1982) 341 Secretary General 75,306 Security Council 27 see also IMF; International Red Cross; millennium goals; Monterrey Summit; UNCTAD; UNCTC; UNESCO; World Bank; WTO uncontrollable risk 264 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 187 UNCTC (United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations) 187 underclass 69,161 underemployment 277 unemployment 13,90,98,99,135, 136,161,194 aggravation 91 alienation of young men as a result de302 estimated 124 global 277 high levels of 109,132 massive 95 more than doubled 121 people moved from low productivity jobs to 148 promoted 149


Unemployment (continued) rising 105 rising 146 rising 104,147 heavily burdening public coffers 87 unemployment insurance 123 UNESCO (United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 212, 413,416 unethical practices 137 servitude 99 uniformity 289,290 cultural 326,402 ,405 fear/concern about 417,420 global 417 standardization 419 structural 382,406,407 subnational factions in permanent rebellion against 293 trend towards uniformity 309 unilateralism 261,269 militarism 378 Unilever 195,211 unionization 190 decline 131 rate increased 1332 United Kingdom, United States 2 see United Kingdom, United States United 2 53.5 65.64, 2 ,78,129,165,259,263,423 Apathy of the electorate 133 Prewar clashes with Iraq (2003) 158 Campaigns against transnational policies 187 deficit spending 74 paradigm of civilization may have impacted 39 clash of civilizations encouraged 39 coercive influence of 103 Command economy during World War II World War 108 Supermarkets Dominated by Successful Brands 82 Consumption 299 CFC Gas Control 164 Crossover Culture 327 Cultural Homogeneity 362

cultural social movements 248 dependence on labor inflow 224 differentiation linked to connection 14 dynamic division of labor 201 economic problems between Europe and 26 enemies everywhere 221 English challenged as dominant language 15 fast food restaurants 384 foreign direct investment 136,169 competitive companies in the world economy are 10 money flow to Europe 186 folk art 369 foreign policy 186,269, 304 work freeze 98 global hegemony 232 global problems effectively regulated by 27 global stock market capitalization 275 government spending 273 hours and intense labor character 193 illegal immigration from Mexicans 137 imitation of everything 353 imports 370 inability to control and regulate economic agents 157 information technology 244 Islam well-established 304 Israel's arms sales to China particularly worrying 310 job losses among low-income workers skilled 131 leading power of the international capitalist system 185 minimum wages 149 monetary orthodoxy 90 national income 106 neoliberalism 111 deployment of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II 231 Policing in the Pacific, Caribbean and Latin America 311

Political Identity 39 PPP 134 Privatization of Social Security 130 Real Downtown Developments 69 Regulatory Reform (early 1970s) 105 Religious Fundamentalism 257,302 Renewal of Interventionism 233 Ascension as a New World Colonizing State 201 Sociology 210 State Institutions as "Midwives" 274 Security of the State 177 Inventory Market 126,127 strong international leverage 173 taxes 169,273 terrorist attacks 278 TNCs 186 trade 11,38,169 underlying differences between China and unilateralism 26 261,269 well-run public sector systems 149 women from Africa who found asylum in 194 world leaders in manufacturing 375 see also Albright; Bush; carter; Clinton; Federal Reserve; Friedmann, M.; Johnson, L.B.; Kissinger; McDonalds; NAPHTHA; Nixon; Regan; Rockefeller; Roosevelt, T.; Also under titles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the "USA" ready (UN 1948) 41,330 Universalism 37,280,301,309,313, 338,415,419 Consumers Consumers Consumers.


Uno, Saika 133 upper class 60,62 restoration of economic power 109, 111 rituals and symbols 300 lifestyles and leisure 299 endangered 105 Upper Palatinate 279 rising 172 uranium 278 urban development zones 74 urban guerrilla 140 urban sociology 250 urbanization 127,136 adaptation to 303 episode of 315 Uruguay 398 US Census Bureau 39,349 US Congress 105,263,268 US Constitution 218,232,234,281 Articles of Confederation (1777) 296 US Department of Homeland Security 178 US Imperialism 67,109-10,215,218, 232,234,241,330 US Agencies see also CIA Intelligence; FBI US National Defense Strategy US State Department Arabists 54 Commonwealth of Democracies 306 US Trade Representative 201 US Department of the Treasury 110 Mexican Oil Company De facto Revenue Control 122 USAID for International Development) 189 Encouraging the Replacement of Publicly Funded Social Security Systems 130 Use of Force 232 User Accounting Systems 276 USSR See Soviet Union Utilitarianism 89 Utility 275 Utopian Fantasies 75 Uzbekistan 41

Value creation activities 172 Value chain 14 Value creation communities 247 Values ​​28,111,256,360 Alternative 249 American 378 Basic Asian 27 Central 107 Citizenship 115 Democratic 247 Family 300 Global 27 Liberal 37 Local 345 National 294 Universal, 41.8378 25.8378 from VAN, Peter 59 VEA Gogh, Vincent 331,365 vegetarianism 392 veil 302 velvet curtain 310 Venezuela 140,211 Vernon, Raymond 11,13 vertical disintegration 391 vested interests 165 Vico, Giambattista 69 Victoria's Secret boutiques 371 Vienna 92-3 Vietnam 29, 75,231,232-3, 375 Vietnamization virgin policy 233 Guadalupe 233 328 virtuality 245,247 visa 376 Viswanathan, Gauri 60,61,66 Vodun 328 Volcker, Paul 108,109,110 Volkswagen 211 voluntary organizations 329 Wacquant, Loic 70 Wade, Robert 8,12,170 wage inequality 11 wages

low 143,136 poverty level 136 stagnant 299 Wales 290 Walker, John 305 Walker, R.B.J. 231 Wall Street Journal 234 Wallersal 267 Massive Growth in Fast Food Restaurants 370 Protests Against Global Capital Institutions 228,240 Terrorist Attack 302 Washington Consensus 126, 199 Water Pollution 177 Waters, Malcolm 311,380-1, 389-92,400 Watney, Simon 61 Watson, Adam 231 Watson, James L. 367381, 382n, 396-9401 Watt, James 5 weak states 158, 170171172, 174, 195206208209 wealth 110139142, 371-2 accumulation of 143422 concentration in the upper classes 1056 control of 10516 huge crystallized in0 explosion of 299 administration of 250 nothing and 372 reappropriation of capital 226 redistribution 73


Wealth (continued) replacing taxes on 129 proliferation and distribution of 272 weapons proliferation 26 see also atomic weapons Weber, Max 58196303312313, 364371377382396422 Weigel, George 24 Weimar Republic 33109 Weiss, Linda 157166-75274 Weissman, Robert 157276-7s5sman 157161-75274. . need for 274 material 88, 91 see also welfare states 177,273 building 104 developing and organizing 264 dismantling or disengagement from global capitalism 108 is consistent with 13 inability to pay generous social benefits 13 indispensable key to increasing 265 need to preserve and improve 175 savings 13 risk calculations 271 strong 104,109 viability of 16 well-being 31,73,103,269,270 collectively 280 livelihood consequences and 111 improved 102 increased 127 substantially 299

Morality 298 Social 13 Welsh identity 6 Wendy's 314,383 West Africa 326,411 West Germany 78,109 West Indian immigrants see Caribbean Western Civilization 21,24,29 early 100 common cultural traits 36 conflict between Islam and 25 game within 28 two major variants 23 vulnerability of 268 Western Europe end of World War II 278 trends towards renationalization or reethnification 282 Western hegemony 340 civilizational hybridity 310 discourse in terms of decline 344,349-50 westernization 137,317,320,332, 356, 395 attempted modernization without 310 emphasizing the role of 362 implicit argumentation against Westney latest 327 versions of 313 313 modernization and 30.20 , Eleanor 342 West Champal System 13157161, 164166183196232261270, 272349 WEISHEGEN, STOMACH, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT , KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT, KURT , WFFLU (World Trade Federation) (World Federation) (World Federation) (World Federation) (World Federation) (World Federation), WFFLU (World Federation WHO (World World Health) 340 Whoppers 366 Williams, Raymond 52.54 Williams, Robin 374 Williams, William Appleman 234

Williamson, Jeffrey 9 Wilson, William 69 Weapons of Mass Destruction 158,233 Wolfensohn, James 134,145-6,150 Wolff, Janet 213 Women 389 Blacks 194 Burdens of Adjustment 120 Divorced 352 Empowerment of 136 Muslims 302,303 Seclusion 302 Suffrage 5 Very low wages and sweatshop labor and patriarchal class conditions 6,1422 women's revolt 247 women's rights 378,409,414 groups dealing with 6 organizations, the 5 Woods, Tigers 349 working class 62,256 falling household income 122 false resistance between natives and cosmopolitan minds 350 industrial 87,224 influence of institutions within the state apparatus 104 McDonald's a mainstay for 397 Tools to resist demands for 120, potential threat to 60 Women 62,126 Workers Compensation 92,106 World Bank 69,70,73,75,76,78,103, 110,117,119,131,132,137, 163, 189,197,216,2 Global Monitoring Report 2706 1 Impact Structural adjustments to human rights 138-46 Justifying action 121 Action harms workforce and rights 146-50 Promoting replacement of publicly funded social security schemes 130


Protests against 228,240 export-oriented restructurings among 120 state-owned enterprises promoted and financed by 127-8 World Development Report 211 see also McNamara; Stiglitz; Wolfensohn cities of the world 250 World Labor Council 190 World Cup 395 World Economic Forum (Davos) 68, 70,189,201,306 World Investment Report (UN) 187 world intelligence services 291 world peace organizations 5,6 world politics political- military in 233 role of crowd in 229 fights for understanding 230,231 .232,234 World Risk Society 20,260-87 World Social Forum (Porto Alegre) 45,68,71 World Society 339,412-14 World Summit on MDGs (2005) 76 World Systems 20,203 -13,262,323

World Trade Center strikes (2001) 231,301 see also September 11 World War I see World War I World War II see World War II Wright Mills, C. 422 Wriston, Walter 109 WTO (World Trade Organization) 68-9,70,129,189,197,216 systematically accused of undermining national environmental standards 132 Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Mechanism 201 Establishment of (1995) 201 Failure to develop sanctions for governments that allow abusive practices 131 Protests/demonstrations against 228,240 Xenophobia 178,237,277,289 Xerox 211 Xie Shaobao 46n Yashar, Deborah 15 Yearbook of international organizations (1995/ 1996) 160

Yee, Donald 349 "Yellow Peril" 310 Yeltsin, Boris 24 Yeung, Henry Wai-chung 274 Young, Robert 348 Youth Culture 331 Yugoslavia 30,39,290,293 Breaking 38 Islamic Borders in Europe 310 NATO Bombing (1999) 385 Recurrent Crises (1999s) 1990) 37 Yummy! Marcas 383 Yuppies 397,403,404 Zaire 322 Zakaria, Fareed 289,297-301 Zanzibar 349 Zapatistas 257 Zara 384 Zedillo Commission 306 Zelizer, Viviana 11,14,15 Zeno 362 Zhan, SherrieE. 194 Zimbabwe 131,215,237 Zionism 53.54 Zipf's Law 82 Zukrigl,Ina415-16 Zulus 293,294

Top Articles
Latest Posts
Article information

Author: Jonah Leffler

Last Updated: 13/02/2023

Views: 6051

Rating: 4.4 / 5 (65 voted)

Reviews: 88% of readers found this page helpful

Author information

Name: Jonah Leffler

Birthday: 1997-10-27

Address: 8987 Kieth Ports, Luettgenland, CT 54657-9808

Phone: +2611128251586

Job: Mining Supervisor

Hobby: Worldbuilding, Electronics, Amateur radio, Skiing, Cycling, Jogging, Taxidermy

Introduction: My name is Jonah Leffler, I am a determined, faithful, outstanding, inexpensive, cheerful, determined, smiling person who loves writing and wants to share my knowledge and understanding with you.